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Bert Hoffmann
Social Policies and Institutional Reform in  
Post-COVID Cuba: A Necessary Agenda
The COVID-19 pandemic has put social policy high on the political agenda 
around the world. Cuba is no exception. The collapse of international tourism 
has hit Cuba’s leading industry, emigrant remittances have decreased and, as 
elsewhere, lockdown measures have weighed on domestic economic activity. 
Already in crisis, the economy contracted sharply in a very short period and 
dragged the people’s living standards down with it. Meanwhile, Raúl Castro’s re-
tirement from the Communist Party leadership in 2021 means Cuban socialism 
enters the post-Castro era, while also facing the uncharted waters of economic 
reform in a situation of profound social distress.
In the past, the leaders of the Cuban Revolution preferred to speak about 
“social accomplishments” (conquistas sociales) rather than social policies. 
Health and education were the banners that brought international recognition 
to Cuba’s development model. Much of the core social policies in other countries, 
such as assisting the poor and unemployment benefits, were seen as typical of 
capitalism. There was no need for them in socialism: the state economy would 
provide full employment and everybody was expected to be able to lead a modest 
but dignified life on their salaries or, if retired, their pensions.
However, the model was in crisis long before the pandemic hit. The all-dom-
inant state sector of the economy that was the great mechanism of social inte-
gration and equality went into reverse in the crisis of the early 1990s following 
the demise of the Soviet Union. As the Cuban peso (CUP) lost value, so did pe-
so-based salaries. And even when the Cuban economy stabilised and returned to 
growth, currency and salaries never fully recovered. On the eve of the COVID-19 
pandemic, the peso was still at 1:25 to the US dollar – or to be more exact to 
the dollar-pegged so-called “convertible peso” (CUC) that the Cuban state intro-
duced as a way to ban the US currency from physical circulation. The dual mone-
tary system not only distorted all economic relations but access to hard currency 
from remittances sent by emigrated family members, work in tourism or other 
means became a key dividing line in Cuban society. 
For more than a decade the overhaul of the economic and social system has 
been on the agenda (Alonso, 2020). When in 2006 Raúl Castro took over the 
https://doi.org/10.3224/84742546.01
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leadership of the state from his ailing brother, succession was all in the name 
of continuity. Nevertheless Raúl embarked the country on a process of gradual 
economic reform. Politically, while any thought of regime change towards liberal 
democracy was firmly off the cards, Cuba went through a transition from a model 
of charismatic socialism to one of bureaucratic socialism (Hoffmann, 2016). This 
culminated in generational change in the state leadership, as Miguel Díaz-Canel, 
a Communist Party cadre born after the 1959 revolution, succeeded Raúl Castro 
as president of Cuba in 2018. The change also included a revision of the country’s 
institutional governance structures via the constitutional reform of 2019, which 
nevertheless left the Communist Party’s leading role and other central tenets of 
Cuba’s single-party system untouched. 
This change “from above” has been a slow-moving, limited and contradic-
tory process. It struggles with the constraints and contradictions of the legacy of 
the model developed over more than half a century. It seeks to accommodate the 
island within the imperatives of a global economy into which Cuba has been inte-
grating primarily as a tourist destination, via migration and remittances, and by 
exporting medical services through government-negotiated contracts. It reacts 
to change “from outside”: the declining support of its once-generous ally Vene- 
zuela; the rapprochement with the United States under Obama and the return 
of high-pitched polarisation under Trump; and the electoral defeats of left-wing 
governments in Latin America. And it is in an uneasy, conflictive interaction with 
change “from below”, as Cuban society is undergoing a process of heterogeni-
sation and re-stratification (Hansing and Hoffmann, 2016). Increased access to 
cell phones and the internet is eroding the state’s media monopoly and driving a 
surge in horizontal communication, while the political narratives and legitima-
tion strategies of the past no longer produce the same effects as in earlier days.
The COVID-19 pandemic has brought things to a head. Epidemiologically, 
Cuba was remarkably successful for a long time in controlling the spread of the 
virus, but infection rates only began to go up in November 2020. At the same 
time, Cuba’s biotech sector developed two anti-Covid vaccines that showed high 
rates of efficacy and which allow the immunisation of the population without 
depending on imported vaccines imported vaccines. In spite of the explosion of 
infection rates since June 2021, as the delta strain made its entry into the island, 
the ongoing mass vaccination campaign makes it possible to reach a “post-COV-
ID Cuba” earlier than in other parts of Latin America. In addition to allowing the 
island to then market itself as a safe tourist destination, the success of the Cuban 
vaccine development also has the potential to turn them into a new export prod-
uct and hard-currency earner.
The economic fall-out from the pandemic, however, has been devastating: 
the economy has shrunk by 11% in 2020, according to official data, import capac-
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ity has fallen by half, and earning foreign exchange has become imperative. This 
is the situation in which the government on  January 1st 2021 enacted a compre-
hensive monetary and exchange rate unification. Returning to a single national 
currency and a unified exchange rate is undoubtedly crucial to restoring mone-
tary rationality to the Cuban economy. Devaluing the grossly overvalued 1:1 par-
ity with which state companies were operating is key to stimulating exports and 
import substitution. But at the same time the measure threatens to unleash the 
inflationary pressures that have built up over years, to drive state companies into 
the red and to expose the hidden unemployment in the state sector. Fearing the 
social and economic consequences, the measure had been postponed time and 
again until a hoped-for better moment. Now, the Cuban government has been 
forced to take this step in the most adverse of circumstances.
In post-COVID Cuba, it seems, the time for slow-moving gradualism has run 
out. The list of pressing problems is long and contradictory. The dire economic 
situation requires effective social protection measures, while state finances are 
at a new low. The switch to targeted social assistance schemes rather than the 
across-the-board subsidies of the ration card system seems as inevitable eco-
nomically as it is difficult politically. Price caps to control inflation are at odds 
with market incentives for producers. As the eruption of street protests in places 
across the island on 11 July 2021 showed, people will not remain patient forever. 
Citizens not only demand more food on the table, but also new ways of doing 
politics. 
The challenges of economic reform and social policy, of effective governance 
and credible citizen participation all are on Cuba’s public agenda simultaneously. 
They have been there for many years now, but the implementation of meaningful 
responses has been slow, piece-meal, or missing altogether. Too much time has 
been lost and we are seeing the consequences. 
This volume brings together analyses of a broad range of the issues at stake 
written by expert scholars from different disciplines taking diverse approaches, 
both experienced researchers and young upcoming scholars, both from the is-
land and from outside. It is organised into three parts. The first centres on social 
policies. 
The distinctiveness of Cuba’s social policies is the starting point for Laurence 
Whitehead, Senior Research Fellow at Nuffield College, University of Oxford, 
and Research Associate at the GIGA, Hamburg. These policies form an integral 
package that has developed over many decades. Addressing the governance chal-
lenges in Cuba’s contemporary social policy system, he argues that the United 
Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals for 2030 provide a useful external yard-
stick that is a good fit with Havana’s plans. However, substantial further gover-
nance innovations would be required to bring the two together. He concludes 
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that the Díaz-Canel administration needs an attractive and unifying project, and 
that a reinvigorated social policy agenda could provide the best opportunity for 
this.
Betsy Anaya Cruz and Anicia García Álvarez from the University of Havana 
underscore that social services have always been a priority of the revolution’s 
socio-economic project. However, the country’s economic situation has been cre-
ating tensions that call into question the sustainability of these services. On this 
basis they take stock of the achievements and challenges Cuba’s public adminis-
tration is facing in the definition and construction of a new model of economic 
and social development. 
Blandine Destremau from the French National Centrel for Scientific Re-
search (CNRS) tackles a crucial issue in today’s Cuba: the provision of care for 
the elderly. Thanks in no small part to its extraordinary healthcare system, Cuba 
has one of the world’s oldest populations. Based on an ethnographic survey her 
chapter shows that the moral ideal of taking care of the elderly in the family 
home is at odds with ongoing social transformation processes. Developing a sus-
tainable geriatric care regime thus constitutes a major challenge on Cuba’s social 
policy reform agenda.
Another key field of social welfare is housing. Mireia Carrasco Ferri and 
María Jiménez Campos, architects from the Polytechnic University of Madrid 
and the University of Sevilla, respectively, focus on the case of habitat manage-
ment in Old Havana. They propose housing cooperatives as an urban resilience 
mechanism for promoting comprehensive rehabilitation and sustainable tour-
ism while protecting architectural heritage and improving the living conditions 
of the residents.  
In the post-COVID context, access to food has probably become Cuba’s most 
pressing social welfare issue of all. Anicia García Álvarez and Betsy Anaya Cruz 
analyse the concepts of food and nutritional security and present an overview of 
the current situation and its challenges in Cuba. They also make proposals on 
what can be done to alleviate the tensions. These include reassessing the concept 
of universal subsidies on products distributed through rationing. 
The second part of the book continues the study of Cuba’s current socio-eco-
nomic challenges with a focus on the institutional transformation as part of the 
economic reform process. The economists José Antonio Alonso from the Com-
plutense University of Madrid and Pavel Vidal from the Pontificia Universidad 
Javeriana in Cali, Colombia, explore the determinant factors at play in the pro-
cess of institutional change in Cuba. They see a conflict between the rigidity of 
formal institutions and the fluidity of informal institutions and, based on a polit-
ical economy analysis, they identify which sectors tend to favour and which resist 
reform initiatives.
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Marcel Kunzmann, a Cuba specialist with a Political Science degree from 
Freie Universität Berlin, discusses the role of planning and the market in the 
Cuban economy, a topic of constant debate and policy change since the 1959 
revolution. Using the analytical concepts pioneered by János Kornai, this chapter 
sets the current reform process in the larger context of the economic history of 
Cuban socialism. He then analyses both the emergent private sector and state-
owned enterprises to ask whether Cuba is moving towards a coherent model of 
market socialism. 
Louis Thiemann, PhD researcher in Development Studies, and Claudia Mare, 
PhD in Cultural Studies, examine this process from a bottom-up perspective. Ap-
plying the concepts of multiple economies, infra-politics and subalternity to the 
Cuban case, they highlight the links and tensions between the formal, state-led 
economy and the popular economy of households in which informal markets, so-
cial relations and family ties play important roles. By using James Scott’s concept 
of ‘everyday resistance’, they conceptualise this as an ongoing transition from be-
low. The authors conclude that any new social contract in Cuba should reconcile 
the formal economic process led by state firms and agencies with the motives, 
mechanisms and legitimacy of the popular economy. 
The chapter by Ruxandra Ana from the University of Warsaw also puts 
forward a grassroots perspective on the Cuban economy, as she undertakes an 
ethnographic case study of emerging work practices and associated attitudes in 
the private Havana dance schools that capitalise on the island’s cultural heritage 
through their work with foreign tourists. A key focus in her study are the tensions 
between different notions of “professionalism”.  For the private entrepreneurs, 
international visibility, competitiveness and personal branding are important 
markers of what it means to be professional, but at the same time dancers turn to 
formal training in state-run educational institutions to underscore their profes-
sionalism, showing that the line between the state and private is not as clear-cut 
as is often assumed. 
Part two concludes with a study by Rosa María Voghon Hernández, an inde-
pendent researcher with a doctorate in Sociology from the University of Havana. 
She draws on the Latin American tradition of critical development thinking to 
analyse the increasing social inequalities associated with the economic reform 
process in Cuba. The impact of the COVID19 pandemic makes it all the more 
imperative to follow an economic model which safeguards effective social pro-
tection. At a time of great economic uncertainty and generational change in the 
political institutions, preserving Cuba’s social fabric should be the basis on which 
the island’s future socio-political prospects are built. 
The book’s third part then turns to institutional reform at the highest na-
tional level: specifically, the 2019 reform of the Cuban constitution and its im-
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plications. José Chofre-Sirvent, Professor of Constitutional Law at the University 
of Alicante, explores the function of the new constitution in the context of the 
ongoing general judicial reform process and the restructuring of the central state 
institutions. He highlights the separation of roles within the new institutional de-
sign, with a president of the republic who is independent of the Council of State 
and the introduction of the figure of prime minister. 
Carmen Antón Guardiola, who teaches Public International Law and Inter-
national Relations at the University of Alicante, follows up on this analysis with 
a specific focus on the reception of international treaties in Cuba. The new con-
stitution of 2019, she argues, missed the opportunity to bring internal coherence 
to the Cuban legal system in this area, as it contains no single procedure for re-
ceiving international treaties in the Cuban legal order. It is now left to ordinary 
legislation to clarify this procedure.
Yanina Welp from the Albert Hirschman Centre on Democracy in Geneva 
focuses on the deliberative process that went along with the drafting of the re-
formed Constitution of 2019. Comparing this process with ten participatory ex-
periences in other Latin American countries, she proposes a set of basic criteria 
to be met in order for these exercises to be deemed fair and democratic. The 
Cuban case, she concludes, shows that while the process of deliberation involved 
massive numbers of people, it fell some way short of qualifying as plural and 
autonomous citizen participation. 
The third part, and with it this volume, concludes with a chapter by Francis-
co Sánchez, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Salaman-
ca, which analyses the dominant coalition that sustains Cuba’s current political 
order. He argues that three factors are crucial: the armed forces’ control over the 
process of leadership change before, during and after the succession from Fidel 
to Raúl Castro, and then to Miguel Díaz-Canel; the continued centrality of the 
Communist Party as the crucial locus of power and coordination; and the emer-
gence of a political-technocratic elite which remains loyal to the socialist order. 
The result is that the demise of Fidel Castro has not led to the breakdown of the 
regime, but to a transition from a system based on strong charismatic leadership 
to one of bureaucratic socialism. 
* * *
Originally, this book was meant to be the outcome of a conference planned to be 
held at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) in April 2020. 
But then the virus came along and the conference had to be cancelled. We kept 
the project going nevertheless, and I want to express my sincere thanks to all 
the authors, who never wavered in their commitment to the project, to writing 
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their contributions and peer reviewing their colleagues’ chapters, to keeping the 
discussion going even if only via online means, and to meeting deadlines and 
revising manuscripts despite challenging personal situations. The consequences 
of the global COVID19 pandemic are not only part of what the book is about, but 
also part of the story of how it came about.
This volume originates from a major research endeavour, the Jean Monnet 
Network “Europe Cuba Forum”, which brings together scholars from 11 academ-
ic centres, both in Europe and in Cuba. I want to extend my sincere thanks to 
Anna Ayuso, Marina Utgés and their team at CIDOB, the Barcelona Centre for 
International Affairs, who so ably coordinate this effort, and who also gave inval-
uable support to the publication of this book. Thanks are also due the European 
Union’s Erasmus+ Programme for funding the project. We hope that it may in-
form the cooperation between the European Union and Cuba as set out in the 
Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement of December 2016.
It is a special privilege to see this volume come out simultaneously in both 
English and Spanish editions. Heartfelt thanks go to Tom Hardy, Anna Calvete 
and Montserrat Sardà for their outstanding work in translating and copy edit-
ing the contributions, and to Simone Gotthardt, Natalia Eduardo and Marcel 
Kunzmann for their dedicated and skilful assistance with the editorial process. 
Both versions are fully available as open access ebooks on the publisher’s website 
(www.budrich.de). Special thanks go to Barbara Budrich for her enthusiasm in 
taking this unusual project on board, and to Franziska Deller for her friendly and 
efficient cooperation in the publishing process.
Berlin, July 2021
References 
Alonso, José Antonio (coord.) (2020). Cooperation between the EU and Cuba for 
economic and productive reforms. The challenges of economic reform in Cuba; 
Barcelona: CIDOB.
Hansing, Katrin and Hoffmann, Bert (2020). “When Racial Inequalities Return: As-
sessing the Restratification of Cuban Society 60 Years After Revolution”. Latin 
American Politics and Society, 62(9), pp. 29–52.
Hoffmann, Bert (2016). “Bureaucratic socialism in reform mode: the changing poli-
tics of Cuba’s post-Fidel”. Third World Quarterly, 37(9), 1730–1744.





Governance Challenges in Contemporary 
Cuba: Social Policies and the UN’s Sustainable 
Development Goals
1 Introduction
Contemporary Cuba faces severe difficulties on multiple fronts – the Covid pan-
demic; the persistence of unilateral US sanctions; the foundering of chavismo in 
Venezuela; the slow exit of the old fidelistas; and the pinched horizons of the is-
land’s youth generation. 2020 brought a crisis as grave as the disintegration of 
the Soviet bloc in 1990. That previous watershed was followed by a traumatic 
“Special Period” during which most outsiders and not a few islanders suspect-
ed that the 1959 Revolution might topple. Yet, in the post-Cold War era, Cuban 
communism has now remained in control for as long as its tenure under Soviet 
protection. 
A quarter century ago I reviewed ten books about the condition of Cuba after 
the Special Period for the London Review of Books, under the title “Cuba Down 
at Heel” (Whitehead, 1995). The best seller of the collection, by Andrés Oppen-
heimer (still lead analyst for the Miami Herald), was entitled Castro’s Final Hour: 
The Secret Story Behind the Coming Downfall of Communist Cuba. My main com-
ment on this was “One could equally argue that the readers of the Miami Herald 
should be preparing for Castro’s final decade, rather than his final hour”. In the 
event Fidel Castro stood down as president in 2008, and died in 2016. At the IX 
Plenum of April 2019 the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) set out its Nation-
al Economic and Social Plan through 2030. My 1995 article ended as follows: 
“Virtually all the criticisms now to be heard of the Castro regime were already 
apparent by the time of my first visit in September 1968. To understand what 
has happened to the people of the island in the intervening years – and there-
fore what kind of a society Cuba can achieve in the next thirty – we need studies 
of health, of housing, of justice, more than we need further studies of the Gran 
Señor, the predicador and his courtiers”.
This chapter is about social policies in Cuba, and therefore focuses on such 
specific topics as health, education, housing, employment and inequality. Since 
https://doi.org/10.3224/84742546.02
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the focus is also contemporary it is essential to include some consideration of 
the present COVID-19 pandemic, which should certainly be analysed as a health 
crisis, but which clearly extends from there into all other areas of social policy, via 
its economic and employment impact. It is too early to assess the consequences 
of the drastic currency unification of January 2021, but unlike the pandemic that 
change is irreversible and so will have more lasting impact.
Even before the pandemic, these topics could not be fully addressed in iso-
lation from each other, or from the economic and governance settings in which 
they must operate. For example, domestic health policies cannot be properly 
understood without also attending to the international commitments Cuba has 
made concerning the deployment of its health personnel overseas, nor the dual 
currency system which affects the pricing and availability of pharmaceutical 
products that may be distributed both through the local and the convertible cur-
rency markets. Similar considerations affect education and employment policies. 
This was so even before the recent worsening of the foreign exchange constraint 
as a result of the crisis in Venezuela, the termination of medical service contracts 
in much of South America, the tightening of the US embargo and, as a final blow, 
the COVID-based collapse of tourism.
So, it makes sense to situate these social policy issues in the context of some 
very distinctive contemporary Cuban governance challenges. Yet these social 
policy problems should also be examined from within an international frame-
work. Cuban exceptionalism is real (Hoffmann & Whitehead, 2007), but can be 
misused for propagandistic purposes. It needs to be assessed in a non-partisan 
comparative manner. This requires some external yardsticks that are not part 
of the usual pro- and anti-regime polemics, but that provide a constructive per-
spective on Cuba’s relative strengths and weaknesses and the policy objectives it 
might prioritise over the coming decade – especially after the regime’s previous 
ambition to “build a communist society” was dropped from the 2019 constitu-
tional revision. Fortunately, the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals for 2030 
have been endorsed both by the government in Havana and by its external crit-
ics. Although highly aspirational and somewhat imprecise, these goals provide a 
set of objectives (and even “deliverables”) that can be calibrated and tested for 
realism both on the island and throughout the western hemisphere and indeed 
the whole world.
All that this summary chapter can offer is a very synoptic outline of these 
issues as they appear to me looking at the island from this external and compara-
tive perspective. The aim is not to provide either a comprehensive or an in-depth 
account of these matters, but rather to highlight some distinctive features of the 
Cuban case that need to be taken into account both when examining specific so-
cial policy dilemmas and when attempting to devise workable reforms. 
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The first part of the paper reviews the main social policy areas, while the sec-
ond half turns to the questions of “governance” that arise. Here it is important to 
start with a disclaimer. My main expertise is in “comparative democratisation”, 
but my decision here is not to enter into such overworked and underspecified 
questions.1 For the purpose of this paper “governance challenges” will refer only 
to those policy alternatives and methods of rule currently in operation on the 
island – i.e. as determined by the prevailing constitution and legal–administra-
tive structures. But, as the 2019 reform of the 1976 “socialist” constitution made 
clear, within the existing system a generational transfer of power is underway, 
and society is articulating a range of new social demands and expectations. These 
constitute unquestionable “governance challenges” that can be examined from a 
comparative perspective, even on the (admittedly disputed) working assumption 
that something close to the current power structure (and existing “rules of the 
game”) continues to regulate policy formation over the coming years.
2 Six major social policy areas
2.1 Healthcare
Before 1959 Cuba already displayed some relative strength as a centre for medi-
cal expertise. After the Revolution the new regime dedicated exceptional priority 
to the development of a comprehensive, universal and high-quality health capac-
ity that would be free at the point of use (Const. 2019, art. 72). In due course it 
also made international medical training and assistance a key part of its foreign 
policy, paying particular attention to the health needs of the poor in various un-
derprovided parts of the world. This was a deliberate and sustained policy choice, 
no doubt partly motivated by the wish to contrast the benefits of a socialist ap-
proach to healthcare with the limitations of the privatised and market-based sys-
tem prevalent in the USA.
Even before the current pandemic, Cuba’s distinctive approach was widely 
recognised as a constructive alternative to Western orthodoxies, although it in-
1  In two previous publications I analysed Cuba’s post-Cold War political prospects as viewed from 
my “transitions to democracy” perspective. Both in 2007 and again in 2016 I concluded that 
Cuban “exceptionalism” made it foolhardy to predict a conventional democratisation any time 
soon. But eventually there is likely to be some easing of the ideological polarisation that has for 
so long blocked the emergence of any “middle” options. However, my verdict was that the timing 
and context of any such shift remained extremely indeterminate, making its democratic content 
open to a spectrum of possibilities. That remains my view even in early 2021. (In Hoffmann & 
Whitehead [2007] I used Benjamin Constant as the template, and in Whitehead [2016] I reflected 
on the uncertain implications of the tentative overture from President Obama.)
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evitably also attracted much criticism and hostility from the advocates of market-
ised healthcare. (The core of the criticism was that politicised medical provision 
denied free choice both to the patient and to the caregiver). Current Cuban pro-
vision can be compared with Sustainable Development Goal 3c (UNGA, 2015) 
to “substantially increase health financing and the recruitment, development, 
training and retention of the health workforce in developing countries, especially 
in least developed countries and small island developing States”. The time hori-
zon for the SDGs is 2030.
According to the December 2018 update of the WHO’s Global Health Work-
force Statistics, the total number of Cuban medical doctors was 95,487 – out 
of a total population of 11.3 million. This equates to 84.2 doctors per 10,000 
inhabitants and is considerably higher than anywhere else in the world.2 Second 
to Cuba is Georgia with 71.2, then Uruguay with 50.8. Italy has 39.8 doctors per 
10,000 people, Spain 38.7, the UK 28.1, and the USA 26.1.3 Elsewhere in Latin 
America, after Uruguay comes Argentina with 39.9, while Mexico has 22.8. By 
contrast in Guatemala there are only 3.5, in Honduras 3.1, and in Haiti just 2.3 
doctors per 10,000 people. Cuba also rates very highly on nurses, and hospital 
beds per capita.
Cuban exceptionalism in the healthcare field extends beyond domestic pro-
vision. It is estimated that over the past half-century Cuban universities have 
turned out over 100,000 medically qualified personnel, not only nationals but 
also students from about 80 other nations, who received their education for 
free. The state-run company Servicios Médicos Cubanos S.A. supplies medical 
personnel on contract to a large number of other countries whose own health 
provision fails to reach the poorest and most vulnerable. Until 2019 it sent per-
sonnel to Bolivia and Brazil, and currently supplies Argentina, South Africa and 
several Caribbean states including Haiti and most prominently Venezuela. Since 
the pandemic began scores of doctors and nurses have been supplied to northern 
Italy to help with the COVID-19 crises there, as well as to Andorra and Qatar. 
There were 28,760 Cuban health professionals serving abroad in total (including 
14 Henry Reeve International Brigades specialised in emergency help in cases 
of natural catastrophes or outbreaks of epidemic diseases, composed in total of 
2  When discounting the medical personnel on overseas missions the rate is still around an admira-
bly high 68 doctors on the island per 10,000 inhabitants. The WHO acknowledges issues of data 
comparability, and relies on the International Standard Classification of Occupations.
3  According to the Migration Policy Institute (Gelatt, 2020), 29% of all US physicians are for-
eign-born, so the ratio of US doctors per 10,000 is below 20 (as is the ratio of UK doctors). 
Whereas poor Cuba contributes doctors to the Global South, these rich Anglo-Saxon democracies 
raid the human capital paid for by less-developed nation taxpayers.
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about 1,400 medical personnel) (Cuba News, April 13th 2020). Overseas health 
services are the island’s largest single source of foreign exchange.
It is important to add here that those who receive free state medical educa-
tion are expected to pursue their subsequent careers as public servants, obeying 
instructions as to where they work, and accepting the very low levels of remu-
neration, even for severe hardship postings. Well-paid medics in other countries, 
who are not themselves willing to face this degree of hardship to serve their peo-
ple, have been quick to condemn the Cuban state for (allegedly) “profiteering” 
by retaining a very high proportion of the ensuing foreign currency payments 
(75% is the ratio reported from Brazil; Senra, 2018). Some also assert that the 
quality of Cuban health provision falls short of the standards that the more priv-
ileged sectors of their populations would expect. But such criticism often seems 
self-interested and displays little interest in addressing the health inequities that 
Cuban assistance prioritizes (it has been claimed that some 10% of Brazilian mu-
nicipalities had no source of medical expertise apart from the recently expelled 
Cubans).4
There is a further international strand to healthcare policy that also re-
quires mention. In some areas (such as meningitis, skin pigmentation, melano-
ma and anti-amputation treatment for severe diabetics) and on some research 
fronts (e.g. anti-viral Recombinant Human Interferon Alpha 2-B, used in a joint 
venture with China as a possible therapy against COVID-19) Cuba is a world 
research leader and not merely a provider of basic care, among other things it 
possesses anti-Ebola and anti-meningitis expertise that may be adaptable for 
the treatment of COVID-19.5 Health tourism has become an important strand in 
foreign exchange earnings, with treatments provided cheaply and safely to pay-
ing foreign visitors. Moreover, top international political figures (from Saddam 
Hussein to Lula da Silva, Hugo Chávez and Evo Morales) have judged Cuban 
healthcare both politically secure and professionally reliable. 
But, finally, the key tests for this very distinctive approach to a crucial area 
of public policy are how well it serves the basic health needs of an ageing and 
relatively impoverished population on the island, and how sustainable this great 
fiscal effort can be, given all the competing demands on state resources and the 
multiple scarcities and bottlenecks that afflict the rationing system under the 
pressure of a longstanding unilateral US embargo. Those were massive challeng-
4  On February 18th 2020 El País reported that there were still 757 medical posts in the most vul-
nerable municipalities that were vacant due to “abandonment” by the Brazilian personnel hired to 
replace the Cubans expelled by the Bolsonaro administration in November 2018.
5  The California-based medical journal MEDICC Review has a long record of expert coverage of 
Cuban healthcare. The April 2020 issue (vol 22., no. 2) provides remarkably full and precise 
information about COVID-19 and the island’s initial responses. 
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es even before the US reinforced its sanctions against the regime and the partner-
ship with Venezuela became destabilised. Many basic medicines (such as aspirin) 
are in extremely scarce supply in most Cuban clinics.
As the pandemic progresses across the island, it remains to be seen how well 
Cuba will emerge compared to its Caribbean and Latin American neighbours 
(Blofield et al., 2020). The very early signs were that strong domestic contain-
ment (with 67 isolation centres across the island that provide 10,000 beds) and 
close contact tracing (8.7 million out of 11.2m Cubans were screened by health 
workers at the end of March 2020) could “flatten the curve” relatively well, but 
the knock-on effect on related social policies could prove very damaging (Morris 
& Kelman, 2020). On the positive side, close medical supervision of the entire 
population may serve to contain the pandemic. On the negative side, critics of 
the regime have been quick to cast doubt on the credibility of its claims about 
health performance, given its centralised control over information and the polit-
ical stakes involved.6
Let us therefore turn to another key determinant of public health, namely,
2.2 Food Security 
The UN’s SDG 2 is to “end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition 
and promote sustainable agriculture” (UNGA, 2015). Here too Cuban public pol-
icy has long been strongly at variance with that of virtually all other nations in the 
western hemisphere. At least by comparison with its main Caribbean neighbours 
the island’s policy exceptionalism has delivered some striking positive results – 
although as we shall see at a high cost, and with a big question mark over its 
“sustainability”. 
Until Soviet aid came to an end in 1990 the “canasta básica” (basic basket) of 
rationed food for every household provided a more or less guaranteed supply of 
basic foodstuffs sufficient to eradicate malnutrition and hunger – although not 
necessarily to provide a satisfactorily varied and nutritionally optimal food sup-
ply to the people. However, collectivised agriculture and the obligatory delivery 
of smallholder output to the state at low prices failed to deliver a domestic food 
surplus, as the eminent French agronomist René Dumont had foreseen half a 
century ago (Dumont, 1970). Instead the provision of the canasta came to de-
pend upon imported supplies, and when foreign exchange became unavailable 
6  Partly to counter this challenge the Ministry of Public Health adheres to WHO definitions and 
provides exceptionally detailed daily hospital reports, giving biometric and treatment details for 
each acute and critical case handled, as well as for every death.
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the “sustainability” of the Cuban food security system became unreliable. Some 
efforts at reform and import substitution were forced on the regime during the 
Special Period of extreme hardship in the early to mid-1990s, but as soon as dol-
lars became more abundant (thanks to Western tourist revenues and help from 
Venezuela) reliance on domestic production was allowed to slip again. (Cuba 
ranked 186th in a recent listing of countries by agricultural growth (Nation Mas-
ter a). This is a remarkable policy choice, not only given the favourable climate 
and soil conditions of the island, but also given the demonstration in Vietnam, 
China and elsewhere that a more market liberal approach could quickly generate 
a food surplus, without putting the ruling party’s control of the state in jeopardy.
In 2017 Cuba imported $246m-worth of poultry meat; $177m of wheat; 
$165m of milk concentrate; $155m of corn; $100m of soybean meal; $82m of 
animal feed; $57m of rice; $28m of coffee; $26m of beer; $22m of cheese; $9m 
of pig meat; $8m of butter; $8m of potatoes, and so on. The island’s overall food 
imports for that year exceeded its total value of goods exports ($1.41 billion), and 
accounted for over 30% of all its imports (OEC, 2020). Many of the items on this 
import list could have been produced somewhere on the island (half of its arable 
land is said to be uncultivated). A substantial proportion of food imports were to 
supply the tourist market, which expected higher food quality than Cuban agri-
culture, with its guaranteed and low-priced market outlets, were accustomed to 
deliver. In April 2020 it was reported that local producers had just discovered to 
their surprise that they could supply Cuban-sourced hamburger meat and hash 
browns that would be competitive with the imported counterpart. 
A further key reason why imported foodstuffs have displaced local sourcing 
is the poor state of the domestic transport system.
2.3 Transportation
SDG target 11.2 aims at providing “access to safe, affordable, accessible, and sus-
tainable transport systems for all … notably by expanding public transport, with 
special attention to those in vulnerable situations” (UNGA, 2015). 
Cuba is, of course, famous for its carefully preserved stock of pre-1959 US 
gas guzzlers, which were imported at a time of low oil prices and close integration 
with the Florida economy. A surprising number of these are still on the road (often 
powered by much more modern and economical Japanese engines) – 60,000 are 
reportedly still in existence, but their annual average mileage is very low. Beyond 
that niche market there were only 173,000 automobiles in operation in 2004 
(very low for a population of 11 million), and although current numbers may be 
twice that level the roads remain remarkably car free by the standards of all other 
western hemisphere nations (in a recent listing Cuba ranked 134th in motor ve-
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hicles per thousand) (Nation Master b). A high proportion of the automobiles in 
circulation are held by the public sector or are for tourist hire.7 Bicycles offer an 
alternative private transport option, although they are accident-prone. Electric 
bicycles have recently made some inroads.
There is clearly an unusual opportunity here to develop a strong public 
transport alternative that corresponds to SDG 11.2 specifications. Before US 
sanctions were tightened and the pandemic hit some progress had been made in 
this direction. For example, modern diesel buses from China had upgraded the 
worn-out urban network, and Beijing had also helped improve the long-range 
(essentially Havana–Santiago) rail freight connection. However, feeder roads 
and secondary lines remain severely underdeveloped, and in current conditions 
only the most essential public transport links are likely to be fully maintained. In 
particular, undercapitalised rural and agricultural locations face further limita-
tions to provision, which is likely to impede agile food import substitution. Poor 
public transport coverage also handicaps the health system, including its respon-
siveness to the COVID-19 epidemic. (On the positive side, it may also slow the 
rate of growth of the disease and facilitate collective acceptance of “lockdown” 
instructions). 
Another issue for management of the epidemic concerns
2.4 Housing
SDG 11 is “make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sus-
tainable”. SDG 11.1 is to provide “safe and affordable housing and basic servic-
es”. The UN-Habitat programme and its New Urban Agenda note that although 
there is a rising stock of spare and unoccupied properties in the world, for most 
of the population housing is not affordable, and for many it is neither safe nor 
supplied with basic services. 
In housing – as in so many other areas of social policy – Cuba is an outlier 
(Const. 2019, art. 71). The Revolution suppressed renting and eliminated mort-
gages and the market in real estate. Thanks to the 1959 Urban Reform Law over 
85% of Cubans own their homes (or at least reside in housing owned by someone 
in their family) but this is combined with a long struggle with “issues of insuffi-
cient housing supply both in terms of the shortage of available units and the lack 
of resources to maintain and improve the existing stock” (Grein, 2015: 1). The 
7  If, as reported by Guardian environmental editor Damian Carrington (2020), there is a strong 
correlation between the lethality of COVID-19 and the concentration of NO2 particles in the urban 
atmosphere, then Cuba’s exceptionally low vehicle density will assist the authorities in their cam-
paigns against the virus.
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Revolution views housing as a social service and not a means of production or 
investment. But unlike health or education, housing involves private property. In 
the absence of a market it was officially estimated that in 2012 seven out of ten 
Havana houses were in need of major repairs. There were 3.9 million residential 
units for a population of 11.3 million, leaving an estimated shortfall of 500,000. 
Each year the government built about 16,000, and there was also said to be pri-
vate construction of about 10,000, but – for example – in 2012 Hurricane Sandy 
destroyed 22,000 dwellings. Belatedly – half a century after the revolutionary 
Urban Reform Law – in 2O11 Decree 288 opened up a private real estate market, 
although mortgages remained forbidden, only nationals are allowed to buy, and 
no-one can own more than two homes.
1,100 government building supply centres had been opened by 2015, and 
limited government grants for home improvements have been made available. 
Although renting is once again allowed, evictions are not permitted and tenants 
have no redress if landlords fail to maintain the premises.
So Cuba approaches SDG 11.1 from a very different angle from all the other 
nations of the western hemisphere, where renting and private ownership (in-
cluding property speculation and self-construction) prevail. It is reasonable to 
argue that existing Latin American property markets do not favour the fulfilment 
of the UN’s goals for 2030. But it is equally clear that in Cuba half a century of 
blanket suppression of market forces has also not proved the best way to secure 
“safe, resilient, and sustainable” housing for all. Decree 288 does at least consti-
tute a recognition of the resulting shortfalls, but on its own it does not overcome 
them. To achieve that, some kind of more flexible and responsive system of sup-
ply would be needed, and existing personal ownership rights would need to be 
expanded (notably in the area of housing finance).
2.5 Education
Cuba was outstandingly advanced in achieving SDG 4 sixty plus years ahead of 
schedule. This UN goal proposes that all girls and boys complete free primary 
and secondary schooling by 2030. It also aims to provide equal access to afforda-
ble vocational training, and to eliminate gender and wealth disparities with the 
aim of achieving universal access to higher quality education. 
In today’s Cuba, education is free, universal and compulsory for all those 
aged between 6 and 17 (Const. 2019, art. 73). The island has been ranked first in 
the world on government spending on education as a proportion of GDP (Nation 
Master c). There is near universal literacy and few drop-outs (and no private 
schools to cream off an elite). The maximum class size is 25 per teacher (with a 
target of 15 in secondary schools). Free school meals are provided for all, with 
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the result that – in contrast to everywhere else in Latin America (apart perhaps 
from Uruguay) – child malnutrition is rare. Obesity is also minimised, as is vi-
olence in schools.8 In rural areas where electricity is unreliable the schools are 
equipped with solar panels. 
Post-secondary and higher education is also free and the gender balance is 
good (evidence on the racial balance is harder to come by, but see Hansing & 
Hoffmann, 2020), and in at least some major fields (notably Medicine, but also 
Applied Sciences) of a competitive international standard – although some other 
disciplines are too politically sensitive for the authorities to tolerate full expres-
sion. Economics has risen in prestige and quality since the fall of the USSR, and 
economists are allowed more scope than other social scientists to “tell it like it 
is”. Cuba’s outstanding cultural output (musical, pictorial, theatrical, cinematic 
and literary) indicates that the humanities continue to thrive, whether supported 
(or not) by the authorities (for unsupported cultural creativity see, for example, 
Dabène, 2020). 
A more detailed and ethnographic investigation of Cuban education would 
no doubt uncover limitations to this positive account. Neither teachers nor stu-
dents are allowed to be too free-thinking, and – as is the case in all countries 
– provision varies somewhat in quality between privileged and deprived neigh-
bourhoods and social sectors. In a previous essay I made brief reference to the 
similarities between Cuban and “Spartan” social models (Hoffmann & Whitehe-
ad, 2007: 20), and it is probably still correct to evaluate the island’s educational 
achievements and limitations from that perspective. It is worth noting that Spar-
ta would perform rather well by SDG 11.1 standards. The main issue would con-
cern the word “quality”. How far does thorough and comprehensive training of 
all go towards satisfying the requirement for quality education (quite a long way 
in all those Latin American nations where it is conspicuous for its absence) – or is 
the encouragement of questioning and critical thinking (perhaps Athenian-style) 
also an indispensable feature of a quality education? 
Wherever we stand on that debate, Cuba’s successes in mass education de-
serve recognition and potentially provide the foundation for further improve-
ments. Most Latin American nations are not so favourably situated. Looking to 
the future, a critical issue will be that the current workforce (not to mention the 
next generation of Cuban citizens) will need a level of digital literacy that is hard 
to develop when IT resources are so limited, and the authorities are distrustful 
of horizontal and unauthorised channels of communication. Which brings us to 
a final area of social policy –
8  The true quality of Cuban educational attainments has become a matter of polemic within the US 
since Senator Sanders praised this aspect of the Revolution. For a counterblast see the Hoover 
Institution’s Professor Paul E. Peterson “Cuban Schools: Too Good to be True” (Peterson, 2020).
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2.6 Employment
SDG 8 includes “full and productive employment and decent work for all”, nota-
bly including social protection, and work opportunities for the young and for vul-
nerable minorities. This is close to articles 68/9 of the 2019 Cuban constitution.
On the bare ILO statistics Cuba appears well-placed. For example, the 2012 
labour force participation rate is given as 74.2%; the 2015 unemployment rate as 
2.4% (6.1% for youth in 2010); with 41 mean weekly hours actually worked per 
employed person in 2010; an 81.4% trade union density rate (2008); and excel-
lent figures on health and safety at work, among other areas. 
But there is also one much more troubling figure in the series – in 2010 the 
average monthly earnings of employees in Cuban pesos was 448, which equates 
to less than a dollar a day at the official exchange rate (all numbers taken from 
ILOSTAT). The World Bank’s (WB) international poverty line recently stood at 
$1.90 a day – although there is also a $3.20 threshold, and much debate about 
purchasing power parity calculations. The Cuban earnings number differs from 
the WB concept, since the former is per worker while the latter is per capita. On 
the other hand, the WB figure refers to total income, whereas in Cuba benefits 
such as free education and health care, home ownership and the canasta básica 
all constitute major non-monetary income supplements. In Cuba it is only the 
actual direct remuneration for employment that is exiguous, so the WB poverty 
line is not comparable.9 In fact the domestic market does deliver goods priced 
in pesos that the whole labour force can afford, so the dollar conversion calcu-
lation is misleading. But psychologically the calculation is highly demoralising, 
and those trapped in a peso economy are very poor compared to those who can 
access dollars. So these exceptionally low official weekly earnings explain why 
most Cubans are accustomed to undertaking shadow activities designed to “re-
solver” their income shortfalls. This also lends credence to the ironic saying “they 
pretend to pay us, and we pretend to work”.10
Over the past decade the island’s labour market has shifted considerably, 
greatly eroding the role of the overpadded public sector as monopoly provider of 
employment. An accurate portrayal of the rise of private employment is beyond 
the scope of this paper. In broad terms, only about 8% of the labour force were 
said to be in the non-state sector at the end of the 1980s, whereas according to 
the CTC trade union in December 2018 the ratio had quadrupled to 32% (non-
9  It has been claimed that in the Soviet Union during the 1980s about 60% of all worker income was 
channelled through various kinds of collective funding, rather than paid as wages (Mandel, 1988).
10  The phrase is amusing and evidence is scarce, but in reality worker supervision, peer group 
pressure, and even party loyalty inducements probably significantly boost labour performance in 
the absence of decent monetary incentives to work hard. 
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state includes workers in co-operatives as well as the smaller private sector). 62% 
of the workers registered in the non-state sector are affiliated to the sole trade 
union confederation via over 7,000 grassroots union organisations (Cuba News 
April 25th 2019). The list of activities authorised for private work has been ex-
panded at the beginning of 2021, but since these are classified as “self-employed” 
they have much less social protection than those in the co-operative sector. Be-
yond these recognised means of employment the “informal” sector is extremely 
marginal by comparison with the rest of the sub-continent, and organised crime 
and gang extorsion are effectively suppressed.
All these six social policy areas are interconnected and need to be evaluated 
as a package. We have seen that overall they correspond to the specifications of 
the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals to an unusual extent, in contrast to all of 
Cuba’s neighbours. But it is also apparent that this matrix was far from satisfacto-
ry even before the loss of Venezuelan largesse, the tightening of the US embargo, 
and arrival of the COVID pandemic. For at least the past decade the authorities in 
Havana have been attempting to “actualizar” (update) their inherited social policy 
model in order to mitigate these deficiencies – but so far with very limited suc-
cess. The crisis conditions of 2020 and 2021 and the shortfalls compared to UN 
SDG ambitions, reinforce the view that the Díaz-Canel administration is confront-
ing extremely grave and long-term structural challenges across the whole social 
policy spectrum. There is a clear risk that the emergency reforms introduced in 
January 2021 will redistribute the state’s now considerably reduced resources to-
wards some productive goods sectors at the cost of severely decapitalising already 
stressed social sectors such as education, housing and pensions. Accordingly, the 
second half of this paper turns to the “governance” problems that will need to be 
addressed if the Cuban people are to obtain the social benefits which both the Cu-
ban constitution (as revised in 2019) and the UN’s SDGs portray as their due.
3 Governance of the social policies matrix
In October 2019 the 600-member Cuban National Assembly unanimously “elect-
ed”11 Miguel Díaz-Canel as president of the republic, in accordance with the con-
11   Ken Jowitt’s comparative classification of Leninist regimes distinguishes between a “consoli-
dation” phase that corresponds closely to Cuba’s 1976 constitution, and an “inclusion” phase 
that matches well with the 2019 revisions (Jowitt, 1992: ch. 3). He does, however, differentiate 
between Leninist regimes, and in particular notes that Cuba (unlike all others) was set up after 
destalinisation in the USSR, and for that reason has some “exceptional” features. I would add 
that the large-scale departure of dissidents to the US reduced the level of internal repression 
(exit instead of gulag); and that the “heroic” structure of revolutionary charisma was kept alive 
both by the guerrilla generation, and by the siege effects of US sanctions. 
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stitutional reform ratified by public plebiscite the previous year. The presidency 
had been abolished in 1976, under Cuba’s “socialist” constitution of that year. 
Although it has now been revived and the formal government has been strength-
ened vis-à-vis the Communist Party of Cuba, according to the constitution the CCP 
remains “the superior driving force of the society and the State” (Const. 2019, art. 
5). At the 2021 Party Congress, Raúl Castro stepped down as first secretary in 
favour of Díaz-Canel (who at 59 is 29 years his junior). This is part of a broader 
inter-generational transfer of responsibilities underway in Cuba, in which the 
founding cohort of geriatric guerrilla fighters are giving way – in a planned and 
orderly manner – to a new cohort of state and party bureaucrats whose claims to 
authority derive from their governmental competence rather than their historic 
struggles. The 2019 modified rules set age and term limits for the new post-hold-
ers, in striking contrast to the lifelong entitlements of their predecessors.
From the outset Díaz-Canel and his colleagues have faced a multitude of gov-
ernance challenges on almost every front. Some of these were medium to long 
term; some international and security-related; some domestic (notably concern-
ing the acute dysfunctions of the economic system); some simply related to the 
management of the transition from old verticalist structures to more normalised 
and regulated governance practices. By the spring of 2020 all of these were dom-
inated by a much more immediate and urgent – perhaps existential – crisis, part-
ly due to COVID-19, but also to international setbacks that accentuate long-run 
negative policy legacies. It is in this extremely difficult overall setting that we 
need to situate the much narrower theme of this paper – governance challenges 
in the social policy sector. What follows cannot attempt a comprehensive over-
view of all the policy issues facing the new government. But it would be extremely 
artificial and misleading to isolate particular sectoral challenges from their en-
compassing context. The seven headings that follow cover most of the difficulties 
besetting Cuban social policy choices (and that is how they will be illustrated). 
But they all obviously extend to wider domains as well. They are
3.1 Command and Control
As noted, the CCP remains the leading force in Cuban society and the state and 
has a six-decade track record of intrusive (often proudly arbitrary) command 
and control (Whitehead, 2016). At times of extreme national emergency – like 
the present – there can be a plausible rationale for stressing the capacity for deci-
sive top-down leadership, but the 2019 reforms were burdened by this approach 
to governance being pressed beyond its limits (notably delivering disappoint-
ing results in terms of consumption levels and food production). The hope and 
intention was that a more professionalised and rational strategy of governance 
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(perhaps along the lines that had served the Chinese CP so well over the post-
Mao period) could support some much-needed “rectifications” or “course correc-
tions”. At the same time, it remained essential for the people to understand that 
top-down authority and national unity in the face of foreign danger were still not 
to be questioned. The “Leninist” mechanics of the constitutional review process 
and the plebiscite and the stately progress of the transfer of authority were de-
signed to leave no doubt on that score. 
At the time of writing all the signs are that the president and the first secre-
tary are managing to collaborate effectively, and that the structures of top-down 
control are working intact and are not gridlocked. One of the paradoxical con-
sequences of Washington’s use of extreme and punitive sanctions for “coercive 
regime change” is that it proves counterproductive because it promotes a strong 
closing of ranks. Certainly, in the Cuban case, any space for critical reflection 
or liberalisation is liable to be shut down during the current emergency. And, 
indeed, if the top priority is to contain the coronavirus, a well-focused and scien-
tifically based command and control response is likely to save lives as compared 
to the demagogy and medical irresponsibility on display in some of the world’s 
leading democracies. 
Nevertheless, in the slightly longer term Cuba’s social policy matrix will re-
quire far more debate, including openness to critical viewpoints and alternative 
models. Blind loyalty and patriotic discipline are wasting assets where complex 
trade-offs and deep structural adjustments are concerned. Even if the old reflexes 
of mass solidarity and revolutionary mobilisation can be made to work against 
the pandemic (which remains to be seen), command and control will not fix the 
transport system, or make the housing stock safe, or provide food security for 
all – not unless it can be informed by honest self-criticism, and upgraded by new 
thinking.12 Here is the first fundamental social policy challenge of the 2020s.
12  “It is only in the initial stages and so long as the charismatic leader acts in a way which is com-
pletely outside everyday social organization, that it is possible for his followers to live commu-
nistically in a community of faith and enthusiasm, on gifts, ‘booty’ or sporadic acquisition … The 
great majority of disciples and followers will in the long run ‘make their living’ out of their ‘calling’ 
in a material sense as well. Indeed, this must be the case if the movement is not to disintegrate 
… For charisma to be transformed into a permanent routine structure, it is necessary that its 
anti-economic character should be altered. It must be adapted to some form of fiscal organiza-
tion to provide for the needs of the group … As a rule the process of routinization is not free of 
conflict …” Thus, wrote Max Weber on the “routinization of charisma” in The Theory of Social and 
Economic Organization (Weber, 1947: 367/70). On pp 386ff he went on to consider the transfor-
mation of charisma in an anti-authoritarian direction (towards authority based on meeting public 
expectations), in accordance with what has since become known as “performance legitimacy”.
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3.2 Rationing
The general point can be amplified by reference to the deep failings of the inher-
ited structure of state-directed economic allocations. As already noted, it should 
be possible to separate this policy issue from the more political question of re-
gime type. Other communist party-ruled states have come to recognise the dys-
functions of the command economy.13 Cuba itself has been forced to pull back 
from the cradle to grave system it pursued so long as Soviet subsidies were avail-
able. But such retreats have been reluctant and inadequate. A coherent embrace 
of market allocation mechanisms has yet to take place. 
Cuba’s dual currency system has long been at the core of the problem, and ex-
perts have talked about the need to replace it for a generation. The monetary and 
exchange rate reform of January 1st 2021 indeed eliminated the so-called “con-
vertible peso” (CUC) and left the Cuban peso (CUP) as the sole national currency. 
In the past, however much command the policymakers arrogated to themselves, 
they lacked the basic signals they needed to detect the pinch-points of resource 
scarcity, and therefore to reallocate limited inputs to where they were most need-
ed. The crucial governance point here is that a distinction can be made between 
using price signals to allocate resources efficiently and “neo-liberal” dogmas that 
prevent attending to collective social needs and that bestow windfall gains on pri-
vate speculators. However, as at the same time the circuit of hard-currency stores 
expanded – where Cubans can pay with dollar-denominated bank cards – a new 
form of monetary dualism persists. 
Some kind of rationing is inherent in the idea of universal healthcare that is 
free at the point of delivery, free education for all and the provision of a canasta 
básica. Such social policies meet demonstrable needs (especially when US sanc-
tions are tightened and the pandemic threatens all) and provide the elements of 
a vital “social pact” between the state and the people the authorities are bound to 
preserve at almost any cost. However, the compartmentalisation of the economy 
undermines the effects of the formal rationing system. As long a peso market 
for the masses characterised by severe scarcity exists alongside a hard currency 
market with more abundant provision for the minority with access to foreign 
exchange, and a profound imbalance exists between the two (at the start of the 
exchange rate reform, the rate was set at 25 Cuban pesos for one US dollar), 
arbitrage and diversion of resources between the two segments can nullify the 
apparent benefits of rationing. To take a simple example, if aspirin and soap can 
be sold for hard currency then the public health system will not be able to retain 
an affordable supply of aspirin for the use of its clients. On a broader canvas, it 
13  See Jowitt op. cit. pp 131/4 on the political structure of the Soviet command economy. A classic 
statement on the economic aspects is Kornai, 1992.
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becomes impossible to measure which economic activities are socially profitable, 
or in fact generate negative added value, when company (and even many house-
hold) accounts require the aggregation of both currency flows.14 
There is a reason why this apparently straightforward accounting error has 
not proved amenable to reform until recently. The official argument is that for-
eign exchange is not available to bridge the gap between the two systems, and that 
is of course a problem – especially now. But the underlying governance problem 
is deeper than that. If doctors and teachers were to be remunerated at something 
closer to their social worth, the magnificent supply of medical personnel and the 
admirable teacher–student ratios would be harder to sustain, as it would become 
clear how much other sectors of the economy were being drained to finance these 
social programmes. As it stands not even the most powerful ministers at the apex 
of the decision tree have accurate information about what their choices are real-
ly costing, meaning decisions may well be taken on doctrinal and even “moral” 
grounds rather than with clarity about their system-wide effects.15 The key point 
here is that if Díaz-Canel is to have the policy tools needed to achieve the UN’s 
SDGs within a decade, better signalling about resource bottlenecks will be es-
sential.
3.3 Collective Responsibility
For the first six decades after the revolution Cuba’s core concept of political lead-
ership was the comandante. As the term clearly indicates, the ruler’s function was 
to issue commands, albeit after gathering collective opinions and expert advice 
according to the matter in hand. The ascent of Díaz-Canel is supposed to inau-
gurate not only a new generation of leaders, but also a more collaborative and 
shared approach to the responsibilities of policy formation and implementation. 
At least in theory there should now be a switch towards more “collective respon-
sibility”. Ministers serving a president and other officers who are constrained by 
term limits can sometimes risk standing out for a proposal, with the calculation 
that if it proves successful the originator will get the credit and possibly even 
improved prospects for future promotion. Under the previous system it was un-
14  For example, when I made impressionistic enquiries in 2018 about how much it would cost to 
repair a restaurant in Old Havana the results were grotesquely expensive, since even readily avail-
able local provisions were being charged as if imported. This illustrated to me why investments 
that might be socially productive would not be considered financially viable.
15  The reductio ad absurdum of this procedure should have been apparent 50 years ago, when the 
“Zafra of Ten Million Tons” wrecked much of the rest of the economy, and therefore rendered the 
sugar harvest target itself unattainable because its essential inputs were disorganised. Entry into 
Comecon was supposed to protect Moscow from further wastefulness on this scale.
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wise to claim credit where the comandante might feel sidelined, and holding out 
against the consensus was a career-destroying strategy.
Only time will tell whether the 2019 reforms do indeed inaugurate such 
a shift in leadership styles. The CCP will be inclined to continue to operate on 
Leninist principles even under Díaz-Canel’s leadership, and as an institution the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces are unlikely to embrace too much innovation (al-
though there could be a subsection with business experience who might aspire 
eventually to break loose). While both these power blocs could well accept a fur-
ther shift towards greater emphasis on efficiency and results, they are unlikely to 
look favourably on mavericks and dissenters. 
If so, a further governance challenge in the social policy area will be to build 
enough momentum around any proposal involving deep innovation. In many 
Latin American nations this obstacle can be circumnavigated by those with suffi-
ciently high status foreign educational qualifications, and/or the backing of spe-
cialised agencies like the WB and the Inter-American Development Bank. Upper 
class connections and private sector lobbying also play their role. None of these 
aids to innovation are likely to be effective in the Cuban context. Perhaps good 
contacts with China or Russia (or business operations in Panama) might help a 
bit – especially in areas like transport where foreign funding and expertise can 
make the difference – but, in general, policy reformers will have to build domes-
tic support coalitions and/or rely on traditional top-down methods of operation. 
Will this be enough to address the challenges of food security or unemployment? 
We now know that the technocrats in the central bank can persuade the cabinet 
to do what is necessary on exchange rate reform or fiscal rationality. What re-
mains to be seen is how well the existing system can manage the potentially ex-
plosive second-round consequences of the currency reform, which could unleash 
an unrestrained wave of inflation. To achieve a lasting improvement of economic 
performance the whole of the government would need to buy into an agreed for-
mula and then sell it to the populace, risking their now-limited political capital.
3.4 Transparency
Throughout the world both democratic and autocratic governments are finding 
that lack of citizen trust has become a major challenge to effective governance, 
both in general and in the social policy area. The Xi government is struggling to 
regain ground after its disastrous mishandling of the first phase of the COVID 
outbreak in Wuhan. In Chile the Piñera administration (despite its clear elector-
al mandate) was almost overwhelmed by the protests it provoked when public 
transport fares were raised. The gilets jaunes have cornered Macron – and further 
examples abound. So a key policy challenge for Díaz-Canel is to manage public 
34 Governance Challenges in Contemporary Cuba
communications and popular expectations so as to retain the authority needed 
for effective governance. Such issues are conventionally analysed under the ru-
bric of “transparency”.
This is not an easy topic to discuss objectively when it comes to Cuba. Sol-
id evidence is hard to come by and polemics quickly intervene. I can, however, 
report a succession of personal anecdotes that illustrate the challenges involved. 
First, I was travelling in Cuba just after the Warsaw Pact invaded Czechoslovakia 
in 1968. For several days as the news came through and no official guidance was 
given, various informants expressed their solidarity with a small socialist country 
subjected to bullying by a Great Power. Then, when the líder máximo eventually 
came out strongly on the side of Moscow, those who had guessed wrong hastened 
to cover up their mistake. Twenty years later I was in Matanzas when the Berlin 
Wall came down. The news spread like wildfire. Everyone, whatever their political 
inclinations, knew that this was a profound moment of dislocation for the Cuban 
Revolution. But for about a week no official recognition of the facts emerged. It 
took the CCP that long to prime all its activists on the new party line, which was 
then imparted word for word to the population at large, as if they were hearing it 
for the first time. During the Special Period, I witnessed further examples of the 
disjunction between instant popular intelligence and the much slower formulation 
of a carefully orchestrated official discourse. By the time of my last visit to Ha-
vana, ordinary people would speak frankly about the situation in Venezuela and 
what it portended for them. At an official event I was alone in explaining that the 
Europeans who had broken with Maduro were not simply US stooges. The Vene-
zuelan leader was, I said, “impresentable” in European progressive opinion. My 
statement was greeted with united disapproval – as long as the formal event con-
tinued. However at the subsequent lunch it was clear that I was not actually the 
pariah after all, as everyone really knew that what I had said needed to be consid-
ered. Criticising Trump at a meeting of Republican senators would invite similar 
(or harsher) responses.
With those antecedents in mind, what might we expect from the Díaz-Canel 
government’s communications strategy (in particular on social policy issues)? On 
paper the current constitution commits to considerable press freedom (Const. 
2019, arts. 53 and 60). More accurate reporting may also have been encouraged 
in part by a desire to contrast with Trump’s tweeting, and perhaps out of a belief 
that they have a good case to make and a sense that the people are with them. 
At the same time, they face more competition from domestic social media – if 
they are to get a hearing they need to upgrade the honesty of their coverage. It 
remains clear that only some topics can be treated transparently – other key is-
sues remain out of bounds, as the vote on the constitutional reforms made clear. 
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Still, various of the social policy issues outlined above are now receiving full-
er and more informative treatment.16 There is scope for a partial and provisional 
expansion of collective deliberation, aimed at taking an educated and concerned 
citizenry more into account and thus bolstering confidence in the new team. The 
ignorance and prejudice of much foreign commentary on Cuba (notably in the 
United States) helps support official messaging. This is by no means sufficient to 
promote “full transparency”, and it may at any point be subject to retraction. But 
if the Cuban people are to maintain their discipline and morale in the hard times 
that lie ahead, it makes sense for the current authorities to reach out to them with 
honest explanations where they can. 
There is, however, one particularly sensitive social policy area where the 
disjunction between what the authorities say and what the people experience is 
particularly intractable, namely
3.5 Equity
The domestic and international prestige of the Cuban Revolution derives essential-
ly from its claim to offer full and genuine social equality (not just social democratic 
social inclusiveness). For the first 30 years this was sustained through massive fi-
nancial support from the Soviet bloc, but the promise has also been kept alive for 
a further three decades when external assistance was smaller and more unreliable. 
Throughout all these six decades the Cuban example has been fiercely criticised, 
implacably opposed and subjected to tight unilateral US sanctions backed by a 
highly motivated opposition centred in Miami that denies the validity of the Cuban 
model and works tirelessly to overturn it.17
So the core social policy challenge for the Díaz-Canel administration is to 
make the Cuban model sustainable in the face of US hostility, while preserving 
and reinforcing those aspects of the historical equity agenda that can be main-
tained over the longer run. Gini coefficients on income distribution are hard to 
16  A proper assessment would need to consider Cuban television, local radio, exchanges between 
island residents and their families abroad, and perhaps even (at the margins) Radio Televisión 
Martí. 
17  Deciphering the real agenda of the “Cuba lobby” in Miami is not, however, straightforward. Intran-
sigents have been subject to generational change both in Cuba and Florida, and since 1989 it has 
become more common for Cuban-Americans to distinguish between the legitimate interests and 
welfare of the island’s population and their still uniformly detested regime. But on the other hand, 
since Trump took office the most hardline Miami revanchistes seem to have regained some of 
their former ascendancy. That was definitely in evidence during the November 2020 US election, 
at least in Miami.
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compute given the dual currency issue, but on any plausible basis there must be 
major (and probably growing) inequalities in this crucial area.
Looking at social equity more broadly, as Cuban policymakers prefer, the 
UN’s SDGs for 2030 provide a non-partisan yardstick. In addition to the objec-
tives discussed above, SDG 5 concerns gender equality, SDG 10 addresses the 
special needs of marginalised and handicapped minorities, and SDG 16 calls for 
strong institutions to secure justice and human rights for all. As can be seen, 
the full UN equity agenda is extremely ambitious, and barely achieved anywhere 
(Scandinavia may be the closest). Certainly there are major deficits throughout 
the western hemisphere (Canada may be the outlier here). Cuba has stronger 
foundations and better performance than most of its neighbours, but its achieve-
ments are at risk and its equity shortfalls remain considerable.
On gender equality the Federación de Mujeres Cubanas has a strong pres-
ence, 42.6% of the 2015 labour force was female, as were 48.9% of the members 
of the National Assembly, and eight out of ten public prosecutors. There is close 
to parity in university enrolments. The revised 2019 constitution specifically 
includes a bar on discrimination based on gender identity. However, the upper 
reaches of the power structure are still heavily male-dominated, and most Cuban 
women struggle with the “doble jornada” – combining heavy domestic duties with 
full-time employment (good evidence about domestic and sexual violence is hard 
to come by, but see UN Women).
Cuba was slower to move on disabilities (affecting an estimated 360,000 peo-
ple), and although they are now receiving more attention there is much to be 
done in terms of mobility, wheelchair access and other areas. Concerning ethnic 
differences, the issue of racial equality remains highly sensitive and generally un-
der-researched (Hansing & Hoffmann, 2020, provide a valuable exception), and 
there are also questions to address concerning Chinese, Jewish and various reli-
gious communities. Still, in comparative terms, Cuba could be considered rather 
well-placed to meet these aspects of the UN agenda within a decade.
Goal 16 is more hotly disputed – to “[P]romote peaceful and inclusive so-
cieties … provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and 
inclusive institutions at all levels” (UNGA, 2015). Some observers (while mostly 
silent about the legal black hole and use of torture that characterises the US base 
at Guantanamo) assert that Cuban justice is a sham. 
A recent interview with a Cuban judge provides a representative example. In 
one question to Edel González, the Spanish journalist calls Cuba the world’s larg-
est prison, with 90,000 currently incarcerated (Gaviña, 2020). González himself 
gives a detailed insider account that in no way corroborates the heated rhetoric 
used by his interviewer. A judge in Cuba for 17 years, who was sponsored by the 
NGO Prisoners Defenders and numerous MEPs, he publicly regrets a number 
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of unfair judgments he had handed down; accepts that there were 126 political 
prisoners; and that despite the habeas corpus provision in article 96 of the current 
constitution the machinery for them to clear their names was still lacking. At 
least some had been prosecuted as a result of the excessive vehemence of (mostly 
provincial) state security officials, who might also intimidate judges that queried 
their methods. He denounced a “climate of fear” that prevented fair access to the 
justice promised by the constitution. On the other hand, he also stated that Raúl 
Castro had issued instructions to all the country’s judges not to fear or be swayed 
by the Ministry of the Interior, and he considered that the new constitution may 
give rise to a series of legal norms that aim to improve Cubans’ freedoms (Gaviña, 
2020).
By western hemisphere standards it is far from clear that Cuba is a laggard 
in meeting Goal 16 standards. On the downside it still lacks any real separation 
of powers (the party still rules, and when times are hard –as in the first half of 
2021 – it clamps down fiercely on all stirrings of dissent), but there are some 
small bufetes of independent lawyers that have occasionally succeeded in win-
ning cases against regime zealots (under the Civil Code).18 More generally, Cuba 
also lacks the criminal violence and extra-judicial killings that so cruelly negate 
the paper “justice systems” in a large and growing variety of other republics, as 
the pandemic underscores. 
As already noted, the most fundamental aspect of inequality concerns the 
distribution of income and wealth. As discussed in section II above (sections on 
employment and rationing), the key problem concerning the distribution of in-
come has been the acutely inequitable dual currency system. Now that this has 
been scrapped, the Díaz-Canel administration must persuade the people of Cuba 
that it will take the consequences of income inequality sufficiently seriously. 
The distribution of wealth is a related challenge that is difficult to sum up in 
a few lines (for more see Hansing & Hoffmann, 2020). In the absence of proper 
capital, credit and real estate markets the scope for private wealth accumulation 
by residents of the island is extremely inhibited, despite the shift towards legal-
ising more personal property ownership. It can be argued that when markets 
are lacking those with access to state power are the true “rich”, but ethnographic 
work on the Cuban elite would be needed to document the point, and the evi-
dence to hand does not suggest they live in unrestrained opulence. Both public 
and private individuals can hold dollar accounts abroad, and there are writers, 
artists, musicians and others who enjoy privileged lifestyles because of the for-
eign exchange at their disposal. By the standards of wealth concentration in the 
18  One of them, Samuel Alipizar of Cuba Demanda (which seeks to develop legal rights on the island 
by activating existing laws), made an interesting contribution to the Vaclav Havel Center’s May 
19th 2020 webinar from Florida International University on Reforming the Cuban Legal System.
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whole of the rest of the western hemisphere it is hard to view such inequities as 
excessive (except perhaps by the idealistic standards of socialist theory). Where 
wealth is obtained by illegal means the Cuban system is better than most in of-
fering a corrective. 
Overall, then, Cuba faces some serious (and distinctive) challenges in con-
trolling inequalities and convincing the people that the resources available are 
being distributed equitably. This aspect of the SDG agenda is tough to deliver. 
Still, only those who have cracked the problem elsewhere are in a good position 
to criticise Cuba in this regard, and the existing system could still build on its 
partial achievements and thereby retain its domestic and external prestige as a 
pioneer.
3.6 External Blockade
SDG 17 calls for international co-operation, and the promotion of “meaningful 
trade liberalization” by 2030 to support the cause of sustainable development 
around the world (UNGA, 2015: 28). US unilateral trade and investment sanc-
tions against Cuba have been in place since the Kennedy administration, and 
were “codified” by the Helms-Burton legislation signed into law by Clinton in 
1996. Although only US citizens and businesses are directly subject to this law, it 
has been extended via extra-territorial enforcement, notably throughout the EU 
despite objections from Brussels. Havana has consistently resisted these sanc-
tions, and claims vast sums in compensation for the damages they have done, 
but for now they are tighter than ever and the Díaz-Canel administration must 
govern on the assumption that they will remain in place for some time to come. 
Cuban authorities always explain the hardships faced by their citizens as the 
product of US aggression and revanchism, and while that argument seemed to 
be losing its potency during the second term of the Obama administration, it was 
impossible to deny under Trump. If progress is to be made on SDG 17 it will be 
despite Washington rather than through its initiative.
Although the so-called “blockade” poses great economic difficulties for Ha-
vana it also produces some countervailing advantages. The first is in consolidat-
ing internal support around a “siege mentality” patriotic reflex. The second is 
that it can attract some compensating assistance from non-Western countries 
that dislike the display of US unilateralism and that may fear the application of 
similar sanctions against their own interests. In the recent past Venezuela was 
the leading ally, but China, Russia and to a lesser extent Iran are also possible 
sources of help. Even Canada, Mexico and Spain, while wary of offending the US 
and ambivalent about Cuban communism, can offer some limited relief.
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If the Díaz-Canel administration can hold on and make a little progress to-
wards SDG goal fulfilment these achievements may gain momentum. On that 
basis Havana might reasonably hope to secure some reluctant easing of the pres-
sures from Washington that are unlikely to disappear entirely, even under Biden. 
There is a severe governance challenge here, but one that Havana is well pre-
pared to manage. The really difficult challenge is the last, namely –
3.7 Internal Inertia 
All the social policy dilemmas and governance challenges outlined in the two 
previous sections are both grave and interconnected. But they are not necessar-
ily insurmountable. The crucial factor that will determine whether they can be 
overcome is the energy, focus and commitment of the Cuban people as a whole. 
In other words, however problematic the international blockade may be, the var-
iable that could empower Havana to press forward regardless and even turn the 
island into an exemplary case of SDG fulfilment is essentially internal – it must 
overcome domestic resistance and inertia and align the hopes and expectations 
of the populace with the plans and priorities of their government.
Although in the early years of the Revolution it may have been possible to 
achieve popular enthusiasm and mass mobilisation, that faith and goodwill ran 
out at least a generation ago. Some of the most capable and creative people have 
emigrated. Those who stayed on the island ended up wasting a considerable de-
gree of sacrifice on unsuccessful and incomplete projects. After a while most be-
came sceptical and turned inward, seeking to “resolver” personal problems rather 
than to perform as heroic guerrillas, or even “new men”. The present youth gen-
eration is particularly likely to be disengaged from official projects. Well-articu-
lated internal opposition is very much a minority sport, but voluntary labour is 
more so. Two of the three components of Fukuyama’s current recipe for national 
success are still very much in evidence – order and identity (Fukuyama, 2019; 
see also Fukuyama, 1995). But the third – trust – will need to be earned all over 
again. Otherwise, the new administration will find that it is just talking to itself, 
pulling bureaucratic levers without adequate response. This issue is urgent, but it 
is not necessarily beyond redress. The community solidarity and collective intel-
ligence elicited by the COVID emergency suggest that a fund of popular support 
still remains latent in the society. The test will be whether it can be enlisted in the 
cause of sober administration instead of the pursuit of utopian hopes.
It is not only popular scepticism that feeds domestic inertia. Another equally 
problematic source of unresponsiveness comes from within the prevailing power 
structure. An enormous amount of consultation and persuasion was required to 
secure institutional endorsement first of the “actualización” measures, and then 
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of the modest constitutional reform. Veto groups with precarious advantages 
require a lot of convincing to embark on even incremental improvements that 
might jeopardise their small gains. Thus, for example, the plan de auto-suficiencia 
alimentaria has been under review for a decade, and yet food security remains 
an always-postponed aspiration. Beyond managing low-level trade-offs, there is 
the challenge of conciliating anxious true believers in the old faith and touchy 
hardliners. Each of these obstacles can in principle be managed by a skilled and 
patient political elite, but the cumulative effect of facing too many at the same 
time can be to induce inertia, especially when the handover from the old to the 
new is still underway, and a coherent vision of a better future is unformulated. 
Here too the problems are urgent, but not necessarily hopeless. More trust, more 
“democratic legitimacy” of some kind (in accordance with Cuban traditions, not 
simply an import from the Global North) could help to break the impasse.
4 Contemporary Cuban governance in comparative perspective
Jair Bolsonaro (the democratically elected president of Brazil) is straining every 
sinew to ensure that his nation’s policy path deviates as much as humanly pos-
sible from the UN’s SDGs. Donald Trump (democratically elected leader of the 
USA and thus the Free World) not only pursued the same priorities – he also 
aimed to dismantle whatever international organisations he could defund in or-
der to ensure that his country could not be entangled in any such commitments. 
To a lesser extent similar points apply to most of the other democracies in the 
western hemisphere.
Miguel Díaz-Canel became president of Cuba by designation rather than a 
competitive popular election. He rose through the ranks of Cuba’s monopoly par-
ty through competence and loyal service. It has charged him with stabilising the 
country at a time of great stress and ideally with setting the stage for a new period 
of recovery and innovation, while preserving the essentials of the revolutionary 
inheritance. If he is to gain trust and legitimacy it will be through “performance” 
rather than “proceduralism” (Dukalskis & Gerschewski, 2017) (the absence of 
any apparently viable alternative might also work in his favour). The island’s so-
cial policies need to perform well if he is to succeed. By delivering on the UN’s 
SDGs his administration might both build domestic support and reinforce Cuba’s 
external prestige by comparison with its largest American neighbours. Indeed, 
they provide an internationally approved and nationally desirable package (or 
even “vision”) that meshes well with the strong social legacy of the Revolution,19 
and that could appeal to most of the inhabitants of the island. 
19  One more or less objective indicator of the positive nature of this legacy comes from the UN’s 
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Although Havana’s social policies can be assessed and improved one by one, 
it makes more sense to evaluate them as an integral package. In fact, they could 
also be understood as a manifestation of what the Cuban Revolution as a whole 
has been seeking to accomplish. The original goal of building a “communist soci-
ety” is no longer so clearly in play.20 And yet with the fruits of that costly endeav-
our on display – to be appreciated and protected (not least by the people of Cuba 
who undertook such sacrifices to establish them) – the survival and success of the 
Díaz-Canel administration will be closely entangled with its performance in the 
social policy domain. Potentially, the opportunity exists for the next generation 
of leaders in Havana to reinvigorate their mandate, win recognition from their 
neighbours and regain the enthusiasm of their citizens by making the SDGs the 
focus of their efforts. It would be a good start if – in stark contrast to the choices 
being made by Bolsonaro and Trump – Havana proved capable of overcoming 
the COVID-19 challenge at home, and then went on to play a constructive role in 
tackling it abroad as well. Cuba’s healthcare investments provide a solid founda-
tion for such an endeavour, but – as this chapter has stressed throughout – no 
single social policy success can be treated in isolation from the rest. So, even if 
Havana’s management of the pandemic does prove a model,21 issues of food se-
curity, housing quality, poor transport and badly remunerated employment must 
also be taken into account. As we have seen above, there is a case to be made in 
favour of the island’s social policies on all of these fronts, but in all these areas 
promising experiments are in need of substantial correction and revision. The 
SDG framework provides both an acknowledgement of Cuba’s potential and a 
spur to much further social innovation and upgrading.
This is a possibility, but it is highly challenging. The governance of Cuba is 
not yet fit for this purpose. Indeed it could be dismissed as yet another utopian 
Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP, 2019). According to this source, in 2019 Cuba’s rating 
on human development, adjusted for per capita income, was the highest in the world. To be more 
precise, in the HDI ranking Cuba was located 43 countries higher than its (low) income level 
would predict. The next best performer was Georgia (the Caucasus republic, not the US state, 
obviously) ranked 34 countries above its per capita income. By contrast some oil exporters were 
far below their expected HDI levels, as rentier states neglected the social welfare of their subjects 
(Equatorial Guinea was 80 positions behind, Kuwait 52, Qatar 40). Returning to Cuba, this excep-
tional HDI ranking can be viewed two ways. It shows how much priority the regime has devoted 
to social policy. But it also shows how poor its economic performance has been. 
20  Article 5 of the 2019 constitution still characterises the CCP as such: “It orients the communal 
forces towards the construction of socialism and its progress toward a communist society”. But 
the revised charter enhances the authority of the Cuban state, and article 13 a) limits the state’s 
mission to the construction of socialism.
21  Not yet an established fact and, in any case, other Latin American republics with more conven-
tional systems of governance, such as Costa Rica and Uruguay, are also performing well so far.
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ambition no more plausible than its “communist society” predecessor. Certainly 
major changes would be needed to give it a chance. Even with the best of ef-
forts and intentions it could be that brute material realities will guarantee its 
failure. But Díaz-Canel’s administration might also gain purpose and cohesion by 
pursuing a strong social policy agenda in the face of formidable difficulties. This 
could build on the unusual merits of the Revolution’s social legacies, while also 
appealing to the national pride and indeed heroic traditions that have sustained 
it for so long. At any rate, it is hard to picture another strategy that can give the 
present incumbents direction and a plausible claim on the allegiance of their citi-
zens. Simply improvising from day to day will hardly suffice, given the existential 
challenges in play. Since the SDGs, like the 2019 constitutional amendments, 
envision strong institutional structures and a more responsive and accountable 
system of decision-making, such a programme might also overcome some of the 
disconnection between the Cuban people and their rulers (Cassini, 2017).
 Two decades ago I posed the following hypothetical question: “If the citi-
zens of Cuba, relatively isolated from their neighbours, were to deliberate and 
conclude that their one-party communist form of government was democratic, 
would we (i.e. democratization scholars) be required to allow that adjudication to 
over-ride more conventional external judgements and definitions?” (Whitehead, 
2002: 23). This was a theoretical exercise to probe “hard cases” in which popu-
lar consent might freely be given to a non-standard regime claiming democratic 
legitimacy. My conclusion was that under such conditions, since democracy is 
a social construct, the national verdict should merit tentative scholarly respect 
– but with stringent conditions. The Cuban people would need the freedom to 
deliberate freely (constitutional rights in UN documents), including the airing of 
alternative viewpoints and the absence of any kind of intimidation. They would 
also need assurance that future generations would retain the option to reopen the 
issue. Assuming that the island retains its national independence, and that most 
islanders wish to preserve most of what their Revolution has accomplished, this 
is the only peaceful route to its further democratisation. As outlined in the “Gov-
ernance” section of this paper, my old theoretical exercise remains on the table. 
Taken together, the revised constitution, the generational transition, the shift 
towards independent social media, the slow easing of state economic controls, 
and an understandable pride in Cuba’s social policy achievements all contribute 
towards a possible pathway of slow, cautious and consensual political evolution. 
Consider how else history might judge the post-revolutionary generation. 
If they fail to find a viable path forward comparative experience indicates what 
else is possible. Alexei Yurchak’s vivid description of the last years of the USSR 
(Yurchak, 2005) could still become an alternative future for Cuba: “At the mo-
ment of collapse it suddenly became obvious that Soviet life had always seemed 
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simultaneously eternal and stagnating, vigorous and ailing, bleak and full of 
promise. Although these characteristics may appear mutually exclusive, in fact 
they were mutually constitutive.”22 If history is to “absolve” Díaz-Canel and the 
CCP from such a verdict they will need an attractive and unifying project. Rein-
vigorated social policy could provide their best option.
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Betsy Anaya Cruz / Anicia García Álvarez 
Social Policy in Cuba: Public Administration 
Challenges and Achievements
Introduction
This chapter analyses the challenges facing the Cuban public administration as 
it defines and constructs a new model of economic and social development. This 
new modele merged from the change of approach introduced in the Guidelines 
for Economic and Social Policy approved at the Sixth Congress of the Communist 
Party of Cuba (PCC), which were updated at the Seventh Congress, and to which 
other important documents were added. Two transformations seem particular-
ly significant. More space will be given to the market, and while planning will 
remain the fundamental regulatory mechanism, it will be managed in a more 
diversified way, with a greater role for self-employment and cooperatives. On the 
other hand, a shift is proposed from a universal protection model that subsidises 
products to a more personalised model that directly subsidises the people facing 
greatest hardship.
Two current approaches to public administration provide the foundations 
(EcuRed, 2015). The first sees it as the set of organisations that political author-
ities award the competences and means to satisfy general interests. The second 
defines public administration as the activity these organisations carry out in 
pursuit of their mission seen in terms of the problems with their management 
and their existence, both with regard to their relationships with other similar 
organisations and with the public. This analysis is based on the first approach.
To address these issues, it is important to remember how unusual Cuba is 
as a country. Our socioeconomic model and concept of development have prior-
itised social development issues above all others, to the extent that social spend-
ing represents a significant proportion of GDP (gross domestic product) and 
government spending. This has enabled it to achieve comparable indicators to 
the world’s most developed countries. However, improving – and even sustain-
ing – these indicators is systematically placed at risk by Cuba’s relative economic 
development.
https://doi.org/10.3224/84742546.03
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Social development and social policy are among the concepts used for this 
analysis. Social development includes not only the main aspects of people’s living 
conditions and well-being, but also how the social structure and level of distri-
butional equity evolve and how social, group and individual consciousness has 
transformed. This chapter addresses only some of the issues related with living 
conditions and equity. Social policy comprises the set of social development goals 
and the means of achieving them that governments and non-governmental or-
ganisations set for themselves in order to influence social development (Ferriol 
et al., 2002). As social spending is a key mechanism for implementing social pol-
icy, looking at expenditure can help us understand the priority governments give 
to a policy.
The work is structured into four sections: the first is this introduction; the 
second analyses the conception of social policy in the documents from the 7th 
Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC); the third examines the avail-
able statistics in order to diagnose Cuban social development from 1989 to the 
present; while the fourth uses the findings to draw conclusions on the main chal-
lenges facing the Cuban public administration in terms of social policy and de-
velopment. 
Social policies in PCC programme documents1
Of the documents examined by the 7th Congress of the PCC, analysis is made 
of the Conceptualización del modelo económico y social cubano de desarrol-
lo socialista (Conceptualisation), the Bases del Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 
Económico y Social hasta el 2030 (National Development Plan), and the Linea-
mientos para el período 2016–2021 (Guidelines). 
From the introduction to the Conceptualisation onwards, it is made explicit 
that the universal nature of Cuba’s social policy is one of its strengths for advanc-
ing its development proposals (PCC, 2017: 4). However, as the diagnosis section 
will make clear, it also involves major expenditure on social programmes. The 
amounts needed to fund this broad coverage are a major burden on the state 
budget, especially when the economy goes through adverse cycles. This spending 
was prioritised even in the hard times the country faced in the 1990s following 
the fall of the socialist bloc, but in the long run this budget deficit is unsustain-
1  The documents in question were examined during the 7th Congress of the PCC and later approved 
by the 3rd plenary session of the Central Committee of the PCC on May 18th 2017 and endorsed 
by the National Assembly of People’s Power on June 1st 2017. Due to its continuing validity, this 
section takes up some ideas contained in the article by García, Gratius and Íñiguez (2013) relating 
to the assessment of the Guidelines approved by the 6th Congress.
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able, and other routes must be found that are more consistent with the current 
economic and social reality. This is probably the greatest challenge to face and 
the reason why PCC congress programme documents since 2010 have focused on 
greater efficiency and effectiveness in the provision of these services. 
A whole chapter of the Conceptualisation is devoted to social policy (PCC, 
2017: 11–13) and draws important distinctions from previous approaches. One 
is the recognition that the resources allocated to implementation should be con-
sidered investment in social development rather than costs. Another distinction 
is the emphasis on the need to increase labour productivity and economic effi-
ciency to make our socialism prosperous and sustainable: the Guidelines of the 
6th Congress were insufficiently explicit on this point. There is a recognition that 
the right balance must prevail between economic and social development, while 
the need for competent public administration in the pursuit of the prosperity 
and well-being of the country’s citizens is also reflected. Finally, it is worth high-
lighting the importance this chapter places on work as a fundamental means of 
accessing prosperity and well-being. 
The National Development Plan establishes the vision of the Cuban nation, 
defining it as a sovereign, independent, socialist, democratic, prosperous and 
sustainable society (PCC, 2017: 16). This reiteration of the socialist character of 
our nation, along with the recognition of the central principle of Cuban socialism 
in the Conceptualisation – that the human is the central focus and protagonist in 
our system – are the foundations that determine that human development, equi-
ty and social justice are a strategic pillar of Cuban economic and social develop-
ment (PCC, 2017: 16). Some challenges are identified that must be overcome in 
order to achieve these goals, such as demographic ageing and the need to achieve 
effective participation of the population at all levels, and general and specific ob-
jectives are set to achieve the transformations necessary to address them (PCC, 
2017: 20–21). 
The general objectives explicitly include the consolidation of the revolution’s 
achievements in social policy and guaranteeing the progressive and sustainable 
growth of the population’s level and quality of life (PCC, 2017: 21). They also 
include the intention to progressively reduce economic and social inequality be-
tween the country’s regions, as well as inequality between segments of the pop-
ulation that do not arise from the quantity, quality and complexity of work or 
economic performance (PCC, 2017: 21). 
Of the 274 updated guidelines approved after the 7th Congress of the Com-
munist Party of Cuba (PCC, 2017), the chapter that addresses social policy con-
tains 34. While this may seem insufficient, it is important to emphasise that the 
other chapters contain guidelines that refer directly or indirectly to social poli-
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cy-related issues. This section analyses all the guidelines that relate in some way 
to this topic. 
The Cuban revolution’s social policy has been characterised by its universal 
reach. In the platform for building socialist society, the establishment of univer-
sal, free national education and health systems was explicitly aimed at eradicat-
ing the access inequalities that affect broad strata of the population due to their 
economic conditions, geographical location or even expectations and motivation. 
In terms of education, various social policy guidelines propose changes with 
indisputable social repercussions, while maintaining the principles that under-
pin the system. The reorganisation of the country’s school network, especially the 
sharp decline in the number of students boarding in middle and upper secondary 
school, reduces state spending, but also imposes greater expenses and a heavier 
care burden on students’ families. This will particularly affect families with lower 
incomes and women, whom the gender division of labour allocates the role of 
primary caregiver. Similarly, this process of making educational services more 
compact and regionalised has impacted access, especially in rural areas. 
Rationality and relevance are the focus of the changes proposed to the coun-
try’s education system. The adaptations to primary school network capacity 
according to pupils’ economic and socio-demographic development and places 
of residence, and to the levels of high school and university enrolment suggest 
policy is shifting towards rational distribution. Meanwhile, the need to guide en-
rolment towards agricultural, pedagogical, technological and related basic sci-
ence degrees, and to give greater recognition to the work of mid-level technicians 
and skilled workers are signs of the corrections needed to the currently distorted 
workforce structure. 
The changes in the national health system will promote the teaching and use 
of the clinical and epidemiological method and its untapped resolutory capacity 
as part of the streamlining of the use of technological methods of diagnosis and 
treatment. The practice of natural and traditional medicine will also be expanded. 
Two other guidelines relate to policies of promotion and prevention to improve 
lifestyles, incorporating intersectoral and community participation and the aim 
of improving public health levels. Strictly speaking, this forms part of health pol-
icy, but it seems clearly connected to the implementation of other guidelines. 
Among them, agro-industrial policy, particularly the improvement of the supply 
of food in the domestic market and guaranteeing the safety of the food produced; 
the territorial management model, and the promotion of projects to expand food 
production; science, technology, innovation and environmental policy aimed at 
generating results that allow food production to be increased; and transport pol-
icy – improving people’s access to transport, among other measures. 
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When it comes to transport, the promotion of new state and non-state forms 
of organising passenger transportation is considered, adapted to the character-
istics of each region. Several variants have been implemented, especially by ex-
panding the participation of the non-state sector (cooperative and private) and 
with greater emphasis on the capital city. However, the lack of competition be-
tween carriers and the difficulties in the supply of fuel, lubricants, spare parts 
and repair services cause high service prices in this area. Measures to protect the 
public’s access to these services will therefore be necessary.
Maintaining social security contributions is one pressing concern. In this 
sense, the proposal is to raise the contributions made by workers (state, private 
or cooperative) to the specific social security budget. But this is not the only way 
to mitigate the deficit in this budget. The changing age structure of the popula-
tion demands that larger-scale efforts be made to deal with the situation already 
being faced and that to come.2 Most urgently, labour productivity must be im-
proved. In our view this issue is insufficiently addressed in the Guidelines. This 
issue of productivity is also the starting point for the later possibility of further 
raising nominal wages and, in turn, real wages. 
A significant fall in real wages was one consequence of the crisis the country 
faced in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the way it was addressed. Over the 
years the nominal wage has increased but a full recovery from the impact has still 
not been made. This raises the pressure on the need for greater economic growth 
and the purposes of it: if pay fails to cover basic needs, the tendency towards 
supplementing income through other channels (legal or otherwise) and to de-
clining labour productivity in the formal sector will continue. The attempts to ad-
dress this situation are based on the various ways of linking wages to the results 
of work, which have been selectively introduced for certain activities. In 2019, 
wages increased substantially in the budgeted sector of the economy.3 Howev-
er, achieving the necessary impact on purchasing power requires the supply of 
goods to be increased, which has remained relatively low over the past year.
One important recognition the Guidelines make is the need to restructure 
consumption based on specific individual funds and social funds. The individual 
2  According to Albizu-Campos (2019), sustained low fertility rates have caused demographic age-
ing, or the transition to a much older age structure of the population. About 20% of the Cuban 
population is aged 60 or older. 
3  The state sector of the economy contains two subsectors: business, where entities have legal 
personality and sustain their activity with their own income and have a degree of economic 
independence; and budgeted, which is composed of units of the services of the public admin-
istrations, and which includes the services that are provided free of charge, such as health and 
education.
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should be prioritised in order to stimulate better performance and greater labour 
intensity and productivity.
A principle is recognised: compensating people in real need should be pri-
oritised over applying generalised subsidies to products that benefit everyone 
equally and greatly restrict the state’s capacity to target specific needs. In the 
2000s some measures began to focus support on specific groups of disadvan-
taged people; their transformation is now being urgently considered. Among the 
concrete measures for dismantling product subsidies is the orderly and gradual 
elimination of the ration book.4 This is a fairly radical change, as the ration book 
was long considered a significant achievement in the social sphere. It should be 
underlined that before making such changes an alternative form of support must 
be designed for people and families who will be helpless to protect themselves 
from these measures. This is probably why their elimination is planned to be 
orderly and gradual.
Meeting the population’s housing needs is just as pressing a problem. This 
issue directly affects the chances of raising population growth. However, even in 
the best short-term economic conditions imaginable, the volume of accumulated 
need means the resources to reverse the country’s housing situation will always 
be insufficient.
The solution the Guidelines envisage to this problem fundamentally involves 
non-state sector activity and the people’s efforts to self-build. While self-building 
has been underway since the 1990s, the scarcity and high costs of building ma-
terials and labour make it difficult for those with limited resources. To achieve 
fairer and more balanced results, the production of building materials and the 
use of available local resources should be promoted. The Guidelines also address 
this issue.
Sales of building materials to the public are already increasing, and banks 
are offering more lines of credit and more subsidies are being granted to people 
with little financial solvency to acquire materials and pay for construction servic-
es and other associated costs like transport.
The Guidelines also place particular emphasis on supporting the building 
and repair of houses in the countryside with a view to improving living condi-
tions in rural areas and helping stabilise the agricultural workforce. 
The legalisation of the real estate market in Cuba is also included in the 
Guidelines, with the proposal that it should contribute to meeting the popula-
tion’s housing demands. The housing shortage drives prices in the “new” mar-
ket up to levels that only segments of the population with access to substantial 
resources will be able to benefit from. State agencies and institutions have also 
4 This is the food rations card.
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carried out a survey of available real estate originally designed to serve as hous-
ing, but which is being used for other purposes – this is also included in the 
Guidelines.
The measures proposed so far favour two narrow groups of people: subsidies 
will help those on low incomes, while those with more financial resources will 
benefit from the real estate market. For the majority of the population that does 
not fall into these two groups, the remaining option is credit.
Finally, the chapter on trade policy in the Guidelines envisages restructuring 
the distribution of consumer goods and services to favour unsubsidised mercan-
tile spaces selling at market prices. They also include the need for a consumer 
development policy that broadens the supply of these goods, which include food 
products, clothing and footwear, household appliances, bicycles and spare parts, 
building materials and hardware, furniture, household goods and furnishings, 
among others. In reality, this type of item has been available in the network of 
markets for some time, but at high prices that limit the access of people in need. 
Broader supply is necessary to reduce prices and prioritise domestic products in 
order to encourage sustainability. 
This examination of the Guidelines on social policy reveals an emphasis on 
economic rationality and efficiency and a trend towards personalising social sup-
port. This emphasis seems to suggest that the resources available for social ser-
vices will be reduced or at least frozen. A population in advanced demographic 
transition and notably ageing like Cuba’s requires growing resources to attend to 
the health issues associated with ageing and guarantee social security. The meas-
ures described could help to mitigate this by redistributing resources currently 
spent on generalised support to population groups that truly need them. But it 
seems clear that a tension will be created between the economic rationality and 
efficiency required and remaining attentive to social equity. Hence the need for a 
well-sequenced transformation agenda that minimises such contradictions. 
Cuba’s social development: services and other conditioning 
factors5
Cuban economic policy has prioritised the allocation of resources to social ser-
vices as the way to progressively improve people’s welfare levels. Even during the 
most difficult periods of the crisis in the 1990s, this determination remained un-
shaken and was probably the most important social cohesion factor when facing 
5  This section is based on the authors’ previous works: García and Anaya (2010); García, Gratius 
and Íñiguez (2013); and Anaya (2008).
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the tremendous adversity of losing the country’s main economic partners in the 
space of just two years. 
Social spending is one of the mechanisms for implementing social policy. 
Indicators such as real per capita social spending and social spending as a pro-
portion of GDP and of public sector expenditure help us understand a state’s 
redistribution capacity, the macroeconomic and fiscal priority it gives to social 
spending and its impact on individual well-being (see CEPAL, 1994; cited in Es-
pina, 2008: 68). 
Social spending includes government expenditure in the fields of education, 
health, culture and art, sport, housing and community services, security and so-
cial assistance. Two categories of expenses may be distinguished by their pur-
pose: those concerned with social investment and those meant to compensate for 
low incomes. The latter category includes social security and assistance spend-
ing. As social investment is aimed at promoting people’s intellectual and physical 
development, the other components fit within this category.
The macroeconomic priority of social spending is expressed by the relation-
ship between GDP and social spending, calculated in percentage terms. The fiscal 
priority of social spending is reflected by the proportion it represents of total 
state budget expenditure. 
As already mentioned, the period after 1989 was shaped by a deep economic 
crisis. In these circumstances, social spending was one of the government’s most 
important means of redistributing income, compensating for deficits, reducing 
poverty and alleviating inequalities. As a result, the importance of social expend-
iture as a macroeconomic priority in Cuba grew until 1993 (Figure 1). Its share 
then declined until 1996, after which it began to recover, slowly until 2000 and 
then much faster, due to a “rescue” of the social programmes. In 2010, this indi-
cator began to contract to almost 30% in 2018. 
The fiscal priority given to social spending continued to grow from 1991 un-
til 2011. It declines in 2011, manages to recover in 2014, but continues to fall 
after that. In 2018, it represented about 40% of the state budget.
Although these indicators allow us to express the level of social expenditure 
in a relative way, regardless of the size of the economy, they do not help us appre-
ciate the evolution of available resources, as this depends on fluctuations in the 
level of economic activity. The analysis therefore includes real per capita social 
spending expressed in 1997 pesos based on the implicit GDP deflator for each 
year of the period examined. It shows that despite becoming an increasing mac-
roeconomic priority until 1993, real social spending was in fact declining and 
continued to fall until 1995. The crisis had a negative impact, but the priority 
indicator shows that it was less affected than the economy as a whole. Between 
1995 and 2007, this indicator more than tripled – a sign of the political will and 
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the development strategy implemented to reduce the impact of the crisis on the 
people’s well-being and quality of life. As of 2009, a period of decline in real social 
spending began, more due to price movements than changes to people’s spend-
ing habits or spending in nominal terms. From 2013 onwards, this trend began 
to reverse. It has yet to recover the level of 2009, and in recent years a contraction 
is notable, again influenced by prices.
Figure 1. Priority of Cuban social spending since 1989.
Source: compiled by authors using CEE, ONE and ONEI data (various years). 
Social spending in nominal terms remained stable during the initial critical years 
(Figure 2). Then, starting in 1999, a rapid rise began of close to 17% on ave-
rage each year until 2007. Instability and even stagnation is notable between 
2008 and 2012, but growth returns as of 2013. In terms of sectors, education and 
health services are undoubtedly those that benefited most from public financing, 
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Figure 2. Cuban social spending and its structure since 1989 .
Source: compiled by authors using CEE, ONE and ONEI data (various years). 
Even with the difficulties associated with the crisis and in the midst of multiple 
material deficiencies, health and education services for all Cubans remained uni-
versal and free and Cuba kept its place among the countries with the best results 
in both sectors. Similarly, the amounts allocated to human development always 
surpass the levels established in this regard by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP). 
The dedication of these resources, especially to the public health and edu-
cation sectors, as well as sports and culture, has brought achievements in these 
areas of social development that are comparable to those of more economically 
advanced nations. Some of these developments are documented and discussed 
below. 
In the field of education, the country’s extensive network of centres stands 
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Table 1. Network of education centres in Cuba
1989–90 1993–94 2000–01 2006–07 2018–19
Day-care centres 1072 1156 1119 1123 1088
Primary 9417 9440 9359 9029 6908
Basic secondary 992 984 1001 989 996
Pre-university 369 303 301 306 302
Polytechnics 782 782 659 585 410
Special schools 487 501 443 430 342
Higher education 35 33 49 64 41
Source: compiled by authors using CEE, ONE and ONEI data (various years). 
As mentioned above, from the year 2000 onwards a series of social services re-
scue programmes were implemented, which were known as the “Battle of Ideas”.
The education programmes included:
 •  Primary: reducing the number of pupils per teacher; the training of “emerg-
ing” primary teachers; and the repair, replacement and modernisation of the 
built infrastructure and equipment. 
 •  Secondary: repairing schools and expanding capacities to achieve smaller 
class sizes; the introduction of double sessions in all schools; the training of 
comprehensive general teachers (Profesores Generales Integrales); and the 
incorporation of the teleclass system. 
 •  Tertiary: the universalisation of higher education, with the aim of decentral-
ising university education in certain specialties to different regions around 
the country and increasing access opportunities; the creation of the university 
chair for the elderly (CUAM); and the creation of the University of Informatics 
Sciences (UCI) in 2002. 
 •  Computing programme to increase the use of computers from an early age 
and help give everyone access to computer skills.
As well as these programmes, the enrolment capacity of pedagogical and health-
care degrees were expanded. 
Changes were made to the health system’s organisational structure, to both 
services and programmes. The aims were to bring services closer to the people, 
adapt them to the health situation in each location, to continuously train and 
develop human resources, and to improve and introduce new technologies.
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The need to draw up strategies for the recovery of the health sector had been 
recognised since the mid-1990s, focussing above all on improving the quality of 
services and preserving their levels of fairness, efficiency and effectiveness. The 
challenges of managing the impacts of the crisis on health services that are uni-
versal and free and with a population accustomed to using them extensively – in-
cluding those involving advanced technology – had to cope with limited access to 
external credit and the markets for medicines, consumables and medical equip-
ment, which were also complicated by the effects of the blockade (Suárez, 1997).
Among the key measures was the Programa de Reconstrucción y Modern-
ización de los Policlínicos, which repaired and expanded the services of polyclin-
ics (García Salabarría, 2006). These offered an average of 20 services, and some 
over 30.6
Secondary healthcare services benefitted from the Programa de Recon-
strucción y Modernización de Hospitales, which repaired, renovated or intro-
duced technological equipment.
The transformation promoted in the Cuban healthcare system, with its clear 
emphasis on preventive medicine and decentralisation, has posed new challeng-
es to the performance of its activity. For example, expanding the offer of various 
services by providing them at polyclinic level required more consumables and 
reagents to be made available, along with specialised human resources. The same 
was true of the strengthening of the early detection of certain diseases. While this 
helped cure or stabilise patients’ conditions, it also involved greater spending 
on medicines and treatments in general. In this context, health spending has in-
creased, in many cases based more on the importation of medical equipment and 
consumables than on integration with national providers. All of this contributed 
to increasing the Cuban economy’s tendency to import over these years. 
After the process of updating the economic model officially began in 2011, 
a programme to make health services more compact and regionalised was de-
signed that used number of inhabitants per doctor as one of its basic indicators. 
The impact of the process has been different in rural and urban areas. Rural pop-
ulations have been worst affected and face greatest access difficulties.
In terms of social security, state expenditure in this area rose systematically 
due to the growth in old-age pensions resulting from the mentioned demograph-
ic ageing trend (Figure 3). This rise accelerated from 2005 onwards, as the levels 
6  For example, rehabilitation services, radiology, ultrasound, optometry, endoscopy, thrombolysis, 
emergency services, traumatology, clinical laboratories, family planning, dental emergencies, ma-
ternal and child care, immunisation, care for diabetics and the elderly, as well as consultations in 
the specialties of internal medicine, paediatrics, obstetrics and gynaecology, dermatology, psy-
chiatry and cardiology. 
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of smaller pensions were raised, increasing both the minimum pension and the 
average. In 2019, the benefits were increased again. 
Figure 3. Structure of the Cuban population by age and sex.
Source: compiled by authors based on data from the Anuario Estadístico de Cuba (data from the 
Population and Housing Censuses).
Cuban social security is a solidarity-based distribution system in which current 
benefits are covered by the contributions of active workers and their employers. 
Hence the challenge posed by demographic ageing. As well as the number of peo-
ple receiving social security benefits increasing, replacement must occur in the 
group of working age people making the necessary budget contributions.
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This is one of the challenges that Cuban social policy is facing. As its impact 
extends beyond this particular area of social security, a series of measures is re-
quired. An amendment to the Social Security Law has already been implemented 
that among other things: extends the years of work required to receive benefits; 
establishes that old-age pensioners can return to work and earn the salary of the 
position they take in addition to their pension; and determines that all workers 
must contribute to social security funding, including self-employed workers – 
previously this burden fell entirely upon the state and employers.
However, more important than these provisions is to improve labour pro-
ductivity, so that a smaller number of employed persons can support an increas-
ing number of dependents. Given all of this, it is important to underline that the 
country does possess potential labour resources. According to Albizu-Campos 
(2019), for every 100 people of working age, 51 are not. In other words, for every 
100 people not of working age, 200 are potentially active. Contrasting this with 
the rate of economic activity – and even more so if considering the rate by sex – 
reaffirms that the potential exists to expand economic activity and raise social se-
curity contributions. This subject is examined in more depth when employment 
is analysed.
Unresolved issues remain in important areas that affect people’s basic liv-
ing conditions, such as food, housing and transportation. These three fields 
have been prioritised in programmes since the mid-2000s, but they needed to 
be executed more dynamically in order to more quickly solve the existing short-
comings. Access differences are growing in these areas. For example, people in 
various locations and with different income levels can find that their access to 
housing construction and repair, the alternative (non-public) transport that pre-
dominates in some parts of the country and even food sources depends on their 
proximity to emerging or revived economic actors.
When it comes to food, access to an additional subsidised distribution source 
in addition to the rationed allocation turns out to be a decisive factor in family 
spending levels.7 In fact, before the 2019 wage increase in the budgeted sector, 
high food prices in market places meant that food accounted for between 65% 
and 75% of the spending of urban Cuban families dependent on average sala-
ries and pensions.8 In the agricultural market, for example, limitations remain 
7  Among the channels distributing food at below market prices are: that distributed via the retail 
sector to cover rationed consumption, social consumption, public food and self-consumption.
8  Refers to a basic food basket that ensures daily nutritional requirements are met in terms of en-
ergy. What is received through the ration book and other subsidised channels is complemented 
with products such as rice, beans, root vegetables and pork purchased at market prices. House-
hold surveys are conducted in Cuba, but their results are not made public. The authors of this 
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that restrict competition and its potential efficiency.9 Prices in these markets, in 
particular, appear to be continuing to rise (Figure 4) in a context of selective 
wage growth. In 2019, food spending (once again, referring to a basic basket) as 
a share of total household spending shrank (between 41% and 50%) as a result of 
salary and pension rises, but access to food nevertheless remains a central issue 
for many families. Anaya and García (2019) suggest actions in six dimensions, 
including: changing the focus in order to address food security; increasing the 
availability of food from existing reserves in all links of the agri-food chain; and 
transforming current protection systems and the universality of some subsidies. 
Figure 4. Price indices in agricultural markets.10
Source: compiled by authors based on ONEI data for sales in the agricultural market January–De-
cember (2006–2011); sales of agricultural products, selected indicators, January–December (2013–
2016) and January–June (2017). 
work have made several attempts to address the subject since 2006 (see García and Anaya, 2007 
and 2014; and Anaya and García, 2018 and 2019).
9  Among them, the following stand out: the marginal nature of supply due to the rules on com-
petitors’ access to it, the lack of input markets to enable expanded production and supply, and 
the decapitalisation of the food production sector; the tacit collusion between the agents in this 
market due to their rules of access and the scarcity of transport services for this cargo.
10  These indices were constructed from a selection of 15 products that represent 2/3 of sales in the 
agricultural markets in value terms. They cover 100% of the sales of these products to 2011 and 
from 2012 they cover over 82% of those sales (state agricultural markets, agricultural supply and 
demand markets and points of sale). The remaining 18% is sold via the new forms of commer-
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Universalising access to food to cover basic needs and good health continues to 
be a major social challenge in Cuba. Although various reforms in the agricultural 
sector have raised domestic production levels, the country still imports much of 
its food,11 which also has a negative influence on the trade balance.
Housing is a basic human need. The limited availability in Cuba was a pend-
ing problem even before the crisis of the 1990s. The impact of the economic 
contraction, coupled with the increasing incidence and destructiveness of hurri-
canes and heavy rains since 2000, has seriously compromised the country’s hous-
ing stock. For this reason, in 2006 the country proposed an ambitious housing 
construction programme, taking advantage of the economic slack accumulated 
thanks to the success of exports of medical services to Venezuela and new rela-
tions with China, which improved access to credit. This programme proposed 
the building of 100,000 homes per year, exceeding even the figure reached in 
the 1980s, the period of greatest construction activity in Cuba. In 2006, the 
programme essentially overachieved thanks to the completion of a number of 
projects that only required minor final additions that had been stalled due to a 
shortage of resources. Subsequent annual levels have been lower. Between 2007 
and 2017, an annual average of some 31,700 homes were built, according to cal-
culations made by the ONEI (several years), with a systematic contraction in the 
construction of homes visible each year (see Figure 5). 
Contributing factors to the non-fulfilment of the goal set in 2006 were low 
productivity in the construction workforce; a shortage of qualified workers – 
builders and electricians, bricklayers, plumbers and other associated trades peo-
ple; the poor quality of construction, including urbanisation; the poor conception 
of the programme’s logistics; and low levels of mechanisation. 
According to Vivian Rodríguez (quoted in Figueredo, 2018) the current 
housing deficit is 929,695 homes, higher than that of the early 2000s (600,000 
homes in 2004, according to Rodríguez García, 2018). 
Since 2018, a new house building programme has been formalised that seeks 
to fill the current shortfall in a ten-year period and is based on the municipal pro-
duction of building materials. The PLVMC (Programme for Local Production and 
Sale of Construction Materials) was created for this purpose. Figure 5a shows a 
rise in the number of homes completed since 2018, while Figure 5b shows in-
creased state participation in this endeavour. 
11  According to estimates, in 2007 imported food represented 49% of the available supply in terms 
of energy and 67% if measured in protein terms (García and Nova, 2012).
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Figure 5. Completed homes and construction by sector.
a) Completed homes (units)
b) Construction by sector
Source: compiled by authors based on ONEI data (various years).
The experiences of a number of municipalities that are beginning to produce ma-
terials have already been reported in the national media. However, for several 
reasons it is considered risky to limit such a crucial programme for the living 
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mogeneous across all regions, the type of housing built in each municipality will 
vary; possibilities will depend the workforce available in each place; and small-
scale production of this kind may not be economically viable.
Among other counterproductive elements are the fact that the constructions 
undertaken in recent years fall short of the necessary quality and that ten years 
to make up the deficit is fairly substantial wait for many people who have been 
suffering from this deficit for years.
Passenger transport is another area that suffered a dramatic decline, one that 
was deeper and longer-lasting than that of the Cuban economy as a whole. A 
priority programme for its recovery is underway, as it has failed to return to the 
passenger numbers of 1989. In 2018, the number of passengers carried by the 
various means of transport was 70% of the figure in 1989, despite the efforts 
made to revive activity (ONEI, 2019).
The two methods of transport used most are buses, which moved 60% of 
total passengers in 2018, and alternative means,12 which carried 36% in the same 
year. 
In recent years, the non-state sector has played a greater role in this activity, 
both under cooperative and private management, especially in the capital.
Among the most obvious difficulties of the transport programme are: the 
need to repair and maintain the roads to guarantee the durability of the fleet 
acquired; the shortage of drivers to match the increase in vehicle numbers; the 
social indiscipline that jeopardises the useful life of these means of transport; the 
supply of spare parts and components given the high breakage rates related to 
poor road conditions and overuse.
As documented, the 2000s saw a significant increase in the resources allocat-
ed to investment and running costs in the fields of education, health, sports, cul-
ture and art, social care and security, and programmes to guarantee employment. 
These efforts lacked a systematic impact evaluation and an analysis of the rela-
tionship between rising expenditure and results in order to ensure the system is 
efficient. Some barriers also reduced the potential positive impacts of these pro-
grammes. Specifically, the insufficient decentralisation process and the limited or 
absent popular participation in the organisation and implementation of some of 
these programmes prevented them from fully achieving their aims. The conjunc-
tion of all these programmes involved such an acceleration in spending on social 
programmes that their growth exceeded that of the economy itself (Figure 6). 
12  Refers to non-conventional means of transport, such as: animal-drawn vehicles, pedicabs, trucks 
and private cars.
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Figure 6. Growth of the economy (GDP) and social spending by period.
Source: compiled by authors based on the Anuario Estadístico de Cuba (CEE, ONE and ONEI, various 
years) and the Panorama Económico y Social de Cuba (2016b). 
From 2007 onwards, under the onslaught of the global crisis, internal problems, 
extreme weather events, a growing trade deficit and with maturities accumula-
ting in the external debt that could not be met, a social spending adjustment pro-
cess was imposed that sought not to affect levels of satisfaction; in other words, 
a more efficient use of resources was promoted in these programmes. Growth 
was subdued and even the running costs budgeted to some of the country’s social 
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Figure 7. Changes in Cuban social spending by sphere.
Source: compiled by authors based on the Anuario Estadístico de Cuba (2010, 2015, 2018) and the 
Panorama Económico y Social de Cuba (2016b). 
The total amount of social spending fell in the period between 2008 and 2010, 
with social assistance expenditure suffering the greatest contraction, falling by 
almost half (47%). Exhaustive research was carried out on each beneficiary in 
order to determine whether they meet the requirements for receiving these be-
nefits. Other areas affected by the adjustment were: education, whose budget for 
current expenditure fell by 3.9% in relation to 2008; housing and community 
services, with a decline of 1.3%; and health, with a 0.9% decrease. On the other 
hand, current expenditure allocated to social security and the promotion of sport 
grew by 12.5% and 34.3% in relation to 2008, respectively.
A process of reorganisation, concentration and regionalisation of health 
services was announced at the end of 2010. A December 2009 speech by the 
President of the Council of State of Cuba said that not only was it possible to sig-
nificantly reduce expenses without affecting the quality of health care provided 
free of charge to all citizens, it might even be improved (Castro, 2009).
Subsequently, in the 2010–2018 period, the total amount of social expend-
iture increased by 16%. Specifically, this growth was in public health and social 
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27%. Spending fell in the other areas, with the greatest decrease in housing and 
community services (37%).
As mentioned above, fundamentally, solving the housing issue has been left 
to private individuals. This is probably the area where spending fell the most, 
although the provision of community services also seems insufficient, at least in 
the capital city. 
Employment is another area facing difficulties. The programmes of the 
2000s achieved significant employment growth, with unemployment falling to 
below 2%. However, there was recognition of a considerable level of underem-
ployment. Hence, the announcement in August 2010 about the need to reduce 
state employment by half a million workers in the short term and up to one mil-
lion in the medium term introduced a new source of tension and challenge for 
Cuban social policy. Achieving this employment cut in the Cuban state sector 
took around four years (Figure 8), rather than the planned six months.
In 2010, self-employment was relaunched with a view to assimilating sur-
plus workers from the state sector during its restructuring. The greatest contri-
bution made by self-employment has been to expand the supply of employment, 
goods and services. This is a result of its design: it can only be performed under a 
license that features in a list of – relatively primary – approved activities.14
One element to consider when it comes to employment is the decline in the 
economic activity rate, which suggests that untapped workforce potential exists 
in the country (see Figure 8). In 2018, the activity rate was 63.8%. In other words, 
only 63.8 out of every 100 people of working age were employed or looking for 
work. Among women, the stock is even greater, with 50% “inactive”. In truth, the 
backward gender attitudes prevalent in Cuban society and the gender division of 
labour mean that many are either working informally or dedicating themselves 
to domestic and care work.
Demographic ageing makes taking advantage of the existing workforce a 
priority. Public policies to promote the greater insertion of women into formal 
employment must be revised, for example, by achieving greater co-responsibility 
of the state in the provision of care for children and the elderly. Young people are 
another group that deserve special attention. They urgently need motivating with 
attractive job offers that allow them to develop their potential within the country, 
especially given how migration also affects Cuban population dynamics.
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Figure 8. Employment in Cuba since 1989: volume and structure.
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Figure 9. Economic activity rate (2013–2018).
Source: Compiled by authors based on ONEI data (2019).
Conclusions
It is clear from studying Cuba’s main social development indicators and analys-
ing the social policy projections in the documentation from the 7th Congress of 
the PCC that the Cuban public administration faces a number of social manage-
ment and development challenges.
First there is the sustainability of maintaining the high priority of social 
spending (both macroeconomic and fiscal) in a context of low productivity and 
low economic growth. Hence, the need to implement the measures to untie the 
knots in the country’s productive forces. It will always be easier to deal with these 
distributional issues in a context of greater economic growth, when more product 
can be distributed. 
Economic policies need to be designed to include implicit fairness criteria. In 
an increasingly heterogeneous society not everybody starts from the same posi-
tion when it comes to taking advantage of the opportunities opened up by policy, 
and these policies have different impacts on different people. Among the most 
significant gaps relate to income, gender and location.
Social policy design must combine the prevailing – undoubtedly effective – 
universal approach with affirmative policies that favour socially disadvantaged 
groups. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, not all people have the same 
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the different policies. For example, employment policy must consider the differ-
ent situations men and women face when entering the labour market in a way 
that it does not widen that gap.
Recent economic performance has shown the need for greater public service 
efficiency, particularly in health and education. Efficiency can be increased two 
ways: achieve the same results using fewer resources, or achieve better results 
using the same resources. The first conflicts with the growing need for certain so-
cial services (such as health, housing and transportation), while the loss of exter-
nal income (60% fall in goods exports between 2013 and 2018, plus reductions in 
medical services exports) puts the sustainability of efficient public services under 
strain. 
The ageing of the Cuban population and its impact on the accelerated growth 
of spending on social security and healthcare for an older population also clashes 
with the budget cuts for social issues. 
Greater co-responsibility must also be achieved between the state, families 
and the market in the care of children and the elderly. This could lead to greater 
numbers of women entering paid employment and help improve the personal cir-
cumstances of these women, but also of the economy as a whole, which urgently 
needs greater economic growth to enable it to support its dependent population.
The linkage must be improved between social services and the rest of the 
economy, so that their needs for inputs and equipment are increasingly met by 
national production and their expansion does not mean increasing the propen-
sity to import. 
A better relationship is urgently needed between decision-makers in the field 
of social policy and the population when determining which programmes will 
receive the scarce resources available to address these issues. A very different 
way must be found to manage the resources made available to the public admin-
istration to address these issues to the one developed to date.
There is a need to coordinate all actors – regional, state and non-state – 
around the purpose of achieving social, economic and community development. 
Since 2011, the actors in the Cuban economy have diversified, with greater 
non-state participation, including the self-employed and non-agricultural coop-
eratives, many of which are willing to be part of the country’s development – par-
ticularly the regions where their businesses are located. 
Finally, it must be recognised that the policies being implemented have in-
creased the differences in people’s access to basic services such as transportation, 
housing and food, among others. Unfortunately, this difference is not always the 
result of better labour performance. A decisive influence is the way the markets 
are organised and the spurious possibility they currently offer of earning profits. 
This trend towards greater inequality is unacceptable in a society like ours. In the 
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necessary balance between efficiency and fairness, the losses cannot be allowed 
to accumulate in the latter. 
In this complex context, the need is all the greater to promote a competent 
public administration in Cuba and one that is above all politically sensitive to 
issues as important as development and social policy. 
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“Who is Going to Take Care of Me?” Care and 
Ageing in Cuba: a Social Policy Challenge
Introduction
Cuba has one of the highest rates of demographic ageing in Latin America and 
the Caribbean.1 Three factors have contributed to this. First, fertility rates, have 
been below replacement level since 1977, making population growth practically 
null or negative since 2006.2 Meanwhile, a considerable rise in life expectancy at 
birth has taken place since the 1950s, turning Cuba into one of the world’s long-
est-lived countries (to an average 78.5 years in 2018, ONEI, 2019). The third fac-
tor intensifying the demographic transition and ageing is internal and external 
migration. Some municipalities, whose economies have been severely affected by 
agricultural, mining and industrial displacement, have seen their young adults 
migrate en masse and their populations age accordingly.
This demographic ageing is to a certain degree down to the success of the so-
cial and health policies deployed since the revolution (Dilnot, 2017; Destremau, 
2019). But it is causing an imbalance in the relations between the economically 
active and inactive populations: a smaller and smaller proportion of adults who 
qualify as economically active are obliged to support a growing dependent pop-
ulation of children and, above all, elderly people.3 Meanwhile, ageing raises the 
pressure on health systems. These are responding by developing research and 
medical care programmes – a particular challenge in a context of internal eco-
nomic crisis and the tightening of the US blockade. Another effect of this process 
is the stress it imposes on the care systems established in previous generations – 
this will be the main focus of my contribution. In this chapter I propose to reflect 
1  The median age in 2020 in Cuba is 42.2, just below that of the European Union (42.6 years); in 
1960 it was 22.9. Those aged over 60 years make up 21.3% of the total population in 2020, of 
whom almost a third are over 75 (6.9%) and a fifth over 80 (3.8%) (ECLAC, 2019b). On the other 
hand, the proportion of people under 15 years of age is 15.8% (ONEI, 2020).
2  In 2017 the lowest number of children per woman in the last 60 years was recorded: the gross 
reproduction rate was 0.77 children per woman and the fertility rate was 1.6 children per woman. 
3  The dependency ratio has been rising since 2002 and was 567 in 2017 (ONEI et al., 2019).
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on the tensions developing around the care needs of the elderly, which are still 
essentially considered a matter of family solidarity. I show that the care crisis is 
transforming what had largely been left to the private realm of morals and love 
into a public problem that is bringing changes to social policy reforms.
My research is based on qualitative and ethnographic techniques that pay 
attention to the sensations, feelings, emotions, projections, representations and 
systems of signification of both researcher and research subjects. This method 
develops situated knowledge, meaning that the objects of study are discussed 
with consideration given to the place and subjectivity from which each speaker 
begins. In this case this applies both to me, a French woman observing situations 
in Cuba based on her own socialisation and subjectivity, and the people I inter-
viewed. 
My own survey was performed over ten years and included regular stays in 
Cuba, mainly in the municipality of Centro Habana – one of the most elderly in 
Cuba – but also outside the capital city. I took advantage of all my encounters 
and housing situations to establish “participant observation” and to conduct for-
mal interviews and informal conversations with older people and their families. 
I joined various socio-cultural centres (talleres de desarrollo integral del bar-
rio) and two old peoples’ groups in Centro Habana, training groups for family 
caregivers of dependent elderly people, activities led by churches and religious 
organisations where I participated in meetings, events, outings and discussions. 
I was also able to attend university seminars and meetings at the National School 
of Public Health of Havana and interact with people involved in public policy. 
As my research progressed, caring appeared to be an invisible backdrop against 
which lives – particularly women’s – often unfolded for years or even decades. 
In the first section, the theoretical framework developed in social sciences 
around care crisis situations will be presented (1). I will then show that the solu-
tion presented as ideal in Cuba is to grow old in one’s family (2), which frequently 
leads to overburdening caregivers and their withdrawal from professional life 
(3). I will address the issue of people ageing alone (4), and then show that solu-
tions are being developed to support caregiving families (5). Finally, I will argue 
that Cuban family culture and the moral and institutional framework of the care 
regime are evolving as part of a context of social policy reform in Cuba. 
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1 Ageing and the care crisis: a theoretical framework 
In a very functionalist way, the OECD defines long-term care as 
a range of medical, personal care and assistance services that are provided 
with the primary goal of alleviating pain and reducing or managing the 
deterioration in health status for people with a degree of long-term depen-
dency, assisting them with their personal care (through help for activities 
of daily living (ADLs), such as eating, washing and dressing) and assisting 
them to live independently (through help for instrumental activities of dai-
ly living, IADL, such as cooking, shopping and managing finances) (Dyer 
et al., 2019). 
Meanwhile, feminist definitions of care also consider ethical, moral, emotional 
and affective dimensions, as well as recognition and mental burdens, and pay 
attention to who performs care tasks and under what conditions of recognition 
and/or remuneration. In this chapter I will focus on social care arrangements – 
those outside the realm of medical care – and on the decisions family members 
make to provide care for the elderly, and how they intertwine with the course of 
caregivers’ lives. In Cuba, as in many other countries, patriarchal institutions or-
ganise the distribution of care according to a naturalised gender and generation-
al order framed by a moral grammar (Weicht, 2015) related to ageing well and 
filial duty, which promotes norms of conduct and arrangements that articulate 
consent and coercion, love and work. 
In a context of sociological transformations in fields such as urbanisation, 
work, lifestyles and housing patterns, demographic, economic and social changes 
place stress on these arrangements, moral frameworks, practices and forms of 
delivering services. In particular, the mismatch becomes starkly visible between, 
on the one hand, women’s aspirations to participate in labour markets and eman-
cipate themselves from assigned gender roles and, on the other, the growing care 
needs that come with ageing, whose persistent moral framing continues to en-
courage family-based care. 
This is how situations arise of “care deficit” (Hochschild, 1995), “care pov-
erty” (Kröger et al., 2019), or “care crisis” (Sisto Campos et al., 2016; Federici, 
2014; Isaksen et al., 2008), as manifested by the fact that “for a large number of 
elderly, the positive effects of a longer life-span have been voided or are cloud-
ed by the prospect of loneliness, social exclusion and increased vulnerability to 
physical and psychological abuse.“ (Federici, 2014). Low-income households 
and older people living alone are more likely to have unmet needs if they rely 
primarily on informal care (Burchardt et al., 2018). What is more, situations of 
material and care poverty perpetuate and accentuate deep gender inequalities. 
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Women live longer than men, suffer more years of poor health, make up the vast 
majority of those in widowhood and do the bulk of care work within the family 
and professionally – often in poor working conditions and for low pay. Hence the 
fact that in many countries, the family model seems to be reaching its limits, as 
the recent ECLAC gender report warns (2020: 139): “The current model of the 
social organization of care, which is based on families and maintained through 
unpaid work done by women, is no longer sustainable”. 
As the tensions rise around the care deficit, the issue of care for the elder-
ly and the development of dignified lifestyles and social inclusion tends to shift 
from being a private matter to become a public one (Provoste Fernández, 2013; 
CEPAL, 2020; Destremau & Georges, 2017). This is notable in Cuba. However, 
unlike the care of young children, elderly and long-term care still belong to the 
least institutionalised sector of social policy (Abe, 2010; Dyer et al., 2019; León, 
2014; Provoste Fernández, 2013). 
In what follows, I will show that, according to this theoretical framework, 
the highly family-based care regime that prevails in Cuba is reaching its limits, 
and that demographic ageing is creating a growing care crisis. Tensions around 
elderly care are becoming a prominent issue that calls for political engagement 
and greater public policy involvement. 
2 In Cuba “ageing well is growing old in one’s family” 
As part of a holistic approach to health and well-being that combines biological, 
psychological, environmental and social factors (Brotherton, 2013), the Cuban 
ageing process has given rise to socio-cultural organisations and institutions 
that aim to promote active ageing, to prevent the deterioration of the body and 
mind and to provide opportunities for the elderly to socialise independently be-
yond the pressures of the family, while maintaining their integration within their 
neighbourhoods and their links with the revolutionary institutions (Destremau, 
2020b; 2021b). But what happens when an older person loses his or her auton-
omy and becomes dependent? How are the needs that emerge gradually in the 
transition from “young-old” to “old-old” attended to?4 
Most older people will stay at home, depending on the care of family mem-
bers. Cuban society has a strong culture of solidarity and interdependence that 
is kept alive in towns, neighbourhoods and families. A form of intergenerational 
4  A distinction is made between the young-old, who are in good physical health and are auton-
omous, who actively participate in domestic and family life or even continue to work, and the 
old-old (generally over 80), who tend to lose their autonomy and have greater medical and social 
care needs. 
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reciprocity prevails that more often than not takes place without calculation. For 
as long as they are able, ageing adults have a central place in their families and 
play an indispensable role in the home’s practical functioning. They help their 
children balance their working, family and community life, contributing signifi-
cantly to caring for children and adolescents and to time-consuming tasks such 
as shopping and all forms of domestic work. Yet, inevitably, as an ageing parent’s 
autonomy diminishes, so does his or her contribution in the form of work. At the 
same time, their needs for care, presence and support increase (Durán, 2010; 
Destremau, 2021a). 
All the categories of interlocutors with whom I was able to interact in Cuba 
seemed to agree that the place for people to grow old is within the family and that 
the family must take care of them, because “they share the same blood”.5 “The 
best cure for dementia is the family”, a geriatrician told me. “Older people need 
their families, and their families need them; they must always stay with their 
families”, insisted a social worker. The country’s 2017 national survey on ageing 
also concluded that its results could help guide policies aimed at keeping the 
elderly in their usual family environment as an ideal form of coexistence (ONEI 
et al., 2019: 81). 
Care for the elderly falls mainly upon those who share the home. This is the 
case for Yanet, a 50-year-old bookseller I met while shopping for books in Cen-
tro Habana. Yanet lives with her mother in the house her mother gave her. Her 
brother takes little care of his mother, and their sister has emigrated to the Unit-
ed States. Indeed, around half of older people live with their children or grand-
children, either out of love, continuity, lack of housing or because they need help, 
and 68.4% of caregivers live in the same house as the person being cared for 
(ONEI et al., 2019).6 Cohabitation becomes more common as age advances be-
cause children – especially daughters – who were not living with their parents 
often choose to take in one or two parents when they can no longer live alone. 
This is what David and Fanny (two retired engineers in their seventies) did when 
their mothers became widowed and ill. In parallel, the burden of care and pres-
ence tends to grow heavier as the family’s caregivers age: in many households, 
several elderly people live together without working-age adults.7 This may be one 
5  The Constitution of the Republic of Cuba and the Family Code give a more formal basis to the 
rights and duties of the family.
6  Half of those who provide assistance or support with the basic activities of daily living (BADLs) 
are sons and daughters, 9% are spouses and 12.6% are grandchildren. Cohabitation tends to 
increase the number of hours of care per week, which can reach 98 hours (ONEI et al., 2019).
7  The results of the 2017 survey show that 23.7% of participants over the age of 60 live only with 
their spouse, who is also likely to be elderly (ONEI et al., 2019).
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spouse taking care of the other or, as in the case of David and Fanny, older people 
taking care of their own parents. The president of one Committee for the Defense 
of the Revolution told me that she cannot go to Barcelona to visit her daughter 
and grandchildren because she has her elderly mother to take care of, whom she 
took into her home.
The ageing of the population is raising healthcare needs. These are largely 
satisfied by a very high quality health system providing free and universal care 
(Chaufán, 2014), but hospital care frequently requires the participation of other 
family members. This is above all because of a lack of nursing staff in hospi-
tals,8 shortages of supplies and medicines, equipment deteriorating due to the US 
blockade, the economic crisis and the departure of personnel to other jobs and 
abroad (Brotherton, 2013; Destremau, 2019a). 
The need for family solidarity towards the elderly is not limited to care and 
presence. It is also to a large extent economic. Despite nominal increases, the 
real value of retirement pensions declined continuously over the years after the 
crisis of the 1990s.9 Since then, retirement pensions alone have no longer been 
enough for their recipients to survive: to avoid destitution, their income must be 
supplemented by self-employment, remittances or other income from the family 
unit.10 This dependency can generate asymmetry in their relationships with their 
children, which is aggravated when there is physical dependency and a greater 
demand for care and can lead to situations of abuse. Cohabitation is even more 
difficult when the family shares a cramped and overcrowded dwelling.
3 Overburdened caregivers, a public problem
To speak of family care is, to a large extent, to speak of unpaid feminised work. 
Research shows that in Cuba the sexual division of domestic and care work re-
mains largely patriarchal (Peciña, 2008; Proveyer Cervantes et al., 2010; Des-
8  See the ENIG-2016 report (Centro de Estudios de la Mujer and Centro de Estudios de Población 
y Desarrollo, 2018). According to interviews, the actual number of nurses in public hospitals is 
one for every 40 to 50 patients. 
9  At the beginning of 2021 minimum pensions underwent a very significant rise to accompany 
monetary unification and the marked reduction of subsidies on basic goods and services. The 
lowest pensions were multiplied by a factor of 5 and the highest by 3.5, although it appears it 
does not compensate for the considerable price rises.
10  Through Law No. 105 of December 2008, the Cuban parliament allowed the retiring of workers 
after retirement age. According to data from the Encuesta Nacional de Envejecimiento de la Po-
blación de 2017, 28.2% of those 60–74 years old (12.8% of women and 45.4% of men) were in 
work along with 5.7 % of those over 75 years old (1.2% of women and 11% of men) (ONEI et al., 
2019).
79Blandine Destremau
tremau, 2015; 2017a).11 Furthermore, frequent matrifocal practices (Zabála, 
2010; Vera & Díaz, 2008; Vera & Socarrás, 2008) mean older women more often 
tend to live with their children than men. Rafael, a retired academic, cares for his 
mother by himself because he is an only child. David and Fanny share the care 
burden, each caring for their own mother. But Yanet says that the reason she 
takes care of her mother (with the attentive help of her husband), is because she 
is the only daughter left in the country, while her brother helps her very little, and 
not financially at all. 
The downward trend in household size – falling from 4.9 people in 1953 to 
2.9 in 2012 (ONEI, 2016) – caused by the declining birth rate and emigration 
over the last six decades plays an important role in concentrating the care burden 
on just one or two children. Time pressure has become a key issue in the daily 
life of caregivers, who must balance paid work, the many complications of ma-
terial life in Cuba and the demands caused by caring for children and the elderly 
(Destremau, 2021a). Overburdened by care obligations, more and more women 
are forced to take considerable time off work and often decide to take temporary 
leave and then leave their employment early, which affects their pension levels. 
Like many others, Caridad, a Trinidadian dentist, decided to stop working 
shortly after 40 to care for her father after he suffered a fall at the same time as 
her mother’s mental faculties were deteriorating. She did this for 13 years, until 
they died one after the other. Women who make this decision have to find other 
economic resources instead of their salary. Self-employment activities may be 
carried out at home, offer more flexible hours and be more compatible with the 
demands of home care; or financial support may be sought from relatives, at 
the risk of losing some independence. For Margarita, a family doctor in Centro 
Habana, these situations are inevitable and natural: “In our culture it is women 
who take care of the elderly and in almost all cases a daughter has to stop work-
ing. Families give it some thought and the person who earns the least is the one 
to stop”. Fortunately, having inherited a large patrician house from her parents, 
Caridad was able to dedicate herself to renting rooms to tourists and maintain a 
good standard of living.
So even provided for free, family care has a cost: it leads to the temporary 
or permanent withdrawal of a considerable number of workers from the labour 
force to dedicate themselves to the care of dependent elderly people. This with-
11  Approximately 68% of those who perform elderly care work are women (ONEI et al., 2019). The 
Encuesta Nacional sobre Igualdad de Género ENIG-2016 (Centro de Estudios de la Mujer and 
Centro de Estudios de Población y Desarrollo, 2018) estimates that the number of women caring 
for the elderly is one and a half times greater than that of men in urban areas, and more than 
twice that of men in rural areas.
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drawal mainly affects women. In a 2016 national occupation survey 119,000 
people declared that they had not looked for work in the past four weeks because 
they found themselves caring for the elderly.12 A study by Hernández Montero 
et al. (2016) estimated that in 2014 the equivalent of 191,000 jobs were lost in 
the Cuban economy as a result of the need for family care – both workers who 
decided to leave their jobs and people of working age who declined to seek em-
ployment. Indeed, the official rate of female workforce participation has been 
in steady decline since 2000, and withdrawal to care for an elderly person has 
played an important role (ONEI et al., 2019).13 At age 50, the employment rate 
for women is only 29%, compared to 59% for men. The pressure is increasing: ac-
cording to ECLAC (2019a), the proportion of informal caregivers required com-
pared to the economically active population under 65 years old was 27% in 2015 
and reaches 32% in 2020.14
Caregiver burnout and withdrawal from working life is becoming a public 
problem. The words of a researcher at CITED, which studies the effects of ageing 
and plays an important role in defining public policy, exemplify this: “It’s very 
good for the older person [that her daughter has quit her job to take care of her], 
but we have to look at it from the caregiver’s point of view as well. We have to 
organise things before the family model is exhausted”. She went on to insist that 
nevertheless “the family must take care of their elderly”.
4 Ageing alone
In this context in which the family shoulders so much of the burden of care for 
the elderly, how is the care organised of those who live alone or do not have a 
family? This is the case of my friends Marta and Aylén, childless septuagenarians 
who have younger brothers they do not intend to burden when they can no longer 
live independently. The first, who is ill and weak, has organised to be cared for 
by her sister-in-law, who will inherit her house upon her death. The second sees 
no other solution than entering a nursing home, an unattractive solution that 
prompts a great deal of anxiety.
12 Cited by Huenchuan and Rivera, 2019. 
13  The male activity rate in the 2002 census was 90% and that of women 60%; by 2018 it had fallen 
to 76.9% and 49.5%, respectively (ONEI, 2019). This decline cannot be attributed solely to care-
giving, but also to greater mobility between jobs and work situations.
14  Cuba is the country in the region that is most affected by the growth in the demand for caregiv-
ers. If the trend does not change, in 2030 as much as 50% of the economically active population 
under 65 years will have to devote themselves to caring for the elderly, almost twice the figure 
for 2015 (ECLAC, 2019a).
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The 2017 survey on ageing shows that 17.4% of people over the age of 60 
who participated in the survey lived alone (i.e. almost 400,000 people nation-
wide), among whom the average age was 71 (ONEI et al., 2019). Half of the 
participants did not live with any of their children.15 Although this percentage 
decreases significantly for the group of women over 75 years old (36.4%), it re-
mains practically the same for the men in the same age group (51.8%). Thus, 
widowhood is more likely to expose men to loneliness. Many elderly people do 
not have children, but what may have been a sign of emancipation in individual 
life courses, or the result of abandonment by a migrant spouse becomes a real 
handicap when ageing and in need for care. Many others only have migrant chil-
dren and/or grandchildren who may send them money to pay for home care, but 
are not there to help them.16 
The family care deficit is also indicative of a cultural change. Common dis-
course frequently opposes country and city life, and one generation against an-
other. María Concepción, a nun from a religious community dedicated to helping 
the sick, gave a sad picture of loneliness in old age in an elegant and well-main-
tained Havana neighbourhood: 
In my village, people are always supportive, but here in the city they beco-
me selfish. Young people no longer want to take care of their parents, they 
distance themselves from them, they want to live their own lives without 
restrictions. Values have changed, they want to consume, to have money. 
And then many young people leave Cuba. Everyone fights for themselves. 
Isolation exacerbates all kinds of vulnerabilities, especially when older people 
lose the ability to care for themselves. For people who live alone, the prospect 
of a loss of autonomy prompts great fear: “Who is going to take care of me?” 
is a persistent and oft-repeated question. Local solidarity mobilises around an 
isolated person living in difficult conditions: neighbours and neighbourhood 
social institutions, such as the Talleres de transformación integral del barrio, 
the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, the social workers and family 
doctors represent precious resources and provide presence and care. But these 
services are not coordinated in a formalised network in order to provide home 
care according to the specific needs of each elderly person.
Since the 2000s, social assistance programmes have been strengthened in 
order to respond to the situation of helplessness of elderly people living alone 
15  This percentage is higher among men (53.4%) than women (45.8%).
16  According to the Encuesta Nacional sobre el Envejecimiento en Cuba 2017, 7% have all of their 
children living outside Cuba, while 3% (about 70,300 people aged 60 and over) have all their 
children and all their grandchildren living outside the country (ONE et al., 2019: 90). 
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with no resources other than their pension. These increasingly target “social cas-
es” (Voghon Hernández, 2019; Destremau, 2017b; Domínguez, 2008; Espina 
Prieto, 2011; García Quiñones & Alfonso de Armas, 2014). The typical elderly 
person recognised as a social case is a single, dependent person who suffers from 
a degenerative disease, lives in serious material deprivation and whose home is 
rundown – those living above the ground floor who can no longer use the stairs 
are a particular focus. Social cases may also be those with families that are “dys-
functional” or incapable, especially when the family caregivers themselves are 
very old, disabled or mentally unfit, and even more so when the family is perma-
nently absent or the person has no children. 
In the best cases, isolated people living in extreme poverty receive a small 
amount of financial help from social assistance to supplement their meagre pen-
sion, which enables them to eat better and to give small tips to neighbours who 
help them. In terms of benefits in kind, the elderly are the main beneficiaries of 
scattered allocations of mattresses, sheets, household appliances and home ren-
ovation materials. Social assistance plans also operate in the field of nutrition, 
through fortified diets obtained on prescription of the family doctor with the ra-
tion book and access to community kitchens,17 which have developed in recent 
years in all neighbourhoods. Today, the elderly represent 60% of the beneficiaries 
of these canteens. They are also the main beneficiaries of the food and clothing 
distributed by religious groups and churches. 
5 Supporting caregiving families: a growing need 
Over the years, programmes have been developed in Cuba to help family caregiv-
ers with their responsibility of caring for the very elderly and people who lose 
their autonomy. 
As long as they are mobile and capable of carrying out the routine acts of 
daily life, older people can apply for a place in a Casa de Abuelos. These day 
centres accommodate older people who live with their families but who are left 
alone during the day when their relatives go to work, and who are unable to care 
for themselves and prone to depression, falls or injury. The number of these cen-
tres, at which meals and social and medical care are received, has increased sig-
nificantly in the last ten years (ONEI et al., 2019). Despite this, they only host 
2.3% of people over 75 years of age and less than 1% of the younger age groups 
(60–75) due to a lack of means of transport and the admission conditions, which 
are limited to mobile people without physical or mental disabilities. A section of 
residential homes is often dedicated to this daytime reception, and the idea of 
17  Sistema de Atención a la Familia, SAF, established by the Ministry of Domestic Trade.
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expanding the temporary use of beds to offer respite to caregivers for a few days 
or weeks is gaining consideration.
In Cuba, nursing homes are conceived of as substitutes for families in ex-
treme cases of need, isolation and lack of care.18 But they are not equipped for 
patients with degenerative diseases, and specialised institutions for these peo-
ple have only recently begun to open. In conversation, the use of nursing homes 
(hogares de ancianos, or commonly asilos) is often energetically denigrated. It is 
common to hear of buildings in disrepair, a lack of supplies and equipment, food 
shortages and insufficiencies, neglect of the people accommodated and scant en-
tertainment or activities. My interviews show that making or accepting the deci-
sion to place a relative in a nursing home is generally perceived with regret and 
shame and may be interpreted as abandonment by the family. The homes run 
by religious organisations, which also receive donations and are better provided 
with staff, equipment and materials, largely escape this reputation. “There are 
long lines to get into the homes for the elderly,” Sister María Concepción told me. 
“There are so many people alone in their homes who can no longer walk up and 
down the stairs or cook for themselves. Nursing homes are full and people are on 
the waiting list, especially for religious institutions”. 
A fairly common practice for overburdened caregiving families, as well as for 
lonely people, is to seek outside help with home care. Throughout the decades of 
revolutionary government, people living alone have accommodated a non-rela-
tive who cared for the elderly in their own home until their death, in exchange 
for the promise of inheriting the house. This practice, which continues today, has 
declined for two interrelated reasons: the reestablishment of the real estate mar-
ket and the consequent rise in the value of homes (especially in tourist areas); 
and the appetites of heirs who since 2013 have been able to reclaim their right 
of return to Cuba, and who often attempt to recover real estate from legatees via 
legal proceedings (Destremau, 2021b). 
In 2002, the Ministry of Employment and Social Security established a pro-
gramme to provide geriatric home care at home to be paid for by the state in 
exceptional cases. Margarita (the doctor quoted above) told me: 
If the elderly have no one to help them, I sometimes put them in touch with 
the social worker. They are usually asked to find their own carer, because 
they have to get along with her. These people are trained as elderly carers 
18  According to official statistics, in 2018 the state subsidised 155 residential establishments (both 
public and run by religious organisations) that offered 12,346 beds, a slight rise on previous 
years (ONEI, 2019). This translates to about 1.7% of people aged 75 and over having a place 
in a nursing home. In the late 2000s, men accounted for 71% of the elderly people admitted to 
nursing homes, a reflection of the patterns of matrifocality.
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at the polyclinic for a few weeks, and the state pays them 300–400 pesos a 
month, a normal salary in the public sector.19 If people are willing and able 
to afford it, they may add a little extra money. 
As my research has progressed, I have come to realise that state-provided geri-
atric care remains relatively exceptional.20 Budgetary constraints are one reason, 
but low wages also make the profession unappealing by comparison to the in-
home care positions available on the market developing in parallel. State-paid 
care assistants often demand extra remuneration from the elderly person’s fam-
ily, or quickly register as self-employed. Family caregivers can also request to 
be paid as carers for their own parents, but the low level of wages discourages 
them. That is the reason Yanet, the Centro Habana bookseller, did not accept this 
solution: 
I can’t stop working, even though the salary from the book stall is very 
low. There are social workers who can come to your house to help you with 
people who need care, but the state only gives this to essential people with 
lots of responsibility at work. [She laughs.] That will never happen, even if 
I insist. Instead, they suggest that I stop working to take care of my mother. 
They offer me 250 pesos a month, ten dollars, what can I do with that? I 
can’t live, or feed Mum and me, especially since I have to buy many things 
that Mum needs. Mum only gets 300 pesos a month.21 In principle, social 
services should help me. Every six months, I can go and get a little mattress 
cover and a little sheet to put on top. But they almost never have nappies, 
cream or syringes. The nappies cost me a lot of money. I keep them by 
removing the wet part and adding a piece of old sheet, but the cloth nap-
pies have to be washed afterwards, and an old lady’s nappy is not a child’s 
nappy! They also don’t have syringes to feed her, because she doesn’t want 
to eat anymore. And the syringes wear out quickly, the rubber deteriorates. 
And [they don’t even have] cream for bedsores and irritation between the 
legs, which should also be applied on the bottom, between the folds of the 
stomach and under the breasts. 
The market for domestic and home care services has been growing since 1993 
(Romero Almodóvar, 2014), when the profession became an approved self-em-
19  The average salary in state entities was 471 pesos per month in 2013 and 777 pesos in 2018 
(ONEI, 2019). The rate of exchange is approximately 25 pesos to one US dollar.
20  In 2017, only 1.2% of people providing assistance or support with carrying out the basic activities 
of daily living were home social workers paid by the state (ONEI et al., 2019).
21  The average pension was 259 pesos per month in 2013, and rose to 303 in 2018 (ONEI, 2019), 
which is around 10–12 US dollars. 
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ployment activity: “caregiver for the sick, people with disabilities and the elder-
ly”. It is a diversified and hierarchical market: from the neighbour who offers 
occasional help in exchange for a small sum or a few gifts of food or clothing, to 
the employment of unqualified people, often racialised migrant women from the 
eastern part of the island.22 That is the option Yanet took: once her neighbour 
became unable to take care of her mother, who suffers from Alzheimer’s disease, 
she decided to entrust her to a lady from the east during the day, and pays for her 
in part with small sums of money sent by her sister from the United States, and 
partly with what she earns from a book stall near the bus station. 
The most expensive care assistants are nurses who have left their jobs in 
public hospitals to specialise as caregivers for the elderly, which earns them 
much more money. Two whom I contacted after seeing an ad on their door ex-
plained to me:
We charge one CUC23 for an injection, eight to ten CUC for eight hours, and 
15 for 24-hour assistance. It depends on the difficulty, and we can negotia-
te a bit. The people who come to us are people who can pay, whether they 
are high-level professionals, people with private income from the economy 
or who receive money from abroad. 
What about the poor, I ask, what about those who cannot pay? The answer 
was unequivocal.
They often don’t get much help. Many are left alone. If they have a home, 
they can take a live-in caregiver, and leave their home to them when they 
die. 
Private caregivers charge the equivalent of a monthly public salary in one or two 
days, an extremely high price for public employees or pensioners. This helps ex-
plain the hostility expressed by a geriatrician interviewed, who considers that the 
private market – which she calls the “commodification of the elderly” – “robs” 
the state of carers. I asked Yanet, my bookseller friend, “But how do people who 
don’t have money pay for home care?” Her answer was clear and confirms what 
is said is private:
22  An individual is racialised when they are perceived to belong to a group that is different, and 
which is then considered homogeneous. Using the term “racialised” instead of “black” indicates 
that I consider it to be a social construction rather than a biological category, a social relationship 
rather than skin colour.
23  Convertible peso, whose value was more or less equal to the US dollar. The CUC has been sup-
pressed by the January 2021 monetary reform.
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Everybody “invents” and does things we are not very proud of. The other 
day I was talking to a doctor at the polyclinic. She told me that when she 
comes to work she leaves her mother locked in the house all day, tied to her 
wheelchair. A doctor, can you believe it? 
However, one sign that family caregivers have become a concern for public in-
stitutions is the existence of programmes created to support families when they 
are in difficulty, exhausted and overwhelmed. In addition to consultations, both 
medical and geriatric, specialised television programmes and books, educational 
courses are being developed in polyclinics and religious training centres for car-
egivers of older people living in a state of dependency, at which they benefit from 
the advice of doctors trained in geriatric medicine or social psychologists. For the 
most part, these initiatives teach the basics about degenerative diseases and the 
ageing process, suggest appropriate gestures and attitudes and seek to develop 
the caregiver’s sensitivity to the condition and special needs of the elderly. They 
also recognise the difficulties associated with caring and teach participants how 
to avoid excessive stress, pain, frustration, depression and so on. Awareness is 
also raised of the risk of elder abuse, particularly in the context of cramped and 
dilapidated housing where several generations live together. While these training 
courses may be a step forward in creating solidarity networks among caregivers, 
they still do not offer any solution to the material difficulties families face, in 
particular with regard to the provision of disposable diapers, healthcare equip-
ment, and technical aids for mobility, which are the highest priority demands 
among those currently performing care duties for their dependent family mem-
bers (ONEI et al., 2019). 
Discussion – Tackling care needs: a challenge for Cuban social 
policies
The ageing of the Cuban population is a successful health and social policy out-
come, but it generates problems of various kinds. My contribution shows that the 
patterns of care reproduced by family-centred moral and normative frameworks 
are under great pressure, particularly due to the considerable burden they im-
pose on families, many of which are characterised by the shortage of children in 
the country, the ageing of their members, poverty, and poor housing conditions. 
This situation largely reflects the prevailing circumstances in other countries af-
fected by advanced ageing, especially those in which a cultural and moral pattern 
of family care persists, as is the case in many Latin American countries (ECLAC, 
2018; 2020; Destremau and Georges, 2017). 
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We have also seen that meeting social care needs removes large numbers of 
workers – and especially women – from a workforce already depleted by ageing 
itself. Meanwhile, the state’s capacity for intervention is hamstrung by the budg-
etary and economic crisis ongoing since the fall of the Soviet bloc in 1990 and ex-
acerbated by the tightening of the US embargo. The current monetary and fiscal 
reform does not yet suggest that this capacity will be strengthened.
However, several indicators – visible both in national surveys on ageing and 
care and in my research in Cuba – suggest that a turning point is being reached, 
and that new moral experiences and regulations are emerging to mitigate the 
preference for family care. On the one hand, the sons and daughters of elderly 
people may feel less obliged to care for their parents at the cost of their own pro-
fessional careers; or they may choose to take care of their grandchildren instead 
of their elderly parents whose greater longevity is to some extent competing for 
the time and attention of 50–65 year olds. On the other hand, as the various life 
stories collected in my book (Destremau, 2021b) show, older parents can them-
selves choose not to depend on the care of their children and take a different path 
of ageing and end their lives surrounded by their children and grandchildren. 
In fact, one result that indicates a change in family culture and practices comes 
from the national ageing survey of 2017, which cites more than 40% of those 
surveyed over the age of 50 saying they would agree to enter a nursing home if 
necessary (ONEI et al., 2019).
I asked Teresa, an 80-year-old woman I have known for many years, who 
spends much of her time and energy helping her two daughters with their house-
work and caring for their grandchildren who would take care of her when she 
was no longer able to take care of her daughters or herself. She answered without 
hesitation: 
I don’t want to add myself [to their household]. I don’t want to live with my 
daughters. I want to maintain my independence. When my daughter came 
to live with me, she followed my rules. Many elderly people find themselves 
living in their children’s home and being exploited and abused by their 
children and grandchildren. I don’t want to depend on my daughters, even 
when I’m very old. I will go to a nursing home. 
Another example is the mother of a university professor who announced to her 
children that she had applied to enter a home run by a religious organisation. 
With tears in her eyes my friend told me: 
We almost felt insulted, as if Mum didn’t consider us capable of caring for 
her. We were also ashamed of what our neighbours would say. But in the 
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end Mum went into this religious home and everything went well. We went 
to see her very often. 
Today’s older generations were born before or at the time of the triumph of the 
revolution, and they experienced a culture of political emancipation over those 
60 years. At a meeting at the National School of Public Health in Havana one 
geriatrician told me:
The generation that is coming of age is the generation that made the revo-
lution, they are highly literate and committed people with different living 
conditions, social situations and expectations from those of previous ge-
nerations. They won’t accept playing dominoes in a rocking chair all day, 
they want to have access to the internet. We have to invent new forms of 
public care.
Public authorities seem to have grasped the need to strengthen residential in-
stitutions for the elderly in order to meet growing demand and have launched 
programmes24 to improve both the quantity and quality of nursing homes. The 
religious institutions that survived the revolutionary period are now presented 
as examples of good practice. Some experimental sheltered housing has been 
opened in Old Havana to increase options and alternatives for the elderly, and 
homes are being built for people with degenerative diseases. But the decisions 
reveal that the trade-off for expanding and improving care in nursing homes is a 
drastic transformation in the methods of charging and financing. Public budgets 
used to cover almost all expenses, with residents making a token contribution 
calculated on the basis of the average level of public retirement pensions; but 
now two important changes are taking place. The first is the progressive reduc-
tion of subsidies, which translates into significantly higher fees. Another change 
is the assessment of total household income and, beyond that, of the income of 
those legally obliged to pay maintenance, even if they do not live with the ageing 
person. 
However, while Cuban public policies aim to keep the elderly integrated and 
active in their living environment, they have so far proved unable to address the 
need to coordinate medical care, professional care, the adaptation of homes to 
the loss of autonomy, informal care and the socialisation of the elderly, particu-
larly those with senile dementia. Therefore, in order not to exhaust the family as 
a model, as the researcher from CITED quoted above said, it seems necessary to 
strengthen community care in intertwined coherent local systems (Burchardt et 
al., 2018: Gross Gutiérrez and Peña Farias, 2018) that allow that the elderly to 
24  In 2011 and 2014, see: https://www.gacetaoficial.gob.cu/sites/default/files/go_x_54_2014.pdf
89Blandine Destremau
remain in their own homes for as long as possible. The option of seeking com-
mercialised care, which still lacks formal recognition needs to be included. As the 
two private caregivers mentioned above told me: “For the family doctor, we do 
not exist”. There seems to be a need for a framework to be established that can 
professionalise and socialise these services, while allowing the health authorities 
to regulate their quality and costs. This would alleviate the risk that this market 
will reconstitute domestic social and racial relations and increase social and eco-
nomic inequalities in the access to care resources. 
Beyond that, a true cultural revolution is required to meet all the needs 
ageing brings. First, as the Cuban government acknowledges, unpaid care and 
domestic work should be recognised and valued through public services, infra-
structure and social protection policies (Government of Cuba, 2019: 18). Second, 
as many researchers have argued,25 and as various resolutions recommend,26 care 
responsibilities must be redistributed between public institutions, the market, 
the family and community, men and women, and between social strata, which 
means establishing care services as a universal pillar of social protection and a 
nexus of interlinked public policies.
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Habitat Management in Old Havana:  
Housing Cooperatives as an Urban Resilience 
Mechanism for Comprehensive Rehabilitation 
and Sustainable Tourism
Threats and vulnerabilities in Old Havana: The cooperative as a 
response
Old Havana is in a state of permanent emergency. A range of forces of varying 
strength are causing unrelenting catastrophe in the city’s historic centre. The 
accumulated vulnerabilities require imminent action. But the comprehensive 
improvement strategies should extend beyond the short-term measures the 
emergency demands. Resilience, understood as a value that is indirectly pro-
portional to the risk function, is a key factor in urban settings, as it describes a 
system’s capacity to prevent, resist and regenerate in the most unfavourable sce-
narios. It is the ability to re-establish functioning in any crisis situation, adapting 
to the change provoked. In this complex context, improving resilience should 
be prioritised as a key factor in alleviating the main vulnerabilities and threats. 
Today, these are: precarious construction, social vulnerability, growing cyclonic 
activity and the impact of tourist speculation.
The dire state of the building stock in Old Havana means an alarming two 
collapses occur every three days. The pace of rehabilitation remains slower than 
the fast process of deterioration, a situation that seriously affects inhabitants. 
According to the Plan Estratégico de Desarrollo Integral 2030 (Plan Maestro, 
2017), 80% of the buildings are in permanent residential use but only a third 
are in good technical-constructive condition. Over 40% of the more than 20,000 
houses and apartments in the area fail to  meet minimum living standards (Pro-
gramas de Vivienda en el Centro Histórico de La Habana, 2010). In recent dec-
ades, the number of buildings in poor and very poor condition in the old centre 
has risen, placing a high number of households at risk. Havana is the most dense-
ly populated part of Cuba, with 20% of the island’s population living on 6% of its 
land. Along with municipalities such as Centro Habana and 10 de Octubre, Old 
Havana is one of the country’s most overcrowded areas. 
https://doi.org/10.3224/84742546.05
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The predominant housing type is the ciudadela or cuartería, a form of 
collective housing that has taken shape through a complex process of transfor-
mation over the last century. Self-building using limited resources on top of an 
already deteriorated base has led to an imploding densification within the build-
ings that has produced high levels of precariousness. In most cases, these homes 
do not meet basic habitability standards. This constant precariousness – in many 
cases closely linked to its inhabitants’ social vulnerability – and the growing de-
mand for better housing requires more effective rehabilitation mechanisms to be 
urgently developed. In 2018 the country had a housing stock of over 3.8 million 
homes, of which 39% of the buildings were in poor or fair condition. At the time, 
it was calculated that a deficit of 929,000 homes existed: 527,000 to be built and 
402,000 to be renovated (Figueredo, 2018).
Over the last two decades, Cuba has suffered serious economic losses from 
natural disasters, including a major impact on the housing sector. Since 2005, 
over 1 million housing units have been damaged and, depending on the intensi-
ty of the cyclone, 10% to 20% of the housing stock has suffered total structural 
collapse. Hurricanes have also become more frequent over the last two decades, 
with cyclonic forces regularly causing devastating impact. The vulnerability is 
exacerbated by extreme hydrometeorological phenomena and other events that 
sometimes affect the territory, such as coastal flooding due to marine incursions, 
strong winds and rain. The poor state of conservation of the buildings seriously 
threatens the stability of the structures and produces a slow and constant dete-
rioration.
In densely populated areas with compact urban morphology like Old Havana 
these threats have a very significant impact. The high volumes of debris produced 
when buildings collapse can create sanitation and waste management problems 
when post-disaster recovery processes are slow. The damage to the housing stock 
shows that preventive and sustainable models must be produced that promote a 
gradual evolution of housing quality and improve people’s living conditions and 
increase their resilience (Mesías et al., 2008).
The growth of the market is another factor, with the old central areas increas-
ingly affected by tourism growth due to their monumental and cultural interest. 
For decades, a national strategy has been in place to make tourism a driving force 
in the economy and generate capital to invest in rehabilitating the historic centre, 
a UNESCO World Heritage Site. Approximately 15% of the architectural heritage 
of Havana’s historic centre has been totally or partially rehabilitated thanks to 
these tourism-linked management mechanisms. 
According to the Master Plan, in 2017 there were 3,274 tourist rooms in 
Old Havana (13% of the Cuban capital’s total), more than half of which were 
categorised as 4 or 5 star. As well as four large hotel chains, private houses also 
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form part of this supply, providing 44% of tourist accommodation (Cruz, 2018: 
15–17).
Tourism’s role in promoting the protection of heritage and local development 
is determined by the established management model. Concessions to promote 
economic growth that are not designed as part of a comprehensive development 
strategy place social, cultural and environmental stability at risk. What is more, 
without legal frameworks that anticipate or manage their impact, real estate 
speculation phenomena may occur, like the gentrification and museumification 
of cities. Both involve the displacement of local residents, as houses are emptied 
of content in the process of conditioning the spaces for tourists.
To respond to this complex scenario, the model of the housing cooperative 
offers a potential comprehensive management and governance mechanism that 
is capable of increasing resilience in favour of sustainable and equitable devel-
opment. The International Co-operative Alliance defines a cooperative as an 
“autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common 
economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly owned and 
democratically-controlled enterprise” (ICA, 1995). This habitat management 
model is a fundamental tool for ensuring decent and affordable access to hous-
ing, and promoting the right to its use over its exchange value (Gamboa, 2018: 
112–117). In order to consolidate this form of ownership, it is based on deep 
collaborative dynamics and structured for the collective life that already exists. 
It is proposed as a mechanism for improving the housing stock on the physical, 
social and productive levels.
The proposals for housing cooperatives in Old Havana were drawn up by 
studying the best practices of other models and adapting them to the Cuban 
context. Particular attention was given to: Uruguayan mutual aid cooperatives 
(Carrizo, 2018: 106–111; Gil & Rodríguez, 1999); the cooperative habitat pro-
grammes of the Regional Government of Andalusia (Junta de Andalucía, Intend-
encia municipal de Montevideo, AECID, 1999); the incipient implementation 
of the model of cooperatives in transfer of use in Barcelona (Gamboa, 2018: 
112–117) (LACOL, 2018); and long-standing European models in countries like 
Switzerland and Denmark. To determine the model’s viability in Old Havana, its 
antecedents must be examined in terms of public policies and housing systems, 
which are understood as inseparable causes and consequences of a place’s cultu-
ra del habitar. 
Housing systems and cultura del habitar 
Housing systems, as defined by Josep María Montaner, are the set of housing 
policies, laws and plans whose long development over time both shape and are 
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shaped by the cultura del habitar. This housing culture is part of the identity of 
any community, city or country. According to Montaner (2018: 61), it links back 
to anthropology and sociology, is inserted into urban forms, shows us the ways 
people live and is expressed in their social and political solutions to the right to 
housing. To define the housing in the Havanan context, the interrelation between 
the housing systems and cultura del habitar must be taken into account and they 
must be integrated into an inseparable whole. 
The aim is to contextualise the viability and relevance of housing coopera-
tives as a social policy in the sphere of the experience of architecture, urbanism, 
technology and human geography; in short, of the historical configuration of do-
mestic life, which merits closer study. It is from understanding these processes 
that this cooperative model emerges.1
The structural changes to housing policies following the Cuban revolution 
were set out in the Urban Reform Law of 1960. Its entry into force brought 
changes to the ownership system of the “casas de vecindad”. This type of hous-
ing, which predominates in the historic centre, became state property, converting 
the inhabitants of what were small rented rooms into their beneficial owners. 
They appropriated the spaces acquired, incrementally modifying them through 
self-production, usually without technical support (Menéndez, 2007). This pro-
cess was the origin of the edificaciones multifamiliares tugurizadas (EMTs). We 
will use this term in this research to cover the domestic typologies of collective 
housing, generally cuarterías and ciudadelas, but also other mixed collective 
typologies resulting from this process that seem well-suited to management 
through housing cooperatives.
The best-known transformation of EMTs are the vertical subdivisions known 
as barbacoas (barbecues). But the catalogue of solutions for appropriating these 
homes is much more complex. What begin as isolated self-production resources 
become consolidated collective processes. Ernesto Oroza describes these pro-
cesses as technological disobedience: solutions to the same problem transmitted 
by contagion thanks to the standardisation of communist periods. In times of 
greatest need, the creativity and responses drawn from self-production experi-
ences resulted in accidental sustainability. This architecture without architects, 
in Orlando Inclán’s definition, makes up the cultural heritage of Old Havana. 
In this setting, the social production of habitat (SPH) grows out of the need 
to generate strategies to channel and enhance the efforts family groups make 
1  For a timeline of housing and urban planning since the 1959 Revolution as well as further graph-
ics illustrating the analysis see the authors’ contribution to the Foro Europa Cuba working paper 
series (# 19, September 2020).  Online: http://www.foroeuropacuba.org/en/cooperation-institu-
tional-reform-social-policies/working-papers/
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when producing their habitable space. The characterisation of the SPH allows 
a production system to be proposed that retrieves the positive aspects of the 
so-called popular settlements while at the same time helping to overcome the 
difficulties these developments present. As participation is the methodological 
backbone of these collective processes, technical support is seen as a participato-
ry social technology transfer (Mesías & Suárez, 2007).
The social production of habitat has emerged in various stages in diverse 
organised collective formats that are typical in Cuba. Housing policies gradually 
recognised esfuerzo propio and ayuda mutua (self-help and mutual aid) as the 
main means of construction, and they were regulated for the first time in the 1984 
General Housing Law (No. 48). It is interesting to note that this law introduced 
the entity of the housing cooperative, a clear reference point for the model’s vi-
ability. A temporary cooperative was defined as the grouping together of two or 
more people for the purpose of building houses for each of the members. Tech-
nical support was mostly provided by non-governmental institutions and other 
national and international actors. After this law institutionalised self-building, 
housing capacity grew in a single year from 11,000 to 40,000 (Pascual, 2018).
Four years later, in 1988, a new General Housing Law (No. 65) eliminated the 
denomination of temporary cooperatives. Among those who retained the right to 
build were agricultural cooperatives, which played an important role in the social 
production of habitat in the 1990s by opening up the possibility of housebuilding 
to their members. The Microbrigades (state and social employment) were for the 
first time recognised as a successful programme – a worthwhile experience of 
organised self-production that began in the 1970s. An internationally respected 
practice, surveys indicate that the continuation of this system is also well received 
by the population. It is the closest currently existing model to the cooperative in 
Cuba. Recent research promoted via the Master Plan shows as much: a compar-
ative framework is established between the Microbrigades and housing coopera-
tives to explain their potential by reference to their clearest point of comparison. 
The Community Architect Programme is another leading instrument for review-
ing, strengthening and taking into account the technical advice of the cooperative 
model. Since the end of the 1980s, it has provided technical support to the peo-
ple’s construction work, offering multiple services at affordable prices. Although 
the scope of its services fell short of the anticipated needs, the programme laid 
the foundations for community construction operations and the development of 
participatory design tools in all their phases (UN-HABITAT, 2014).
In self-build modalities, mass housing production most often occurs without 
integration into superior physical planning systems at the urban level. Because 
the habitat is formed of more dimensions than merely the built, comprehensive 
strategies are needed to provide a joined-up response. 
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The housing deficit also remains an ongoing challenge. The strategies for 
solving this problem in recent decades have focused on the mass production of 
houses and not on the maintenance of existing ones, meaning that losses from 
the building stock are not compensated. The rehabilitation of the building stock 
is a pressing need.
Today’s legal housing framework continues to provide for self-made housing 
construction systems, placing the focus on the rehabilitation or production of 
housing through the Microbrigades. It establishes a process of regulating and le-
galising houses, rooms, bedrooms and premises to encourage housing solutions 
for thousands of families without recognised property rights. Property regulation 
mechanisms must be adapted in order to find solutions to this situation of grave 
vulnerability.
There is a clear need for social policies that can connect the institutional and 
community spheres on issues such as managing integrated land use planning, 
infrastructure and the financing of development projects. Instruments must be 
designed that connect the people with technicians and politicians and coordinate 
at an intermediate level, prioritising networked actions over isolated meddling. 
The cooperative habitat in Old Havana
Self-managed, self-built and self-sufficient housing cooperatives
The cooperative, as a strategy, is an integration of three closely related devel-
opment axis (social–physical–productive). Addressing each area independently 
would fail to meet the needs of the proposed comprehensive development. The 
cooperative acts as a regulatory mechanism for these interrelations, presenting 
measures needed to enable the model to achieve the desired resilience.
The model proposed is that of a self-managed, self-built and self-sufficient 
housing cooperative, as these three principles form the backbone of the urban 
resilience strategy to address the need for the comprehensive rehabilitation of 
the housing stock.
Self-management is the participatory process by which the members of a 
cooperative seek out and generate the optimal living space. This model involves 
shared decision-making, which will allow the EMTs to be adapted to the specif-
ic community that inhabits it, through the development of comprehensive ac-
tions for its regeneration. Once the community consolidates self-management 
and takes ownership of its dynamics, it is equipped to face future challenges by 
reaching consensuses over the solutions to be carried out.  
Self-production is seen as the solution to rehabilitating the EMT in a way 
that responds to the varying needs of its inhabitants. The existing mutual aid 
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self-build housing processes result in the community production of residential, 
private, shared spaces, understood as a living organism that mutates to reflect 
the community’s interrelations. 
Self-sufficiency is the capacity of communities to establish productive means 
to satisfy their needs. By formalising the services the cooperatives offer, their 
members’ capacities are augmented and the community receives income it can 
reinvest in its own development. The ultimate goal is the autonomy of the co-
operative as an organism, which will be coordinated at neighbourhood level in 
order to increase urban resilience.
As such, Havana’s cooperatives adhere to the principles defined by the In-
ternational Co-Operative Alliance on Cooperative Identity: voluntary and open 
membership; democratic member control; member economic participation; 
autonomy and independence; education, training and information; cooperation 
among cooperatives; and concern for the community and environmental sustain-
ability.
The Havana housing cooperatives: Model and innovation 
The housing cooperatives seek to meet the needs described above. The coopera-
tive model is a proposal for the integrated management of the habitat, to rehabil-
itate it through collective ownership and production mechanisms. It is in essence 
a project to carry out the goals the institutions identify and meet the needs the 
communities express. 
In 2017, the Master Plan, a body attached to the Office of the Historian 
(OHCH), launched the Plan Estratégico de Desarrollo Integral 2030, a planning 
instrument for the comprehensive, prosperous and sustainable development of 
the historic centre. It brings together the premises, aims and actions for the com-
ing decade. The central purpose of this research is to instrumentalise the aims 
formulated by the institutions in a multilevel strategy.
The key elements of the model are presented below, along with the set of 
innovative measures that make up the cooperative strategy for increasing the 
resilience of Old Havana’s housing stock and communities.
Mechanism of protection and access to collective housing
The housing cooperative is considered the building’s collective ownership entity, 
and ensures the community’s development is sustainable, integrated and takes 
place in equality of conditions.
The rights associated with housing may be reduced to four basic areas: the 
right to use, to profit from, to sell and to alter the home. Cooperatives focus their 
activity on the right to transfer of use. Fundamentally, the cooperative, which 
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owns the entire building, transfers the right to use each home to its inhabitants, 
while the other rights mentioned are collectively managed. Rather than becom-
ing a consumer good, the housing’s social function is restored. That is, its use 
value takes precedence over its exchange value (LACOL, 2018).
Through collective ownership, the basic right of access to housing is ensured 
for the inhabitants of the EMTs. It is a protection mechanism against the reval-
uation of these properties, preventing them from being managed exclusively as 
financial assets. In an area that is so sought-after for its tourist appeal, manage-
ment mechanisms are needed that can regulate tourism’s impact. The aim is to 
prevent processes like speculation and gentrification and maintain Old Havana 
as a living centre (Mesías & Suárez, 2002).
The significant value houses acquire when used in the tourism sector opens 
up a huge gap with the purchasing power of their inhabitants. This imbalance 
leads many of the local people who own their homes to sell them to obtain a 
means of subsistence they could not in many cases otherwise achieve. Mean-
while, local people with fewer resources are displaced by these processes to pe-
ripheral areas, uprooting themselves from their community and the services that 
have always served them. When this happens, old towns are emptied of content 
and become mere tourist sites. For this area of Old Havana to remain alive, its 
inhabitants must be granted the stability and security they need. Guaranteeing 
communities can access the goods and infrastructures that sustain life and pre-
venting their forced eviction is the basis of the right to the city.
Comprehensive participatory rehabilitation: the social production of habitat
The housing cooperative is proposed as a response to the specific needs of a com-
munity that already lives in a collective housing model: they meet, cooperate, 
share spaces and establish care networks. The processes that formed the EMTs 
have been explained, including the different self-build projects their inhabitants 
have carried out over time. The social production of habitat (SPH) is the estab-
lished housing system that has consolidated collective self-production models. 
The SPH structure is the foundation of the cooperatives and they will require 
continuing support from a technical advisory team in order to reduce the insta-
bility of this housing via collective management. Participatory social technology 
transfer is an instrument for empowering cooperative members, who will be cen-
tral actors in their community’s development. In contrast to other cooperative 
models of self-build housing, the proposed strategy is committed to the compre-
hensive participatory rehabilitation of the building stock. 
It seems appropriate to systematise the potential technical responses that 
prioritise structural and constructive safety while taking into account the com-
plexity and richness of the existing self-build housing and construction using 
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prefabricated materials. The aim is to maintain the existing heritage of popular 
architecture, while enhancing its qualities and correcting its weaknesses. In order 
to conduct comprehensive interventions the family groups must be thoroughly 
assessed (to be performed by the technical advisors) and the duties shared with 
the rest of the community. 
Multidisciplinary accompaniment and assistance will enable the community 
to equip itself with the management capacity and tools to facilitate participatory 
design and community construction. When drawing up the strategy and actions 
to be carried out by the cooperative for its sustainable development, the coop-
erative community must learn and internalise the tools provided for applying 
participatory techniques, so that the advisors’ support is reduced until it becomes 
very occasional. 
Productive housing: sustainable tourism and actions to promote  
self-sufficiency 
The housing cooperative involves joint investment by the community (taking 
into account the complex variety of family situations) to pool its resources for 
shared, comprehensive development. In so doing, greater achievements are pos-
sible than many of the cooperative households would be able to achieve inde-
pendently. 
The high levels of precariousness in terms both of the buildings and the res-
idents’ economic instability means innovative financial mechanisms need to be 
developed that derive from the cooperative management model and complement 
the contributions of the members of the cooperative while allowing stable eco-
nomic performance to be achieved. 
A productive housing model is therefore proposed that includes strategic ac-
tions for the cooperative’s self-sufficiency and sustainability over time. Barajas 
writes that (2016: 14) productive housing functions as an urban infrastructure 
for building different types of material and intangible assets and above all dif-
ferent forms of social and productive relationships. It is important because it is 
able to bridge the dichotomy of the productive and reproductive spheres to form 
a single structure, becoming, as Silvia Federici shows, a fundamental factory of 
both the social and the urban.
Given the present need to regulate tourists’ participation in the historic cen-
tre, the first strategic action should be to integrate tourism in a sustainable way, 
to make it part of the cooperative in a process of mutual inclusion. Spaces ded-
icated to tourism should be set up within the collective housing infrastructure. 
These may be tourist accommodation, using EMTs’ collective facilities, or the es-
tablishment on the ground floor of any type of productive use (shop or hospital-
ity), taking advantage of the exchange relationships that occur on the thresholds 
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of the houses in Old Havana. The key lies in the collective management of these 
spaces by the communities which – following the model already established by 
the Office of the Historian – would reinvest tourism revenues directly into the 
comprehensive rehabilitation of the heritage. The mixing of uses at urban level 
is thus promoted in order to generate a network of services that use the tourist’s 
economic contributions to supply the housing cooperatives. 
Activities that promote the cooperative’s self-sufficiency should not come 
only from tourism. This economic boost should be complemented by a pro-
gramme that aims to promote creative economies and the various services (so-
cial, cultural, productive) often carried out informally by the residents of Old 
Havana. Cooperatives should open up to the city, offering community spaces and 
knowledge transfer that respond to the community’s needs while at the same 
time promoting cooperative values. They can also support self-production work-
shops and technical training in which members of the cooperative produce the 
elements necessary for the physical rehabilitation of EMTs from the local level. 
Finally, the possibility is contemplated of using the cooperative to generate clean, 
renewable energy for the supply of heat and electricity: this may be profitable in 
terms both of meeting the needs of the cooperative itself, and supplying the rest 
of the community. 
The cooperative inhabits (collaborates in the city’s culture and social ac-
tions), builds (participates in the rehabilitation of the historic centre), produces 
(generates profitable services for public use), and forms part of a management 
network and collaboration with other cooperatives. Expanding the offer of ser-
vices (social, technical, productive, tourism) is a response to the specific needs 
of the historic centre. Neighbourhood management through a collaboration and 
feedback network is needed that allows lessons to be drawn from the model im-
plemented, in order to improve and possibly replicate it across the rest of the 
Cuban territory. 
The Cooperative as a Strategy
Once the key elements of the proposed cooperative housing model have been 
defined, we must address its implementation in Old Havana. In terms of strategy, 
the cooperative aims to define the form of its implementation and viability, from 
its management as a public policy at municipal level through to the development 
of a comprehensive improvement project in an EMT.
The strategy consists of four phases that structure the process. Each will be 
shaped by a series of guidelines and instruments included in the Marco Regu-
lador Cooperativista (MRC), the proposal’s regulatory framework, compendium 
and core component. Its development is intended to guide the institutional re-
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form, generating tools specifically designed to make each of the stages possible, 
from promotion and evaluation to financing, and providing the keys to its partic-
ipatory community development. Finally, a set of actors are defined as essential 
structures in its institutional and community viability. After studying the current 
management of Old Havana, new agents are proposed that can coordinate the 
process and would join the existing organisation of the Office of the Historian 
of the City of Havana. The OHCH structure can guarantee the full development 
of the heritage rehabilitation, linking it not only to the recovery of buildings and 
public spaces but also to society, housing, education and health programmes, and 
humanitarian issues.
The OHCH’s interdisciplinary bodies and directorates general work together 
to manage and execute the recovery, revitalisation and rehabilitation programmes 
of the historic centre (Rodríguez, 2000). Far from being a rigid structure, the 
work is coordinated via a complex network of relationships between the different 
actors, as well as with universities and national and international institutions 
and organisations. The Office of the Historian’s duties and values mean it should 
play an essential role in fostering the management and regulation of cooperative 
production. Similarly, as the body in charge of urban planning and management 
in the Priority Zone for Conservation, the Master Plan (2017) should accommo-
date the development, promotion, monitoring and feedback of the MRC, the ba-
sic mechanism for creating and empowering housing cooperatives.
To make the cooperative model a reality, cooperative actors will have to act 
as conductors and intermediaries between the OHCH and the communities that 
live in the EMTs. The Uruguayan cooperative model of mutual aid has been used 
as a reference for defining these new structures, adapting them to the Cuban con-
text and inserting them into the existing management organisation. 
The phases are the backbone of the process and as it develops they integrate 
the role of each actor and the specific guidelines and instruments designed for 
each stage. Each phase features a back and forth process between institutions 
and communities through simultaneous top-down and bottom-up bidirectional 
feedback. 
Phase 1. Starting the cooperative 
The first necessary condition for implementing the cooperative model is a mech-
anism that makes the community’s collective ownership of the building it inhab-
its viable. Currently, multi-family buildings are broken down into individual legal 
entities grouped into conventional family units. In order of increasing vulner-
ability, they may be homeowners, beneficial owners, or find themselves in the 
state rental system or illegally squatting. In recent years, mechanisms have been 
established for the transfer of home ownership, focusing on community building 
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and rehabilitation. The implementation of a legal framework for collective tenure 
is therefore one of the most important steps in making this habitat management 
model viable in the long term. 
Pilot projects are set up in order to establish viability precedents at munic-
ipal level, with Old Havana acting as a laboratory for the cooperative system of 
building rehabilitation to resolve the housing deficit. The aim is for the previous-
ly discussed relationship between housing systems and the cultura del habitar 
to work in both directions. If this new form of habitat management successfully 
consolidates collective housing models, there will be repercussions for housing 
systems in terms of deeper legislative and institutional reforms. As mentioned, 
the most recent update to Cuba’s Housing Law promotes social production of 
habitat models and recognises the Microbrigades as a system. In turn, the “Con-
ceptualization of the Cuban Economic and Social Model of Socialist Develop-
ment” recognises cooperative ownership as one of the main forms of ownership, 
as does the new Constitution of the Republic of Cuba approved in 2018.
The proposed instrument for implementing the pilot projects is a Coopera-
tive Habitat Programme in which the organised groups living in the EMT con-
stitute a collective ownership association, as a group of their own. This or any 
similar framework would be useful as an intermediate way of testing and pro-
moting the cooperative housing model without the protection of a specific legal 
ownership framework. This programme would function as a call for pilot projects 
run by the Office of the Historian, and would require start-up funding to ensure 
it possessed the necessary resources. The Andalusian government’s self-build co-
operative housing model has been taken as a reference. Studying its replicability 
and importation would require a broader comparative research exercise to find 
valid synergies for cooperation between cities twinned with Havana like Cádiz 
and Seville.
In the Cuban context, the Cooperative Habitat Programme would be man-
aged by Department of Housing Cooperative Projects. This coordinating actor’s 
fundamental requirements and operations would be established by the OHCH. 
Once the model is implemented, it would be responsible for accompanying co-
operative housing construction from the formation of the groups of people to 
the end of construction. It would be in charge of managing the activity and 
involvement of the different actors involved in the process, while at the same 
time serving as a meeting point for them, facilitating communication and creat-
ing synergies between them. Specifically, it would supervise the performance of 
non-profit technical advisory organisations by monitoring and evaluating their 
compliance with their rights and obligations. This body, a mirror-image of the 
Uruguayan Cooperative Center, could be part of the OHCH’s General Directorate 
of Architecture and Urbanism, which would encourage coordination with the ex-
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isting departments. This is a fundamental role for monitoring and evaluating the 
activities undertaken and applying facilitation mechanisms and instruments, in 
order to identify improvements that may aid the different actors or the process 
itself. It will also aid the search for synergies with international cooperation pro-
cesses in order to facilitate the exchange of practices and the systematisation and 
accumulation of participatory housing production experiences to identify possi-
ble solutions to apply to new cases.
A second fundamental actor emerges in phase 1, without which the devel-
opment of the cooperative project would not be possible. These are the technical 
advisory teams, whose services must be contracted by the community in order 
to begin the cooperative process. The technical advisory teams  are multidisci-
plinary units of specialists qualified to advise on every part of the process: le-
gal, social, technical-spatial and economic. They are commissions specialised in 
management, execution and monitoring that accompany the community through 
the phases of their cooperative project. They would form part of the business sys-
tem within the OHCH’s General Directorate of Investment/Construction and be 
directly involved with the office’s other agents, particularly the DPCV (in charge 
of coordinating their involvement). But they would work most continuously with 
the communities. The studies by Gustavo Romero and Rosendo Mesías (2004) 
and experiences like the Community Architect Programme reveal what technical 
advice is sought in Cuba and the role and level of participation required of these 
technical teams to transfer knowledge and capacity in management, action and 
development to the communities. These teams would be trained in participative 
methodologies and would control the application of techniques and methods, 
and assess and encourage their adaptation and appropriation by the community. 
The technical advisory teams would support the definition of the coopera-
tive’s internal structure and formalise all the components needed to conclude the 
first phase with the Act of Foundation. A key concept is that the mechanisms for 
forming a cooperative are not enough, cooperativists must be trained. 
A process of educating, training and raising awareness among EMT inhab-
itants is therefore essential to establish a community with a shared interest in 
starting a process of joint and comprehensive development, which opts for the 
cooperative process as the way to undertake a systemic improvement of their 
habitat through self-management, self-sufficiency and self-production.
Phase 2. Evaluating the cooperative habitat
In this phase the cooperative is formed, with the communities and the technical 
advisory teams the key players. The latter act as moderators in the decision-mak-
ing and negotiation of the parties involved. The relationship between the advi-
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sory team and the community is strengthened, and at the end of this phase they 
will decide the scope of the cooperative project and complete its consolidation.
To begin with, a comprehensive assessment of the cooperative habitat is nec-
essary, evaluating its three parts: physical, social and productive. Nine compo-
nents are measured according to the parameters and indicators established for 
the specific context of Old Havana. The cooperative framework (MRC) sets out 
all the assessment instruments, establishing guidelines that are both defined and 
at the same time open and responsive, in order that they may later be adapted to 
each case. An evaluation methodology has been designed that reflects the typolo-
gy of the EMT and its self-build processes as part of the heritage of Old Havana. 
This typological analysis of the SPH will be classified and gathered in line with 
the MRC’s guidelines. 
We developed a model analysis form that includes the core components es-
tablished, which may be expanded using whatever information the technical ad-
visory teams consider relevant to each case. In this form, a typical survey of an 
EMT has been carried out – a cuartería in which we place a hypothetical sample 
of 15 families. Using this model, we categorise 15 different self-build combina-
tions and compose a possible physical reality. This reconstruction is based on 
studying the EMTs via site visits and studies, photographs and reference docu-
ments. The data for studying social and productive conditions are obtained from 
the Population and Housing Census of the National Office of Statistics and Infor-
mation (ONEI, 2014), drawing on the most up-to-date statistics in documents 
from the Master Plan for Old Havana. From this, we obtain the profiles of the 
inhabitants of the potential cooperative model in order to as accurately as possi-
ble gather information on the diversity of the inhabitants of the historic centre. 
Physical assessment:
The physical characterisation of the structure and self-building is established by 
measuring four states: material composition, age, pathologies and critical points. 
The technical advisory teams will make the final assessment of each housing unit 
and the shared spaces in order to draw up a technical report on the elements that 
require repair and determine their diligence.
With the level of overcrowding in Old Havana being a critical factor, it is 
vital to measure the occupied and built areas to set them against the number of 
inhabitants. The access to services aims to determine the provision of water, san-
itation, bathroom/shower and kitchens in the home and/or community spaces. 
Supply should be measured by capacity and surface area, as well as the distance 
to services if they are shared. Cataloguing the electrical and household applianc-
es available to the home is recommended, as it can indicate needs that may be 
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addressed collectively, while an assessment of the state of grid connections is also 
advisable.
Social evaluation: 
For the detailed study of the inhabitants’ social conditions, each user’s character-
istics are determined, along with their individual circumstances, position within 
the household and the role they play in the community. Family composition is 
classified according to whether it is a single-person, nuclear, non-nuclear or sin-
gle-parent household. By analysing each household and its structure the aim is to 
identify social vulnerability as a parameter. 
It is essential to use surveys to gather the qualitative data that is relevant 
to the project’s development in each case: the interpersonal relationships in the 
community, the proximity to the tourist, the level of rootedness, and so on. The 
more thorough the advisory team’s knowledge of the community is, the better it 
can design the necessary joint responses and actions. 
The tenure status of their housing is essential to the shift to collective tenure. 
For the formation of the cooperative, the decision on the transfer of property and 
the new acquisition of rights must be unanimous. 
Productive evaluation: 
To evaluate the income of members of a cooperative project, it is important to 
measure the productive contribution each user and/or household can make to 
the development of the cooperative. This contribution can be determined in 
terms of money or labour. This is necessary for the implementation of the priori-
ty strategic actions of the next phase and will require the profiles of the users and 
their skills to be studied. 
The socio-economic profiles of the families are distinguished by whether 
they could contribute an extra payment, a budget-adjusted contribution, re-
quest assistance that could be paid in instalments or, ultimately, non-refundable 
assistance in cases of greatest vulnerability. Similarly, the degree and form of 
users’ participation in key community development activities will be evaluated 
according to physical capabilities and availability. As part of this, the method is 
established of quantifying the hours of work that correspond to each user and the 
resulting contribution each household may make to the cooperative. 
The cross-cutting analysis of these three dimensions is the basis for the ne-
gotiation process that will result in the binding contract establishing the coop-
erative’s principles and statutes. Mediation by the technical advisory is essential 
to build a gradual process of agreements at the physical, social and productive 
levels. Assemblies will be held to negotiate the contributions and scope of each 
individual and household in this new collective organisation based on the param-
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eters described above. These agreements will make up the sections of a document 
that is agreed upon but also reviewable and adaptable in line with the project’s 
development. Each community will have a tailor-made process, but the common 
factor lies in the training of cooperative members: users of a new way of living in 
a process of reclaiming the collective. 
Phase 3. Strategic productive action 
Once the cooperative is consolidated, an analysis of all the components will result 
in the prioritisation of the actions that require immediate resolution. These are 
expected to be the transformation and improvement of the critical physical con-
ditions that require urgent correction to meet basic living standards. 
At the same time, productive strategic action will be launched to provide an 
innovative financing mechanism. As mentioned above, this will materialise in the 
generation of services that bring tourists into the cooperatives, so that their eco-
nomic contribution can drive the development of the comprehensive improve-
ment process. This must be put in place in the short term, and is a safe initial 
investment that not all communities will be able to benefit from in the same way. 
To address this imbalance and ensure the historic centre’s development is 
comprehensive, the creation of a Housing Cooperatives Finance Unit is pro-
posed, which would be responsible for providing financing to projects that co-
operatives self-manage in order to strengthen their competitiveness. This body 
would be established in the General Directorate of Investment/Construction and 
would benefit from the support of the other directorates and bodies. The partic-
ipation of the Economic Directorate is particularly important, as it could divert 
some of the funds collected for the rehabilitation of the historic centre to the unit. 
On the one hand, the money would be used to create a revolving fund to grant 
microcredits for the execution of projects promoted and managed by housing 
cooperatives. This would offer credit lines to be repaid in full or in part, allocated 
to the co-financing of investment projects for the promotion and development 
of cooperatives. On the other hand, a renewable fund would be set up to grant 
non-repayable assistance to housing cooperatives in need of an economic boost 
to invest in developing their productive activities.
Depending on the funds available, the finance unit would open calls for 
cooperatives (via their technical advisory team) to submit their requests based 
on the social–physical–productive evaluation and the project to be carried out, 
meaning the funds could be awarded based on criteria of equity and solidarity. 
However, the funds may not be enough. An aid channel should therefore be con-
sidered that includes the participation of the interdisciplinary international co-
operation body, which would enable very vulnerable communities to participate 
who need targeted support to embark on the cooperative process. 
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Such groups may be those who at any time during the cooperative process 
lack the funds to hire a technical advisory team and are unable to develop a pro-
ject by themselves to present to the economic funding calls. Or they may be coop-
eratives that have developed projects that address their needs alongside advisory 
teams but which involve significant costs or specialised help. They may be com-
munities with shortages of active people (mentally, physically or economically) 
to manage the cooperative profitably, or with buildings in very poor structural or 
constructive condition, which require specialists. The former could receive finan-
cial or advisory assistance, provided it fits the requirements of the MRC; while 
the latter show the need for integrated and constant support.
In response, two financing channels are considered. The first is an aid pack-
age generated by donations from international entities that provide financial 
resources for the promotion of housing cooperatives in highly vulnerable commu-
nities. If the funds deriving from the Economic Directorate are insufficient, they 
could be topped up with resources from this package. The second is a database of 
international organisations that may agree to international cooperation projects 
in the form of comprehensive support for the formation of housing cooperatives. 
This aid answers the specific needs of very vulnerable communities that require 
support that goes beyond the economic and involves stable accompaniment. De-
veloping housing cooperatives through international cooperation projects would 
mean external actors offering their responses to the Cuban cooperative process. 
As well as increasing the visibility of different ways of operating, this would ex-
pand the range of measures and instruments and thereby enrich the MRC.
The technical advisory team will be responsible for the design and formula-
tion of this strategic productive action as well as managing its start-up and op-
eration. The members of the cooperatives will participate in this phase in order 
to supervise and approve the entire process carried out by the technical team. 
At the same time, throughout the process they will learn the technical advisory 
team’s methodologies, techniques and instruments. The technical advisory team 
will also need to be aware of its role, the main focus of which will be the transfer 
of knowledge and skills to the cooperative community. The Cooperative Projects 
Directorate will follow up on these activities, while the technical team must adapt 
the MRC’s guidelines and instruments to each community.
Phase 4. Community development project 
With the strategic productive action underway and the most pressing damage 
repaired, the building’s comprehensive rehabilitation strategy is designed (by 
the technical advisory team and the community), based on the parameters an-
alysed and the experience acquired. Taking the composition of the cooperative 
into account, a progressive and participatory process of community construction 
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is defined that is dedicated to promoting the social production of habitat and the 
use of local self-build techniques, managing the project collectively and generat-
ing activities that favour its self-sufficiency. The aim of this whole process is to 
increase the resilience of the communities by building in a network. 
The community will guide the process in this phase. The cooperative’s mem-
bers will have gained the basic skills from the technical team in the previous 
phase, and the community prepares for the comprehensive self-management of 
the complex with the technical advisory team’s support and accompaniment. The 
MRC will provide the process with a multitude of facilitating instruments, such as 
the participatory design and community construction techniques (Oliveras et al., 
2007) that will be essential for this phase to develop properly. These instruments 
are drawn from best practices from international and national experiences that 
are applicable to the current project, and which the advisory teams must assess 
and adapt to the cooperative communities. In order to operate independently, 
cooperatives may obtain a Certificate of Self-Sufficiency when they have acquired 
the knowledge and skills related to the management and construction of their 
housing complex. However, to present a development project they must have the 
support of a technical advisory team (preferably the one worked with previously).
In order to achieve sustainable self-sufficiency, in this phase the cooperative 
has three key self-sufficiency actions (social, technical and productive) to gen-
erate community-managed spaces that complement those already adapted for 
tourists. 
Cooperatives could host community spaces for passing on knowledge related 
to the technology transfer – a process of generation, adaptation and collective 
transmission of knowledge that aims to obtain permanent, evolutionary results 
in the community where it is carried out (Romero & Mesías, 2004: 49). These 
transfers are always possible in two directions, and between various groups and 
individuals. This community space could be used for the internal activities of the 
cooperative and for collective activities in the neighbourhood, forming part of a 
network of community spaces with complementary functions.
Cooperatives must underline the importance of the complexity of self-build 
combinations, as well as of using parts prefabricated by the cooperative itself 
through self-production workshops and technical training. These workshops will 
be especially useful during the community construction phase, as they will allow 
self-builders to produce their own building components. Acquiring this knowl-
edge also allows subsequent economic returns through the sale of prefabricat-
ed parts, training workshops and knowledge transfer, which work in a network. 
This will facilitate access to prefabricated materials and components suited to the 
specific processes of the social production of Havana’s housing and habitat, re-
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duce material purchasing prices, and develop on-site production systems and the 
manufacture of innovative components by the commercial sector (Ortiz, 2007).
The last step towards self-sufficiency – solar and photovoltaic energy pro-
duction – is considered feasible. A minimal initial rooftop installation would 
achieve heat and electricity energy self-sufficiency for the cooperative and its 
partners. In the long term, joint investments could be made with more coopera-
tives or neighbouring buildings in order to set up larger installations and share 
the energy collected. In both cases, the possibility of returning surplus energy to 
the public grid in an accessible way is considered to be a productive option.
Developing joint actions will multiply the effects of the services offered by 
the different cooperatives. Key to this will be the creation of a network of produc-
tive housing cooperatives in the historic centre for collaboration and joint learn-
ing, which acts as a body of the OHCH. Such networks play an essential role in 
essential role in the Uruguayan cooperative movement and federations like FUC-
VAM and FECOVI. The network would fit within the framework of the OHCH’s 
General Directorate of Culture and Education, benefitting from its resources for 
the training and capacitation of cooperatives and complementing them with the 
services the cooperatives offer. In turn, it would serve as a direct link with the 
People’s Councils in the historic centre, which will act as neighbourhood manag-
ers under the coordination of this network.
At the beginning of the cooperative process, this network would be respon-
sible for disseminating and promoting cooperative principles and values among 
the actors participating in the process (mainly the OHCH and communities). It 
would offer technical and professional training linked to cooperativism, and pro-
mote theoretical and practical learning to strengthen the social economy. The 
need would end with the development of self-build and capacity-building activ-
ities by the cooperatives themselves. When the housing cooperatives begin to 
self-build, the network would function as a meeting point for sharing experiences 
and would facilitate synergies between their actions (social, physical and pro-
ductive) to bring consistency to the work in the historic centre. At the end of the 
projects, the network would continue to coordinate the provision of services by 
the housing cooperatives and would be in charge of publicising them among the 
population.
The aim of this cooperation between cooperatives is for each community to 
participate in a network of relationships that allows joint, sustainable and com-
prehensive development of the historic centre of Old Havana.
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Conclusions
The challenge presented by the current housing problem in Old Havana cannot 
be addressed from a single disciplinary perspective. This research, which began 
with the intention of providing a technical response to the self-build complexity 
in the historic centre, therefore results in a comprehensive strategy that aims 
to include all possible dimensions of the built reality. Housing cooperatives are 
proposed as a reflection of the cultura del habitar of Havana communities, con-
solidating and regulating the processes that already exist and acting as interme-
diaries in the management of the institutional objectives and the needs of the 
communities. Through this strategy, a model is proposed that complements the 
existing management of Old Havana.
Faced with this scenario of growth, sustainable development models are 
needed that are committed to a housing balance that protects the local popula-
tion from urgent threats. Social policies based on the participation of the com-
munities as key actors in the process must be introduced, with their direct impact 
ensured by their materialisation as institutional reforms. We must progress to-
wards more effective and complex forms of organisation that guarantee rehabili-
tation, tenure and access to decent, inclusive and diverse housing. This research 
opens up reflections on the current scenario and proposes mechanisms, actions 
and responses from other models of habitat management.
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Anicia García Álvarez / Betsy Anaya Cruz 
Food Access in Cuba: Current Situation and 
Challenges
Introduction 
As a country, Cuba places great importance on food security. Indeed, all the doc-
uments approved by the 7th Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba and sub-
sequently endorsed by the National Assembly of People’s Power explicitly state 
that. The Conceptualización del modelo económico y social cubano de desar-
rollo socialista recognises Cuban citizens’ fundamental right to food (see PCC, 
2017: 5, 12). Among the guiding principles of the Plan nacional de desarrollo 
hasta el 2030 is the need to achieve greater self-sufficiency from domestic food 
production, increase the productivity and sustainability of agri-food chains in 
order to strengthen food security and make food production a strategic sector for 
the country and the necessary guarantee for exercising the right to food (see PCC, 
2017: 15, 18, 21). Meanwhile, the Lineamientos para el período 2016–2021 ad-
dress issues related to all dimensions of food security (see PCC, 2017: 28–31).
In general terms, Cuba’s average daily food consumption indicators are satis-
factory when compared to nutritional recommendations. However, these results 
do not reflect the complexity of the issue, because access to food is a constant 
concern for many Cuban families.
This chapter aims to determine whether a food access problem really exists 
in the country, what its main manifestations and consequences are, and what can 
be done to alleviate tensions in this regard. It is structured into five sections: this 
introduction is the first; the second addresses the fundamental concepts related 
to food and nutrition security (FNS); the third, the current food availability and 
distribution channels in Cuba; the fourth, the issue of access, which is the central 
component of this work; and finally the fifth contains some ideas on how to im-
prove access to food based on the current situation.
https://doi.org/10.3224/84742546.06
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Conceptual aspects of FNS
The concept of food security within a country means that “all people, at all times, 
have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that 
meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” 
(World Food Summit 1996, cited by FAO, 2019).
It contains four fundamental dimensions: availability, access, consumption 
and utilisation, and the stability over time of the previous three (see FAO, 2019). 
Availability refers to food production, imports, storage and the food aid the 
country receives. To estimate it, post-harvest losses and exports must be deduct-
ed.
Access may be physical or economic. The lack of physical access refers to 
food being unavailable in sufficient quantities where its consumption is need-
ed. Issues such as the isolation of certain communities and the lack of road, 
transport, storage and distribution infrastructure can be obstacles to adequate 
physical access on a permanent or temporary basis. Economic access is linked to 
people having the income to feed themselves with regularity, quality and dignity 
given the levels of food prices.
Consumption concerns whether household food supplies satisfy nutritional 
needs and cultural and diversity preferences. It also considers factors such as 
safety, dignity, the hygienic condition of homes and equitable distribution within 
the household.
Safety takes in the risks associated with food that may impact people’s health, 
both those that are natural and those caused by contamination, pathogens or that 
may increase the risk of chronic diseases such as cancer, cardiovascular diseases 
and diabetes, among others.
Utilisation refers to biological use and is linked to the nutritional status that 
results from the individual use of foods (ingestion, absorption and utilisation) 
and health status.
All FNS components are equally important and none is sufficient to guaran-
tee it alone; rather, a combination of all of them is needed to secure FNS objec-
tives.
Food availability and distribution
To assess food availability in Cuba, data is taken from the National Statistics Of-
fice (ONE) publication Consumo de alimentos, which is available up until 2008 
(ONE, 2009). It evaluates the contribution of apparent food consumption in 
terms of macro and micronutrients per person per day, and contrasts it with the 
nutritional recommendations for the Cuban population.
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Apparent consumption is a calculation based on food distribution (see ONE, 
2007). It provides an approximate picture of what the public consumes in terms 
of food distributed through retail, social consumption, public food, self-con-
sumption, currency stores and agricultural markets. This estimate takes into 
account losses in the distribution chain from inedible portions and cooking and 
household waste.
Retail includes food distributed via direct sales to the population by produc-
ers and/or distributors to satisfy rationed consumption (quotas), diets, camp-
ing grounds and other allocations that enter the retail network of non-rationed 
goods. The allocations linked to rationed consumption are universal in scope, 
with every Cuban citizen receiving this allowance; however, there is differenti-
ation according to age group. For example, children 0–6 years old receive the 
equivalent of one litre of milk every day. Medical diets that vary in accordance 
with the particular requirements of a condition are issued via prescription. Other 
retail sales are made according to demand.
Social consumption consists of the allocation of food to education, public 
health, sport and other sectors. These other allocations include cyclical con-
sumption (e.g. sugar harvests) and that designated to training, sailing and cabo-
tage crew, special fishing fleets, and defence agencies (MININT and MINFAR), 
among others.
Public food is what is delivered to the restaurant and catering sector for sub-
sequent sale to the public through its establishments and for the preparation of 
meals and buffets for special trains and similar services, as well as the allocations 
that ensure the functioning of workers’ canteens. Sales through the restaurant 
and catering sector are made according to demand, while workers benefit from 
guaranteed supply through the workers’ canteens.
Self-consumption refers to food that is intended for the consumption of sec-
tors that generate agricultural production, such as private peasants, state-owned 
agricultural companies, non-specialised agricultural production organisations, 
agricultural production cooperatives (CPAs, in the Spanish initials) and basic 
units of cooperative production (UBPCs).
Food is also sold in establishments previously called “foreign-currency 
shops”1 that are operated by several different chains (e.g. TRD, Tiendas Pan-
americanas and Caracol). 
1  The prices of the products in these stores were originally denominated in US dollars. They are 
currently given in Cuban convertible pesos (CUC). For a few years these establishments have also 
sold in Cuban pesos (CUP), for which the CADECA currency exchange rate is used. It should be 
noted that this chapter was written in early 2020, and that since July 20th 2020, direct food sales 
to the public in dollars have resumed.
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In 2008, food was distributed via these channels in the proportions shown 
in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Nutritional contribution of apparent food consumption by distribution 
source, 2008 .
Source: compiled by authors based on ONE data (2009): Consumo de alimentos 2008, September 
2009 edition, Havana.
The retail trade mainly serves regulated or rationed consumption, and it is this 
channel that makes the largest contribution to apparent food consumption. In 
2008 it contributed most significantly in terms of energy, while in terms of fat 
barely exceeded a third of the total.
The second most important channel was self-consumption, with social con-
sumption the third. These distribution channels are available only to the appli-
cable people in each case. Their scope is not universal, but in 2008 they had a 
greater impact than the pathways determined by demand.
There is no information on food distribution by channel for the last ten 
years. However, based on the measures implemented in the context of updating 
the Cuban economic and social model, in some of the channels the following 
behaviour may be expected:
 •  Retail: regulated food sales are maintained; however, retail sales are rising 
of certain basic foods by the state at differentiated prices. Prices in this last 
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that would emerge if only agricultural markets and foreign currency sales 
functioned.
 •  Social consumption: likely to have fallen due to closures of countryside high 
schools with scholarship students.
 •  Public food: has probably decreased as a result of the closure of many of the 
workers’ canteens.
 •  Self-consumption: should have increased since the policy of transferring idle 
land for beneficial use.
 •  Agricultural markets: using estimates based on the sales indices, these showed 
a tendency to grow until 2016; in the last two years they have decreased and 
a shortage is observed.
 •  Foreign exchange market: no information is available, but in recent years the 
import adjustment related to rising short-term debts with suppliers has also 
led to a contraction of supply.
In the absence of official figures on apparent food consumption after that date, 
availability has been estimated based on information relating to domestic pro-
duction and imports. The losses corresponding to distribution, inedible porti-
ons and cooking have been deducted, according to the indices used in national 
planning. Exports are also discounted (including those allocated to tourism). The 
results are shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Apparent food consumption of the Cuban population.
Source: compiled by authors using ONE data (various years, “Food Consumption” and Anuarios Esta-
















































































































































































Based on the estimates for the most recent period, a decline in protein and fat 
availability is observed as of 2008, affecting one of the components of food secu-
rity. For these macronutrients, what is available has been oscillating around the 
required level.
On the other hand, this availability is to a large extent supported by food 
imports (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. Contribution of domestic production and imports to apparent food 
consumption in Cuba.
Source: compiled by authors.
Import dependency is higher for proteins, but imports also supply over a third 
of dietary energy. An estimate of the import contribution in terms of fats has not 
been made, but it is undoubtedly high given the shortage of domestic production 
sources. 
External purchases of food average around $2 billion per year and represent 
between 15% and 20% of total goods imports (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. Food imports as a share of total goods imports (1989–2018).
Source: compiled by authors using ONE data (several years).
Among the items the country currently imports are rice, beans, edible oils, meat, 
fish, wheat and other cereals, milk, fruit, vegetables and protein for animal feed 
(see Figure 5). Several of these items are acquired in order to fulfil regulated 
consumption and social consumption quotas. Some research (García, 2009; Gar-
cía, Barrios and Echevarría, 2010) shows that almost half could be replaced with 
domestic production. While there has been a marked emphasis on achieving this 
goal since 2008, not enough progress has been made over this decade. Rather 
than substituting imports for domestic production, a process of administrative 
import contraction has occurred due to the low availability of financial resources 
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Figure 5. Structure of food imports.
Source: compiled by authors using ONE data (several years).
This tension in external finances is closely linked to the country’s poor export per-
formance. In recent years, goods exports have shrunk systematically, with a cu-
mulative fall of 60% between 2011 and 2018. To this is added the loss of income 
from medical services due to the agreements ending with Brazil and Bolivia, and 
the economic difficulties in Venezuela, a key destination. This puts acquisition 
in foreign markets at risk, both of food and inputs for agricultural production.
Specifically, a permanent deficit in the agricultural trade balance has ex-
isted since 2001 due to the loss of the sugar agribusiness, which was for many 
years the engine of the Cuban economy (see Figure 6). As a whole, the value of 
agro-product exports comprises less than a quarter of that generated in 1989.
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Figure 6. Agricultural trade balance.
Source: compiled by authors using ONE data (several years).
Food access 
In terms of physical access, not enough food is always supplied to the markets 
to guarantee people’s nutritional demands and needs are fully met. Several fac-
tors affect this: the seasonality of domestic production (around 70% of harvests 
are in the winter months); the lack of adequate infrastructure for the storage, 
conservation and processing of these products in order to maintain systematic 
supply throughout the year; and other aspects already mentioned in the previous 
section, such as, for example, cuts to food imports.
Rationed consumption is able to guarantee a level of both physical and eco-
nomic access to food via highly subsidised prices. The quantities it provides meet 
the nutritional recommendations for those under seven years old. However, they 
do not guarantee the necessary dietary diversity. In particular, they do not pro-
vide foods that are rich in dietary fibre, or fresh fruit and vegetables. For those 
aged seven or older, they provide around 55% of the recommended energy, 50% 
of the recommended protein, and a third of the fat. The population group aged 
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mended energy, 34% of the recommended protein and 26% of the fat).2 In these 
cases the problem of low diversity remains.
To meet nutritional needs use must be made of the various forms of free 
market, where high food prices prevail. Some of these markets show an upward 
trend in prices over recent years (see García and Anaya, 2017).
Certain groups face access disadvantages due to income. Among them are 
the beneficiaries of social assistance, retirees and workers in the budgeted state 
sector without an additional income source other than what they receive via pen-
sions and salaries. This problem may be more prevalent among female heads 
of household and single mothers who depend solely on their salaries or social 
assistance and who do not have a family support network.
In Cuba, systematic surveys are made of households’ economic situation, but 
this information is not in the public domain. Hence, the authors of this work have 
addressed the issue in several studies (see Anaya and García, 2007; 2014; 2018a; 
and 2018b). The estimate is based on constructing a budget of basic expenses for 
a household of three for one month.3 
As the sociodemographic composition of a three-person household may vary, 
several possible structures were considered: two adults of working age and one 
elderly person (with pension and without); one adult of working age, a minor and 
an elderly person (with pension and without); two adults of working age and one 
minor. Each family structure produces its own level of household income and 
generates different food expenses due to the varied access to subsidised sources 
and their distinct levels of household income. Other expenses may differ due to 
the presence of an elderly person in the home who requires particular expend-
iture on medicines or certain foods, but without gathering specific information 
these details cannot be known.
Of the basic expenses per household, those that grant access to essential liv-
ing conditions have been considered: food, clothing and footwear, hygiene and 
cleaning products, medicines, transport, electricity, water and gas. These expens-
es do not include education or health services, as the state provides those uni-
versally and free of charge; nor do they include rent, as most people live in their 
own homes.
Table 1 shows the contrast between estimated per capita food expenditure 
and average and minimum wages and pensions corresponding to 2017 and 
2  The nutritional recommendations for the Cuban population by the Institute of Nutrition and Food 
Hygiene in October 2008 have been used for the calculations (see INHA-Minsap, 2008).
3  This is the approximate average household size in Cuba, according to the 2012 Population and 
Housing Census (see ONEI, 2014: 69).
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2018.4 The comparison with the total basic consumption expenses referred to 
above is also included. Following the same methodology as previous studies, we 
work with two variants of food consumption:
 •  A “basic variant”, in which the range of food and expenses beyond that provid-
ed by rationing and the other subsidised food distribution channels are sup-
plemented through purchases in agricultural markets. These purchases are 
limited to products that form part of the traditional Cuban diet, such as rice, 
beans, root vegetables and pork.
 •  An “improved variant” in which supplementation includes products beyond 
what is considered the traditional diet, adding others that bring greater qual-
ity and variety to the diet. One example is the incorporation of the daily con-
sumption of 400 grams of fruit and vegetables (according WHO recommenda-
tions, 2015 and 2017),5 as well as a glass of milk, poultry meat and vegetable 
oil.
 •  Supplementation means incorporating the quantities of food needed to reach 
the necessary apparent food consumption (about 3,200 kcal per day per capita 
in terms of energy) estimated by the authors for 2016 and to achieve con-
sumption equivalent to the nutritional recommendation for the Cuban popu-
lation (2300 kcal per day per capita also in terms of energy, according to the 
INHA, 2008).
Table 1 includes a range for minimum and maximum expenses (both on food and 
in total), as these vary according to the different family compositions considered.
The first thing that stands out from the information in Table 1 is that in 2017 
neither salaries nor minimum pensions were sufficient to meet the food expenses 
of the basic variant and an average calorie consumption of about 3,200 kcal per 
day. Accessing the improved variant would mean incurring additional expenses 
per person of between 70 and 100 CUP per month on top of the basic variant. 
Even the recent rise in the minimum pension would not permit this.
Even based on a more modest level of consumption that fits the nutrition-
al recommendations for the Cuban population, those on minimum wages and 
4  By salaries we refer to the monthly direct remuneration accrued on average by a worker in state 
employment and entidades mixtas (public-private ownership); and the pensions and benefits 
everyone receives based on their age and years of service as an employee for the rest of their 
life.
5  “… a minimum of 400g of fruit and vegetables per day (excluding potatoes and other starchy tu-
bers) for the prevention of chronic diseases such as heart disease, cancer, diabetes and obesity, 
as well as for the prevention and alleviation of several micronutrient deficiencies, especially in 
less developed countries”. https://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/fruit/en/
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pensions struggle to access a diet that provides the desired energy content and 
includes greater variety in its consumption (fruit, vegetables, dairy and vegetable 
fat).
The magnitude of food expenditure as a proportion of average salaries in the 
community, social and personal services sector in both the basic and improved 
variants and for an energy consumption of 3,200 kcal per day also deserves com-
ment. At over 50%, the level is excessive, given that families also have other im-
portant basic household expenses: services of all kinds (electricity, gas and water 
above all) and non-food consumer goods.
The comparison contrasts spending with income of a certain magnitude per 
capita. If another dependent person (either a minor or a senior) must be support-
ed with that income, the situation becomes much more restrictive.
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Regarding the contrast between total basic consumption expenditure and av-
erage and minimum wages and pensions, it is notable that neither wages nor 
minimum pensions are sufficient to cover estimated levels of expenditure, not 
even for the basic variant with lower calorie consumption. Similarly, those who 
depend on average pensions find it difficult to cover their consumption expenses. 
Those with average salaries have better access, but the number of economically 
dependent family members will be decisive.
Moreover, the difficulties multiply if it is necessary to take on expenses 
above those considered basic – for example, for purchasing equipment and other 
household items, paying private parties for services (equipment repair, trans-
port, caring for children, the sick or the elderly in order to be able to work, and 
others that the state provision does not cover), the acquisition of non-school 
books and entertainment.
What can be done to improve access?
In order to improve access and to achieve greater food security in general, a set 
of actions is proposed that are discussed below.
Change the approach to food security
 •  Produce and/or import safe, healthy food in sufficient quantities to satisfy 
needs and preferences, as set out by the FNS concept.
 •  Address food provision with a focus on food security. Producing large quan-
tities of food is important, but so is what food is being produced, its level of 
acceptance, and how safe and nutritious it can be.
 •  Understand that this issue is not solely the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and other organisations linked to food production. 
 •  Design specific policies for the non-state sector, which is increasingly import-
ant in food production and distribution. Coordinate it with the state sector in 
order to contribute on food security.
 Create a space for coordinating all the agencies and institutions that support 
and evaluate food security in Cuba, so that this issue is comprehensively ana-
lysed and projected.
 • The bodies that issue macroeconomic policies (MEP, MFP, BCC).
 • The bodies that issue production policies (Minag and Minal).
 • The bodies related to the food trade (Mincin and Mincex).
 •  The bodies and institutions that evaluate how food is consumed and used 
(Minsap, INHA).
 •  Design a system of indicators and incentives to support the goal of greater 
food security in all its dimensions.
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Increase the availability of food from existing reserves in: 
 •  Primary production: increase agricultural yields, introduce new varieties 
with greater productive potential and better seasonal distribution, decrease 
post-harvest losses, strengthen the focus on demand and nutritional consid-
erations.
 •  Processing and conservation: reduce losses of raw materials, introduce tech-
nologies that preserve and/or enrich the nutritional content of food.
 •  Distribution: review the retail sales network in order to guarantee the proxim-
ity of food outlets to the entire Cuban population; evaluate the effectiveness of 
food market segmentation in current conditions.
 •  The capitalisation of the sector: notable heterogeneity exists between agricul-
tural producers. Some have accumulated considerable resources that allow 
them to take on certain functions, such as, for example, the direct importation 
of inputs and capital goods and the management of this market; and the chan-
nelling of their savings through an agricultural development bank. 
 •  Support services for food value chains: financing, supply of inputs and invest-
ment goods, storage, transportation and scientific and technical services.
 •  The infrastructure to support the chain: among them, the road network and 
services such as telephony, electricity and communications stand out. 
 •  Living conditions in rural areas: guarantee basic services, such as health, ed-
ucation, retail trade, recreation and transportation, which stimulate people to 
settle and remain in these areas and, therefore, farm.
Study the current mechanisms interconnecting the different actors so that im-
port substitution programmes represent an effective stimulus to producers. 
 •  Direct sales to tourism could become a means both of import substitution and 
of improving processes and products for related producers through the re-
moval of administrative obstacles, such as the way transactions are made be-
tween parties. For example, some forms of production have to be sold through 
the state company to which they are linked, since they do not have accounts 
in CUC.
 •  As the stimulating effect of import substitution is not immediate, a mecha-
nism must be created that allows the resources it releases to be applied to 
investment in the agricultural sector.
Achieve a more suitable design for food markets that allows:
 •  Higher percentages of domestic production to go to agricultural markets, 
which could have an impact on prices.
 •  Price formation that is more in line with the interplay of supply and demand, 
with an emphasis on prices set in CUC serving as a reference for prices in 
other market spaces.
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 •  Physical access for the entire Cuban population. The absence of points of sale, 
even in urban areas, hinders access, especially to people with disabilities and 
the elderly in a context of accelerated demographic ageing.
Transform current protection systems and the universal nature of some subsi-
dies
 •  Food distribution targeting specific groups such as the Sistema de Atención 
a la Familia and workers’ canteens need modifying due to their very limited 
effectiveness. Delivering food stamps to the intended beneficiaries of these 
channels and/or extending the cash payment system in work centres might 
be considered.
 •  Another element that should be highlighted concerns the universality of sub-
sidies for products distributed through rationing. Remittances, the dynamic 
development of a non-state sector in which personal income has outgrown the 
average salary by several times, and the modification of migration regulations 
to promote longer stays abroad are all factors that seem to recommend reas-
sessing the efficiency of the universality of this assistance.
In short, all the elements of food security must be considered elements of natio-
nal security and constitute an essential factor in the people’s living conditions 
that must be improved immediately. On the basis of this work, it is considered 
that sufficient reserves exist to achieve this.
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José Antonio Alonso and Pavel Vidal
The difficulties of Institutional Change in Cuba
1 Introduction
Until they collapsed in the 1990s, Cuba’s key – not to say only – commercial and 
financial relations were with the socialist economies of Eastern Europe. For the 
almost three decades since, the Cuban economy has been immersed in an endless 
and confusing reform process meant to lay the foundations of a new model of 
growth and international relations. Granting greater economic scope to private 
actors has been at the heart of this process, but only within a remarkably restric-
tive regulatory framework, which maintains the state’s centralised control over 
the economic allocation and distribution processes. This hybrid model has prov-
en unsuccessful and produced notable dysfunctionalities, which are expressed 
in the Cuban economy’s limited levels of growth, structural change and external 
competitiveness. 
A lack of clarity about the purpose of the reform means the process has taken 
a rather tortuous path: forward steps are followed by setbacks, measures are at-
tempted and subsequently abandoned, and promising initiatives are announced 
only to end up being reversed. In general, the process has been characterised by 
its partial, fragmented nature, and the absence of a comprehensive vision and an 
explicit, planned timetable. The key measures for establishing a new model of 
accumulation based on a greater role for the market – ending monetary duality, 
dismantling the state monopoly in agricultural marketing, and enshrining pro-
ducers’ decision-making autonomy, among others – have receded, despite occa-
sionally being announced and garnering adequate levels of consensus. 
Taken as a whole, the Cuban reform process has had three different stag-
es. Fidel Castro was still in office for the first – between 1990 and 2008 – and 
the reforms were seen as a necessary evil intended to prevent greater ills. At-
tempts were thus made to limit the reforms to the strictly essential and, where 
circumstances allowed, to make them reversible. Raúl Castro’s replacement of 
his brother as head of state began a second stage in which the reforms were seen 
as an objective that was desirable and even to a large extent inevitable. Keeping 
the inherited system intact was thought to be a certain route to failure, making a 
profound “actualización” (update) of the economic model necessary. But as Raúl 
https://doi.org/10.3224/84742546.07
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Castro’s mandate progressed the reformist momentum of this stage faltered. 
Finally, the third stage began with the generational change in the state leader-
ship. This stage was characterised by a number of previously planned regulatory 
changes (constitutional change being the most important) and some modifica-
tion of the management style in the governing bodies, but the slow pace of the 
reforms was essentially maintained and in some cases led to regressions from 
what seemed to be the desired objective (such as, for example, the return to a 
degree of dollarisation of the economy). 
Each stage has its own tone, but three features seem to run through the en-
tire period. The first is the persistent failure to define the precise goal to which 
the reform should lead the Cuban economy. The strategic documents that make 
reference to the reform are notably vague in this regard.1 They tend to use some-
what political language and a wishful tone, and make extremely limited com-
mitments to the potential scheduling and priorities of future reforms. Another 
notable absence is a diagnosis of the starting point using internationally compa-
rable metrics, and the presentation of intermediate and end goals backed by ver-
ifiable public data. The lack of planning of the sequence of the reforms inevitably 
increases the uncertainty for both national and international economic actors, 
effectively penalising them for investing in the country. 
The second consistent feature also derives from the absence of a precise goal: 
the partial and fragmentary nature of the reforms. Thus far, no comprehensive 
framework of the reform process has been constructed that brings coherence to 
the changes. Instead, a pattern has been established of opting for partial changes 
that are tentative, experimental and always subject to modification (or reversal), 
if the conditions require. There are two consequences of this: i) the regulatory 
framework becomes more variable, reducing the predictability of the rules; and 
ii) the fragmentary and uncoordinated approach to decision-making prevents 
the reforms from giving sense to others made in complementary fields. 
Finally, the third feature is that the economic reforms have generally been 
carried out with the least possible institutional change. Aspects of the regulatory 
and institutional framework that are less important or less controversial have 
been selected in order to limit or avoid political resistance. While this has man-
aged to reduce the opposition of the most pro-continuity sectors, it has also di-
minished the scope of the reform and the foreseeable impact of the changes. An 
attempt has been made to change the Cuban economy’s operational logic without 
altering the institutional framework in which the economy operates (or changing 
1  We refer to: Los lineamientos de política económica y social del partido y la revolución para el 
período 2016–2021; the Plan nacional de desarrollo económico y social 2030 de Cuba; and the 
Conceptualización del modelo económico y social cubano de desarrollo socialista.
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it as little as possible). This resistance to institutional change, which is to a large 
extent political, is the key to understanding how the reforms are being carried out 
in Cuba, their partial and fragmentary nature, the absence of a comprehensive 
vision of the process and the lack of precision about the scenario it is intended 
to produce. 
However, if progress is made in line with the reform programme announced 
for 2021, this characterisation of the reform may no longer apply. This would 
mark the beginning of a new phase of more substantial and dynamic changes 
that seeks to transform the logic of the economic allocation processes in Cuba. 
Phasing out the convertible peso (CUC) is at the heart of the process announced, 
along with significant corrections to the exchange rate, relative prices and subsi-
dy system. In parallel, the government intends to make ambitious improvements 
to wages (and pension and retirement policies) in public companies and entities 
with a view to protecting the incomes of this majority group of workers, particu-
larly from any inflationary effects produced by the exchange rate devaluation. It 
is also meant to correct the trend of progressive decline in the living conditions 
of these segments of the population. The partial opening up of the economy has 
undoubtedly widened the income gaps between families with links to the private 
sector and access to international remittances, and those that still depend on 
depressed state salaries and pensions.
 “Monetary ordering” and “unification” appear to be the drivers of this new 
phase, but doubts remain about the scope of the measures and the consistency 
of their continuing application over the coming years. In fact, beyond “day zero” 
the exact sequence of the changes remains unknown, and uncertainty continues 
to surround the exchange system that will result, the guarantees of the Cuban 
peso’s convertibility, and the support state companies will receive to adjust to 
the new costs and prices. The depth of the other structural changes announced 
to accompany the monetary and exchange rate adjustments, particularly those 
relating to agriculture, self-employed workers, and small and medium-sized pri-
vate enterprises, also remain unknown. 
While these uncertainties make it difficult to anticipate the scope of this new 
bout of reforms, they confirm that the features of the previous reforms remain 
intact: loosely defined goals, fragmented measures, and a reluctance about insti-
tutional change. The measures will affect a more central part of the economic sys-
tem, and may trigger subsequent reforms, but the way the changes are presented 
makes it hard to believe that the limitations that characterised previous episodes 
will be overcome. Hence, viewing the process as a whole, after more than 30 
years of reform, the crucial question is what lies behind the Cuban authorities’ 
stubborn resistance to a more comprehensive and coherent reform of the insti-
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tutional framework in which its economy operates. Answering this question will 
help us understand the prospects for the new set of reforms.
As with any process of institutional change, a complex arithmetic of inter-
ests is implicit in the reform of the Cuban economy. There are those who believe 
they will benefit from the changes, there is resistance generated by institutional 
inertia, immobility among those who benefit from the status quo and fear among 
those concerned they will lose their position in the social structure. If the reform 
is to succeed, the authorities must anticipate and manage these tensions. 
The vagueness of the goal, the patchy nature of the reforms and the partial 
compensations seem to have been designed by the Cuban authorities to prevent 
the sectors most resistant to the reform from digging their heels in. The govern-
ment has justified its recourse to excessive gradualism on the grounds of mini-
mising the social costs potentially generated by the reforms. Over time, however, 
this strategy seems merely to have delayed the changes, frustrated the hopes of 
the most dynamic social sectors (particularly young people) and protected the 
capacity for action of the sectors most opposed to larger-scale and broader eco-
nomic reform. Meanwhile, the worsening financial situation, stagnant economic 
growth and low rates of investment have caused serious regressions in various 
social areas, including the quality of health and education services and the tech-
nological development of the production apparatus. 
This work intends to discuss the possible reasons for the resistance to insti-
tutional change in Cuba. To this end, a political economy approach will be adopt-
ed, in an attempt to identify the conflicts of interest that support and oppose 
this process. It will be shown that the sectors with greatest access to power are 
relatively unyielding to reform, while those who most support the reforms have 
limited access to decision-making processes. At the same time, a widening gen-
eration gap is dividing the population, which is affecting the values, beliefs and 
expectations of Cuba’s people about the country’s future.
The work is structured into four sections in addition to this introduction. 
The second section aims to confirm whether Cuba’s institutional quality has un-
dergone any perceptible changes during the reform process; the third section 
explains the resistance to institutional change by considering the characteris-
tics of formal and informal institutions and applying them to the Cuban reality; 
the fourth section makes a political economy analysis to identify the sectors that 
favour and resist reform; finally, in a brief final section, some conclusions are 
drawn.
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2 Lack of progress
To be effective, economic reforms must be accompanied by institutional changes. 
Ultimately, all economic reform seeks to promote change in agents’ behaviour, 
meaning the regulatory and normative frameworks that guide social behaviour 
must also be altered. The framework of economic and social incentives within 
which Cubans operated in the past is undergoing a process of progressive ex-
tinction and must be replaced by another that is consistent with the aims of the 
proposed reform. The question this section attempts to answer is: has an effec-
tive change occurred in the quality of Cuba’s institutional framework during the 
reform period?
Providing an objective answer to this question is no simple matter, for two 
reasons. The first relates to the limited reliability of the existing databases on 
institutional quality. All of the indicators available at international level draw 
criticism, either for their fragile theoretical foundations, the subjective nature 
of the sources on which they draw, or the limited comparability of the results 
both between countries and over time (Malito et al., 2018). The second difficulty 
is specific to Cuba: the majority of the most widely used databases contain lit-
tle information about the country. Exceptions to this general rule are the World 
Bank’s Worldwide Governance Index (WGI), and the Bertelsmann Transforma-
tion Index (BTI), two of the most reliable sets of indicators in this field. A third 
source of information is the Cuba Standard Business Confidence Survey, which 
has researched the main obstacles entrepreneurs face to developing their busi-
nesses in the Cuban market since 2015. Further reference will be made to these 
three indicators in what follows.
The WGI uses over 30 information sources, with data for over 200 countries 
grouped into six basic dimensions supposedly associated with the quality of insti-
tutions.2 The evolution of the six dimensions is reflected in Graph 1, with data for 
the entire period available. The data have been rescaled in relation to the global 
2  The WGI covers six different dimensions of governance, using hundreds of variables gathered, in 
most cases, from the opinions of non-governmental organisations, experts and economic deci-
sion-makers (Kaufmann et al., 2010). The six dimensions of governance can, in turn, be grouped 
into three large chapters, each of which is assigned two indicators: 
(a)  The process by which governments are elected, chosen, monitored and replaced is encom-
passed in: i) Voice and Accountability; and ii) Political Stability and Absence of Violence/
Terrorism; 
(b)  The government’s capacity to effectively formulate and implement sound policies is covered 
by: iii) Government Effectiveness; and iv) Regulatory Quality; and
(c)  The respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern social and economic 
interactions is assessed via: v) Rule of Law; and vi) Control of Corruption.
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average, with their values ranging from -2.5 to +2.5, and incorporating the data 
for Cuba. The World Bank database also provides information on the variance of 
the data, which helps estimate the margin of error in the data and determine the 
degree of significance of the variables.
Figure 1: Evolution of institutional quality indicators for Cuba
Source: Based on WGI data from the World Bank.
Note: VA: Voice and Accountability; PS: Political Stability and Absence of Violence; GE: Government 
Effectiveness; RQ: Regulatory Quality; RL: Rule of Law; DC: Control of Corruption
An overview of this set of indicators allows the following conclusions to be drawn:
 •  First, in four of the six indicators Cuba ranks below the global average, re-
vealing clear shortcomings in terms of institutional quality. Only in two di-
mensions – Political Stability and Control of Corruption – does is sit slightly 
above this average, although at some distance from the higher values. This 
result seems to align with expectations. Cuba’s Political Stability score shows 
the stability of the political system over time, as well as the absence of violence 
and manifestations of terrorism. Although corruption exists, it remains rela-
tively under control. There is day-to-day petty corruption (privileged access 
to services or obtaining consumer goods through unauthorised channels) and 
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ucts to the black market, but larger-scale corruption phenomena are relatively 
unknown. The absence of a free media is an obstacle to greater public aware-
ness of corrupt behaviour. 
 •  Second, Voice and Accountability and Regulatory Quality are the dimensions 
in which Cuba scores lowest, placing to the bottom decile of the global distri-
bution. The first of these dimensions relates to citizens’ capacity to elect their 
representatives, critically monitor public decisions and demand correspond-
ing accountability, all of which are areas where the Cuban political system 
is clearly deficient. But the government’s capacity is also revealed to be poor 
when it comes to producing quality regulation, defining public policies and 
regulating the private sector – key to evaluating the process of economic re-
forms undertaken so far.
 •  Third, no meaningful improvement is evident in Cuba’s relative position in 
terms of institutional quality throughout the period under consideration. 
Three indicators  – Rule of Law, Political Stability and Government Effec-
tiveness – show a slight upward trend, but not to statistically significant lev-
els. It may be that the processes of institutionalising the current regulatory 
frameworks, including the recent constitutional change, and the stability of 
the process of substitution in the governing elites have contributed to the 
improvements in the Rule of Law and Political Stability. Government Effec-
tiveness concerns the quality of public service provision, which shows a very 
slight improvement compared to the Special Period of the 1990s. In any case, 
it should be reiterated that the slight rise noted in the data falls short of sta-
tistical significance.
 •  Finally, the other dimensions either fail to improve or worsen (as is the case 
with Control of Corruption). 
In summary, the WGI data as a whole show no significant improvement in Cuba’s 
institutional quality in the period in which the reform process was rolled out.
A similar picture emerges from the Bertelsmann Transformation Index 
(BTI), another of the better-founded institutional quality indicators. What is 
measured in this case is the capacity of institutions to face the challenges that 
arise in three specific areas: politics, economics and governance. In this case the 
data gathering is biennial, but the time frame of the data available is sufficient 
to note whether any advances are detectable. Graph 2 shows Cuba’s ranking out 
of the 137 countries for which data exists in each of the years and each of the 
dimensions considered. 
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Figure 2. Cuba’s institutional quality according to the Bertelsmann Transformation 
Index
Here it is also possible to draw two general conclusions:
 •  First, Cuba scores best on Governance, although the differences from the 
other two dimensions (Political Transformation and Economic Transforma-
tion) are relatively minor. In all cases, Cuba is around the border between the 
fourth and fifth quintile in the distribution of countries by levels of institu-
tional quality.
 •  Second, taking the period as a whole, all three indicators show Cuba’s relative 
position decline. The path has not been linear, but the data reveal that, on an 
international scale, Cuba appeared to be better positioned in 2006 than 2020, 
although a degree of caution must be applied to this assessment given the 
imperfect nature of some of the indicators. What does seem to be confirmed is 
that, based on this indicator, no impactful progress has been made on Cuba’s 
institutional framework.
The Cuba Standard Business Confidence Survey has been conducted on a quar-
terly basis since 2015 on a sample of around 100 businesspeople with links to 
the Cuban market. One of the questions in the survey relates to the main obsta-
cles entrepreneurs face in creating or expanding their businesses in the Cuban 
market. Over a four-year period the same obstacles are repeatedly encountered. 
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(about 64%); this percentage remained unchanged in both the period of easing 
under the Obama administration and the more recent tightening under Donald 
Trump. In both cases, businesspeople saw the US policy towards Cuba as the 
most restrictive factor of those listed, which is a reflection of the constant prohi-
bitions on investment and trade that have for decades formed the nucleus of the 
embargo, and which remain essentially unaltered.
Figure 3. What factors are hindering the possibility of creating/expanding business in/
with Cuba? 
Source: Cuba Standard Business Confidence Survey.
As well as indicating the enormous external restriction that the embargo effec-
tively represents to normal international insertion and the development of pro-
jects on the island, the respondents also highlighted internal factors, some of 
which are noticeably institutional. Cuban governmental bureaucracy, excessive 
regulation, inefficient state-owned companies and legal procedures were repea-
tedly cited as major obstacles by respondents. In fact, grouped together these 
four factors would add up to twice the importance given to the embargo. What is 
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most remarkable is that in these five years, despite attempts to advance a reform 
process, those surveyed believe that backwards steps have been taken in all of 
these obstacles. Monetary, financial and credit factors comprise a third set of 
obstacles, which are associated with the continuity of the monetary and exchange 
rate duality, and the financial uncertainty generated by the whole regulatory and 
institutional framework, and which might also be linked to the handling of ma-
croeconomic policies and the erratic administration of foreign debt. 
None of the three metrics referred to in this section is perfect, but their con-
cordance means that we can more convincingly conclude that any institutional 
improvement prompted by the Cuban reform process is virtually marginal.
This conclusion supports Alonso’s (2020) proposed understanding of Cuba 
as an example of a model of change characterised by institutional stickiness. 
This model describes cases in which institutional inertia is so powerful that any 
changes occur only occasionally and are very gradual in scope.3 The result is to 
render institutional change barely perceptible, generating a dissonance between 
the rigidity of formal institutional frameworks and the fluidity of informal insti-
tutions activated by a changing society and a rapidly mutating reality (Alonso 
and Vidal, 2020). The pertinent question, then, is what factors explain the resist-
ance to institutional change in Cuba. We will start by describing the difficulty of 
the task before referring to the political economy of the process of change. 
3 Explanatory factors of institutional inertia 
The institutional framework of any country is formed of both formal and infor-
mal institutions. The formal institutions are expressed via explicit rules or laws 
that are publicly known and accompanied by an exogenous system of sanctions 
to ensure compliance (enforcement). The informal are based on norms, values, 
beliefs and expectations that are in many cases tacit and rely on moral (or repu-
tational) sanctions that promote an endogenous process of compliance (self-en-
forcement). Clear differences exist between these two types of institution, but 
both are present in every society, mutually influencing each other through com-
plex relationships of various types. 
To understand the effectiveness of the institutional framework, we must ex-
plore whether its formal and informal institutions possess congruent logics and 
objectives. If congruence exists, a process of reinforcing agents’ compliance with 
3  This is distinct from three other possible models of institutional change. Namely, one inspired 
by “critical junctures”, when the change is occasional and radical; “gradualism”, when change is 
frequent and gradual; and “serial replacement”, where the change is frequent and radical (see 
Alonso, 2020; and Alonso & Vidal, 2020).
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expected behaviour may occur, in accordance with the provisions of the two types 
of institution. Thus, for example, the reliance of informal institutions on agents’ 
voluntary disposition for compliance may help reinforce a compliance with rules 
and laws that does not depend on the coercive mechanisms of these formal struc-
tures; and, in turn, the formal framework helps preserve norms, values and ex-
pectations that form part of the existing informal institutional framework. For 
example, the world of social networks and collaborative platforms (originally in-
formal institutions) is congruent with the functioning of business-oriented mar-
ket institutions (formal). 
The opposite occurs when the operational logics and respective objectives of 
formal and informal institutions clash. What happens in such cases, in practice, 
is either that certain rules are accommodated or displaced by others (at a cost to 
the functioning of both), or they directly conflict with one another, which weak-
ens them or prevents their proper functioning. An example of accommodation 
is provided by the African-origin religions preserved in informal institutions in 
Cuba and Brazil in a context of formal dominance by Catholicism – considered 
the official religion by the colonial power. The result was hybridisation, a syn-
cretism that masks the references of one religion beneath the formal appearance 
of the other, with neither being completely faithful to its original content. An 
example of conflict between formal and informal institutions is the recourse of 
families in Cuba to buying products on the black market or via direct purchases 
from peasants: while formally prohibited, informally this is an accepted practice. 
The consequence is that the formal rule is not complied with and ceases to mod-
ulate agents’ behaviour.
This difference between formal and informal institutions is also useful for 
explaining the dynamics of institutional change. In principle, it is assumed that 
formal institutions can be altered through deliberate decisions taken at a given 
time in a centralised process enacted through the bodies that possess the ca-
pacity to draw up the rules (e.g. the government or parliament). The decisions 
taken in these fields are, in turn, the sometimes uncertain result of the lobbying 
capacity of the various interest groups affected by the change. Even a largely top-
down or centralised decision may have its origins in a prior, more decentralised 
(bottom-up) process of challenging or questioning the rules that drives the in-
stitutional change. In fact, many institutional changes are preceded by the rules 
being weakened by a growing dissonance between what the norm establishes and 
agents’ expectations. At any rate, what is important is that the change is ultimate-
ly expressed in a centralised decision (for example, of the drafting of a new law).
For their part, informal institutions evolve through decentralised, dispersed 
processes of prolonged, gradual changes in agents’ perceptions, beliefs and ex-
pectations. It is a blind process, an evolutionary response by social actors to con-
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tinual changes in the social reality. The interests of the different groups affected 
may cause conflicts to arise, but it is unlikely that any will have the capacity to 
design or control the process of change, as it concerns agents’ values, beliefs and 
expectations, which are not easily manipulated. 
As a consequence, processes of change in formal and informal institutions 
may be unsynchronised, with the former more subject to abrupt changes and dis-
cretionary decisions than the other way around. Thus, a new formal institution 
may be confronted with informal institutional inertia that is difficult to change. 
Traffic regulations in certain Latin American countries provide an example of 
this. Formally comparable to those in a developed country, they are nevertheless 
incapable of modulating the behaviour of agents still guided by previous informal 
regulations. Meanwhile, changes in informal institutions may be inadequately 
reflected in adaptations to the formal framework. Cuba’s experience bears this 
out: people’s behaviour has changed faster than the formal institutional struc-
ture.
In fact, Cuba is a good example of a society constituted on a large gap be-
tween formal and informal institutions. The formal institutional framework has 
turned out to be particularly rigid and restrictive, and to have limited inclination 
to change. Meanwhile, a complex web of informal institutional responses has 
taken shape, created by citizens’ permanent search for solutions in an especially 
adverse environment. While formal institutions are characterised by great inertia 
and stickiness and are rarely changeable (except in minor aspects), the informal 
framework appears highly fluid and contingent. The vitality of these informal 
institutions is at once a cause and an indicator of the limited capacity of formal 
institutions to mould collective behaviour. Changes to formal institutions should 
be more closely matched with the changes that occur in agents’ expectations, and 
the adaptation of informal institutions they produce.
But progressing in that process is no easy task. Institutional change in this 
field faces at least four types of problem:
 •  First, to encourage institutional change it is not only necessary to correctly 
identify the institutional failure that needs correcting, but also to find an al-
ternative institutional arrangement that can overcome the deficiency detect-
ed. Sometimes the failure is identified, but the technical alternative remains 
unknown. Or the alternative may appear likely to incur costs or uncertainties 
that are greater than those generated by the institutional failure in need of cor-
rection. This is a relevant issue in the Cuban case: even though the failures of 
the inherited economic model are recognised, the costs – perhaps exaggerat-
ed – associated with alternative institutional frameworks are also recognised.
 •  Secondly, even when a clear alternative is available, promoting institutional 
change requires the inertia of the pre-existing institutional framework to be 
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overcome. All change comes at a cost and in this case the inertia is strength-
ened by three factors that are characteristic of institutions: i) the interdepen-
dencies between the institutions make change difficult, as the functioning of 
one depends on the effectiveness of many others with which it is related; ii) the 
dense network (explicit or implicit) of social commitments and expectations 
of the agents on which every institution rests is difficult to alter; and finally 
iii) the objectification of values, expectations and beliefs that every institution 
generates gives rise to realities that are resistant to change (Scott, 2008).
 •  Thirdly, beyond the inertia in the face of change, all institutional reform has 
redistributive implications that must be taken into consideration. Every insti-
tution articulates hierarchical relationships, which are expressed in the distri-
bution of resources, voice and power that may be altered as a result of change 
(Knight 1992). This produces winners and losers, and it is reasonable to as-
sume that those who see themselves among the losers will resist the change. 
The political economy of institutional change is thus key to understanding the 
viability of the reform.
 •  Finally, even if an apparently acceptable institutional alternative exists and 
the inertia that hinders change is overcome, along with the resistance of reluc-
tant groups, the new rules still need to reach the citizens and be internalised 
in their behaviour. It is therefore important to do the work of justifying the 
change and disseminating the rules and values associated with the new insti-
tutional arrangement. All of this suggests that a high fixed cost is inherent in 
the design and implementation of a new institution, even when the marginal 
cost of its operation (once the institution is created) is low. This fact increas-
ingly rewards the existing institutional framework and conspires against the 
creation of new institutions.
The factors mentioned above help us to understand the difficulties of institutio-
nal change and explain why it is often easier for (bad) institutions to survive than 
for new (and better) institutions to be created. One factor that holds back institu-
tional change is the political economy of the interests at stake. What interests are 
affected by the reform in Cuba? 
4 The political economy of the reform
Any reform’s level of success is crucially conditioned by how policymakers man-
age the conflicts of interest of the sectors affected by the changes. Failing to ad-
dress this can lead sectors opposed to the reform to end up blocking the changes. 
The aim should therefore be to widen the space for those who are favourable to 
change, to dispel the fears of the doubters and the resistance of those concerned 
150 The difficulties of Institutional Change in Cuba
that they may be negatively affected, and to compensate some of the losers, 
thereby reducing the margin for those who are irretrievably opposed. 
To understand the resistance to change, it is important to note that relative 
losses in this field can be as great or greater than the absolute losses. In other 
words, even if the reforms raise living standards across society as a whole, those 
who consider that their relative position (in relation to the other sectors) will 
decline may resist the change. Addressing this is important, because Cuba’s eco-
nomic reform is likely to lead to a higher level of aggregate welfare in the country, 
at least in the medium term; enough to compensate the potentially affected sec-
tors, without anyone losing out. And yet, certain sectors may oppose the reform, 
believing that their position in the social hierarchy (of income or power) will be 
harmed.
In Cuba, two large sectors have the capacity to guide and promote the re-
form process: the bureaucrats of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC), on the 
one hand, and the officers of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), on 
the other. Traditionally, the highest levels of the Cuban administration and the 
officials with effective decision-making capacity have been drawn from these two 
large pools. Both sectors are reluctant to actively support the reform, albeit for 
different reasons. 
PCC bureaucrats have traditionally shown very little enthusiasm for the re-
form process in Cuba. This fits with their position as one of the sectors with most 
to lose from the changes. The party’s reach extends to the National Assembly, 
whose process of nominating candidates to be members it controls. The electoral 
system does not permit choices to be made between different options; rather, 
citizens endorse a list of nominees that has been carefully selected via the party’s 
“policy of cadres”. Indeed, the National Assembly was a visible source of resist-
ance to the transformations of the second term of Raúl Castro’s presidency, and 
engaged in open confrontation with Marino Murillo, Chairman of the Permanent 
Commission for Implementation and Development of the Economic and Social 
Policy Guidelines (reforms).
The party’s “policy of cadres” is also decisive in the selection of leading po-
sitions in ministries, government offices, and even in the most important state-
owned companies. The policy of cadres and control of the press have been the 
party’s main tools for tying the hands of the reform process. When tensions with 
the United States government have been at their highest, this group has used its 
control of the media to spread the rhetoric of unity and memories of revolution-
ary struggles, presenting any attempt to open up as a potential weakness in this 
decisive showdown. 
Clearly, this group’s power depends on the fact that the key decisions about 
economic life in Cuba continue to be made in hierarchical structures, through 
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relatively centralised administrative processes. The size of the state and its con-
trol over citizens’ lives with limited public management accountability leaves a 
large space for rent-seeking activities and the discretionary exercise of power by 
these groups. The little to zero transparency with which state institutions op-
erate protects them from public scrutiny. Granting more space to the market, 
to automatic incentive- and price-setting and to autonomous decision-making 
among economic agents is a clear way to limit the discretion and power of this 
interest group. It is no surprise, then, that they work to keep the rigid structures 
of decision-making processes substantially unaltered, advocating planning as the 
best way to maintain their control over the country’s political and economic pro-
cesses.
What is more, this sector knows that if the economic reform brings changes 
to the political framework (via democratic transition), they would be one of the 
main sectors affected. Indeed, they would lose the monopoly of political power 
they have enjoyed until now. Hence, their particular resistance to the reforms, 
accepting only those that they perceive as inevitable in order to prevent greater 
evils. Their position appears to be inspired by one of Fidel Castro’s doctrines. 
Namely, that in an adverse context, concessions over reforms is an inevitable 
(but reversible) way to guarantee the regime’s survival: a kind of Gattopardian 
reform doctrine. 
Obviously, the bureaucrats refrain from using these arguments to justify 
their resistance to the changes. Instead, they claim to be defending the interests 
of the weaker social groups that may be affected by the reform (retirees or ben-
efits recipients), they exaggerate the costs and problems potentially associated 
with the changes, and play up their staunch defence of the essence of the regime 
to prevent the reforms from opening up cracks that may be exploited by “the 
enemy”. All of this gives their position a more noble and acceptable aura among 
the citizens.
For their part, FAR officials, while equally reluctant about more comprehen-
sive and radical changes, have taken a more favourable position on gradually 
advancing the reform process. Two features distinguish the position of this group 
from that of the bureaucrats of the PCC. First, the survival of FAR officers as a 
privileged social group does not depend on preserving the centralised structures 
and decision-making processes that have characterised the Cuban economy to 
date. Whatever future lies ahead of Cuba, the armed forces will remain an impor-
tant group in the state structure. The prestige and social function of the military 
could, in fact, remain relatively untouched even if progress is made in the reform 
process or a democratic transition is undertaken. That is the first reason they are 
less resistant to the reforms than the CCP bureaucrats. 
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A second factor is that the FAR hold major economic power in Cuba and over 
time have accumulated not inconsiderable business management experience. 
Indeed, many of the microeconomic reforms governments have adopted to im-
prove the productivity of companies over the last three decades were first applied 
in state-owned companies controlled by the armed forces. The military therefore 
contains specialists with a precise idea of the changes needed to improve the lev-
els of efficiency and competitiveness of the production apparatus. The fact that 
the prime minister and a number of ministers in recent governments’ economic 
departments have come from the FAR bears this out.
But not all the factors are positive, and this group also presents two major 
limitations. First, although they are accumulating experience in microeconomic 
management, the same cannot be said of the macroeconomic areas that will be 
crucial when designing the reforms in Cuba, such as fiscal, monetary, financial 
and exchange rate policies. Military officers also tend to have an excessively “en-
gineering” vision of the economic process, focussed more on the material pro-
duction process than on translating it into market efficiency. This vision may be 
useful when designing certain microeconomic reforms, but may become counter-
productive if it is used to guide macroeconomic restructuring.
The FAR’s economic power gives rise to the second limitation. Specifically, 
the military’s perception of the possible impact of the reforms on the economic 
apparatus they control. As mentioned, the FAR participate, directly or indirect-
ly, in nearly 800 companies in a range of sectors, including sugar production, 
tourism, basic industries, finance, construction and business services. Indeed, it 
controls the business group GAESA, which as well as being the island’s main tour 
operator, with 57 hotels, has the capacity to control about 70% of the retail trade. 
The group contains some of Cuba’s most competitive businesses, which could 
benefit from the reform. But any changes could also undermine the group’s mo-
nopoly in various markets. These contradictory factors may influence the FAR’s 
position on the reform.
The two groups that view the reform most positively are the academic sector 
(university lecturers and researchers) and the heterogeneous group of managers 
of Cuba’s private businesses and cooperatives. The first of these groups has great 
technical knowledge about the changes required in Cuba. As well as possessing 
knowledge of the workings of other economies that may serve as references, as a 
sector their position may be improved by operating in an economy that is open to 
the market. All of this makes them generally well-disposed to the reform process.
Private sector business people, meanwhile, are well aware of the problems 
they face in their day-to-day life and the potential that could be exploited by al-
tering Cuba’s frameworks of regulations and incentives. Young people also com-
prise a significant – albeit heterogeneous – group that would support a more 
decisive advance in the reform process. 
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Academics and private sector business people are the segments of society 
that most clearly favour the reforms, but it is worth noting that neither has the 
effective power to condition Cuba’s reform processes.
Finally, what about the wider population? What do they think of the re-
forms? Answering this question with any sort of authority is tricky. Citizens are 
unable to freely express their opinions, to exert organised pressure against public 
authorities, no free press is openly distributed and there is an absence of reliable 
opinion polls that measure citizens’ feelings. Speaking to different groups sug-
gests that much of the population wants the reform process to accelerate and ex-
pand. But some are also suspicious of the process of change, either because they 
believe themselves to be among the potential losers or out of the simple fear of 
uncertainty. Finally, there are those who have been left tired and sceptical of any 
announcement of change after years of piling up frustrated expectations. 
The greatest resistance undoubtedly comes from groups that may be neg-
atively affected by the resizing of the state that the reform process must neces-
sarily entail. Reducing the state’s role and spending may have a major negative 
effect on public employees and sectors of the population that depend on sub-
sidies (most importantly, the retired population). These groups have noticed a 
significant squeeze on their incomes over the years of crisis in Cuba. In fact, the 
gap between the salaries of civil servants and workers in the private sector has 
been widening over time, leaving public sector wages as much as ten times lower. 
The same is true of retirees, whose pensions have steadily shrunk in real terms.
To stop these groups from opposing the reform, the public authorities must 
embark on an active policy of committing to deepen the fiscal reform, expand 
tax revenue collection capacity, encourage job transfers from the public sector 
towards an invigorated private sector and draw up a social policy that protects 
incomes when they are most vulnerable. Insufficient progress been made in all 
these areas to allay the fears of these potentially affected groups.
However, attitudes towards the reform appear to be conditioned not only 
by calculations of the expected effects on each sector, but also by the climate of 
values, beliefs and expectations of the affected group. Without wishing to exag-
gerate the isolation of Cuban society or to disparage its critical capacity, it seems 
reasonable to assume that biases exist against the reform. It could hardly be oth-
erwise, given the partisan control of the press, the very low levels of internet ac-
cess, the restrictions on the freedom to travel and an entire communication and 
educational system that has promoted an ideology that boosts nationalism and 
devalues everything beyond the state’s borders. The effectiveness of the PCC’s 
“political–ideological work” over decades continually repels the change in mind-
set now required to activate support for the reform and, with it, the cognitive 
bases for institutional change. 
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In terms of public opinion, an intergenerational gap is noticeable, which 
seems to be widening over time. Some of the values the system has cultivated 
over the years remain present among the older segments of society. It is a vision 
of an all-embracing paternalistic state that organises, disciplines and protects the 
people, while providing services, employment and subsidies, but which does not 
subject itself to citizen control or accountability for its actions. The limited chan-
nels for citizens’ voices and representation and the absolute state control of the 
means of production foster a relationship of passiveness and dependence among 
the citizens, weakening their capacity to promote change. Some of these citizens 
hold on to the ideals of the “eighties” and the aspiration to return to the living 
standards of that era without the need to make major changes to the system. 
Younger people clearly do not share these perceptions, and appear more 
open to the possibilities of reform. The young have been less influenced by the 
regime’s indoctrination and did not experience its “golden moments”. In fact, for 
many, their life experience has been framed by the continuous deficiencies that 
began with the “special period”. Young people are also the most open to using 
new forms of media (especially the internet) to access different views and opin-
ions about the problems Cuba faces. They are the group most clearly challenging 
the official messages and the continual delays to the reforms.
The gradual nature and slowing down of the changes is one of the ways the 
authorities have sought to keep the reform under control and reduce resistance 
to it. While understandable, as a method it is becoming less and less effective. 
The progressive worsening of Cuba’s economic conditions is one factor conspir-
ing against this slow pace of reform, along with the social deficits that are wid-
ening over time and the fatigue of a population whose access to a steady path 
of progress has been systematically deferred. What is more, the gradual nature 
of the changes has allowed the sectors that are most resistant to the reform to 
strengthen their positions, as was evident in the attenuation of the reforming 
drive of Raúl Castro’s first term.
Hence, a more reasonable way to expand support for the changes would be 
to achieve partial short-term successes that produce a degree of improvement in 
people’s living conditions. As of 2021, this is a possibility. The implementation 
of reforms aimed at correcting the exchange rate – one of the Cuban economic 
system’s central distortions – could, if the reforming momentum is maintained, 
drive a continuous process of changes that result from it. The monetary and ex-
change rate adjustment is distinguished by its intensity (the value will decrease 
more than twenty-fold) and its comprehensiveness, as it will re-establish the 
absolute and relative values of wages, pensions, retirement benefits, subsidies, 
costs and the prices of final goods. 
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Whether the opportunity these announcements present ends up being fully 
exploited depends on two conditions. First, keeping up the momentum and tak-
ing successive steps that allow the reform to acquire the comprehensiveness and 
coherence it has thus far lacked. Second, the success of the process depends on 
overcoming the adverse conditions of the prevailing economic context. Indeed, 
this new bout of reforms is taking place in a highly depressed and imbalanced 
macroeconomic environment, without accumulated international reserves and 
with little state borrowing capacity, which limits the resources available to face 
the short-term financial disruptions that will result. Access to international fi-
nancing in suitable conditions appears to be a crucial factor in successfully car-
rying out the reforms. Achieving a positive economic balance that facilitates the 
process will depend, on the other hand, on the economy’s capacity to make the 
resource profitable at a more appropriate real exchange rate. Correcting rela-
tive prices offers greater transparency to business and fiscal finances, and has 
the potential to improve the allocation of resources and boost the export sector 
and production chains. Self-employment, microenterprises and cooperatives are 
likely to be important candidates for accelerating responses to the new monetary 
and exchange-rate environment and achieving visible results in the short and 
medium term. Unlike large companies, this sector has great flexibility to adapt 
to a new framework of incentives and is best equipped to overcome bureaucratic 
inertia.
5 Final considerations
The foundations supporting Cuban institutions have recently deteriorated. In 
particular, the implicit intertemporal contract that was fundamental to these 
institutions seems to have been broken, generating disaffection among young 
people who appear to want more radical changes than those taken so far. This is 
the part of the population that is most likely to support the reform, although its 
capacity for agency is conditioned by the use of emigration as an escape from dis-
content. This individual “exit” is a response to the impossibility of being “loyal” to 
a manifestly inefficient institutional framework and the difficulties of construct-
ing a collective “voice” in order to encourage change.  
Over 30 years since the fall of the socialist bloc, the failure of real wages to 
regain their value and the gradual deterioration of health and education servic-
es – buttresses of the revolutionary institutions’ legitimacy – have contributed 
to growing discontent. The lack of institutionalised channels for voices and com-
plaints to be raised leads to collective frustration or the recourse to individual 
solutions (emigration). The transformations in the matrix of exchange rates, in-
comes and subsidies that begin in 2021 are essential to reverse the decline in real 
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wages, accumulated inequities and to alter migration trends. But if this new stage 
of the reforms is not to suffer the same fate as the previous ones, corrections must 
be made. Specifically, the goal to which the economy is to be led must be defined, 
and coherence must be given to the partial, fragmented reform process. Changes 
should also be made to the formal institutional framework to adapt it to the new 
economic and social setting. 
Thus far, Cuba has experienced a slow and fragmented process of economic 
reform, accompanied by minimal institutional change. This institutional rigidity 
is a poor reflection of the accelerated pace of change in the people’s ways of life, 
values and expectations, which is translated into a vigorous and fluid informal 
institutional framework. Cuba thus exemplifies the model of institutional change 
whereby the inertia and stickiness of formal institutions comes into increasing 
conflict with changing informal institutions. As a result, the formal lose some of 
their credibility and effectiveness in shaping collective behaviour. To achieve a 
better fit between the two institutional frameworks, progress must be made on 
reforming Cuba’s formal institutions.
The most active support for this goal appears to be found among young peo-
ple, academics and private sector business people, who are the least conditioned 
by the official discourse. However, the system’s bureaucratic logic of top-down 
decision-making processes means that the demands of these sectors have limit-
ed political weight. Given the limited space for democratic deliberation and so-
cial pressure, it is difficult to envisage a spontaneous movement emerging from 
society driving institutional change. In this setting, institutional changes are 
possible, but they are limited by the demands of the sectors that dominate the 
decision-making structures.
The two groups with most presence in the power structures are PCC bureau-
crats and FAR military personnel. Despite differing on certain points, neither 
group is inclined towards comprehensive, radical changes to the configuration 
of the Cuban economy. But the worsening of the economic situation due to the 
Venezuelan crisis and COVID-19 and the deterioration of social life seem to have 
inspired certain sectors of the political elites to embrace a faster pace and more 
ambitious scope for the reforms. The change of direction in US politics does not 
guarantee a new pace of transformation, but it will bring significant degrees of 
freedom that favour it. Nothing guarantees that this new reforming drive will be 
maintained over time and fully realised, but the chance of such a comprehensive 
change is higher today. 
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Marcel Kunzmann
“Neither Plan nor Market”. Problems and 
Coherence of the Gradualist Reform Approach
1 Introduction: Reading Kornai in Havana
To the surprise of many observers, it took socialist Cuba more than 15 years, 
which included various experiments and “on the fly” reassessments of basic 
premises, to finally execute its first five-year plan (1976–1980) using Soviet- 
style planning techniques. What the Hungarian economist János Kornai defined 
as the “mature form” (Kornai, 1992) of the classical socialist system finally be-
came a reality in Cuba. Kornai’s comprehensive analysis of socialist economics 
not only delivers useful categories for evaluating the Cuban model, it also sheds 
new light on the ongoing debate about the prospects of the economic reforms in 
Cuba, bringing fresh insights to the increasing contradictions affecting the coher-
ence of the current gradualist approach.
In The Socialist System, Kornai looked at the common properties of all so-
cieties practising “real socialism” from Moscow to Havana which, “even though 
their actual systems differ in many details are all members of a broader, clearly 
identifiable class of social-political-economic systems” (Kornai, 1992: 5). Exactly 
like Marx’s approach to his analysis of capitalism 100 years earlier, Kornai aimed 
to define the “properties and […] laws of movement” of these societies (Kornai & 
Bossányi, 1990: 315). 
His analysis starts with the role of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC), which 
was constituted in 1965, five years after the declaration of the “socialist charac-
ter of the Revolution”.1 As the “organized vanguard of the nation”, the Commu-
nist Party plays the leading political role and constitutes the political core of the 
socialist system. It is structured by the principles of democratic centralism and 
highly interwoven with the state and its branches, so “all major appointments, 
promotions and dismissals are decided upon by the various bodies of the party”; 
the party and the state, Kornai quotes an Hungarian party ideologist saying, “are 
not one, but they are not two either” (Kornai, 1992: 37). 
1  Although the Communist Party of Cuba was officially constituted in October 1965, it really began with 
the merger of the three different parties and organisations to form “Integrated Revolutionary Organi-
zations” (ORI), two years after the revolution in summer 1961.
https://doi.org/10.3224/84742546.08
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Ideologically, the Communist Party of Cuba adheres to the principles of 
Marxism–Leninism and with the aim to “organize and orient the communal 
forces towards the construction of socialism and its progress toward a commu-
nist society” (Constitución de la República de Cuba, 2019: art. 5). In this line of 
thought, socialism is perceived not only as a more human form of social organ-
isation than capitalism and its inevitable heir in the course of history, but also 
as a means to overcome economic backwardness and poverty as fast as possi-
ble. In Cuba (as in other developing countries), socialism was always seen as 
a way of nation-building. Its construction foresees the abolishment of private 
property and the market, which are replaced by the instruments of public own-
ership and planning to enable the advance to a classless communist society. The 
construction of socialism requires not only willing sacrifice and discipline from 
the people, but also the establishment of a different state apparatus, led by the 
Communist Party as representative of the working class (Kornai, 1992: 53ff.).
According to Kornai, all elements of classical socialism – like the party, the 
official ideology, public ownership of the means of production and central plan-
ning – have an organic affinity for each other and form a “coherent”2 system 
that reinforces and reproduces itself. But persistent shortages and the failure to 
keep its basic promises of superiority in contrast to capitalism led to reform, as 
happened in eastern Europe in the second half of the 20th century. During reform, 
new forms of ownership are introduced, and coordination mechanisms change. 
At this point, macroeconomic tensions appear, undermining the central planning 
apparatus and the system loses its former coherence. Finally, Kornai’s argument 
goes, the party will lose its power, a “change of system” will take place and capi-
talism will be restored as seen in eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
Kornai quotes the Soviet dissident Yuri Orlov to illustrate his point: “[…] the 
system designed by Lenin was such that once you pulled out one brick, the whole 
thing fell apart” (Kornai, 1992: 571). During the course of the Cuban Revolution, 
more than “one brick” was pulled out of the system. But how did these reforms 
unfold, and to what extend did they affect the functioning of the system?
2  Kornai’s uses “coherent” to mean a system with affiliate elements that interlock and reproduce 
each other (1992: 360–377).
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2 Patterns of development: Planning in Cuba 1959–1990
2.1  Early planning and the “Great Debate”
To understand the roots of the ongoing reform discussion and the shifting roles 
of planning and the market in Cuba, we must look back at history. As early as 
the Batista regime, some rudimentary tools of development planning were used 
on the island, as was common in many developing countries at that time.3 No 
clear testimony in the historical sources seems to explain which specific econom-
ic model the rebels of the 26th of July Movement originally envisioned, but the 
discussions within the movement before 1959 seem to indicate a “market econ-
omy under indicative planning”4 with different forms of ownership and govern-
ment-sponsored industrialisation (Mesa-Lago, 1971: 146).
In March 1960, 14 months into the revolution, the Central Planning Board 
(Junta Central de Planificación, JUCEPLAN) was established, which paved the 
way for the first attempts at economic planning.5 During the first years of the rev-
olution the economy suffered from harsh disorder. Policies for a more egalitarian 
distribution of resources prevailed, while the new government was learning how 
to manage the freshly nationalised companies, as the exodus of skilled workers 
and technicians significantly constrained the construction of the fundaments of 
central planning (Mesa-Lago, 1971: 152–154).
In the aftermath of the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion on April 16th 1961, Fi-
del Castro officially declared the “socialist character of the Revolution” at one 
of the countless mass rallies held at that time. At this point, it was already clear 
that some sort of planned economy would define Cuba’s future economic model. 
In 1961–62, Cuba tried to further boost central planning by implementing the 
Czechoslovak model with its 500 material balances, introduced by a delegation of 
that country’s State Planning Commission. But the experiment failed, mainly due 
to the rather mechanical approach to implementation, the lack of reliable data 
and statistics and serious miscalculations made by JUCEPLAN’s bureaucracy.6 
3  Though planning is the “natural” mode of economic organisation for a socialist system, some 
form of planning schemes have also been utilised in capitalist countries such as South Korea, as 
well as other Latin America countries, see: Mesa-Lago (1971: 146).
4  It is said that the movement’s early programme was conceived more according to tactical reason-
ing than with the aim of developing a coherent strategy.
5  The first planning attempts were mainly based on agricultural development, which may be the 
root of the still largely centralised approach to agriculture.
6  As Mesa-Lago summarises: “In fact, it was difficult with a few trained people, no previous expe-
rience, and inadequate data to convert the chaotic Cuban economy into a planned one in such a 
short period of time” (1971: 154).
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In March 1962, the monthly ration book (Libreta) was introduced (Mesa-Lago, 
1971: 154). 
As the Cuban revolution gained international attention, from 1962 on-
wards, famous economists like the Polish planner Michał Kalecki, the French 
Marxist Charles Bettelheim and the Russian economist A. Evinov prepared me-
dium-range development plans following Soviet techniques. All those attempts 
proved unsuccessful and never materialised, again partially because of a lack of 
sufficient information about the economy as well as immature institutions and 
insufficiently qualified personnel (Mesa-Lago, 1971: 155). What followed was 
the “Great Debate”, in which Che Guevara promoted the highly centralised “Bud-
getary Finance System” in contrast to the position of Charles Bettelheim, who 
argued along similar lines to the German Marxist Ernest Mandel for the utilisa-
tion of the “law of value”7 embedded in a Cuban version of the recently reformed 
Soviet-style planning framework (Mandel, 1969: 132; Guevara, 1969: 65f.; Bet-
telheim, 1969:  95).
In contrast to Soviet economic thinking, Guevara’s ideas foresaw the con-
struction of socialism and communism at the same time, with a heavy emphasis 
on the education of the masses in order to transform their consciousness. The 
use of voluntary labour and moral incentives for the purpose of forming the “New 
Man”, a morally altered, altruistic human being free of the flaws of the previous 
society, were some of the basic premises of Guevara’s concept. Unlike the Soviet 
model of economic accounting, with its individual material incentives, Guevara 
promoted the setting of good examples, constant education and collective re-
wards to unleash the forces necessary for rapid economic development. Accord-
ing to Guevara, communism can and should be constructed “as fast as possible” 
and in parallel to socialism. The abolition of capitalist categories like the law of 
value, private property and money as a basic precondition should therefore al-
ready begin in the early stage of socialist construction (Guevara, 1969: 65–67). 
Hence, the country’s factories should cease to operate as relatively independent 
economic units with their own financial responsibilities, but rather develop into 
centrally administered entities in order to guarantee a more rational use of na-
tional funds and to gradually achieve the abandonment of money and market 
prices (Guevara, 1969: 76–77).8 
7  The Marxist political economic term “law of value” is the counterpart to what is commonly re-
ferred to as “market coordination” and will be used here as synonymous, see: Kornai (1992: 92).
8  Guevara had to admit that his concept lacked a coherent mechanism of price-setting and per-
ceiving real production costs without referring to the global market. This problem contradicts 
his argument of achieving a “more rational use of national funds” by using central coordination, 
which he hoped could be solved sometime in the future through the establishment of a socialist 
world economy, see: Yafee (2012: 27).
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In contrast to Guevara’s position, Bettelheim argued that the existence of 
independent producers, different forms of ownership and the objective level of 
development of the productive forces meant that commodity production and 
therefore the law of value, money and the different forms of property would need 
to continue to exist during the socialist period for a long time to come. The level 
of development of Cuba’s productive forces was “relatively low”, he observed, 
stating that “the economic organization can never be higher than the forces of 
production” (Bettelheim, 1969: 92–95). Citing Lenin, Bettelheim concluded that 
the formal ownership of the means of production by the whole society “doesn’t 
converge with the possibility to actually make use of those as such” (Bettelheim, 
1969: 92–95). Instead, Cuba should continuously make use of the law of val-
ue within a central planning framework to develop its productive forces (Yafee, 
2012: 23). Although Mandel’s position significantly diverged from Bettelheim’s, 
he also agreed on the use of the law of value, adding that only after a very high 
level of development of the productive forces is reached, at which “full satisfac-
tion of the fundamental needs of the citizens” can be “automatically guaranteed” 
can communist consciousness be achieved. 
During and after the “Great Debate”, Che Guevara’s model was partially im-
plemented along with some characteristics of the Soviet model, but the problems 
continued. Annual plans lacked the envisaged compulsory character, while “mil-
lions of economic microrelations were destroyed at once, breaking the automatic 
mechanism of market distribution when the state system was not ready to take 
over these functions”, which led to severe economic distortions, especially in the 
agricultural sector (Mesa-Lago, 1971: 156). At the same time, during the 1964–
65 period, parts of the market socialist approach proposed by Bettelheim (e.g. 
self-financing of enterprises, attention to cost and profitability) were implement-
ed and applied to around one-third of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), though 
the system at the time “resembled the budgetary-finance model more than the 
market socialist model” (Mesa-Lago, 1971: 156). 
After 1965, the leadership’s economic preferences moved towards sectori-
al “mini-plans”, which undermined the parallel establishment of a rudimenta-
ry Soviet-style central planning framework with about 200 material balances 
(Mesa-Lago, 1971: 167). The Russian economist and inventor of input-output 
analysis, Wassily Leontief, commented after his visit to Cuba in 1969: “Fidel 
apparently has for some time emphasized what he calls ‘mini-planning’, that 
is separate planning of the operation of each individual sugar mill, textile plan, 
or electric station. No wonder bottlenecks develop everywhere, inventories run 
down, and unforeseen shortages occur resulting in frequent extremely costly 
shutdowns” (Mesa-Lago, 1971: 158). 
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As centralisation progressed with the gradual establishment of the planning 
system in the late 1960s, Fidel proclaimed the “simultaneous construction of 
socialism and communism”, emphasising Che Guevara’s ideas of abandoning 
money and radical egalitarianism in salaries through the massive use of mor-
al incentives and voluntary labour (Torres Pérez, 2020: 170). The idea was to 
gradually eliminate money through the expansion of free social services such as 
transportation, telecommunication and housing. This approach culminated in 
the Revolutionary Offensive in spring 1968 with the closure of all 56,638 exist-
ing small private businesses, which led to serious shortages and organisational 
problems. Until 1970, “wage differentials proved to be almost meaningless” in 
Cuba and the role of the market had been marginalised more than in most other 
socialist countries. (Karl, 1975: 31–34). Official growth rates went down from 
an average of 3.7 % in the 1962–65 period to a mere 0.4% during the 1966–70 
period (Zimbalist & Eckstein, 1987: 8). But it was the failure of the “Gran Zafra” 
(great harvest) in 1970 – according to Karl the “largest mobilization in Cuba’s 
history with more than a million of workers doing voluntary labor day and night” 
– that marked the turning point in Cuba’s voluntarist approach of simultane-
ous construction of socialism and communism. Despite being the largest harvest 
in the country’s history, bringing in 8.5 million tons of sugar, the campaign fell 
short of its goal of 10 million and came with high costs for the economy, which 
basically stood still during the campaign. Fidel Castro subsequently took person-
al responsibility of the failure (Karl, 1975: 34–35).
2.2 The SDPE: Establishing an institutional central planning framework
After the failure of the Gran Zafra, the country’s economic strategy underwent 
its first radical reassessment since the revolution. In November 1973, Fidel Cas-
tro announced: 
When we declared on July 26, at the celebration of the Twentieth Anniver-
sary, that we must bravely correct any idealistic errors we may have made, 
we meant that if at certain times we had tried to advance more than what 
was possible, it was now necessary to rectify. […] We must apply the formu-
las which correspond to this actual phase of our revolution, and apply them 
in every area […] (Roca, 1986: 157)
What followed was the most comprehensive wave of institutionalisation of the 
Cuban revolution, which lead to the establishment of the legislative body of “peo-
ple’s power” (Poder popular) in the political sphere, along with the PCC’s first 
congress in 1976. In the economic sphere, the Economic Planning and Manage-
ment System (Sistema de Dirección y Planificación de la Economia, SDPE), a 
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decentralised, state-of-the-art version of Soviet planning was installed in order 
to “achieve maximum efficiency in the state enterprises” (Roca, 1986: 158).9 Core 
properties of the system included: the financial autonomy of SOEs, which should 
create their own stimulus funds, the use of financial rather than physical produc-
tion indicators, the introduction of profitability at company level, the application 
of differentiated wage scales and material incentives and the reduction of plan-
ning indicators in order to stimulate enterprise autonomy (Zimbalist, 1989: 72). 
The full implementation of the SDPE was scheduled to take place over 
a ten-year period until 1986, but serious shortcomings again undermined the 
functioning of the new system,10 whose introduction had come to an halt by 
the mid-1980s (Roca, 1986: 161–162).However, despite never being fully im-
plemented, the SDPE delivered respectable results compared with all previous 
systems of economic management. Growth rates went up from 1971 onwards 
and averaged a fairly healthy 5.7% in the 1976 to 1985 period, permitting the 
massive expansion of Cuba’s social services, like free healthcare, education and 
extensive consumer subsidies during that period (Zimbalist & Eckstein, 1987: 
8). Despite its shortcomings, the SDPE led to the execution of the country’s first 
five-year plan (1976–80), finally increasing Cuba’s planning capacity for the first 
time towards a medium-term timeframe. The establishment of a comprehensive 
institutional framework between 1973 and 1976 marked a qualitative leap away 
from the various inconsistent previous attempts at central planning towards 
what Kornai calls the “mature form” of classical socialism (Kornai, 1992: 20). 
In accordance with the decentralised SDPE framework, which in large part 
resembled Bettelheim’s proposal during the Great Debate, Cuba withdrew some 
of the results of the Revolutionary Offensive. In 1980, for the first time since 
1968, the government allowed significant private initiative in, for example, the 
form of farmer’s markets and small repair shops, to compensate for the shortcom-
ings of the state economy and generate additional income in the form of taxes.11 
9  Including the financial planning aspects of the 1965 Soviet economic reform.
10  One of the most severe problems was that the envisaged autonomy of SOE management never 
materialised, with ministries continuing to give direct orders. A document from 1985 that evaluat-
ed the problems with the reform in rural Havana province made the following analysis: “One of the 
key stumbling blocks is the persistent limited economic autonomy in the fulfilment of enterprise 
functions. What happens is that while the central planning system reduces its directive indicators, 
the ministries increase them [to the enterprises] and the intent of reform is lost in an excessive 
paternalism […]” (Roca, 1986: 161–162). In addition, micro-management by the top leadership 
remained in areas such as the sugar and agricultural sphere, which continued to distort the plan 
(Roca, 1986: 171). Zimbalist (1989: 72) gives the most serious shortcomings of the SDPE as: 
bureaucratic resistance, pervasive shortage and an irrational price structure.
11  Although some private initiative, like car repair work and carpentry on a self-employed basis, was 
166 “Neither Plan nor Market”. Problems and Coherence of the Gradualist Reform Approach
A fresh variety of vegetables turned up on the streets of Havana, while in 1981 
the recently established cooperatives for housing construction were responsible 
for 38% of all new Cuban homes that year. In 1982, Cuba issued its first law on 
foreign direct investment (FDI) since the revolution and in May 1983, a new 
tax regime was established to regulate the emerging private sector (Zimbalist & 
Eckstein, 1987: 13–17). In 1985, official statistics counted 39,000 self-employed 
workers in Cuba, only 30% less than on the eve of the Revolutionary Offensive 
17 years earlier (Díaz Fernández, 2019). Thus, in contrast to the commonly held 
view that the reforms in Cuba did not start until the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, market reforms were already in full swing on the island during the first 
half of the 1980s. 
That changed with the start of the “Rectification” in April 1986, when Fidel 
Castro sought a new balance between the “utopian” mistakes of the early revo-
lutionary period and the “rightist” errors of the SDPE period. According to Cas-
tro, some transportation drivers supplying the farmers’ markets earned up to 
ten times more than the country’s top surgeons at that time, while many others 
were neglecting their jobs in the state sector in favour of greater participation 
in the private economy. The growing private sector, with its higher salaries and 
the increasing use of the market mechanism in the economy, undermined the 
coherence of the system and was increasingly perceived as a threat to the hegem-
ony of the state economy (Zimbalist, 1989: 84). Ideologically, the Rectification 
campaign sought to re-emphasise the Guevaran concept of voluntary labour and 
moral incentives. Wage scales in the state enterprises were harmonised in order 
to reduce inequalities and in May 1986, farmers’ markets were finally shut down. 
At the same time austerity measures had to be applied as Cuba’s hard-currency 
revenues in 1986–88 fell to a third of their 1984 level due to growing tensions 
in the external sector and the accumulation of debt. But the campaign was not a 
complete revision of the SDPE policies; indeed, apart from the continuing limi-
tation of the private sector it came closer to a “fine-tuning” of the planning appa-
ratus, trying to tackle some of the problems with the SDPE mentioned above by 
again reducing the role of market relations (Zimbalist, 1989: 76–78). 
allowed from the very beginning of the SDPE in 1976, the early 1980s saw them expand more 
rapidly and comprehensively, see: Zimbalist and Eckstein (1987: 13).
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Table 1: Patterns of economic development in Cuba
Period 1959–61 1961–71 1971–80
















Revolutionary Offensive Consolidation of central 
planning institutions, 
SDPE
Period 1980–86 1986–90 1990–ongoing
Phase Reform socialism Reform socialism  
(on hold)




Material and financial 
planning, minor market
Material and financial 
planning, marginalised 
market




Rise of a small private 
sector, decentralisation
Closure of farmer’s 
markets, Rectification
Various waves of de- 
and recentralisation 
Source: Authors’ compilation
As can be seen in Table 1, Cuba’s economic development from 1959 to 1990 fol-
lowed certain patterns of de- and recentralisation with constantly changing roles 
for the plan and market.
The triumph of the revolution was followed by a transitional period, as it was 
in most socialist countries in eastern Europe from 1946 to 1949, during which the 
system established itself politically with the creation of the single-party system 
and social reforms. As mentioned before, Cuba here is an atypical case, where 
the Communist Party was founded six years after the revolution and held its first 
congress only in 1976, although the basic political conditions were set with the 
declaration of the “socialist character of the Revolution” in April 1961. Econom-
ically, while market mechanisms still played the dominant role during the period 
of transition, the central planning apparatus was already under construction and 
increased its control over the economy. In the Cuban case, planning was very 
immature until the early 1970s, as many policy shifts delayed the development 
12  Expression by T. Bauer, borrowed by Kornai to describe the coordination mechanism of reform 
socialism. As the reforms in the 1980s still made little alteration to the classical system, this ex-
pression gradually became applicable only in the aftermath of the dissolution of the socialist bloc 
during the 1990s, see: Kornai (1992: 508).
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of a coherent framework for central planning, while the marginalisation of the 
market reached its greatest extent in the period from 1968 to 1973.
With the beginning of the gradual implementation of the Soviet-inspired 
SDPE in 1976, the first party congress and the establishment of the National 
Assembly of People’s Power (ANPP) all in the same year, the mature form of clas-
sical socialism took shape in Cuba. With the decentralisation of political and eco-
nomic power achieved, Cuba was ready to embark on the reform of the system.13 
A revaluation of monetary and financial relations in the state sector took place 
along with the resurgence of a small private sector, which reached its peak dur-
ing the first half of the 1980s.14 Beginning with the Rectification in 1986, market 
relations outside the state sector were marginalised again, though the financial 
categories of planning and material incentives remained intact. However, while 
the market reforms came to a temporary halt, the Rectification was far from a 
second Revolutionary Offensive. Cuban socialism formally remained in reform 
mode throughout those years, which was reflected in the overall maintaining of 
monetary relations in the state sector.15
Of course, history does not fit within sharply distinguishable categories like 
those in Table 1. For example, elements of “reform socialism” can also be found 
during the classical period of Cuban socialism, and while parts of the private sec-
tor first re-emerged in 1976, their broader development did not start before the 
early 1980s. The timing of the establishment of mature classical socialism is also 
far from a clear-cut historical event. One could argue that  the implementation of 
the Soviet model in the aftermath of the failure of the Gran Zafra in 1971 meant 
that classical socialism was fully established in Cuba; or that the creation of the 
ANPP and the start of the SDPE’s implementation after the first party congress 
in 1976 mark the turning point. The same is true for the role of plan and market, 
since many policies and properties from each phase tend to overlap and contra-
dict each other in the different time periods.16
13  According to the criteria laid out by Kornai (1992: 388), establishing “reform socialism” requires 
at least “partial, moderate change” in the political sphere, property relations or coordination 
mechanisms.
14  Overall, the Cuban reforms of the 1980s were fairly modest compared to those of other socialist 
countries at that time and never reached the level of market use of those in Hungary, see: Pink-
stone & Farrell (1997: 78).
15  Due to the limited scope of this chapter, the emerging new model of reform socialism during 
the 1990s will not be subject to deeper analysis, but many of its still persistent aspects will be 
examined in the analysis of the current state of market reform over the following chapters.
16  For a more detailed scheme of Cuba’s economic development patterns, see: Mesa-Lago & Pérez-
López (2005: 4).
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Despite these limitations, a general pattern becomes clear. While Bettelheim 
and Guevara’s  policies differ on increasing or decreasing the use of the mar-
ket mechanism and moral incentives – favouring or neglecting different forms 
of ownership – the influence of both poles of the “Great Debate” have shown 
long-lasting influence on Cuban economic policies. 
3 Plan, market and the coherence of the system
Following the dissolution of the socialist bloc in 1990, Cuba entered the so-called 
“Special period in peacetime”, a phase marked by harsh rationing, frequent elec-
tricity cuts and severe shortages. Austerity measures and a drastic reduction of 
imports had to be implemented as by 1993 Cuba’s GDP had contracted by 35% 
(Mesa-Lago & Pérez-López, 2005: 28). The disintegration of JUCEPLAN, whose 
functions were transferred to the Ministry of Economy and Planning (MEP) in 
1994, highlight the end of the old Soviet planning model, which was followed by 
constant improvisation and crisis management.17 The opening up to tourism and 
foreign investment, as well as the mutual economic assistance from Venezuela 
from the early 2000s allowed much of the classical system to survive in Cuba 
with only modest reforms and a small private sector, in spite of the tightening of 
the US economic embargo, which caused great damage to the economy (Alonso 
& Vidal, 2019: 12).
In the conditions of forced integration into the global market, inefficient 
state factories, ongoing shortages and the lack of basic consumer goods together 
with the growing black market continued to erode the country’s productive base. 
Import dependency was high and the material trade balance negative, despite the 
exportation of professional medical services, mainly to Venezuela, which com-
pensated for low goods exports.18 Real wages remained at 76% below their 1989 
level in 2007 and Raúl Castro admitted in the same year that they were “clear-
ly insufficient to satisfy needs” (Mesa-Lago, 2008: 17). A new liquidity crisis, 
following the devasting consequences of two hurricanes in 2008 and the global 
economic crisis of the same year, marked a new turning point in Cuba’s pattern 
of development, as the leadership began again to reassess the country’s develop-
17  As Cuban Economist Juan Triana (2019) explains: “We don’t do planning in Cuba. What we have 
is a system of administrative allocation of scarce resources”.
18  The leadership’s awareness of the model’s structural problems extends way beyond the Special 
Period, as a remarkable quote from Fidel Castro in 1985 confirms: “(We always assumed that) ev-
erything was available always without asking ourselves how it all came about. (This) gave shape 
to a wasteful mentality, a mentality of little thrift, a consumption rather than export mentality, an 
import rather than export mentality” (White, 1987: 156).
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ment model, and it became clear that Cuba’s socialism could not be built while 
“balancing on a razor’s edge” (Gabriele, 2011: 652). 
In this chapter, two main cornerstones of the post-2011 reforms will be ex-
amined: the emerging private sector and the reform of state-owned enterprises. 
It will be shown how the interaction of these two sectors affected the functioning 
of the coordination mechanism and therefore the overall coherence of the reform 
system. 
3.1 The emerging private sector
Following some years of modest reforms after Raúl Castro took over the Cu-
ban presidency in 2006, it became increasingly clear that slight adjustments 
would not resolve the economy’s structural problems. The leadership once again 
opened a public debate about the country’s future course. The result – the “Eco-
nomic and Social Policy Guidelines” (Lineamientos de la Política Económica y 
Social) approved at the 6th Party Congress in 2011 – aimed to change the model. 
Its core pillars were the creation of a “complementary” private sector (self-em-
ployed microbusinesses and non-agricultural cooperatives), decentralising SOE 
management, cutting unnecessary workforce in the state sector, land leases for 
private farmers and attracting foreign direct investment. Central planning, ac-
cording to the Guidelines, shall be the dominant coordination mechanism but 
it “will influence on the market and take into account its characteristics” (PCC, 
2011: 12).19 The Guidelines and their further amendment at the 7th PCC Con-
gress in 2016 almost exactly resemble what Kornai describes as the core concept 
of reform socialism: “The public sector should retain its dominant position, but 
it should change over to market behavior. At the same time, there should be a 
private sector, but only with a complementary, secondary role. The two sectors 
should cooperate while concurrently engaging in market competition with each 
other” (Kornai, 1992: 506).
Following the implementation of the Guidelines, the number of self-em-
ployed workers (cuentapropistas) in the private sector rose from 152,600 (with 
a 3.2% share of total employment) in 2006 to 617,974 (14% share) in December 
2019, with most of them working in gastronomy, transportation, house-renting 
for tourism and other services (Figueredeo et al., 2020; ONE, 2018: 7). By De-
19  The “Conceptualization of the New Model Economic and Social Model for Socialist Development”, 
approved at the 7th Party Congress in 2016, justified the existence of the “objective laws of the 
market” with “the level of the development of the productive forces, the social division of labor 
and the coexistence of different forms of ownership and management” delivering a Leninist ex-
planation for utilising the “law of value”, following Bettelheim’s line of argument during the Great 
Debate, see: PCC (2017: 8).
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cember 2018, there were 434 non-agricultural cooperatives (many fewer than 
originally envisioned) with 18,100 members. Along with the agricultural coop-
eratives, the non-state economy in Cuba (except the widespread informal sector) 
accounted for 32% of Cuba’s total employment by the end of 2018 (ONE, 2018: 
7).
Despite these figures, neither the quality nor the scope of the private sec-
tor developed enough for it to give substantial lift off to the economy or come 
anywhere near the role of services exports, tourism and foreign remittances in 
generating income (Izquierdo Ferrer, 2020). There are 123 license categories 
for private enterprises (most require non-professional labour), while non-agri-
cultural cooperatives (Cooperativas No Agropecuarias, CNoAs) still cannot be 
freely established. In 2015, Raúl Castro warned of the “massification” of this type 
of property, because cooperatives still needed further “perfection” of their man-
agement. Their expansion came to a halt. The same holds true for self-employ-
ment, with no new licenses issued for over a year beginning in summer 2017. 
Like the CNoAs, the private sector underwent a restructuring of its organisa-
tional structure, with the approval of a few more activities, while many core de-
mands for its proper functioning (like access to a wholesale market) still could 
not be met. The official claim was that the non-state sector would be “perfected” 
to better “control” and bring “order” to these economic activities (Torres Pérez, 
2020). Continual public affirmations were made of support for the development 
of the non-state sector as an important part of the economy. It was said that 
it would absorb excess labour from SOE layoffs so the state could focus on the 
development of the “command heights” (as Lenin put it) of the economy instead 
of micro-managing non-strategic activities. Yet, its development has in practice 
stalled. What happened? 
As the previous section showed, development in Cuba follows certain pat-
terns, during which the proportion and supposed role of markets and private 
property is assessed differently. Although the Guevaran approach of economic 
growth and socialist construction through the rapid elimination of private prop-
erty proved unsuccessful, its political DNA remains part of the apparatus. This 
creates a dilemma for the bureaucracy, which Raúl has repeatedly denounced as 
the persistence of an “obsolete mentality”, or as Kornai put it:
The bureaucracy behaves ambivalently toward the private sector in the re-
form phase. Sometimes it reassures and assists it, and sometimes it under-
mines its confidence and hinders its operation. The ambivalence may take 
the form of support for the private sector in one branch of the bureaucracy 
coupled with obstruction of it in another, or of an alternation of periods fa-
vorable and unfavorable to the private sector. Both kinds of behavior have 
their reasons […] But although one of the bureaucracy’s mental compart-
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ments is aware that it needs the private sector, another compartment of the 
same mind nurses a smoldering distaste and hatred for private ownership 
and individual activity (Kornai, 1992: 450).
In addition to that, the private sector “siphons off some of the labor force, often 
the best white-collar and manual labor” (Kornai, 1992: 506),20 because the state 
sector is unable to compete in the form of salaries, leading to a situation in which 
workers prefer to work in the private sector even if they are greatly overqualified 
for their job. Cuba’s highly qualified workforce leads to the common phenome-
na of taxi-driving academics and university professors doing the accounting for 
private restaurants to improve their living conditions. So the perceived “threat” 
has a real basis: as long as the state sector does not operate in an competitive 
and efficient way, the private sector, having proven its ability to create relatively 
substantial salaries, goods and services that the state is unable to provide in the 
same quantity and quality, distorts the state economy. The CNoAs, in particu-
lar, have in recent years demonstrated their ability to operate in an efficient and 
competitive manner, which may be the reason behind the delay – now stretching 
over half a decade – to the approval of this form of economic organisation (Bye, 
2020: 41).
Another factor is the lack of sufficient input goods and a coherent market 
environment, which prevents the private sector from operating properly. Fraud-
ulent practices, arbitrary pricing and a lack of workers’ rights have become a com-
mon feature of the private economy in reform socialism, fuelling popular anger 
towards the sector. This pushes the leadership to implement harsher regulations, 
like the price-caps established in Cuba in 2016 for the agricultural sector and in 
2019 for private gastronomy and transportation, in order to demonstrate its abil-
ity to “act on behalf of the people” while temporarily sacrificing its own long-term 
goals of reforming the system (Bye, 2020: 271). Kornai’s analysis of the reform 
socialist economies of eastern Europe and Asia during the 1980s again delivers 
an astonishingly accurate description of the situation in today’s Cuba: 
The position of the private sector under reform socialism enters a vicious 
circle. The ambivalent actions of the bureaucracy and the prejudice in 
society cause insecurity in private owners and entrepreneurs, who often 
show under these conditions the worst, not the best, side of capitalism. 
That heightens the antipathy toward them, which is a stimulus and argu-
ment for the bureaucracy to be even more hostile toward them, so that the 
negative features of their activities come to predominate even more. The 
system needs the private sector, and the private sector has to acknowledge 
20  Interestingly, this is not a new phenomenon in Cuba; indeed, the pattern of the 1980s reforms is 
being repeated, just on a qualitatively higher level. 
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the power of the bureaucracy, which is hostile toward it. But the result is 
a bitter coexistence, replete with mutual suspicion and conflict (Kornai, 
1992: 455).
3.2  The reform of planning and state-owned enterprises in Cuba
State-owned enterprises are the backbone of the socialist system. In the clas-
sical system, state-owned enterprises’ residual income flows directly into the 
state budget, while the planning bureaucracy centrally decides each product’s 
sales price, wages and allocation of input goods. The category of state property 
as “property of the whole society” is according to Kornai “not only depersonal-
ized, but eliminated. State property belongs to all and to none”, leading to low 
incentives and the common phenomena of worker alienation (Kornai, 1992: 
73–75). The companies operate under a soft budget constraint, resulting in their 
managers’ interest primarily in meeting material output targets, even if this im-
plies financial losses for the company. Hence, during the elaboration of the plan, 
instead of acting on behalf of the whole economy, SOE managers in socialist 
countries develop a particular interest in underestimating the firm’s real capabil-
ities in order to be given weaker targets while overestimating the need for input 
goods. The hoarding of goods is a fairly common phenomenon in socialism, not 
only among consumers, but also by state enterprises. Even in the reform mode 
of the system, when financial criteria gains greater weight – as in Cuba under 
the SDPE – plan fulfilment remains the core goal of the SOEs rather than prof-
itability, making management decisions responsive merely to price signals and 
consumer demands (Kornai, 1992: 140–148). 
Various reforms have attempted to tackle these problems. The Enterprise 
Perfecting programme (Perfeccionamiento Empresarial) aimed to revive SOEs 
by giving them greater autonomy, decentralising their management decisions 
(e.g. on wages, recruitment and pricing) and encouraging the retention of a high-
er share of their profits for investment decisions. It was also stated that worker 
participation, a basic promise of the classical system, could be better imple-
mented with a more decentralised decision-making framework at company level 
(Campbell, 2004/2005: 70). The programme started in 1987 in some military 
enterprises (mainly in charge of tourism and foreign trade) and later extended to 
around one-third of SOEs until 2002 (Travieso-Diaz, 2002: 129–133). In 1998, 
the so-called Higher Organizations of Business Management (Organizaciones 
Superiores de Dirección Empresarial, OSDEs) were founded in order to replace 
the companies’ direct management by the ministry with a more entrepreneurial, 
less political body (Travieso-Diaz, 2002: 125).
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Another reason for the ongoing shortfalls in Cuba’s state sector is monetary 
duality, which creates serious disincentives for production. While the exchange 
rate between the two official currencies, the Cuban peso (CUP) and the convert-
ible peso (CUC, pegged to the US-Dollar) is 24:1, the exchange rate within the 
state sector is arbitrarily set at 1:1. This makes imports cheaper (as they are 
charged at only 1/24 of their actual price) and thereby further discourages SOEs 
from generating income by exporting competitive goods. Additionally, monetary 
dualism distorts the overall evaluation of efficiency throughout the economy, 
hiding subsidies and preventing managers as well as the bureaucracy from taking 
rational decisions based on real performance results (Doimeadiós et al., 2011: 
118). 
Table 2: Selected macroeconomic indicators for Cuba 2011–2019 
Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019








46.8 46.7 55 55.5 62.1 68.7 67.6 67.7 -
Exports of goods 
(billion US$)
6.17 5.89 5.56 5.14 3.57 2.54 2.7 2.74 -
Fiscal deficit  
(% of GDP)
1.7 3.7 1.3 2.2 5.8 6.7 8.7 8.2 -
Source: compiled by author using ONE (2018) and Mesa-Lago (2019) data.
Today, the majority of SOEs are still generating chronic losses while a small share 
of the sector (e.g. mining, tourism) is responsible for producing the means nee-
ded to maintain the rest of the state economy. Since 2006, the number of SOEs 
in Cuba has more than halved – from 3,519 to 1,776 at the end of 2018 – mainly 
due to regrouping attempts, although one-third of them were definitively shut 
down between 2009 and 2017. In 2016, 60% of state firms were still in a “defi-
cient or bad” state, according to the Comptroller General (ONE, 2018: 4; Bye, 
2020: 30). As can be seen in Table 2, the slow recuperation of industrial out-
put and modest SOE reforms did not contribute to a growth of export revenues. 
Exports of goods more than halved between 2011 and 2019 and GDP growth 
fell short of the official goal of 5% to 7% – the target to accomplish sustainable 
growth. Gross capital formation (as a percentage of GDP) grew due to the rising 
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rate of investments and money allocated to the productive sector, but still aver-
aged only 9.7% between 2013 and 2018 – far below the 25% that is necessary to 
hit the projected growth rates, according to economists. The revival of the state-
owned enterprises currently remains the main key for the success of the reforms 
due to their dominant position, but their decentralisation (as the state refrained 
from taking some of the SOEs’ revenues) also contributed to a rise in deficit spen-
ding (Mesa-Lago, 2019: 4).
Following the implementation of the Guidelines, the OSDEs were gradual-
ly expanded throughout the whole economy, with the aim of changing vertical 
state–business relations. Since 2014, SOEs have been allowed to keep 50% (in-
stead of 30%) of their profits to create stimulus funds and take their own invest-
ment decisions, albeit on a limited scale (Rosabal, 2013). Five years after these 
modest reforms, the planning mechanisms again underwent a serious reshuffle. 
The problems of the SDPE era emerged again. The state media portal CUBADE-
BATE quoted a state factory manager saying that the legal framework of the new 
OSDE-business relationship was still not “totally clear” after five years (Rosabal, 
2013). Some OSDEs arguably began to act as “mini-ministries”, giving direct or-
ders instead of granting autonomy. There was “role confusion” and enterprises 
received “contradicting orientations” (Roca, 1986: 161). On the one hand, com-
panies were expected to react immediately to market signals, while on the other, 
autonomy existed only on paper. Or, as Roca described one of the main problems 
with the former SDPEs: “The enterprise director was obliged to fulfill the output 
plan, […] but in terms of decision-making; […] it was always necessary to consult 
with the superior level, with the organ that had created the enterprise” (Roca, 
1986: 161).
Again, the micro-management inherited from the classical system proved to 
be more persistent than expected (CUBADEBATE, 2019). With the new planning 
model presented in summer 2019 by the minister of economy, Alejandro Gil, 
SOEs are now encouraged to take their “own initiative” and negotiate contracts 
with other enterprises in the state and private sector. This is one way the plan is 
made more flexible, by substituting a top-down for a bottom-up approach. SOEs 
should get credits for creating new lines of products and form value chains au-
tonomously. Above-plan surplus can be sold freely, including to foreign compa-
nies in the Mariel Special Development Zone (ZEDM) established in 2014. Prices 
are to be flexibilised, gradually replacing the centrally set mechanism with agree-
ments by both parties (Gil Fernández, 2019; Mesa-Lago, 2019: 18). Although the 
coronavirus pandemic resulted in a huge economic downturn and the return of 
rationing, decentralisation was at least partially implemented before the curren-
cy reform of 2020/21 with the prior opening up to foreign trade.
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3.3 Market reform and coherence
How does the emergence of the new private sector and the changing planning 
model affect the coherence of the system? As Kornai describes, market reforms 
undermine the coherence of the classical system, which, despite its flaws, oper-
ates in a consistent manner with well-defined functions and competences. Mac-
roeconomic disequilibria appear during the reform phase, as market and plan 
coordination tend to block each other: “The result of the ambivalence in the re-
form of the public sector is that the shortcomings of the bureaucratic and market 
mechanisms, far from correcting each other, tend to reinforce each other. The 
sector falls between two stools. What takes place in the name of coordination is 
‘neither plan nor market’” (Kornai, 1992: 508). As a result, shortages and public 
dissatisfaction tend to be more severe than before the reform phase. The for-
merly coherent administration of society gets more and more blurred by the loss 
of consistency, which affects not only economic coherence but the system’s core 
values:
The semideregulated public sector shows few signs of being influenced by 
respect for industry and thrift associated with private ownership, the mar-
ket, and competition. What it does display is a spirit of cheap commercia-
lism. This permeates the whole society: personal connections with officials 
in the bureaucracy are used by state-owned firms and private entrepre-
neurs in matters of production and by individuals in their own affairs, and 
bribery is often attempted. Buyers suffering from shortage, whether firms, 
self-employed artisans, or consumers, try to do the same. The wealth of the 
state has no value in the public’s eyes; people do not sense that it arose out 
of the taxes and sacrifices of taxpaying citizens, or that those handling the 
nation’s wealth could be held responsible for it. Many of the public do not 
condemn defrauding or stealing from the state (Kornai, 1992: 509).
In Cuba, these problems were perfectly mirrored by Raúl Castro’s speech about 
“social indiscipline” from July 2013, when he criticised the increase in corruption, 
illegal activities and anti-social behaviour, concluding that “despite the undeniable 
educational achievements made by the Revolution […] we have taken a step back 
in citizens’ culture and public spirit […] I have the bitter sensation that we are a 
society ever more educated, but not necessarily more enlightened” (AP, 2013). 
According to Kornai (1992: 25), reform socialism’s lack of coherence makes 
it “doomed to fail”. And, indeed, the history of reform socialism in eastern Eu-
rope seems to prove his point.21 But is the same true for market socialism as 
21  All forms of the classical system – as maintained, for example, in highly isolated Albania – failed 
during the same time period that Cuban reform socialism has proven to be sustainable for a 
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practiced in China, Laos and Vietnam? In stark contrast to Kornai’s statement 
from 1992 that any form of market socialism could never form a coherent new 
model that leads to sustained growth, the Chinese approach of “dual-track” re-
form, in which the plan load on SOEs is gradually substituted for market coor-
dination within the framework of strategic macroplanning, has not only proven 
to be highly successful, but also led to the formation of a new model over a suf-
ficiently long period to qualify as at least “viable”, if not “coherent” (Qian, 2002: 
19). As Alberto Gabriele points out, market socialism could be the most viable 
alternative for Cuba,22 solving the structural problems of its economic model, as 
“the tension between Cuba’s exceptional human development achievements and 
the weakness of their material foundation cannot be maintained indefinitely” 
(Gabriele, 2011: 671–672). 
Indeed, the party’s current economic concept papers (approved at its 7th 
Congress in 2016) already point towards the vision of a market socialist system 
that will be under construction until 2030.23 However, “market socialism with 
Cuban characteristics” would not necessarily resemble its counterpart in China 
and Vietnam in every aspect, as the starting conditions in those countries differ. 
For example, Cuba has much more developed social security systems and a more 
highly skilled workforce than China and Vietnam had during the start of market 
reforms, and the political and cultural conditions are vastly different. Still, many 
properties of the Chinese and Vietnamese model could prove to be useful for 
future reforms in Cuba, as all three countries stem from the same family of so-
cio-economic formation, and therefore face similar system-specific challenges.24 
Summarising the previous chapters, Table 3 shows the three different forms 
of historically existing socialism with their respected differences in the main 
economic aspects laid out using the criteria of Kornai (1992: 393) and Gabriele 
(2012):
historically long period despite its lack of coherence. 
22  For a definition of market socialism, see: Gabriele Schettino (2012: 31).
23  For example, the different forms of property (e.g. for the first time not only small but also me-
dium-sized private enterprises) shall interact with each other, while the planning bureaucracy 
should “give priority to strategic planning” PCC (2017: 9); PCC (2017: 22). The current adminis-
trative mechanisms of planning shall be replaced with economic–financial ones (indicative plan-
ning), while in a first instance the plan should be “less detailed”, as economic minister Alejandro 
Gil pointed out in February 2020 (CUBADEBATE, 2020).
24  For a discussion of the question of what market socialism in Cuba could potentially look like, see: 
Gabriele (2011); and Wilkinson (2012).
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Table 3: Different types of socialist system
Classical socialism Reform socialism Market socialism
Political system One-party state One-party state One-party state
Forms of property >≈80% SOEs, little or 
no private owner-
ship of the means of 
production
Dominant state sector, 
increasing number of 
private businesses and 
cooperatives






Bureaucratic (plan) “Neither plan nor 
market”
Market (with strategic 
planning)
Planning method Mainly material Material & financial Mainly financial
Market situation25 Seller’s market Seller’s market Buyer’s market
Formation of prices Centrally set Partly free Mostly market driven
Budget constraint 
of SOEs
Soft Soft Partially soft
Coherence Coherent Incoherent Coherent (?)




Cuba (since 1980), 
GDR (1963–71), Hun-
gary (1963–89), USSR 
(1953–64; 1985–91)
China, Laos, Vietnam 
(all 1980s), Yugoslavia 
(1949–90)
Source: Authors’ compilation
This overview seeks to give the typical characteristics of each version of the sys-
tem, rather than a complete list of all their respective properties. As explained 
with regard to Table 2 in the previous section, the boundaries between the diffe-
rent types sometimes overlap and vary over the course of history.
4 Conclusion: Towards a new form of market socialism in Cuba?
As this paper has sought to demonstrate, economic development in Cuba since 
1959 followed clearly distinguishable patterns, with phases of de- and recentral-
isation and different combinations of coordination mechanisms. After the “Great 
Debate” of 1963–65, Guevara’s approach of eliminating the market “as fast as 
possible” reached its peak with the Revolutionary Offensive in 1968. The sub-
25  For an explanation of the seller’s/buyer’s market under the conditions of socialism, see: Kornai 
(1992: 218-19, 245-52).
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sequent “great disenchantment” after the failed sugar harvest in 1970 led to the 
first fundamental reassessment of the economic system, connecting the objective 
conditions of economic development with the state’s management abilities. The 
institutionalisation wave since the mid-1970s reflects this shift of assessment 
during the first experiments with market reform in socialist Cuba. 
After many years of various phases of reforms and their partial reversal, in 
2011 the PCC for the first time recognised the existence of the market as in-
tegral part of its socialist model. The essence of the reform concept was even 
enshrined in the country’s new constitution of 2019, where article 18 states that 
central planning should “consider the market and regulate its functions”. Differ-
ent forms of private property were recognised. Planning, according to the new 
constitution, should “essentially project and conduct the strategic development” 
instead of micro-managing the economy (Constitución de la República de Cuba, 
2019: 3). Thus, Bettelheim, in the end, seems to have won the Great Debate.26
But the implementation of the reform programme has so far fallen short of 
the political consensus reached. At the 7th Party Congress in 2016, Raúl Castro 
had to admit that only 21% of the Guidelines had been implemented so far. As ex-
amined before, reform since then has stagnated on many fronts due to short-term 
efforts to resolve tensions, leaving the current state of economic coordination in 
Cuba at the level of “neither plan nor market”. Although some indicators point 
towards the vision of a Chinese-inspired dual-track reform framework with stra-
tegic planning, currently, Cuba’s reform process is “stuck in the middle”, leaving 
many questions in the air (Alonso & Vidal, 2019: 17). This picture did not change 
much until January 1st 2021, when the staggered devaluation of the peso along 
with the harmonisation of exchange rates and the abolition of the CUC finally 
took place in the aftermath of the economic downturn following the pandemic. 
Although the updated reform framework amid the 2020 recession does point 
towards a substantial increase in the use of market mechanisms as well as the 
tightening of the budget constraint, only time will tell whether Cuba manages to 
take the step forward from the gradual approach towards a market socialist mod-
el on its own basis, which could potentially create the material foundations for 
sustained and dynamic growth and by solving the economy’s structural problems 
restore much of the coherence lost. 
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Multiple Economies and Everyday Resistance in 
Cuba: A Bottom-up Transition
Introduction1
Contemporary political economy and economic anthropology research recog-
nises that any national economy must be studied as a web of dissimilar but in-
terdependent spheres: formal and informal, commercial and social, family and 
corporate, state and community, legal and illegal. A “diverse economies” frame-
work helps us better understand the interconnected flows of valuation, reproduc-
tion and development (Gibson-Graham, 2008). In the Cuban case, we see such 
a framework as essential to analyse an increasingly complex economy, as well 
as to visualise bottom-up dynamics that could serve as seeds of transformation 
towards more equitable economies (e.g. Ostrom, 2010; Smith et al., 2014; Rich-
ardson, 2015; Koopman, 2011; Goodman et al., 2012). 
Addressing the Cuban economic system’s inequalities of income and access 
to opportunity (and gradually to property), as well as the opacity of its economic 
flows (Hansing & Hoffmann, 2020; Espina & Togores González, 2012) requires 
an understanding of how its different realms of production and exchange inter-
act in practice. Diverse, interconnected production relations co-exist and depend 
on each other, but have their own rules and rights (Ritter, 2015; Pérez-López, 
2018). The key structures for formulating public and economic policies remain 
unreachable (and often invisible) in the public debate, while essential activities 
for societal evolution have been criminalised or marginalised. This impasse is 
encouraged by three factors: the lack of independent social research institutions; 
citizens’ very limited capacity to associate and speculate about issues of social 
and cooperative interest (Chaguaceda, 2011); and the geographical and ontolog-
ical distance of comparative cases from which examples of post-socialist transi-
tion could be drawn (Reid-Henry, 2007). Beyond the stagnation of the economy 
itself, we thus face important conceptual gaps in its representation. 
Our research approaches this void from two angles. First, a conceptual frame-
work is proposed that breaks with the exceptionalism that prevails in the study 
1  Parts of this work are based on recent essays published in Foro Cubano (Universidad Sergio 
Arboleda, Bogotá): Thiemann and Mare (2019); Thiemann (2019a, 2019b).
https://doi.org/10.3224/84742546.09
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and discourse about Cuba (Hoffmann & Whitehead, 2007) and leaves behind the 
binaries that still dominate discussions about the island’s economic “system” (so-
cialism/capitalism; legal/illegal; state/private, etc.). We will explore the utility 
of two novel conceptual frameworks: Gibson-Graham’s theory of multiple econ-
omies; and the research on infra-politics and everyday resistance (Scott, 1986; 
1990; Tria Kerkvliet, 2009; Ye et al., 2016) based on subaltern studies (Shanin, 
1990; van der Ploeg, 2008). In this way, we attempt to link the socio-economic 
data collected in recent standardised surveys (Mesa-Lago et al., 2016; Hansing & 
Hoffmann, 2020) with transdisciplinary perspectives that allow us to address the 
post-socialist economy considering political, cultural and semantic dynamics. 
Secondly, the chapter discusses the results of our own interview series, 
which includes respondents from a diversity of illegal and informal spaces and 
practices. We collected empirical data in the form of testimonies and life histories 
that detail the fluidity between legal and illegal practices. Due to the sensitivity 
of the topics covered and the likelihood of data contamination from patterns of 
self-censorship, we worked with a team of collaborators who interviewed people 
they already knew and followed the technique of “snowball sampling” (Atkin-
son & Flint, 2001). The meetings were held at an intimate, conversational level, 
and in some cases over several sessions in order both to gain the confidence of 
the subjects and to better understand the places and mechanisms they use in 
their livelihoods. For this project we considered a total of 72 accounts collected 
between 2017 and 2020 in five provinces (Havana, Mayabeque, Pinar del Río, 
Camagüey and Matanzas). The sample consists primarily of subjects aged 30–59 
with experience of both state and non-state work in their sectors, and who live 
and work in (sub-/inter)urban areas.2
We argue that the Cuban transition has created three economies with their 
own motives and mechanisms of mobilisation and valuation (Table 1). The mo-
tives and methods of the paternalistic statism that characterised society during 
the period of Soviet dependency and led to the crisis of the “Special Period” have 
largely been left behind. Emerging from the crisis and its structural origins, Cuba 
has gone through two interconnected transitions: one, top-down, in which the 
post-socialist elites have reorganised various state monopolies as commercial 
enterprises that enable the power apparatus to survive and fund a reduced range 
of social services (Morales, 2009); and another, bottom-up, in which the popula-
tion has reorganised everyday relationships, both inside and outside the state, in 
order to allow households to survive. 
2  Thiemann and Spoor (2019) addresses similar issues to this chapter, but focuses on agricultural 
production and rural livelihoods.
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Interactions between Cuba’s multiple economies
Table 1 summarises our analysis of the three subsystems that make up the Cu-
ban socio-economic space. The first column contains all the surviving operations 
of the paternalistic state: a state that intends to feed its inhabitants (regulated 
and unsubsidised food), offers them clothing, assigns them a job (social service), 
provides them with subsidised education, health and cultural options, assists in 
case of unexpected events (Civil Defense) and even provides household applianc-
es (as during the “Energy Revolution” of the mid-2000s). This social economy 
has been of particular political utility in sustaining egalitarian assumptions and 
legitimating a stagnating ”revolutionary process”. It has functioned as a strategy 
for social cohesion and signification around the semantics of ”socialist equality”. 
This economy uses state philanthropy to prioritise social concerns and includes 
several forms of distribution, such as rationing, subsidy, gratuities and loyalty 
incentives. 
Table 1: Cuba from a “multiple economies” perspective
Mixed  
economy
Actors Motives Methods Importance 




















































This social economy survived the transition, but only just. Pressed by the eco-
nomic crisis of the 1990s and 2000s, the government approved cuts to general 
spending, reductions to state services and subsidies, and began raising funds 
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from previously free services. Thus, in both practical and symbolic terms, the di-
scursive constructs and egalitarian underpinnings of the hoped-for “construction 
of socialism” were liquidated (Espina et al., 2011: 59–75; Mare, 2019). Thirty 
years after losing its position as a subsidised “outpost” of the Soviet Union, Cu-
ba’s paternalistic state depends more than ever on the sacrifice of its workforce of 
specialised professionals, local bureaucrats, manual workers and technical per-
sonnel. State-sector workers are the social actors that are both the “natural” allies 
of the perpetuation of state paternalism and the most vulnerable to its changes. 
After three decades of inflation and wage stagnation, the 3.1 million full-time 
workers in the state sector received an average monthly salary of $32.38 in 2018 
(ONEI, 2019), a token amount even in the Cuban context.3 Several authors have 
calculated that real wages in 2011 reached only 26%–27% of their 1989 value 
(Vidal & Everleny, 2012: 9; Mesa-Lago, 2012: 8); Mesa-Lago gives the figure for 
2016 as 39.3% (2017: 5). State wages, along with pensions, social security and 
other redistributive payments, account for just 3.5% of Cuban GDP.4 Although 
the monetary reform announced for January 2021 promises to considerably rai-
se nominal wages in CUP, we estimate that inflation, the dollarisation of many 
domestic markets, and the impacts of the pandemic, will mean real wages will 
not rise in 2021–22.
When it comes to household sustenance, the post-socialist transition has 
already taken place. While state employment is still formally the norm on pa-
per, for most state employees their formal salary is only a secondary (or tertiary) 
source of income. By upsetting the relative balance between wages and consump-
tion that characterised Cuba’s social-centralist economy under Soviet tutelage 
(1972–1991), the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) reduced its paternalistic obli-
gations. By sending Cubans out to fend for themselves, however, it oddly insisted 
that they continue to fulfil their part of the social contract between the paternal-
istic state and proletarian society. The state continues to regulate the economy 
in a way that means citizens must almost exclusively work, sell, buy from and 
respond to the demands of its omnipresent apparatus. Hence, rather than see-
ing it as a deviation from the script of command economics, the PCC’s response 
to the economic crisis of the Special Period constituted a radicalisation of the 
3  In the official press, the secretary general of the Cuban Workers’ Confederation acknowledged 
that wages were not enough to meet needs (Granma, July 31st 2017). We estimate that fewer 
than 10% of Cuban households are able to meet the costs of their basic monthly food basket sole-
ly through salaries and pensions (those earning over $50 per household member at the informal 
exchange rate) (see also Belyea, 2018). This percentage falls even further when daily costs for 
transportation, utilities, basic home maintenance and medical care are calculated.
4  Authors’ calculation based on ONEI data (2018), taking into account the GDP deflator calculated 
by Vidal (2017: 12). 
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Guevaran model of voluntary work based on morality rather than payment. The 
result is that both the elites and the working population have been obliged to seek 
other, informal ways of sustaining themselves. 
In spite of this generalised sacrifice, the social economy is becoming increas-
ingly limited in scope. Every year since 2008, the “libreta” (ration booklet) has 
offered a smaller variety of subsidised products, with some of the remaining ones 
habitually substituted or missing from stores. The paternalistic state today guar-
antees food at subsidised prices for the first week of every month (a policy that 
appears to end with the January 2021 monetary reform). After that, the popula-
tion must find solutions on the black market or succumb to the military’s high-
priced supermarkets. 
In the absence of a new social contract, and rejecting the radicalisation of 
voluntarism, the vast majority of Cubans reformulated their obligations to the 
state as opportunities for day-to-day privatisation, increased participation in 
black and grey markets, and rely on remittances and their domestic recirculation. 
Rather than trusting the macrodynamics of nation-construction and institution-
alised redistribution, their economic lives have shifted to the microdynamics be-
tween unsustainable dependencies and illegal autonomies. 
Coexisting with the paternalistic state but much less visible is a second sphere: 
the corporate state. Here, we find the main actors in the top-down post-social-
ist transition: conglomerates that belong to the military leadership, their loyal 
managers and professionals, and a small number of international companies as-
sociated with this elite. They operate within an opaque environment with little 
balance of power (Tedesco, 2018; Klepak, 2012; Pedreira, 2013).5 Indeed, this 
capitalist sphere has become the main “fortress” of the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces (FAR): “defending the system” has evolved from military tasks of terri-
torial defence to commercial operations for economic survival. Siddiqa (2017: 
1–2) suggests that an economy’s degree of militarisation is not measured only by 
the size of its defence budget, but by the political economy of its “military cap-
ital”: “Profit-making ventures conducted by the military, with the involvement 
of armed forces personnel or using the personal economic stakes of members 
of the defence establishment”. So while 1952 marks the beginning of the mili-
tary dominance over politics in Cuba, which was cemented after the Rebel Army 
entered Havana in 1959, the military economy we now know is more recent. It 
was fostered in the 1990s with the unification of the various operations carried 
5  The nature of its organisation and members means that it operates with no direct (or even partial) 
oversight, that the information on its assets and budget is neither public nor accessible and that 
its managing officers do not grant interviews or reports. Its military status is justified by the eco-
nomic strategy in the name of national security and its secrecy on the premise that “the enemy” 
should not be given access to such information.
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out by agents of the Ministry of the Armed Forces (MINFAR) and the Ministry 
of the Interior (MININT) to provide the country with foreign exchange (Sweig, 
2016: 71, 135–6). From that point on, military-led entrepreneurialism expanded 
to manage tourism, the domestic foreign exchange market, air transport, mining, 
biomedicine and various exports of profitable products such as tobacco and rum 
(Tedesco, 2018: 113).
The military’s activity in the post-socialist economy therefore differs categor-
ically from the arms and military construction companies set up in the 1960s and 
1970s. There are four essential differences: 1) military corporations today react 
to business opportunities rather than matters of defence; 2) they have embarked 
on the open pursuit of surplus value rather than defined national security objec-
tives; 3) military companies compete with civilian companies that could perform 
the same business activity; and 4) the FAR have created informal hierarchies that 
exist in parallel to those designated by the constitution. During the presidency 
of Raúl Castro (defence minister since 1959 and main architect of the corporate 
transition) this elite took control of key ministries and public agencies in order 
to command the main sources of surplus value (the commercialisation of med-
ical services, tourism, revenues from remittances and the trading of imported 
products, exports of sugar, tobacco and rum, among others) and capital (e.g. the 
national spatial planning system, the Banco Financiero Internacional (BFI), and 
the corporation that manages Cuba’s protected areas, Flora y Fauna). The most 
profitable company in Cuba is currently the multisectoral conglomerate Grupo 
de Administración Empresarial S.A. (GAESA in its Spanish initials). Its sales are 
estimated at between $4 and $5 billion per year, a figure that represents over 
10% of GDP (González et al., 2018). 
Through GAESA and other smaller conglomerates, the corporate state con-
centrates and controls almost all profitable economic sectors. Institutionally 
separate from the social state’s egalitarian, redistributive motives, it seeks to 
maximise its margins by recasting citizens as paying customers. However, its 
profitmaking is only possible due to the monopoly it exercises over key economic 
sectors and the unfavourable regulation of possible competitors. No foreign com-
pany can sell its products and services without the participation of the corporate 
state, while unaffiliated Cuban citizens are only granted licenses and economic 
spaces that do not interfere with established monopolies. To protect the exclu-
siveness of its export markets, for example, the government refused the Barack 
Obama administration’s proposal to allow small Cuban businesses to export to 
the United States as part of the intent to thaw bilateral relations. Crucially, sever-
al key monopolies originally established to facilitate the role of the paternalistic 
state now serve the corporate state. High subsidies have thus become high mar-
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gins.6 In these conditions, GAESA’s projects and those of similar corporations 
can grow very rapidly, and despite being companies with severe operational in-
efficiencies, they manage to invest in their value chains and establish branches 
(for example, of the supermarket chain aptly named “Currency Collection Stores” 
(Tiendas de Recaudación de Divisas) and the Panamericana chain throughout 
the country.
In part, the corporate restructuring of parts of the state is based on the tran-
sition from one mode of international dependency to another. In the 1990s, Cuba 
was disconnected from what Cubans called the “pipeline” of donations from 
countries governed by PCC sister parties. Though Hugo Chávez’s taking power in 
Venezuela allowed a new setup of dependency on this (initially) much more pro-
ductive sister-economy, Cuba’s model of intergovernmental dependency appears 
to have ended conclusively with the collapse of the Venezuelan economy between 
2014 and 2017. Rather than unleashing major productive forces at home, the 
state has since focused on reconnecting with another external benefactor – the 
diaspora of Cuban refugees in wealthier countries. Rather than opening a new 
“pipeline”, the state now faces a multitude of irregular “hoses” into the country, 
typically extended by family members abroad. In the period from 2008 to 2018, 
remittances (as a flow of subsidies to Cuba) exceeded the value of the goods, 
credit, fuel, knowledge, investment and weapons sent annually by the USSR and 
its satellites in the 1980s.7 The main difference between the two periods of ex-
ternal dependence is that the state had direct access to the first, while today it 
needs to develop commercial mechanisms to seize a share of the second. In order 
to participate in the transfer and domestic redistribution of remittances, the en-
trepreneurial state has extended its trade networks so as to be able to buy cheap 
6  One sector that reveals how the corporate state’s interest in increasing commercial margins often 
prevails over the paternalistic state’s endogenous development interests is the policy applied 
since the 1990s to the import and sale of tools in state stores. One interviewee, a representative 
of a foreign firm with a long-term presence in Havana, explained how basic electric and hand 
tools are rendered inaccessible to the population: “They proposed that we open a shop to sell 
electric and hand tools to the public, and we were very interested because there is a large market 
for these products. We gave them our proposal with the prices at which we’d supply the products 
to the store, which would be run by Habaguanex. At the next meeting they showed us the list of 
prices they would set for the public, and they were triple the cost. Nothing would sell that way, 
and we can’t bear the investment costs for a store that will be ghosted” by the population (# 5, 
Havana, 30.11.17).
7  According to Mesa-Lago (2018), between 2008 and 2018, Cubans on the island received $57.3 
billion from the diaspora. Of this, $29.9 billion was in cash and $27.3 billion in goods. In the space 
of 11 years, this form of external subsidy surpassed the aid Cuba received from the USSR in al-
most 30 (estimated at $30 billion), as well as the estimated $40 billion it received from Venezuela 
over 17 years. 
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merchandise on the (overproduction-driven) international market, multiply its 
value in Cuba’s scarcity-driven domestic markets, and thus obtain exceptional 
commercial margins.
This favourable context for Cuba’s fledgling state capitalism is explained by 
its leaders’ direct access to power. While the Soviet central planning model is 
maintained in the ministries, a parallel hierarchy now controls most of the assets 
and investments needed to actually implement planning. The Ministry of Do-
mestic Trade (MINCIN), for example, may decide to improve its outdated refrig-
eration and transport capacity in order to improve the effectiveness of its tasks 
to collect and distribute domestic products to stores and agricultural markets. In 
practice, however, these resources are invested elsewhere – primarily in GAE-
SA supermarkets that sell imported luxury products (Thiemann & Spoor, 2019). 
Given their close (often family) relations with the main leaders of the PCC and 
the FAR, it is likely that in certain cases the directors of the corporate state have 
more power to make key decisions about the economic sectors they participate 
in than the (civilian) ministerial cadres whose job it is to plan and regulate the 
same sectors.
This capacity of the business elite to establish political interests means they 
may be conceived of as a new class: a social sphere where profit motives and 
protective power converge with new and exclusive entrepreneurial autonomies 
from the state’s tax and redistributive system that have conclusively divorced 
from the PCC’s egalitarian ideals (Riggs, 2001). This class benefits from access 
and entrepreneurship opportunities, clientelistic ties, political power and finan-
cial leverage far beyond those of the other economic agents we present here. It 
accepts economic reform, yet retains a Cold War mindset in its political think-
ing, coupled with an acute need to maintain the ideology of statism on which its 
monopolies rest. To do so, the entrepreneurial FAR preserves its hegemony in 
state security matters and encourages military supervision of political processes. 
In short, a class that is “increasingly despotic in its relations with workers, and 
which in the course of its consolidation and development begins to self-recruit 
and to maintain production/appropriation relations of an exploitative nature” 
(Quijano, 2014: 580–581). 
A third sphere of the mixed economy counterbalances the first two, and 
grows in their contradictions. This is the popular or autonomous economy in 
which a large variety of black and grey markets, perks and bribes coexist with 
semi-legal self-employment. Although wages in some state sectors nominal-
ly rose in 2018, most of the labour carried out in Cuba takes place in a subal-
tern context, as an “ongoing struggle for autonomy and progress in a context 
characterized by multiple patterns of dependency and associated processes of 
exploitation and marginalization.” (van der Ploeg, 2008: xiv). The origin of this 
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definition lies in debates over non-capitalist relations in agriculture (the “peasant 
condition”), but in the Cuban context it is notable far beyond the specificities 
of agricultural work. Through a broad portfolio of economic subversion and re-
sistance strategies, state workers have transformed their jobs into platforms for 
the “everyday privatisation” of state assets and inputs. Large parts of the popu-
lation have accepted and normalised their at least partial dependence on illegal 
transactions and practices. The macroeconomic weight of these practices has in-
creased and – we argue – jumped category: initially supplementary channels for 
scarce goods, black and grey markets have come to represent the main source of 
income for a significant majority of households. They are also key markets for 
many goods and services, from gasoline to cement. 
Extensive illegal economies existed in all countries that followed the Sovi-
et central planning model, including the Cuba of the 1980s (Loś, 1990; Smart, 
1993; Smart & Hsu, 2007). Within these supplementary economies, citizens set 
about correcting the clumsy movements of the planned economy (shortages of 
some products and services, and overproduction of others). Since the Special Pe-
riod, however, the provision of basic needs and the search for progress in Cuba 
have become individualised and displaced into the underground economy on a 
scale that exceeds both the Soviet blat and the Chinese guanxi. The imbalance 
between the increasingly limited agency of the paternalistic state and the exploit-
ative practices of corporate monopolies leads many Cuban households to partici-
pate in this third economy on a much larger scale and daily basis: when they buy 
groceries, hygiene products or newspapers; when they pay electricity bills; when 
they require transport; when they build or repair their houses; when searching 
for jobs, medical treatment, legal permits or documentation. The lack of official 
data means that it will remain difficult to quantify this economy, but from our ob-
servation the autonomous economy has already become the largest of the three, 
and the one that “resuelve” (solves) most problems and needs in the daily life of 
Cubans (Ritter, 2015; Hirschfeld, 2006).
Most state workers rely on alternative activities to supplement their wages. 
Many of these activities take place during their working hours, at their workplace 
and at the expense of their companies’ social or business purposes. Necessity 
has led Cubans to legitimise a day-to-day life of illegal trade, misappropriated 
resources, petty bribery and tax evasion. “La lucha” (the struggle) is the name 
commonly given to illegal (trans-)actions that are performed in order to subsist. 
But “la lucha” also constitutes an area of collective agency that transforms the 
country from the bottom up, as it allows the practice of resistance to a govern-
ment that gives no space to other, more explicit manifestations. Lacking serious 
political platforms, people demonstrate economically. 
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The praxis of autonomy is rolled out in a series of informal economies that 
resist power, yet also avoid confronting it (Scott, 1985). We depart from the com-
mon analysis that Cuba’s black markets are a “proto-capitalist” sphere of entre-
preneurial spirit that reveals that “Cubans are capitalists” after all, in spite of 
their government’s refusal to legalise such “innate” pursuit of profit (Cave, 2012). 
We propose to frame the vast majority of self-employment within what Shanin 
(1990) calls “expolary economies” – spaces of subsistence practice and motiva-
tion that lie outside the socialism–capitalism dichotomy. 
Grey markets can also describe civil servants who improve their salaries with 
what Riggs (2001: 817–818) calls “prebendary income”: personal income or ad-
vantages deriving from access to state assets (vehicles, machinery), scarce goods 
and services, privileged information and administrative powers (cf. Katsenelin-
boigen, 1977). Even the majority of legal businesses (state-run, cooperative and 
private) routinely engage in opaque transactions, source from the black market, 
hire unlicensed labour and evade taxes. Most of these activities take place in a 
regime of “tolerated illegality”, whereby the government avoids explicit prosecu-
tion of most illegalities so as not to incur economic and political tensions, thus 
effectively permitting these activities within a legal limbo and limiting itself to 
selective interventions (Bloch, 2018).
The mixed economy produces bifurcations and gaps that are undesirable but 
latent in the country’s day-to-day life. According to Bloch, they form the basis of 
the balance of power between the PCC and society, developed over the last three 
decades of post-socialism. If the paternalistic state were to enforce its own laws, 
leaving the population with only the token salaries it provides legally, a mass ex-
odus from state jobs would result (including from the bureaucratic and executive 
bodies) and the PCC would face more serious threats to its absolutist retention 
of political power. And yet its operations, alongside the military’s margin’s, have 
shaped the state into a double-edged presence in people’s lives. It has, in short, 
come to unite two contradictory functions: improving people’s conditions (in 
CUP), and sharpening their exploitation (in $). 
Subversion and everyday resistance in the autonomous economy
In the contemporary context of globalisation and the centralisation of commer-
cial and state hierarchies, studies of the popular economy have highlighted invis-
ible forms of resistance and autonomy reproduced in everyday practices. These 
resistances are not merely considered forms of reaction or explicit confronta-
tion, but also of production, affiliation and action. Authors such as Negri (2006), 
van der Ploeg (2013) and Schneider and Niederle (2010) consider that, while 
open, direct organised resistance (political movements, armed struggles) tend to 
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be most visible, often everyday, indirect, disorganised resistance processes have 
a larger impact on countries’ political and economic evolution. In his theory of 
“everyday resistance” (1985) James Scott engages with a phenomenon that may 
be applied to the Cuban reality. He analyses the set of disorganised, covert and 
generally depoliticised acts that subvert the norms, laws and economic and so-
cial structures imposed from above. In Scott’s theory, everyday resistance be-
gins where compliance with what is established ends, and any action against the 
system is considered an act of “rectification”. Far from being a deliberate act of 
speculation to defend apparently selfish personal interests, it may be understood 
as a subaltern initiative to survive and reproduce under difficult conditions. Al-
though these exercises occur by altering economic relations, they avoid open and 
organised confrontation with political power (Scott, 1985: 290). In this sense, 
everyday resistance is incapable of overthrowing a government, but quite capable 
of overriding its policies.8 Linz and Stepan (1996: 9) suggest that in systems that 
more severely restrict economic rights, the strength of illegal practices that em-
power the population on a broader scale (i.e. without creating new hierarchies) 
can be seen as de facto democratisation. Everyday resistance can thus promote 
greater economic plurality, as well as the development of forms of association and 
exchange that oxygenate the status quo. That is why it is common for “illegality” 
to spike in periods of political decadence, societal realignment and transition.
The informal mechanisms and structures of everyday resistance in Cuba not 
only comprise an economy that is larger than the official one, they also represent 
a more widespread socio-cultural phenomenon than the top-down culture of vol-
untarism, and a sphere of everyday politics that draws more citizen participation 
and discussions about what is legitimate and what is not than the PCC’s mobili-
sations and the debates around the “socialist model”. Since the 1990s, the effects 
of everyday resistance have become more and more pervasive; they have accu-
mulated and amalgamated. The internal policies of state companies and agencies 
are no longer what ensure that their employees remain at their jobs. In many sec-
tors, achieving a living wage means adjusting to activities that have largely lost 
their stigmata and are considered essential to basic sustenance: theft from the 
state, misappropriation, bribes and commissions are thus justified and sanitised. 
In Scott’s terms, “infrapolitics” are socio-economic actions that have polit-
ical weight while occurring in a depoliticised way (Scott, 1990: 183–201). His 
integrated vision of infrapolitics explains how different practices and discourses 
of resistance can sustain each other. Everyday resistance as a behind-the-scenes 
8  In Everyday Politics (2005), Benedict Tria Kerkvliet describes how acts of everyday resistance in 
the predominantly peasant societies of Vietnam and China managed to defeat communist collecti-
visation projects and lead to a legitimatory opening to private initiative from the bottom up, which 
the government began to institutionalise in the 1970s and 1980s.
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phenomenon of societal readjustment can also be assimilated within the study of 
“free spaces”. These are meeting places where close association fosters collective 
identity, shared grievances, frameworks of opposition and tactical innovation 
(Johnston, 2005: 108–137). From a sociolinguistic point of view, such legally 
porous livelihoods tend to shape a lexicon as elusive and cryptic as the practice 
it accompanies. In this lexicon the “hidden transcripts” of everyday economic 
culture are expressed, revealing forms of a resistance that often remain invisible. 
Thus, the study of infra-resistances is not limited to a range of practices that con-
travene the public transcripts of the dominant group. It also involves deciphering 
speech acts that may include rumours, urban legends, jokes, euphemisms, codes 
and rituals, as well as other symbolic, relatively passive covert acts that have im-
mediate effect but lack an explicit identification with the political sphere. In fact, 
not only do the vast majority of the subjects interviewed not link their actions to 
an explicit political objective, they deny any (potentially dangerous) relationship 
to politics at all. 
In Cuba, “to live and let live” has become the basis of the language between 
workers and those meant to monitor them (inspectors, police, company manag-
ers, etc.). As one interviewee said, referring to the inspectors with whom he has 
a bribery agreement: “I know what they want and they know what they are com-
ing for” (# 67, Camagüey, 22/1/20). The popular saying “invento, luego resisto” 
(I invent therefore I resist) is an example of the enigmatic language that as a 
metaphorical operation accompanies daily activities to the point of representing 
essential business communication. Several small traders we interviewed – inter-
mediaries between the source of misappropriation in an official institution and 
the clientele of families and small businesses – said that they communicate with 
their buyers via mobile phone, always calling and never via messages, in order 
to avoid surveillance. In the calls they use an alternative language: for example, 
beef – a product whose commercialisation is still a criminal offence – is referred 
to as “tomato” for these purposes. In such circumstances, good relations must be 
maintained with partners to ensure no one reports you (“echar pa´adelante”), 
which would lead to being caught (“te llevan”) because, after all, as one inter-
viewee comments, “if you don’t screw, you get screwed, and if you don’t go there, 
they take you” (#10, Havana, 03/2/17). This cause and effect relationship seems 
to reduce the impact of illegality on daily life and normalises theft, fraud and 
the misappropriation of goods. A popular saying gives a clue to the perceived 
acceptability of this practice: “Thief who robs thief [read: the state], a hundred 
years pardoned”. This language becomes highly functional for everyday resist-
ance not only in strategic terms, but also to create common references around 
a social space, to open up opportunities and accompany contentious political 
action. In this sense, social learning takes place via extrinsic motivations that 
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nevertheless have a normative sense: by observing social models, these mecha-
nisms are reinforced by repeating what is legitimate and refraining from what is 
sanctioned in public life.
In a report on the blog Generación Y, the independent journalist Yoani 
Sánchez describes the inevitability of living with the black market from the per-
spective of consumer:
I try to imagine an incredible 24 hours when I don’t have to resort to the 
informal market. How about one day without the milk bought from those 
knocking on my door […] I can’t imagine a day without delving into the 
black market to buy eggs, oil or tomato sauce. Even to get a cone of pea-
nuts, I have to cross the line of illegality […] Not to mention the wide range 
of underground workers I have to call upon when the washing machine 
breaks, the gas burner clogs or the shower stops working. All of them – in 
the shadows – support my day-to-day and supplement the limited services 
provided by the state […] But the most amazing thing is the infinite capa-
city for regeneration informal sellers show after one of the frequent raids 
on them. I don’t know about you, but I can’t live a day without the black 
market (Sánchez, 2008).
Without “la lucha” or access to the opportunities it provides, the vast majority of 
Cubans would struggle to survive, let alone prosper. They thus overwhelmingly 
choose a livelihood over a political voice. They invest their dissatisfaction, effort 
and aspirations in constructing black and grey markets, in underground produc-
tion and suitcase-based importation, in the spontaneous and concealed privati-
sation of state resources, in the expansion of practices beyond those authorised 
by “self-employment” licences,9 in the evasion of controls and taxes, among other 
ruses to avoid the law. These practices are so prevalent that their motives, eth-
ics, structures and consequences far exceed the rationale of proletarianisation 
and voluntary work. In place of orders and slogans, a more informal activity that 
is individualistic but family-based and self-directed predominates, but with the 
fears and insecurities that are natural to the subaltern sphere. 
One interviewee, a storekeeper in a hospital, explained the social dynamic 
created so that a specific job may be used to meet family demand. His funda-
mental expenses are food, and in his position he is able to “resolver” the needs 
9  Since 1993, certain specific economic activities have been legalised under the unlikely common 
legal denominator of cuentapropismo (self-employment) (Mesa-Lago et al., 2016). The portfolio 
of approved private businesses includes a range of businesses, from those that generate liquid 
assets and have privileged access to imports and neo-patrimonial ties to the corporate state 
(e.g. non-agricultural “cooperatives” formed by former cadres with connections), to small-scale 
individual or family production.
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of his six-member family in terms of dairy, meat and eggs. While his boss does 
not know exactly how he does it, he turns a blind eye to him taking some things 
because “he knows how bad the situation is and he does it himself – so I should 
have my turn as well … Then I help out the caretaker with a packet of milk or a bag 
of yogurt and I leave with the products in the trunk” (# 49, Havana, 11.18.19). 
To supplement his 750 CUP wages, the interviewee also sells some of the stolen 
products. Taking one example from his account – the powdered milk intended 
for hospital patients – we learn that the respondent misappropriates approxi-
mately 20% of the total stock and sells it for 2,200 CUP per month. This product 
alone thus raises his salary by 293%.
As it is safer to involve other workers in the product extraction chain (shift 
manager, caretakers, colleagues), the practice of this so-called “búsqueda” 
(search for resources to misappropriate) has collective traits in many workplac-
es. This relationship is described in popular parlance as “sociolismo”, a jovial 
inversion of the term socialism (socio in Spanish means associate/partner). In 
(and between) workplaces where “sociolismo” reigns, the people involved do not 
necessarily like each other, but everyone keeps up appearances. Relations based 
on bribery thus become small theatres of friendship, as the word “socio” shows 
– a partner is someone you ask for help and who helps as if you were a friend, 
concealing the fact that they are really helping you in exchange for a bribe, money 
or protection. 
Masha Gessen’s The future is history: How totalitarianism reclaimed Rus-
sia includes a popular saying from the Soviet Union that attempts to describe this 
balance: “We pretend to work, and they [the state] pretend to pay us” (2017: 64). 
Several interviewees underlined that as well as offering higher earnings, self-em-
ployment allows them – albeit temporarily – to overcome the stagnation and 
inefficiency of work in state hierarchies. For professionals, state jobs continue 
to offer a desirable and necessary source of social status, while non-state work 
in their sectors is more strictly outlawed and stigmatised. Many professionals 
therefore maintain themselves by working in both spheres, gaining status and 
tranquillity in the one and monetary sustenance in the other. An interviewee who 
works as a journalist described it: 
The reason I don’t leave journalism to dedicate myself entirely to online 
marketing is not just because of the facilities the first gives me to achieve 
the second, like the internet connection, but because promoting private 
business has no legal recognition. I live in an endless ethical conflict: run 
the risk of being caught, with the professional consequences that would 
bring, or continue to financially support my family (#71, Camagüey, 
11/3/20). 
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That said, everyday resistance cannot be analysed as an exception that can be 
located and eradicated, but rather as an endemic and functionalised element of 
the Cuban system. Any future regulatory or legislative change – in any direc-
tion – will face an economic reality created by millions of Cubans “luchando” 
(struggling within/against) the law, normalising and legitimising their economic 
countercultures. Aware of this reality, the government has nonetheless not em-
barked on structural changes that could free the population from the illegalities 
they practice every day and from the uncertainty, inefficiency and dependency 
they generate. 
Ritter and Henken (2015) locate the cause of widespread illegalities precise-
ly in their statist critique. They write that the state’s monopolies that structure 
legality according to unpopular expectations and the exercise of rigid central 
planning create chronic bottlenecks, inefficiency and missing incentives for 
workers. The authors consider that this creates a perfect environment for rent-
seeking, for the theft and private use of scarce state resources, for corruption, the 
black market and the underground economy. Given that the vast majority of civil 
servants and state employees (including the managers, ministers and generals) 
participate extensively in the illegal economy and that the systematic repression 
of this illegality would worsen the situation in the country, the state is obliged to 
tolerate it and restricts itself to drawing red lines. This approval is also the foun-
dation of the post-socialist political system: the state limits the application of its 
own laws against the illegal economy, but firmly maintains the power to grant or 
prohibit access to each individual or profession. Instead of universal economic 
rights, subsistence thus depends on individual favours that are conditioned, per-
sonalised and come with certain obligations:
Virtually every instance of personal domination is intimately connected 
with a process of appropriation. Dominant elites extract material taxes in 
the form of labor, grain, cash, and service in addition to extracting symbo-
lic taxes in the form of deference, demeanor, posture, verbal formulas, and 
acts of humility. In actual practice, of course, the two are joined inasmuch 
as every public act of appropriation is, figuratively, a ritual of subordina-
tion (Scott, 1990: 188).
Cubans give up their political and civil rights on a daily basis in order to maintain 
their economic rights – in other words, their carte blanche to continue acting 
outside the law. As apolitical individuals, they are permitted to “luchar” in their 
state or private jobs. Individuals and projects that express dissident opinions 
or seek to escape the web of imposed loyalties, however, are quickly stifled by 
the application of dormant legal and administrative regulations. Vincent Bloch 
quotes a source that describes this relationship succinctly: “You suffocate, then 
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you start to invent, meaning you mark yourself, then you have to clean yourself, 
and then you fall into Fidel’s machinery” of self-censure or token participation 
(2015: 34).
Notions and experiences of power and subordination are renewed via this 
daily ritual of defining, committing and absolving illegal acts, more so than by 
explicitly political deliberation. One the one hand, power, in the state–society 
hierarchy, shows a capacity to disregard and repress economic processes of great 
importance to the people, but on the other it cements that capacity as a legal ne-
cessity, establishing illegality as normality. The deference, tributes and perks that 
buy and maintain the powerful’s benevolent tolerance thus become a necessary 
daily condition for the subaltern. On a personal level, the application of the many 
prohibitions in force is highlighted by close, public experiences of confiscations 
and convictions that have an intimidatory effect (also resulting in the world’s 
second-highest rate of incarceration).10 These may be avoided in exchange for 
voluntary un(der)paid labour, as well as symbolic work, ranging from partici-
pation in official demonstrations to public non-dissent. At the sectorial level, it 
ensures that most members of each trade (whether they are artists, taxi drivers 
or plumbers) tend to abstain from association and criticism.
Another great value of Scott’s ontology of the relationships that interweave 
domination and submission lies in his attention to the fact that, far from a simple 
application and affirmation of power, they represent a field of mutual negotiation 
and inhibition. Here lies both the key to the continuity of the Cuban order of 
domination-by-prohibition, as well as the explanation of its futility in develop-
ment terms:
The bond between domination and appropriation means that it is impos-
sible to separate the ideas and symbolism of subordination from a process 
of material exploitation. In exactly the same fashion, it is impossible to 
separate veiled symbolic resistance to the ideas of domination from the 
practical struggles to thwart or mitigate exploitation. Resistance, like 
domination, fights a war on two fronts. The hidden transcript is not just 
behind-the-scenes griping and grumbling; it is enacted in a host of down-
to-earth, low-profile stratagems designed to minimize appropriation. In 
the case of slaves, for example, these stratagems have typically included 
theft, pilfering, feigned ignorance, shirking or careless labor, footdragging, 
secret trade and production for sale, sabotage of crops, livestock, and ma-
chinery, arson, flight, and so on. In the case of peasants, poaching, squat-
ting, illegal gleaning, delivery of inferior rents in kind, clearing clandestine 
10  According to official data in Granma, May 22nd 2012, and the international list by Warmsley 
(2012), from which micro-nations were excluded.
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fields, and defaults on feudal dues have been common stratagems (1990: 
188).
Although the PCC retains the nuclei of control and loyalty necessary to perpetu-
ate its position of absolutist power (single party, tactical control over large com-
panies, tight censorship of the press and academia, etc.), everyday resistance 
has significantly limited its ability to set agendas and priorities. In other words, 
everyday resistance has made Cuba an often economically ungovernable country. 
The vice president of a Havana municipality shared an interesting parable with 
us. In his experience as a state manager, “the country is like a person with an 
open belly. Everything slips out, the organs cannot function, and the effect of any 
order we may give them is overriden” (#1, Havana, 2/3/18). 
Conclusions: How can a new social contract be developed?
What do we learn from a society in which the usual study of economic statistics, 
publicly expressed opinions, laws and formal powers, and open and organised 
resistance is intertwined with the study of the hidden transcripts inscribed in its 
fabric by illegal, informal and everyday transactions, hierarchies and practices of 
resistance? Much has been written about how alternative spaces for expression 
and subsistence developed in so-called illiberal or “closed societies” (e.g. Gessen, 
2017: 47–64; Fitzpatrick, 2000). Several authors have traced how these previ-
ously illegal practices have been formalised during post-totalitarian transition 
processes, and how they have affected the course of these transitions (Thelen, 
2011; Polese & Rodgers, 2011). Little study (and even less comparison), how-
ever, has been made of countries where the political transition – with its funda-
mental basis in the legalisation and normalisation of existing popular economies 
– was abandoned half-way. Cuba’s paternalistic system conclusively collapsed 
in 1992–3, causing (and for wages we might say formalising) the need for a bot-
tom-up transition that has been carried out over the subsequent three decades 
without legal and political recognition, but with even more force and dominance 
in everyday life and livelihoods. 
We conclude with four themes that are both implicit interpretations of our 
ongoing research and questions/hypotheses for further inquiry:
1. The importance of the popular economy: The series of transactions that make 
up the popular economy, including black and grey markets for products, services 
and access to opportunities, remittances arriving via irregular channels, ever-
yday resistance and illegal activity, constitute essential supports for the Cuban 
population. From being a supplementary space for exchange,  black and grey 
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markets have become the main economy. The proliferation of digital markets, 
including sites such as revolico.com, the different “paquetes semanales” (compi-
lations of digital information that reach every corner of the island, cf. Dye et al., 
2018) and promotional applications will continue to offer new routes for illegal 
everyday activities, while avoiding both state control mechanisms and the physi-
cal monopolies of its corporations. 
2. The political dimension: Every economic transaction, especially those com-
mitted in spite of the risk of sanctions from the state, is an expression of people’s 
opinions and preferences. The more deficient a population judges the economic 
system imposed on it to be, the more intense, ingenious and obstructive will be 
the acts of resistance to which they resort to defend themselves from scarcity, sta-
gnation and inequalities of access. In a setting in which virtually all inhabitants 
depend on illegal activities, the system of governance perpetuates a vulnerabili-
ty among its citizens (subalternity) that privatises their discontent and dissent. 
Acts that constitute theft, illegality and corruption from a legalistic perspective 
are in Cuba above all acts of disobedience of the military-controlled corporate 
state’s attempts to extract foreign exchange. They also show disobedience of the 
paternalistic state’s demands that its employees work in exchange for insufficient 
wages and subsidies. Hence, when the leaders of the party-state carry out cam-
paigns against corruption, they do so from their position as employers who ma-
nage projects of exploitation as well as projects of development. 
Rather than accusing the self-employed and participants in black markets 
of corruption and moral deficiency, policymakers should rethink the core issues 
hindering transparency in internal market relations. In Cuba, an intolerable gap 
has opened up between the narrative of continuity promoted by the government 
and the daily experience of a population navigating the transition, seeking terms 
for its analysis, means to express interests and spaces for association. Trust – in 
the government, in the legal system, in the perception of justice – is a shared 
perception variable that will not grow through official propaganda, but from a 
project to formalise the popular economy.
3. The socio-cultural dimension: The rational response of a society that faces a 
series of uncertainties lives on in its social imaginary. For the time being, it is dif-
ficult to imagine how, after decades of generalised and legitimised theft, Cuban 
society can re-develop codes of citizenship, tax discipline, a mutually beneficial 
relationship with state institutions and societal agreements about acceptable and 
unacceptable levels of inequality.
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4. The social contract and formalisation: The absence of a social contract which 
the majority of society subscribes to and upholds is due to the state – in its laws, 
proclamations and interactions – failing to recognise the real economic relations 
the population is developing, thus leaving them in a legal, cultural and political 
limbo. According to Gauthier (1986), a social contract is founded when the dif-
ferent classes that make up a society enter into a sufficiently transparent, credi-
ble and majoritarian commitment on how to conceive, generate and distribute a 
country’s wealth and opportunities. The PCC has not been able to reproduce the 
social contract of the Soviet period – “a tacit agreement” between the regime and 
the workers “to exchange political obedience for social security” (Cook, 1993: 
1–18) – without massive donations of economic means from a sister country. 
Cuba’s fledgling state capitalism will not result in a new pact between the social 
classes because its low productivity and focus on recirculation economies (recei-
ving remittances, tourism and the sale of imported goods) prevent value creation 
that is broad enough to improve wages at a societal level and thereby forge a new 
consensus based on capitalist development – as in the case of Chinese and Viet-
namese post-socialism. The PCC would face difficulties reinventing its “historic 
mission” and monopoly of power in this setting. Most importantly, current inter-
national conditions – most importantly the technological shift away from cheap-
labour driven manufacturing – will likely prevent a repetition of the “Chinese 
transition”. In Cuba, a new social contract can only be conceived by reengaging 
with the motives, mechanisms and (de)legitimacies of the popular economy.
A social contract is a basis for cooperation (Rawls, 1971; Gauthier, 1986). As 
long as the motives behind the three economies remain unreconciled within a 
tacit societal commitment, and as long as post-socialist transitions (from above 
and below) continue to advance in a disconnected manner, it is hard to ima-
gine how the entrenched mutual inhibition between the three economies could 
turn into beneficial cooperation and competition. In order to achieve a dynamic 
of endogenous development in Cuba (i.e. development not driven by donations 
from sister countries or the diaspora), participants in the popular economy must 
limit theft and the subversion of the law, the paternalistic state must limit its 
outlawing of actions that contribute to subsistence, and the military-run business 
system must limit the over-exploitation of the country’s human capital and re-
sources. Neither of these developments appears likely at this point.
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Bailarín, Bailador, Callejero, Inflador: Being/
Becoming Professional on Cuba’s Dance Scene 
(An Ethnographic Approach)
On New Year’s Eve 2019, halfway through my eight-month fieldwork in Havana, 
I found myself at a house party organised by Isabel, one of my closest and dear-
est acquaintances in the city. Her son, Ernesto, had been my first dance teacher 
when I started travelling to Havana in 2011, and even though he had given up 
teaching tourists, we would still dance together occasionally and talk about my 
experiences with different salsa schools in the city. On the night of the party, 
Ernesto told me: You see how this became good business in the past years? How 
many dance schools do you remember from the first time you came here? And 
look how many you have now. It’s easy money, and any good dancer will have 
more knowledge than most of the tourists coming here, so what they do is they 
keep dancing with you during class, like I did with you tonight, but they call it 
teaching and they take your dollars. 
His words resonated with my own dancing experience in Havana. Over the 
years, I took lessons in living rooms, basements, backyards, kitchens, studios, 
theatres, parks, terraces, rooftops – and this non-exhaustive list does not include 
the “lessons” I received (sometimes even against my will) in the street, in bars 
or at parties. Year after year, the lessons started more to resemble my lessons 
in Europe than my first lessons in Havana: I was making online appointments 
on the schools’ websites, my teachers carried business cards and wore t-shirts 
with the school name and logo, they discussed their methodology with me before 
starting the class, made sure I stretched before and after class, offered me dis-
counts after a certain number of lessons, invited me to try out other dance styles, 
and made sure to check I had left a positive review on Tripadvisor, Airbnb and 
Google Maps. And, most importantly, I would always be reassured that I was in a 
“professional” dance school, with “professional” teachers. Almost imperceptibly, 
a shift had happened. 
*
https://doi.org/10.3224/84742546.10
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This paper puts forward a grassroots perspective on Cuban entrepreneurship 
and newly emerging work models by addressing the increased professionalisa-
tion of dance teaching aimed at foreign tourists. By analysing the experiences 
of dancers and dance teachers in Havana, I discuss the tensions between noti-
ons of “professionalism” defined from the point of view of the Cuban state and 
its institutions that specialise in dance education, on the one hand, and private 
businesses, on the other, where notions of market, competitiveness and personal 
branding put forward new understandings of what it means to be professional. 
My ethnographic fieldwork indicates that professionalism comes to be unders-
tood primarily as individual responsibility, ambition and improvement, with in-
ternationalisation – whether through social media or more direct relations with 
foreigners – playing a key role in developing the business. At the same time, the 
relationship between tourism economies, entrepreneurship and politics of (self)
representation reveals ambivalent and shifting attitudes towards the state and 
the emerging private sector. 
The paper is based on ethnographic fieldwork I conducted in Havana over 
12 months in 2018–2019 in two research stays and draws upon previously con-
ducted research, mainly among dancers, dance instructors, owners of private 
dance schools, performers and tourists taking part in dance lessons. The main 
methodological tools I employed were long-term participant observation among 
groups directly or indirectly involved in the creation, development and commod-
ification of dance-related heritage and ethnographic interviews. 
The embodied aspect of dance was key to my fieldwork. I participated in in-
dividual and group dance lessons, as well as in workshops organised for tourists 
and in training sessions before stage performances. Whenever possible, I attend-
ed dance events in various locations in Havana, from well-established venues, 
famous among Cubans and tourists alike, to newly opened spaces or parties or-
ganised by the different dance schools I worked with. The first part of the article 
discusses the reforms introduced by the Cuban government in order to facilitate 
entrepreneurship and some of the social consequences of these new measures. I 
focus on the relatively new businesses centred on dance and their position in the 
processes related to the commodification of heritage. I then move on to analyse 
the meanings attached to “professionalism” by dancers and dance school owners, 
discussing the implicit tensions and ambivalence in relation to the state. 
Cultural heritage and emerging work practices 
The collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1991 determined a series of drastic changes 
in Cuba, as the country lost the support of its most important economic part-
ner. Cubans faced extreme poverty and changes to the political and economic 
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system became inevitable. Two reforms that occurred in 1993 were particular-
ly significant: Cubans were allowed to own foreign currencies (thus introducing 
two parallel denominations, access to which would only deepen economic in-
equalities and social stratification)1 and to take up private initiatives (trabajo por 
cuenta propia or cuentapropismo), which would bring supplementary income to 
the state budget. The country reopened to foreign visitors and the government 
invested heavily in tourism infrastructure. Small businesses renting rooms to 
tourists were legalised in 1997. Initially depicted by Cuban authorities as a “nec-
essary evil” (Fernández, 1999), the sector has undergone a dynamic expansion 
over the past two decades, becoming one of the main sources of foreign currency 
and investment. At the same time, although a marginal activity after the victory 
of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 (Carmona Báez, 2004), cuentapropismo has 
established itself as one of the key areas of Cuba’s tourism-based economy. This 
became especially relevant as the financial crisis intensified, tourism and remit-
tances fell as a result of the international crisis (Hoffmann, 2010) and the enter-
prising strategies used to creatively navigate daily hardships came to signal the 
island’s neoliberal turn (Perry, 2016). The broad body of literature addressing 
recent economic reforms has emphasised public policy towards entrepreneur-
ship and the informal sector (Ritter & Henken, 2015), the social effects of eco-
nomic adjustment (Espina Prieto, 2004) and the impact of transition on social 
policy (Mesa-Lago, 2007). However, the relationship between entrepreneurship, 
commoditised cultural heritage and the politics of (self)representation remains 
under-represented in studies of contemporary Cuba. 
Self-employment in Cuba allows a shift from the state sector to the private 
sector, reshaping work relations and becoming a symbol of economic and po-
litical transformations. This is due to the meanings attached to the legalisation 
of independent work, with cuentapropistas being regarded as facilitators of the 
transition from socialism to a free market economy (Phillips, 2006). Self-em-
ployed workers remain subject to strict regulations and taxation by the state, but 
are otherwise characterised by occupying a distinct position outside state-regu-
lated work, defining new market relations that place them between the state sec-
tor and the private sector. New spaces and forms of economic activity as well as 
emerging work practices, common for post-socialist transitions, create the basis 
for individual explorations of new spheres of decision-making and self-reliance. 
While self-employment may not necessarily lead to entrepreneurship, the speci-
1  The Cuban convertible peso (CUC) and the Cuban peso (CUP) were Cuba’s official currencies at 
the time of my research. The value of one CUC was roughly equivalent to 1 US dollar and worth 
25 times as much as the CUP. As of January 1st 2021, Cuba transitioned to the unification of its 
double currency system, eliminating the CUC. 
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ficity of the Cuban context and state regulations make developing the enterprise 
possible only through self-employment (Peters, 2015). Its peculiarities lie in the 
fact that it has been shaped by state socialism and the “second economy” (Pérez-
López, 1995) that emerged to provide the goods and services the state was unable 
to and which went on to become a structural feature of Cuban economy. 
As discussed by Ritter and Henken (2015) in their analysis of Cuban entre-
preneurship, restrictions on the private sector have either resulted in a classic 
“brain drain”, pushing some of Cuba’s most educated and skilled citizens abroad, 
or in a particular form of “insile”, forcing them out of their field of expertise and 
into much better remunerated work, although perhaps less socially beneficial. 
Such downward mobility, which saw doctors, lawyers and teachers working as 
taxi drivers, waiters or managing private accommodation, happens because pro-
fessional activities are still prohibited, as well as private business in sectors like 
education and healthcare. However, some exceptions, while still heavily regulat-
ed, have opened the doors to innovation and created the premises for capitalising 
on cultural heritage both in Cuba and outside it. 
The above-mentioned downward mobility has a counterpart in the cases I 
am addressing in this article: with no other capital required except for bodily cap-
ital, Cubans who become involved in the dance business experience an upward 
mobility – financial and symbolic – due to the imaginaries and narratives about 
dance and dancers created mostly outside the island. By adopting and adapt-
ing these narratives, Cubans subject themselves to a “self-folklorization” process 
(Klekot, 2014) which underlines the inequalities of international tourism, which 
are made and remade in social practices. For tourists, dance practices become 
“embodied souvenirs” (Ana, 2017) that make Cubanness available and, in a way, 
portable through the body that experienced it. In this way, dance comes to func-
tion as a key symbol of cultural tourism, employing the “rhetoric of the Caribbean 
body” (Scher, 2011) – understood as lightheartedness and sensuality – and leads 
to the commodification of Cubanness in its entirety, a phenomenon that can only 
be regarded in relation to class, gender and racial hierarchies that are deeply 
rooted in colonialism (Stoler, 1995). 
With music and dance at the core of Cuban popular culture, their transna-
tional circulation and popularity abroad brought about processes of commodifi-
cation that are simultaneously cultural and political and have played a key role in 
the development of the tourism sector. Anthropological studies have discussed 
artistic forms beyond their local anchors, and in the field of dance in particular 
it is possible to observe the creation of transnational “social spaces” around spe-
cific genres (Waxer, 2002; Pietrobruno, 2006; Davis, 2015). While in the Cuban 
context the dance business itself is by no means comparable to well-established 
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private initiatives like casas particulares or paladares,2 it does occupy a central 
position in processes related to the commoditisation of heritage and it illustrates 
the standardising regimes that situate dance between cultural heritage and lei-
sure commodity (Pietrobruno, 2009). Performances and the transmission of 
dance traditions become part of the touristic and political uses of culture, strong-
ly determined by economic factors and operating with essentialist concepts and 
definitions of identity. Intangible heritage creates socio-economic revenue and 
the moving body becomes the main tool for accessing tourism economies. Eco-
nomic realities and social inequalities that stem from contact with foreigners re-
sult in creative approaches for financial gain, perpetuating expectations about 
Cuban fantasies, as dancing bodies become transactional through the maximisa-
tion of bodily capital (Wacquant, 1995). 
Images of “authentic” music and dance have to a great extent come to shape 
the touristic modes of visualisation and experience, at the same time revealing 
the processes of commodification and standardisation behind these images. Ul-
timately, they have also contributed to the creation of a rapidly growing market 
for dance and dance teaching. 
Over time, dance practices on the island also started functioning as an inter-
face for more complex networks of alternative economies, revealing the rising in-
equalities and social stratification that arise as direct effects of market socialism 
(Morris, 2008), creating new spaces, forms and means of revenue. In the next 
section I discuss how, against this background, the processes of institutionalisa-
tion of Cuban dance reveal the fluid relations that stem from encounters on the 
dance floor between Cuban dancers and foreign visitors and reshape the notion 
of professionalism. 
The business of dance: what makes a professional?
In 2010 the Cuban government announced that it would reduce work in the state 
sector while at the same time introducing new policies to facilitate self-employ-
ment. The private sector was ultimately supposed to absorb the “redundant” 
workers in the state sector, which proved to be rather unrealistic, especially given 
the stigma that still surrounded the private sector. The list of permitted activities 
was published in Gaceta Oficial no. 12 in October 2010 and included 178 catego-
ries (some of them extremely detailed, such as piñata seller or umbrella repair), 
to be augmented to 181 in 2011 and 201 in 2013, and again reduced to 123 in 
2018 through the reorganisation of 96 activities within 28 categories. With the 
new laws, the hiring of labour was liberalised and it was permitted to rent facil-
2 Restaurants run by self-employed people.
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ities from either the state or other citizens in order to set up small enterprises. 
While all professional activities were still prohibited, there were some exceptions 
– and number 101 on the list read “Profesor de música y otras artes” (Teacher of 
music and other arts). The first half of 2011 saw a change of tone in official me-
dia, and self-employment stopped being deemed a temporary solution. Instead, 
it was encouraged and by 2014 the number of self-employed workers had tripled 
compared to 2010 (Ritter & Henken, 2015: 162). The Cuban state intended to 
introduce a radical overhaul of the Cuban economic system that would favour 
cuentapropistas (Pérez Villanueva, 2015), which was however brought to a halt 
in August 2017 when the government suspended the issuing of new licenses to 
certain businesses until “the self-employment system has been brought to per-
fection” (Gaceta Oficial  no.31, 2017). 
It was in this climate of uncertainty that in March 2018 I found my friend 
Mireya worrying about the future of her business amid the uncertainty sur-
rounding the forthcoming new regulations from the government. For the past 
four years she had been quite successful in running a dance school owned by her 
brother, who after a few years spent abroad had returned to Cuba and reclaimed 
his business. She had lost any source of income and even though she had found 
a place for a new school, she could not hire people who wanted to work for her 
because they could not apply for a dance teacher’s license. Two of the teachers 
who had worked with her in her brother’s school chose to follow her and started 
training the future teachers, so that they would be able to start working once they 
got their license. In order to be able to register her new business, Mireya had to 
change her documents so that the address of the new school would appear on her 
ID as her residence. Despite the hardships she had to navigate, Mireya managed 
to set up her new school and even receive her first groups of dancing tourists (in 
other contexts, this would have been labelled a form of neoliberal governance 
which compels – or “empowers” – people to consider themselves entrepreneurial 
subjects). “There is no need to wait for the state to give you anything. I am an 
empresaria (entrepreneur), I make all the decisions, and the government has no 
say in this as long as I pay my taxes”, she told me one day in front of the school, 
while handing out leaflets to passers-by. She did however express her support for 
another measure rumoured to be included in the new laws, namely allowing only 
one license per person. “It’s not normal to have five or seven licenses, you can’t 
cook here and dance there, you either cook or you dance”. 
Later that year, on July 10th, Gaceta Oficial no. 35 would shed some light – 
and cast a lot of doubt – on the new laws and regulations regarding self-employ-
ment. The Vice Minister of Work and Social Security, Marta Elena Feitó Cabrera, 
clarified during a press briefing that the new measures did not mean self-employ-
ment was taking a backwards step, but it would be carried out in a more orderly 
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manner (Figueredo Reinaldo & Extremera San Martín, 2018): “There are work-
ers who own a cafeteria and at the same time have a manicure license or one for 
producing and selling shoes. In practice, this person is the owner of several busi-
nesses and this is neither the essence nor the spirit of self-employment, which 
consists of workers carrying out their activities on a daily basis”. In her support of 
the government’s decision to limit the number of licenses one could hold, Mireya 
expressed a certain degree of trust in the state’s regulatory framework; however, 
with labour security shifted towards the individual and an unstable income she 
found herself in a position to somewhat circumvent the regulations. 
As far as the activity of dance schools and dance teachers was concerned, the 
new regulations described it as follows: it is forbidden for teachers of music and 
other arts to constitute schools or academies, they cannot issue graduation certif-
icates, work is individual and therefore they cannot contract the services of other 
teachers or instructors, nor organise events of a competitive nature or otherwise. 
The new dispositions came into life as of December 7th, but as early as No-
vember they were already all everyone ever talked about in the schools where I 
conducted research. In a display of distrust that characterised much of everyday 
life under socialism (cf. Verdery, 1996) the actual legislative text was deemed 
less important and relevant than the various interpretations of it which circu-
lated widely among dancers, who would voice their concerns over what they had 
heard from their peers about the new laws. Mireya expressed these worries one 
afternoon after a group lesson which involved ten of her dancers: “Only three of 
my teachers have licenses. And now they say that they will check who is a trained 
dancer and who is not. I think it’s because the government didn’t get enough 
money from the dance schools, we pay taxes in Cuban pesos so it’s not profitable 
for them”. The only bright side she saw – if they were allowed to continue without 
the requirement for trained dancers – was that she had managed to change her 
documents and thus appeared to be renting out the space to the dancers teach-
ing in her school. Thus, if the authorities come to inspect, it would be easy to 
justify that they are in fact doing “individual work”, and thereby complying with 
the rules. Sofia, the owner of another dance school, found a different way to cir-
cumvent regulations: “Most schools will have to shut down because of these new 
requirements for teachers to have graduated from the ISA or the ENA in order to 
work in dance schools.3 But this is not a problem for us, 70% of my dancers grad-
uated from one of these institutions. I always said I wanted professional dancers, 
long before the new laws were announced. Now, if an inspector comes to check, 
even if he spends the entire day at the school, instructors who are not graduates 
3  The Instituto Superior de Arte (ISA) and Escuela Nacional de Arte (ENA) are two of the most 
prestigious schools for the arts established by the Cuban government. 
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can be presented as assistants, so it is not a problem”. These reactions illustrate 
the type of accommodating relationship that arises when the total avoidance of 
the state is seldom possible (de Soto, 1989). But they also indicate the role of the 
state not just in legalising a particular activity, but in legitimising it and making 
it more profitable through the sense of security and responsibility implied by the 
notion of being “professional”. 
This became particularly relevant in recent years, with the increased de-
mand for “experiential tourism” (Salazar, 2011). Cultural practices and symbols 
that ensured recognition and revenue gained meaning both locally and interna-
tionally, 
A few years ago I noticed that whenever I was offered lessons in a dance 
school the license was the main argument used to convince me. “I am a dance 
teacher, I have my license and everything” was the usual conversation opener. 
But as more dance schools started functioning, especially in Havana, the license 
argument stopped being enough. Unlike casas particulares and paladares, le-
gality was no longer the main concern nor the main argument used to attract 
potential new clients – professionalism was. The most common explanation giv-
en for this was the state’s failure to control and regulate certain key aspects of 
self-employment. In an 2018 interview, Rogelio, choreographer and owner of a 
dance school, explained as much: “Nobody asks for any proof or documents [of 
formal education in the field of dance], you just go and say you want a license to 
be a teacher of music and other arts. And they did this in all sectors, cell phone 
repair, hairdressers – nobody checks your skills. Nobody but the market. When 
people realise that you don’t know your job, they will stop seeking your services. 
But with dance it’s more difficult because sometimes tourists don’t know if they 
were taught well or not. Beginners in particular can’t tell the difference between 
a professional and a fraud, they can be tricked easily”. 
Rogelio’s comment draws the attention towards the regulatory mechanisms 
of the market, which can establish and confirm one as a professional where the 
state fails to acknowledge the differences between practitioners. In fact, one’s 
ability to understand the market and the demands that come from tourists is un-
derstood as the key to achieving success and is very often presented in opposition 
to the state’s lack of flexibility and capacity to innovate. Two of the dancers who 
followed Mireya to her new school pointed out the differences between the two 
business models – the “socialist” one and the “capitalist” one –making it clear 
that from their point of view a private business should adopt what they consid-
ered a successful capitalist model. Eduardo explained it in the following way: 
“when you have a business which does not belong to the state you need to have a 
capitalist way of thinking, you need to think more about the business than about 
the personal problems of the people who work for you. Let’s say we both work for 
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the same school and you are a much better dancer than I am, you teach better, 
but I constantly have problems and complain to the owner – she will give me all 
the clients and leave you with no work for days because I have problems. This is 
very unprofessional”.4 
Functioning outside the state-regulated system, many of the self-employed 
dancers and dance school owners enjoy a new-found independence and sense 
of freedom that the state sector lacks. But at the same time, they contribute to 
the creation of new social norms characterised by increased individualism and 
autonomy (Ewick & Silbey, 2003). The “self-steering” capacities of the individual 
designate new rules for everyday life: initiative, ambition and personal responsi-
bility, in an attempt to maximise one’s human capital (Rose, 1996). 
Another recurring aspect in discussions around the professionalisation 
of dance teaching is the increased flexibility and readiness to adapt to an ev-
er-changing schedule based on clients’ demands. Whenever I apologised for 
being late for a dance lesson (having somewhat internalised a more relaxed ap-
proach to time and schedules), my teachers would explain that while the client 
can be late, the teacher cannot, as this would be considered unprofessional and 
be reflected in the reviews left by the clients. As opposed to being employed in the 
state sector and therefore having a somewhat fixed schedule, work in the private 
sector means adapting to a different kind of lifestyle, one that puts the clients and 
their needs ahead of one’s private life, personal plans and priorities. 
Many of the dancers I worked with pointed out that their free time had be-
come practically non-existent, since the time they didn’t spend teaching was 
dedicated to finding new clients. Such was the case of Merced, owner of a dance 
school and casa particular, whom I’d meet quite often at salsa parties in one 
of the most popular venues in Havana: “I am a professional, I graduated from 
ISA, and at times I can go a week without anyone. If you don’t have a [travel] 
agency or a foreigner to send you students, your only option is to be out in the 
street all the time”. For Merced and for many other dancers, having graduated 
from a state institution is an extra legitimisation which should at least theoreti-
cally ensure a steadier flux of clients, this differentiating them from the teachers 
who lack this kind of formal training. However, in most cases dancers cannot 
rely on their expertise or experience alone to build their client base, and it is 
widely acknowledged that international cooperation with a travel agency or a 
dance school abroad can increase client numbers (especially given the rising pop-
4  My findings match those of Amelia Rosenberg Weinreb (2009), who in her study of Cuban “con-
sumer-citizens” points out that while abandoning an analysis built around binary categories might 
be an appealing intellectual endeavour, some of these binaries remain present and relevant in the 
daily lives of Cubans.  
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ularity of “dance trips” or organised tours that place a strong focus on dancing 
and include lessons and parties in the programme). The desired/targeted client 
is a tour operator, who would ensure a steady and significantly higher income. 
In reality, many schools rely on individual clients who find information on the 
internet or simply happen to be passing by the school, ask for dance lessons on 
the spot or make appointments from one day to the next. Social media has come 
to play a very important part in running the business: before opening the new 
school, Mireya had already made sure she had hired a team of professionals to 
build the school website and manage social media accounts; reviews on Tripad-
visor and Facebook comments were carefully monitored by school managers, 
who would sometimes employ strategies the dancers disapproved of just to make 
sure the clients were content. Sofia recalled one such situation during one of our 
interviews: “When one client couldn’t have his lesson as planned, I offered him 
two free lessons, as a courtesy. I had to explain to the teachers that even if the 
client doesn’t pay, they will still get their money, but this is a way to make sure 
the client leaves happy and writes a good review. Most of the times they don’t 
understand how this works, because they just want their money, they don’t care 
about anything else”.
The professionalisation strategies discussed above were ultimately aimed at 
ensuring international visibility (most often measured in reviews, popularity on 
social media and reservations from tourists who had either seen videos of the 
teachers dancing, or had come across the school’s website) and a relatively con-
stant workflow, at least during high season. But at the same time the growing 
demand for dance re-emphasised a differentiation between two groups of practi-
tioners: those who learned to dance from family and friends, and those who ac-
quired it through formal instruction (McMains, 2013). This, in turn, generated a 
series of ambiguities around the very notion of professionalism and rendered the 
apparently clear-cut distinction between state and private somewhat less clear-
cut, as I discuss in the following section. 
Bailarín, bailador, callejero, inflador
In 2012, while doing research among rumba practitioners in Matanzas, one of 
my closest acquaintances at the time shared the good news that her grandson 
Omar had been admitted to the ENA. “We are all bailarines empíricos5 in this 
family”, she told me, “and he has been dancing ever since he was very little. But 
he is the first of us to get into the ENA, even though others have tried before 
5  A term used to describe those who learn to dance in informal community settings (e.g. from 
family and friends) rather than in organised classes.
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him”. As I returned to Matanzas in the following years, she was often critical of 
the knowledge being passed on to her grandson and his classmates, since in her 
opinion the teachers were superficial in explaining Afro-Cuban folklore, which 
she referred to as “our heritage, our roots”. However, she did point out that as a 
bailarín profesional (professional dancer) he would have more opportunities to 
find work in a dance company after graduation. 
Six years later, I met Omar on the set of Bailando en Cuba, a TV programme/
competition aimed at finding Cuba’s most talented young dancers while at the 
same time promoting the island’s dance heritage. He was going to perform with 
some fellow dancers and then he was off to work in one of the hotels in Vedado, 
one of the more affluent neighbourhoods in the capital, a major tourist attraction 
with a bustling nightlife. “I work as a choreographer for a dance company and we 
have shows four times a week, it’s going really well. Before this I was in another 
company, we would train a lot but there was no work”. Omar was not the only 
one to draw a clear line between training and actual work. Many of the dancers I 
worked with pointed out that being in a dance company meant – in the best-case 
scenario – a salary of a few hundred CUP and additional money when the com-
pany is contracted for a show. This kind of insecurity led many of them to seek 
employment with the somewhat more profitable dance schools aimed at foreign 
audiences, where, as explained by Danaysi, “you don’t have to wait for the end 
of the month to get your money. And besides, clients take you to places you can’t 
afford, because they are too expensive. As a teacher you work a lot, but it’s not the 
hard work of a bailarín professional”. 
A few months later I met Omar again at Casa de la Cultura in the neighbour-
hood of Centro Habana. I was there with a group of tourists from Poland who had 
come to Cuba to take part in dance, music and personal development workshops, 
organised by Anna, a dance teacher I had taken classes with a few years before in 
Warsaw. Omar was there to help his friend Yordanis, who led the class along with 
Anna. Just like Omar, Yordanis works as a choreographer for a dance company 
and for this occasion he had to find five other male dancers, so every woman in 
the group would have a partner. Before the lesson started, I asked Anna why she 
didn’t choose any of the salsa schools for her project. “I know Yordanis and his 
work, but I also know how they work in those dance schools and I am not inter-
ested. I wanted professional dancers for my women, not some random guys from 
the street who say they are dance teachers”. 
The lesson had a different structure to the one I was used to from the dance 
schools: there was no warm-up, no exercises to prepare the body, no breaking 
down of the basic steps into smaller sequences. After the lesson Yordanis ex-
plained that none of these things made sense and they were just inventions for 
tourists, because Cubans learn how to dance without stretching their muscles be-
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fore and after class. Halfway throughout the lesson he asked his fellow dancers to 
lead better and more forcefully, because as the women didn’t know how to dance, 
they didn’t understand their partners’ signals. He went on to tell them that this 
was not really learning to dance because the time was too short: the point of the 
lesson was to give the women an idea of Cuban culture. On our way back to Old 
Havana, Anna told me: “I didn’t want to say anything to Yordanis because I didn’t 
want to spoil the mood, but I specifically asked for professional dancers. And you 
saw, some of them didn’t even know how to lead”. A few days later I met Yordanis 
at the end of his training session with his dance company. We talked about tour-
ists, dance and teaching, and he explained: “Teaching tourists is monotonous 
and repetitive and not challenging enough for a bailarín. Sometimes bailadores 
are better for teaching tourists because bailarines don’t know.6 They will teach 
you what they learned, they have very good technique, but their dancing does not 
have the street style (pero no bailan callejero)”. 
In the previous section I discussed issues related to legality and the roles 
played by the state and by the emerging dance market in defining a professional. 
But for many Cubans involved in the dance business, notions of professional-
ism are strongly related to formal training and to an education completed in a 
state institution (this also holds true, to a certain extent, for more generalised 
perceptions, not only those of the people involved in dance teaching). While in 
some cases professionalism is understood as a marker of an entrepreneurial self, 
in many others it has less to do with business and more to do with the chosen 
career path of someone who decided to pursue a degree in dance. From this per-
spective, there is a clear cut distinction between the two categories mentioned by 
Yordanis: bailarín is the professional dancer with a formal education, whereas 
bailador is a dancer who has not benefited from formal training, but the notion 
itself does not imply any qualitative judgment on the skills and abilities of the 
bailador. What Anna expected when she asked Yordanis for professional dancers 
was, in fact, highly skilled bailadores. Yordanis made sure he offered what she 
had requested (as in the end this was a business opportunity he did not want to 
miss). Professionalism was what sealed the deal – but their ideas and under-
standings of the notion did not coincide. 
Just as Yordanis and Omar taught tourists from time to time while still fo-
cusing on their careers as choreographers/dancers, Lianet, who at the time of my 
research was teaching at the ISA, told me she would work with travel agencies 
every now and then, earning in one hour the same amount she received from the 
government for a month of teaching. She also pointed out that for a bailarín pro-
6  While both bailarín and bailador can be translated as “dancer”, the meanings attached to them 
differ, as I explain further on. 
219Ruxandra Ana
fesional there is no professional development in just teaching tourists – although 
it’s easy money, a professional will have a career to think about, new choreogra-
phies to create, and will seek out performances that give more visibility. At the 
same time, the dance market is not necessarily compatible with the background 
and formation of professional dancer: “Salsa7 is not something you are taught at 
the ISA or the ENA. It’s a popular dance and even if you have classes on it they 
are usually superficial – just to give an idea. Because these are dances that Cu-
bans learn at home, or with our friends, everything you see happening in dance 
schools now is a methodological invention. It exists because there is a market for 
it”. While teaching foreigners is a remunerated activity and usually more lucra-
tive than dancing professionally, other financial aspects separate the worlds of 
bailarines and bailadores. They were clarified by Rogelio after one lesson, when 
he also explained what he believed to be the essential difference between the 
two categories and added a third one: el bailarín comes from the school, from 
academia, has theoretical and practical knowledge; el bailador knows how to 
dance, hears the music, knows when to start,8 he comes from the street (viene de 
la calle); but he is not the same as the callejero, who usually doesn’t know how to 
dance, hears the beat but starts whenever he wants without paying attention to 
the musical phrase. “Havana is definitely a city for bailadores”, he told me. “The 
dance schools are constantly looking for teachers, all the festivals are looking for 
teachers, a bailador goes to a festival and is content with free admission and with 
showing his dance skills. Even if they don’t come from academia, they are usually 
good dancers and have many students. They are out every night, they need to be 
in this world all the time. For a bailarín, dancing is his job – he wants money for 
his work, and usually there’s no money for this”. 
Night-time entertainment, centred on music and dance events, provides the 
venue for further delimitations and constant negotiations of identity. Night-time 
interactions in Havana, juxtaposed with an imagined, fantasised Cuba, and im-
ages of romantic love created and communicated through dance, make tourists 
susceptible to being seduced by the scripted performances (cf. Grazian, 2008) 
articulated in spaces of cultural interactions between tourists and locals. 
Since tourism reinforces the idea that in Cuba everyone dances, dance schools 
usually take responsibility for creating “safe spaces” for their clients including 
7  The term is used by Cubans to refer to a dance style otherwise known on the island as casino, 
which came to be known internationally as “Cuban salsa”, and was adopted as such especially by 
dance schools aimed at foreign tourists. 
8  In salsa, the basic step is done to a quick-quick-slow, quick-quick-slow rhythm on beats 1-2-3, 
5-6-7 of an 8 count, and “knowing when to start” means finding the beat for the first step, infor-
mally known as “finding the 1”.
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outside the class. In such contexts, professionalism gains yet another meaning: 
taking responsibility for the client, making sure they do not become the target of 
infladores – self-professed dancers/dance teachers with no knowledge or skills 
but with a strong presence which can quite often be deceiving.9 One night, at a 
party to which he had accompanied one of his clients, Noel explained to me just 
how deceptive they could be: “Sometimes I go out with my clients and I tell them 
it is fine if they want to dance with someone else, but if you want to leave with 
the guy, you need to let me know. Of course I know many of them [the men who 
usually attend salsa parties], you can find respectful people, but often girls don’t 
understand that guys have other intentions, that they want money, or sometimes 
just to be with a foreigner. There is a difference between I love you and I like you. 
I like you pretty much always means I like your money, I like your phone”. 
Such protective behaviour is seen as a professional obligation, but it becomes 
the carrier of multilayered messages that are open to identities in the making, 
because more often than not the strong discourse around professionalisation is 
built not so much around what a professional is, but around what a professional 
is not: “A professional dancer is not one of those guys from the street who always 
look for girls. This kills the image of the professional”, was a comment made by 
Ricardo, one of my dance teachers from Sofia’s school. As such, responsibility for 
one’s clients is not only a strategy for defending the image of the business and 
ensuring an overall positive experience, sheltered from the nuisance that may 
occur in random street interactions, it becomes a means of self-affirmation and 
ultimately self-esteem for the dancers and for how their subjectivities are under-
stood and articulated. 
These themes, which are central to the way dancers and dance teachers per-
ceive themselves and their work, relate to the phenomenon of jineterismo, widely 
discussed in Cuba and often considered a consequence of tourism (Rundle, 2001; 
Simoni, 2016). The term literally means horseback riding, but it is used to define 
hustling and/or prostitution. The persons engaging in jineterismo (called jinet-
eros or jineteras) offer sex, company, guidance and sometimes goods (usually ci-
gars but not exclusively) in exchange for money, meals or a night out. Often such 
engagements with tourists are expected to lead to marriage and, subsequently, 
the chance of leaving the country. The phenomenon is also perceived as a very 
delicate issue for the country’s socialist government, as it constitutes an affront to 
revolutionary morality. Relationships are seen as either purely sexual – usually 
between Afro-Cuban women and male tourists (cf. Fusco, 1998) – or romantic, 
9  The term literally translates to inflator or pump, but it is commonly used in Cuban slang to refer to 
a person who uses trickery and deceit, usually by pretending to be someone or something they 
are not, in order to obtain certain gains or benefits.
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lacking economic connotations (Fernandez, 1999). The relationships between 
Cuban men and foreign women are often framed as “romantic involvements” 
(without disregarding the economic component) that reinforce the sexualised 
racist fantasies that attract female (sex) tourists to the Caribbean (Kempadoo, 
2004; Simoni, 2015). 
But jineterismo raises issues related not just to economic inequalities, it 
reveals divisions related to class, race and gender, and is frequently framed as 
challenging to Cuban notions of morality. In explaining the distinction between 
bailarín and bailador, Lianet referenced the low cultural level as a differenti-
ating aspect between the two: “They [bailadores] have a very low cultural level 
and many times they are in the business for what comes along with the dance: 
the money, finding a foreigner and leaving the country, so teaching salsa is rare-
ly about teaching salsa”. The moralising argument against jineterismo seems to 
have become dominant in the late 1990s (Kempadoo, 1999), particularly among 
white, middle-class Cubans who tend to consider it a manifestation of a “low 
cultural level” (bajo nivel cultural) generally ascribed to Afro-Cubans, revealing 
racialised ideas of morality and behaviour. 
For many dance instructors, it became important to emphasise their oppo-
sition to bailadores, jineteros and infladores, while at the same time pointing 
out that simply being immersed in music and dance is not enough for tourists 
to learn how to dance themselves. More and more schools started offering the 
service of “taxi dancer”, giving clients the possibility of being accompanied to 
dance parties or concerts by a teacher for a fee that covers entry to the venue 
chosen by the client, drinks and a few hours of dancing (usually from two to 
four). This would help tourists practice what they learned in class in a safe, se-
cure environment, which would not only protect them from possible trickery, but 
would guarantee the quality of the dancing (most of the dancers I worked with 
explained this as an attempt to avoid tourists going to parties and only dancing 
with people with poor dancing skills). I discussed this with Isabel one day and 
she promptly commented: “The only difference between taxi dancers and jinet-
eros is that jineteros don’t have t-shirts with a logo. Besides, jineteros can always 
choose how far they want to go, how much time they spend with tourists. Dancers 
don’t have this possibility, they are like jineteros hired by the dance school, and 
they probably get less money anyway”. While, financially, such activities do pay 
off, giving dance instructors the possibility of earning in one night the equivalent 
of half a month’s state salary (prices for taxi dancing usually start at 15 CUC), 
this night work in fact joins the circle of objectification, (mis)representation and 
emotional entanglements, shedding light on the ways the individual is locked 
into a mode of constant promotion, while the self becomes commodified in social 
spaces of self-affirmation. 
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Conclusions
With heritage and tourism functioning as collaborative industries (Kirshen-
blatt-Gimblett, 1998), they offer the venue for the negotiation of memory, iden-
tity and social mobility, articulated in spaces of cultural interaction between 
tourists and locals where “authenticity” functions as a tool for legitimising and 
validating the tourist experience. Music and dance become part of a set of key 
symbols that define the tourist experience before it actually happens and during 
the experience itself. While for the tourism industry and for tourists themselves 
the representational emphasis is more on the imagined attributes of the island, 
Cubans use aspects of this discourse in order to promote and develop initiatives 
deeply rooted in pragmatic motivations. In a country where legal employment 
in the tourism industry is the fastest way to accumulate capital, the main aim is 
access to foreign currency. 
Against this background, the institutionalisation of dance-related practices 
(and particularly teaching aimed at foreign tourists) is related to the (re)con-
ceptualisation of work and productivity within emerging small businesses. The 
reforms introduced by the Cuban government to allow self-employment brought 
with them a strong discourse of professionalisation and new work practices in 
the field of dance. Becoming a dance teacher in a private school aimed at inter-
national tourists has a dual outcome: on the one hand, it gives access to foreign 
currency, making it possible to earn more than in state jobs (some simply do not 
possess the capital required to set up a different kind of business). 
On the other hand, this type of mobilisation of cultural resources through 
tourist encounters creates the premises for capitalising on cultural heritage both 
in Cuba and outside it. At the same time, it illustrates a dynamic that to a certain 
extent mirrors the downward mobility experienced by highly skilled profession-
als in the state sector who choose to work in the more profitable private sector. 
While this is mostly the case for trained dancers coming from academia, it is 
also true for dance aficionados without formal training who experience an up-
ward mobility that is simultaneously financial and symbolic. This prestige and 
symbolic capital are reinforced by ideas that circulate around Cuban dance and 
by the ability of dancers themselves to quickly adapt, adopt and capitalise on 
these narratives. Through these processes, a certain ambivalence towards the 
state emerges: with dancers displaying similarities to other self-employed work-
ers in their ability to circumvent regulations and navigate an intricate legal and 
taxation system, they also rely on the state as a legitimising tool. While for other 
self-employed workers the relation with the state is usually only a matter of le-
gality or formalisation of their activity, dancers turn to the state in order to em-
phasise their professionalism, as a result of proper training in one of the higher 
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education institutions. In this way, the lines between notions of state and private 
become more blurred and the processes related to the commodification of herit-
age reveal the inner tensions that arise in the wake of political and social change. 
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Cuban Institutional Reform and the Crossroads 
of Inequality in the 21st Century1 
Introduction
Any analysis of the institutional reform implemented in Cuba this century faces 
the complexity of addressing a process that remains ongoing and includes mul-
ti-temporal dynamics and intersecting interests.2 Economic considerations are 
prioritised in this process, in a wider Latin American context of coexisting re-
gressive and progressive political changes. In the Cuban case, legal instruments 
and policy documents guide the search for a path of autonomous development.
The ongoing reform has (re)aligned basic pillars of social distribution in 
place in the country since 1959.  It is too early to evaluate the magnitude and 
scope of the changes, given the slow process of their implementation. However, 
the starting point of the adjustments and their handling is vital to thinking about 
the present and future of Cuban society in the socialist transition; not least be-
cause the transformations are designed to improve the sustainability of Cuba’s 
overall strategy (PCC, 2011a; 2011b; PCC & ANPP, 2017a; 2017b; 2017c; PCC 
& ANPP, 2019). The general aim of this chapter is to analyse the structural and 
symbolic correlations of deepening inequality within the framework of the cur-
rent reform.
The discussion of ideas in this paper is based on the cooperative production 
of sociological research appropriate for these issues, as well as a contemporary 
review of official documents (PCC & ANPP, 2019; Gacetas Oficiales No. 13 and 
1  This text has benefitted from the valuable reading and recommendations of Dr Blandine Des-
tremau, who improved it with her informed suggestions about Cuban society and helped to bring 
more coherence and precision to the theoretical and practical dilemmas addressed in it.
2  When referring in the chapter to “institutional reform”, the perspective used is that of interrelating 
the transformations of the legislative framework with the desirable (or otherwise) effects they 
produce at the social level. To be sure, the process of (re)commodification in Cuba and of sig-
nificant transformations to the welfare system began long before the changes implemented this 
century, but narrowing down the ideas presented here has led to a focus on the impacts of the 
commodifying shifts in Cuban government policy strategy from 2010.
https://doi.org/10.3224/84742546.11
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85,3 2019), newspaper articles and research outputs. The chapter proposes a the-
oretical understanding of the processes, the actors involved and the temporal-
ities affected by the changes underway. The overarching ambition is to debate 
the political economy premises of the reform and its effects on social justice in 
emancipatory terms.
The existence of an expansive, well-established structural and ideological 
context of capitalist accumulation at global level and in Latin America means Cu-
ba’s institutional reform faces challenges beyond the merely economic. Critical 
evaluations of this Caribbean experience therefore urgently need to be produced 
and disseminated within the framework of Latin American political alternatives.
This chapter aims to contribute to the dialogue on these challenges, and its 
analysis develops over four sections. The first sets out Latin American contribu-
tions deriving from inherited and contemporary critical thinking to consider the 
limitations of development on the continent, with particular attention to Cuba. 
The second addresses the political dilemmas facing the reform, not only to act 
with the stated economic urgency but to give greater consideration to processes 
and context when evaluating the changes. The third section presents the impor-
tance of broadening the analysis of inequality and poverty towards a multidi-
mensional approach that examines habitat, local differences and generational 
factors to achieve the political consensus needed to advance the current adjust-
ment strategy. In the fourth part, a diagnosis of inequality is sketched out based 
on the impacts of old and new actors in the reform,4 as well as the articulation of 
diverse and emerging sociabilities within the restructuring of Cuba’s social class-
es. Finally, the fifth section outlines a more comprehensive and inclusive course 
for both political and academic agendas.
One last clarification and statement of principles. The author’s work of think-
ing about and questioning Cuba has been continuous, but she is not directly ex-
posed to the country’s everyday life experience or to the heat of the discussions in 
situ about the direction of the changes and the conflicts they entail. At the same 
time, looking at events in Cuba with a more global perspective is proving to be an 
enriching experience. Hence, the call to recognise the need for an open approach 
to the dialogue of knowledge between academics, civil society and policymakers 
thinking about the island that also includes emigration. 
3  Gaceta Oficial No. 13 refers to raising pensions and pay scales in the state sector, while No. 85 
adds and modifies elements of the practice of self-employment.
4  The focus of the article is general and looks at the transformations of actors produced by the 
reform. The processes of the production of poverty in detail can be found in other works by the 
author (Voghon, 2016; 2018; 2019).
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1  Critical thinking in Latin America: a useful perspective for 
understanding the dynamics of inequality beneath Cuba’s 
universal policies?
In the first decade of the 21st century, one of the most important considerations 
when reflecting on Latin America’s social protection architecture is the viability 
of the development models underway. The arrival in power of several progres-
sive governments contributed significantly to regaining autonomy in the leader-
ship of national projects,5 as well as to expanding assistance and the social policy 
system in general. Geared towards addressing social vulnerability and extreme 
levels of poverty, these instruments, however, have proved incomplete when it 
comes to transforming the social and symbolic structures of the (re)production 
of poverty and inequality, the regressive nature of the tax system and the founda-
tions of exploitation in wealth production and distribution.
The shift from the Washington Consensus to the Commodities Consensus 
established new problems and paradoxes that even reconfigured the outlook of 
Latin American critical thought and the left as a whole (Svampa, 2019: 30). As 
Gudynas argues (2015), more than a mode of production, extractivism refers to 
a mode of appropriation in which the extraction of natural resources – and their 
negative social and ecological impacts – is legitimised by a larger role for the 
state in capturing that surplus and redistributing it. 
Progressive governments have emphasised the comparative advantages of 
the demand for commodities in the international market, introducing new para-
doxes that have reshaped the Latin American left and critical thinking. Neo-ex-
tractivism has shown the limitations of projects that also legitimised the mindset 
of infinite development by minimising or denying the unequal and negative eco-
logical impacts of the extraction and export of natural resources on a large scale 
(Svampa, 2019; Gudynas, 2015). 
Hence, the complexity of analysing inequality requires a historical perspec-
tive: one that questions the centrality of income as a structuring element of so-
cioeconomic class (Antía et al., 2015) in contemporary societies and particularly 
those in Latin America. The dominant vision in both the social sciences and poli-
cy measures ignores the limitations of income and results analysis. It is necessary 
to reflect more on the processes that produce inequalities, which, for the most 
5  The regional background to these projects was the advance of integration mechanisms such as 
the creation of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), the Community of Latin American 
and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America – Peo-
ples’ Trade Treaty (ALBA-TCP). However, these alliances hinder the development of a robust and 
systematic system of cooperation on the continent. 
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part, are not are located in this secondary sphere of distribution. It should be re-
called that the monetary form of this inequality tends to mystify these processes 
through its abstraction (Pérez, 2017: 73).
The technocratisation of social policy during the boom in conditional cash 
transfer programmes reinforced this historical legacy and deepened gender ine-
qualities within families due to a moralising (Cunha & Ivo, 2019), minimal and 
clientelistic view of poverty (Álvarez, 2005; 2013). The difficulties progressive 
governments face in the 21st century and their setbacks and advances in devel-
opment matters are useful for discussing the importance of political instruments 
that link democracy and equality.6 In the absence of political will and with the 
state captured by Creole and transnational elites, this equation seems to offer 
little hope of success. Particularly when, under neoliberal rule, the power struc-
tures uphold the logic of capitalist accumulation. In the current domestic and 
international setting, specifically worsened by the effects of the pandemic, Cuba 
also finds itself unable to escape this neoliberal mandate.
It is therefore worth highlighting some of the Latin American contributions 
that will help us reflect on Cuban inequalities (Cattani, 2008; Arzate et al., 2011): 
1) a relational and dynamic perspective on the mechanisms that explain the exist-
ence and (re)production of inequality and poverty; 2) recovering the historical–
cultural as a structural and shaping element of development; 3) the relationship 
between the global, national and local levels and the mechanisms of power and 
domination that make them possible; 4) the need to question the persistent na-
ture of transnational capital’s hegemony in peripheral economies, as imposed by 
the international division of labour; 5) the existence of agents/mechanisms that 
generate inequality and poverty in a context of asymmetric relationships; and 
6) the increasing sophistication of the symbolic mechanisms that legitimise these 
social forces and contribute to maintaining the status quo. These premises are 
critical in order to tease apart the complex web of (re)production of inequality in 
Cuba and the contradictory nature of the ongoing reform.
6  This chapter employs a basic definition of “development” that centres on the relationship between 
material and human components. In Cuba, in conditions of economic dependence, significant 
human development progress is observed, along with stagnation in the political and participation 
structures meant to respond to the challenges of creating a political alternative to the neoliberal.
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2  Postponed economic urgency: the political dilemmas of the 
reform 
A more abstract conception of the reform reveals two problem areas: the break 
with an integrated, complex vision of development;7 and the existence of stag-
nant political practices that cause obstacles and incongruencies for the proposed 
transformation. A relatively recent example of these contradictions was the (re)
centralisation drive towards the end of the 1990s (Triana, 2015). The slowdown 
of the current reform is the result of systemic gaps in the development agenda 
begun in the 1990s upon the fall of the socialist bloc and the resurgence of the 
US blockade. To trace a path of many twists and turns, of which the recent “mon-
etary ordering” is but one (Juventud Rebelde, 2021), it is necessary to critically 
review the agenda of priorities and the set of measures approved so far. A fact 
that should not be overlooked is the way civic mobilisation shapes this agenda. 
Despite centralised state power, pressure groups assert their demands to the det-
riment of others who are growing increasingly silent. 
The first areas on the reform agenda that opened up sketched out the eco-
nomic and social policy priorities roadmap. Some of the most important were the 
economic measures such as increasing the flexibility and promotion of the pri-
vate sector,8 loosening the immigration reform, releasing certain banned prod-
ucts and goods for consumption, access to hotels and cell phones, the purchase 
and sale of cars and homes, and the promotion of foreign investment.9 Other 
initiatives such as the (arbitrary in most cases) creation of non-agricultural pro-
duction cooperatives,10 guaranteeing broader levels of autonomy to Cuban en-
terprises, the transfer of idle lands and the decentralised management of local 
governments face(d) greater vicissitudes in their implementation despite being 
fundamental actors/areas in the change process.
7  Official documents propose the idea of sustainable development (PCC & ANPP, 2017a; 2017b; 
2017c), and put forward a conceptual model of a comprehensive implementation pathway for 
achieving it.
8  Inaccurately called the self-employed sector from the start. This euphemism, used to character-
ise both employees and employers, has also encouraged a failure to distinguish between different 
business sizes and types of activity.
9  The Foreign Investment Law, No. 118 of 2014, was approved just three years after the extensive 
consultation exercise on the Lineamientos de la Política Económica y Social (LPES) by the Na-
tional Assembly of People’s Power; there was no grassroots consultation about its legitimacy as 
a key instrument within the reform strategy.
10  Although recognised as the second most important form of property after state ownership, con-
tradictory incentives have prevented it from playing a fundamental role.
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Nevertheless, when referring to Cuban society recent documents do not use 
the word “inequality” (PCC & ANPP, 2017a; 2017b). By contrast, the documents 
legitimise the differentiated access to and enjoyment of the supply of goods and 
services, declaring the intention to eliminate subsidies and ineffective expenses 
(PCC, 2011a; 2011b).11 In this sense, these documents lack a strategic perspec-
tive of the links between economic advances, sustainability and the expansion of 
social policy by which to promote equality.  
The urgent economic need and the promotion of mercantile dynamics have 
clearly given rise to a degree of conflict between the economy and development 
in the current Cuban context. This imbalance has had serious implications for 
social assistance policies, wages and the pension system (Mesa-Lago, 2015). The 
delayed economic transformations in key areas such as agricultural development 
and food security policies have contributed to the mechanisms of inequality and 
social stratification worsening at a faster rate in the absence of strategic meas-
ures designed to contain them. 
Among the characteristics shaping the emerging policy modulations of the 
reform underway, the following may be noted (Voghon, 2019; Hernández, 2015): 
1)  The state’s formal withdrawal12 from the traditional spaces of social protec-
tion;
2)  The restructuring of classes and the growing demands of well-positioned 
pressure groups/actors;13 
3)  The recognition of the market as an actor that should be given more space 
within the social distribution mechanisms;
4)  Little or zero articulation of co-responsibility as an approach for defining ac-
tors and welfare policies in a public–private governance scheme. Hence, the 
family becomes the recipient of political demands in facing social risks as 
11  These advantages were not removed for certain groups, such as the armed forces, the political 
high command, the police and certain segments of the diplomatic staff who have retained privi-
leged access to income and consumer goods that other population groups have been denied both 
in the period prior to the crisis of the 1990s and in successive reforms.
12  “Withdrawal” in this text refers to the relative absence of state responsibility in key areas of social 
protection. The term suggests the greater burden imposed on the family or individual to meet ba-
sic needs. One example is the current constitution’s legalisation of family responsibility for risks 
and care, criteria that went on to be used to evaluate whether or not to offer social assistance 
benefits (Constitución de la República de Cuba, 2019: Chapter 3). 
13  A deeper appreciation of this issue in the implementation of the reform agenda is urgently needed 
in order to understand the class restructuring process in Cuban society today.
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a result of norms and cultural behaviours in which moral discipline is key 
(Cunha & Ivo, 2019);14 
5)  When addressing vulnerabilities, there is an increased use of individual/fam-
ily and moralistic rhetoric, in combination with targeted actions shaped by a 
humanitarian perspective;15 
6)  The lack of coordination between different levels of the institutional system 
of social and economic policies means the capacity is lost to effectively re-
spond to changing social processes and problems;
7)  Robust evaluation mechanisms that assess the reform implementation and 
its results in priority human development areas are incomplete or barely ex-
ist. 
While the priority is given to economic development, the crucial task is to over-
come the practices that have shaped the institutional development of the Cu-
ban political system and their effects throughout the entire social fabric. A key 
example of this continuity, also present in the current Díaz-Canel government, 
is the fact that in parallel to the initial economic changes since Raúl Castro came 
to power, a process has been underway of consolidation and expansion of the 
military sector.16 Another contradictory aspect is the legislative component of the 
legitimation and stability of the measures. Even today, many of the institutional 
order’s legal mechanisms are produced by decree. It is important to note this 
procedure in light of the fragmentation it introduces, which results in a random 
field of action that offers ample leeway to arbitrary decisions when defining the 
relationship between rights and duties. 
The new constitution approved in 2019 is a concentrated expression of the 
conceptual dilemmas associated with the process of change, and of the expe-
rience gained in the preparation of previous fundamental documents (PCC & 
14  Here, “co-responsibility” means an approach that emphasises the central place of care in devel-
opment and establishes which collective, community and family mechanisms will guarantee it.
15  A key area in which this shift may be appreciated is attention to homeless people, whose numbers 
have been rising, particularly since the purchase and sale of houses began. For more, see the list 
of journal articles in the References section. Another example is the start of university training in 
social work: by going further than the current training, it will open up new possibilities.
16  Through the Grupo de Administración Empresarial, S.A. (GAESA), the Revolutionary Armed Forc-
es (FAR) control high added-value natural and tourism resources, import and export companies, 
customs control, and ports and transportation, as well for example the Mariel Special Devel-
opment Zone. During the reform, many of the currency collection stores (TRD) and the CIMEX 
corporation were transferred to the FAR’s management system. The dissolution of Habaguanex 
S.A. was a paradigmatic case. Created by the Office of the Historian, it had formed part of the 
local-management model of Old Havana’s historic centre.
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ANPP, 2017a; 2017b; 2017c). However, compared to the ambitious development 
objectives of these previous texts, its scope is limited. Close reading of the final 
document reveals the importance given to the political and ideological content 
as key components of building a society in the socialist transition. Another sig-
nificant advance is the incorporation of a rights focus, although the practical im-
plementation of these guidelines throughout the legislative calendar will need 
further assessment and evaluation. 
Cuba’s processes of institutionalisation have left a major deficit in the for-
malisation of citizen participation, which has been stripped of its transforma-
tive and innovative character when seeking community/local solutions. Popular 
Councils, the most important grassroots organisations, have been granted very 
limited space within the constitution. Their absence is notable from the section 
on the processes of promoting foreign investment. It should be borne in mind 
that from the 1990s onwards the country opened up to neo-extractivist formulas 
in both the tourism and mining industries, of which the nickel exploitation in the 
Moa area of Holguín province is one example (De la Cantera & Toppin, 2019). 
The minimal tradition of socio-environmental conflicts meant that investment 
projects based on foreign capital, such as the Castellanos mining megaproject 
in the province of Pinar del Río, got underway without the necessary consulta-
tion and participation of the populations involved in managing the ecological risk 
they pose. 
As Svampa warns, neo-extractivism is characterised by the gigantism or 
large scale of its undertakings, which is also a warning sign of the magnitude 
of the investment (capital- rather than labour-intensive) and of the actors in-
volved. In general, these are transnational corporations, although the so-called 
trans-Latin corporations play their part. Such megaprojects generate little direct 
employment after their initial construction phases,17 produce few significant en-
dogenous supply chains, disrupt traditional local economies and displace people 
or cause health problems for those who remain (Svampa, 2019: 22–23). Given 
their major eco-social impact, these issues merited greater consideration in the 
consultation over the final drafting of the current constitution. The inclusion of 
regulation and public consultations in those projects is critical given the lack of 
previous debate about the drawing up of the foreign investment law.
The constitution was an opportunity to promote a socialist transition that 
is more closely attached to the democratic value of citizen participation and its 
17  In these small communities, generally located in rural areas of the country, the levels of job cre-
ation resulting from this type of investment and male-dominant activities amplify social inequality, 
as certain groups are included in these projects at the expense of others, a process that also 
includes notable gender inequality.
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contribution to development. It could also have promoted a model of access to 
information and knowledge centred on a collective perspective that extends be-
yond the individual.18 At this point, the persistent political dilemmas found an 
ideal niche for their reproduction, and neither the reform as a whole nor the laws 
that underpin it are able to provide an answer. They remain at the mercy of their 
contradictory essence.
3  A multidimensional reconfiguration of inequality and poverty in 
Cuba
The Cuban system’s main strength has been the existence of the political will to 
guarantee positive social indicators even in times of economic downturn. Tra-
ditionally, this model has been characterised by the existence of a structure of 
universal guarantees, which have worked with relative effectiveness for over half 
a century, establishing an institutional legacy of social protection (Álvarez & Mat-
tar, 2004). It has also been distinguished by the state’s central role in providing 
social protection and the people’s identification of it as the main agent for secur-
ing those guarantees. 
Despite the social spending in the key human development areas (health, ed-
ucation, employment, habitat, access to information and culture), inequality per-
sists in the access to the institutional social policy architecture meant to ensure 
inclusive social mobility for families with different starting positions in terms 
of accessing material and symbolic resources (Voghon, 2018). Local differences 
and habitat appropriation are two essential factors when analysing processes of 
inequality at urban and rural levels. 
Housing is key to explaining the contemporary dynamics of spatial and cul-
tural segregation in the access to welfare. In Cuba, the development of home-
building and renovation policies (Núñez, 2008) has been too slow and falls of the 
short of levels needed to respond to the dynamics of generational replacement 
and the (re)composition of the family unit. Access to housing has proven difficult, 
increased by the limited capacity for self-management and cooperative solutions 
for this problem (Carrasco & Jimenez, 2021). 
The diverse temporalities that coexist within the revolutionary context and 
its policies are key to understanding Cuba’s present and future challenges. The 
vectors of tension between the present and past in generational terms unfold 
throughout the historical development of the socialist project in the country. The 
18  The use of urban land is another key omission from the document, with the focus more on the 
regulation of idle land in rural areas.
235Rosa María Voghon Hernández
experience of inequality is therefore not temporally or generationally homogene-
ous,19 but is riddled with processes of retraction, improvement and bifurcation 
that have marked and characterised the Revolution’s history and its policies of 
promise (Davies, 2017). Hence, the reform is the product not only of a moment 
of urgency on the part of the government, but also of the way alternative actors 
organise a response to the raft of generational problems and social demands in-
terwoven in civic mobilisation and or individual/collective struggles.
The reinforcement of equality in Cuba requires more complex and systemic 
approaches that go beyond the conception of income as a variable for measuring 
well-being. Extensive study has been made of government structures and their 
weaknesses from a participatory perspective (Dilla, 1996; 2000). More research 
is needed to advance theoretical and methodological research on wealth accumu-
lation and state capture practices (Cañete, 2018; Durand, 2019) within Cuban 
society. This is because these mechanisms are at the heart of Cuban enterpris-
es’ lack of autonomy, the advance or regression of the private sector, the access 
to and management of information and the increasingly stratified supply in the 
leisure industry. Hence, the importance of recognising the channels and actors 
involved in the dynamics of inequality.
4 The drivers of inequality: actors and mechanisms.
This chapter has repeatedly raised the need to go beyond a vision that focuses on 
income and consumer goods. More complex analyses are needed when address-
ing the social dynamics of the (re)production of inequality. One observable real-
ity within the long transformation that began in the 1990s is the weakening of 
work as a source of social integration.20 Among other processes of vulnerability, 
the reform legitimised the figure of the on-call worker,21 as well as job insecurity 
19  Throughout this chapter, generations are not just considered in their chronological dimensions. 
Instead, temporality means a generation’s modes of production, and therefore concerns deep 
variations in economic and social conditions. These differences shape group identities at a given 
moment and not necessarily the whole society (Mannheim, 1928/1952; Bourdieu, 1980; 1999).
20  Fundamentally, this disconnection is caused by the relative decline of state-sector salaries and 
the pensions derived from workers’ social security contributions – the most significant group 
in the Cuban labour network. The fall in their earning capacity makes it difficult for workers and 
their families to meet their expenses, despite recent measures to increase wages and pensions 
(Gaceta Oficial, 2019a).
21  In labour terms, the rules of the game demand higher levels of skill in the face of reduced job 
supply in the state space. Faced with these mechanisms, the unskilled workers in this sector 
who have spent much of their working life in a particular position are forced to relocate or lose 
their job. The biggest shock of this process at the subjective level was that state work ceased to 
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and precariousness (Peña & Voghon, 2014). The current Labour Code (Gaceta 
Oficial No. 29, 2013) turns out to be a weak legal instrument for tackling the ex-
istence of ad hoc mechanisms that undermine rights in the world of work. 
Remittances have contributed significantly to weakening the labour factor, 
its social value and contribution to social inclusion (Hansing & Hoffmann, 2020). 
Their relevance as a parallel factor of social distribution due to their irrigation-
al capacity explains a great deal of private sector investment and the strategies 
developed by individuals and families to satisfy their needs (Munster, 2014; Del-
gado, 2016). Despite the permanent updating of the regulations on the exercise 
and development of the private sector, three obstacles remain: the low inclusion 
of skilled jobs; the fragile implementation of the tax system; and the mechanism 
of supply and assurance of these initiatives. One positive element of inclusion in 
the 2019 regulations was the disaggregation of tax burdens by territory and type 
of activity (Gaceta Oficial, 2019b).
What follows is a simplified and incomplete review of actors22 and scenarios 
that are well-placed in the social structure and have the capacity to achieve up-
ward mobility and an influential political voice in the island’s present and future. 
Some worth mentioning are: the self-employed, artists, academics who regular-
ly travel abroad or participate in international cooperation schemes, workers in 
the mixed public-private sector, those involved in tourism or who form part of 
internationalist missions via the provision of professional services, agricultural 
landowners who never formed cooperatives, those who recently took advantage 
of the increased flexibility in the transfer of idle lands, and Cubans with dual 
nationality who take advantage of flexible migration policies to practice circular 
migration (Aja, 2017).
To piece together the unsolvable puzzle of progressing with the reform, the 
informal economy must be mentioned. More in-depth social research is required 
on this topic (Peña & Voghon, 2014; Rodríguez, 2017a; Rodríguez, 2014). As an 
unproven hypothesis, this space may be proportionally as significant as the for-
mal sector – or even more so – when it comes to re-establishing social distribu-
tion. Its dynamics must also be considered when addressing the mechanisms for 
maintaining the political system.23 Since the removal of foreign travel restrictions 
represent secure employment for life.
22  In this chapter, when referring to groups no pretence is made of homogeneity, which would only 
contribute to the opacity of processes and actors. The intention is to indicate those who are 
presently – or who have the potential to be – well-placed within the reform framework.
23  Although it seems to contradict and contravene it, in fact, the black market plays an essential role 
in satisfying the needs of individuals and families, of the private sector of the economy and of the 
system as a whole, because it enables individual responses to collective problems.
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for Cubans in 2012, the informal sector has driven the circulation of resources 
from abroad to meet individual/family needs, and aid the operation of private 
businesses. Finally, it is important to highlight the endurance of underground 
cultural practices such as the lottery and the sale and consumption of drugs.
Another group is the elite linked to political power and the government. The 
divide between the public and this group is overwhelmingly huge. That is why 
researching their privileges is no easy task, and even trickier is getting a full un-
derstanding of the threads moving the social and patrimonial capital this sector 
is able to mobilise based on access to information, resources and political legit-
imacy. 
Finally, two groups who appear to be a minority in fact occupy a significant 
position by aiding social mobilisation. The first of these are the religious organ-
isations. The second are the communication media and platforms whose man-
agement, production, distribution and reach in most cases evade state control 
(Sosa-Valcárcel et al., 2019: 9). The access to technologies and information in a 
global context of connective interdependence has taken the confrontation into 
areas of the exercise of hegemony that have no tradition in Cuban post-1959 
history.
The role of religious organisations has been widely addressed in terms of 
their cultural practices, but less attention has been given to their political nature 
and significance. They played an important role in the consultation process for 
the constitution, preventing the advance of progressive content within it. Martín-
ez writes that some of the Protestant circles made serious efforts via their civic 
commitments, ethics and ecclesiology to participate in the defence of solidarity 
within society (2015: 201–202). In doing so, they also stress the need for trans-
formations to address current problems, while providing fundamental material 
and spiritual support in disadvantaged neighbourhoods and communities. 
The subjective configurations and imaginaries built around the reform (Peña 
& Voghon, 2014) show that public opinion is in favour of the need for change, 
while at the same time tacitly accepting the structural inequality deriving from it. 
On the subjective level, the most significant contradiction, and one that may be 
expressed with a certain level of reluctance, is the withdrawal of state protection 
in priority areas. In this context, a question remains about the conflictive inter-
action between the anti-capitalist struggle and the power relations (Martínez, 
2015) that uphold the political dilemma that characterises Cuban society today. 
238 Cuban Institutional Reform and the Crossroads of Inequality in the 21st Century
5  Conclusions. Proposals for an alternative academic and 
political agenda
The application of Cuba’s current reform “seems” slow and inoperative when set 
against the main economic objectives and goals that gave rise to it. However, 
the impacts in terms of reinforcing inequality are compelling. In the context of 
readjusting political consensus, challenges arising from the unfulfilled promises 
of the present motivate the collective building of the utopian reality of the future 
(Davies, 2017). A clearer and more appropriate definition of distributive justice 
is called for within an ethical framework that fits the present and future. It should 
consider that:
1)  Economic growth must be subject to well-being, meaning it must be suppor-
ted by a balanced relationship between social and economic policies that con-
solidate an effective social protection model.
2)  A cultural change is urgently needed that allows us to produce an alternative 
ethic to the dynamics of capital accumulation. The consensus over the “desir-
able” society must be formed based on generational renewal.
3)  Inequality and poverty are two issues of primary importance. The pandemic 
has also amplified Cuba’s social and eco-environmental asymmetries. Among 
other things, a society advances through knowledge. Without official data on 
these phenomena and verifiable sources of diverse research, the transform-
ative capacities of society and academia to respond to the challenges of the 
present are diminished. 
4)  The country’s educational and productive model must increasingly adjust to 
the scenario of info-communications and new technologies that characterises 
today’s societies. 
5)  A fundamental part of the discussions around the implementation of the 
changes has been the call for a change of mentality, an idea promoted by the 
Cuban government during the Raúl Castro administration. At present, pro-
ducing this transformation on a volitional basis will fall short, given the old, 
reissued corrosive political practices applied in handling the reform. The first 
real step towards achieving this goal must be a critical survey of all the gov-
ernment’s shortcomings and limitations in the long term. The imminent gen-
erational power shift requires the active recovery of the collective memory to 
face the info-communication and cultural challenges Cuban society will face 
in the future.
The current reform deals with recurring dilemmas around the economic opening 
up and political renewal that began in the 1990s. Without popular control and 
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advocacy, the goals of this process will remain unreachable. We must not unde-
restimate the long memory of colonisation within the DNA that maintains Cuba’s 
chances of becoming a reference point for political transformation. Indeed, as 
Martínez (2015: 203) points out, among other requirements, there is a need to 
recognise that what appear to be fixed realities may actually be in motion. In do-
ing so, we must jettison some certainties in order to embark on a re-identification 
that extends from values to institutions, and above all to create and recreate – a 
minimum aspiration if we are to be pragmatic in the anti-capitalist struggle.
The current pandemic has highlighted the importance of stable and integrat-
ed architecture in the social protection system. At a time of crisis, such as the one 
humanity now faces, Cuba must be analysed based on the interaction between 
the micro-stories of daily life, the interaction between past, present and future 
temporalities, and generational changes. The divisions over social and econom-
ic priorities produce unfertile ground for opposing the entrenched inequalities 
generated by an increasingly unipolar world of eco-environmental destruction.
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Cuba’s 2019 Constitution and Socialist 
Constitutionalism: Realities and Challenges 
1 Introduction
The usual approach to studying the Cuban constitution and its varied content is 
to make a comparative study with the principles of liberal constitutionalism. But 
the Cuban constitution does not fit with the principles and foundations of that 
constitutionalism; it is conditioned by the parameters of socialist constitutional-
ism, which gives it a different political, legal and ideological grounding.
Both of these constitutionalisms (and there are others) has its own view of 
reality. It is their radically different foundations that makes a comparative anal-
ysis from a liberal constitutionalist perspective a useless, merely rhetorical and 
ultimately melancholy task.
It was initially hoped that the recent constitutional changes would reflect 
the social development that has taken place in Cuba over a number of years. But 
those hopes became deep frustrations when it was confirmed that the material 
reality of the constitution, in other words, the balance of the powers that interact 
in society (Revolutionary Armed Forces, Communist Party of Cuba (PCC), bu-
reaucracy, economic system, Cuba’s international position and its relationship 
with the United States) and which dialectically give life to the formal constitu-
tion not only have not changed, they continue to be shaped by the strategies and 
principles of socialist constitutionalism. As such, making interpretations of the 
Cuban constitutional text that are materially limited by the parameters of the 
constitutionalism of which it forms part does not seem feasible. 
The historical circumstances that engendered this model of constitutional-
ism in Cuba are not identical to those of today, but the model’s foundations and 
structural principles have been consolidated over the years, as a full reading of 
the 2019 constitution shows. Cuban society in 2020 is the product of substantial 
transformations that have occurred progressively and unceasingly for some dec-
ades now. 
Framed by this paradigm, the analysis of the 2019 constitution will focus 
on verifying the contrast between the norm and the reality, between the formal 
constitution and the material constitution, and on confirming, at least tentatively 
and to the furthest possible extent, whether the political, social and economic 
https://doi.org/10.3224/84742546.12
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forces condition or are able to condition what the letter of the constitution es-
tablishes.
2  Socialist constitutionalism. The position of the constitution 
in the “legal order”: constitutional supremacy and direct 
application
The 2019 constitution is intended, in principle, to be coherently related to the 
society from which it emerges. In fact, it legitimises a contradictory situation 
that resulted from the economic and social transformations that began with the 
Lineamientos (Guidelines) of the PCC approved in 2011, which led to continual 
flagrant violations of the 1976 constitution (modified in 1992 and 2002) of vari-
ous types, but above all linked to economic activities. The creation of the Office of 
the Comptroller General of the Republic is one example: in this case, an impor-
tant new institution was incorporated into the fabric of the Cuban institutional 
system extra-constitutionally. In other cases, reforms have been made to the eco-
nomic system, among other things to create new forms of self-employment and 
new labour relations, that ought to have required prior constitutional amend-
ments before their implementation. Their post hoc inclusion in the current 2019 
constitution shows a lack of respect and consideration for the state’s highest law.
Hence, the constitution has been used not to address profound changes 
across all orders of society, but to re-legitimise the system, fundamentally for 
external consumption. The 2019 constitution is manifestly a continuation of the 
previous political and institutional model, which is that defined in the 1976 con-
stitution, and which in turn drew on the sources of the 1936 Soviet constitution. 
The position of the constitution in the “legal order”: constitutional 
supremacy and direct application
For the first time it is recognised that “the Constitution is the supreme norm of 
the State” (Const. 2019, art. 7). Never before had the principle of constitutional 
supremacy been recognised, which involves the subordination of power and citi-
zens to the constitution, as well as the other legal norms.
The consideration given to the constitution as the “supreme norm” is an im-
portant advance, but the material reality exhibits structural issues that make it 
extremely difficult for the formal constitution to be truly reflected in the country’s 
social, economic and political life.
There is more than one reason for this lack of alignment. The institutional-
isation of the principle of “unity of power” is one. This is the way the “people’s 
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power” is upheld, and it means that the National Assembly of People’s Power 
(ANPP), as the expression of the will of a homogeneous society without class dif-
ferences, approves both legal and constitutional norms, which therefore appear 
to be politically homogeneous. This system means that any doubts that may arise 
about the constitutionality of certain norms are resolved by political decisions 
supported by the ANPP (Const. 2019, art. 108 e.). The second reason is the level 
of disregard for the law, which means that, historically, rather than the subordi-
nation of power to the constitution, what has been most notable is the subordi-
nation of the constitution to power. 
This devaluation of the law and more specifically of the constitution is no 
more than a reflection of the USSR’s constitutional parameters and, specifically, 
of its 1936 constitution, a decisive influence on Cuba’s 1976 constitution. 
The Cuban constitution is essentially ideological, and its foundations lie in 
Marxism–Leninism (Const. 2019, art. 5). This ideology, which is transmitted via 
the PCC structure, invariably determines the conceptions of the state and the law 
that derive from the worldview of the social, economic, political and legal reality 
of socialist constitutionalism.
In socialist constitutionalism, the constitution is nothing more than a polit-
ical and ideological programme – it is not a binding norm. The constitution has 
instrumental value as a dynamic, transformative agent in the work of achieving 
communist society. That it is intended to transform reality is one essential quali-
ty that distinguishes it from liberal constitutions, which preserve the status quo.
The law is a superstructure that the Cuban revolution did not encourage par-
ticular adherence to or respect for. The sense of personal security, equality and 
equity was not based on the law, but on the social and political conditions created 
by the revolution. Slow, painful legal proceedings recalled bourgeois institutions 
and forms. Hugo Azcuy (1995: 145–155) claimed that the revolution was made 
not with law but with politics. With that reality recognised, Azcuy went on to un-
ambiguously defend the law’s normative function (Chofre, 2017).
The roots of this conception of the law and therefore of the constitution lie in 
the very origins of the revolution. This conception has not changed, and as long 
as we find ourselves constrained by the same parameters, it will not change. In 
reality, the dominant position is one that recognises the supremacy of the law 
over the constitution. Many of the economic and social reforms undertaken in 
the years prior to the new constitution were manifestly unconstitutional and, for 
example, breached the provisions of Article 14 of the 2002 constitution, which es-
tablishes that: “In the Republic of Cuba, the system of economy based on socialist 
ownership of the means of production by all the people prevails, and the suppres-
sion of exploitation of man by man”. Certain changes were made, above all in the 
economic field, that derived from the PCC Guidelines approved in 2011, with no 
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consideration given to whether they fitted within the constitutional framework. 
This is one of the specific cases where constitutional reform was required in order 
to provide adequate legal coverage, even if in an unorthodox way.
Enshrining the constitution as the “supreme norm of the State” is a very sig-
nificant step and an inescapable commitment for all organs of the state and all 
citizens to comply with and respect the magna carta. A highly illuminating and il-
lustrative statement on the position of the constitution and its place in the Cuban 
legal system was made by José Luis Toledo, then president of the Constitutional 
and Legal Affairs Commission of the ANPP on the occasion of the debate in the 
assembly on the preliminary draft of the constitution. He very forcefully stated 
that the PCC was above the constitution and was the highest governing power of 
both society and the state. In a different setting these declarations might cause 
astonishment and perplexity, but they are fully coherent with the revolutionary 
conception of the law within the framework of socialist constitutionalism, where-
by the constitution is subordinate to power and a different reality should not be 
expected (OnCuba News, 2018).
Despite the conditions imposed by the external reality and the clear estab-
lishment of political and ideological frames of reference, during the constitu-
tion’s gestation process most Cuban constitutionalists supported the recognition 
of a Constitutional Court – or, at least, the conversion of one chamber of the Su-
preme Court into a Constitutional Chamber – in order to guarantee the express 
provision of Article 7 that the “constitution is the supreme norm of the State” and 
must be fulfilled and respected by all. In short, this was to give recognition to the 
constitution’s supremacy over the law rather than the other way around.
Nevertheless, the view of Cuban constitutionalists (Martha Prieto’s opinion 
is representative: Prieto Valdés, 2019: 59) was not reflected in the final approved 
text for the precise reason that the political, ideological and legal reference 
framework is that of socialist constitutionalism, which is tethered to the prin-
ciple of unity of power and democratic centralism – today synthesised in the 
“principles of socialist democracy” (Const. 2019, art. 101). The institution of the 
Constitutional Court fits perfectly (although not indisputably) within liberal con-
stitutionalism and with the principle of the division of powers, but not within 
socialist constitutionalism. The same logic explains why the 2019 constitution 
formally recognises the supremacy of the constitution, while in practice main-
taining the system of constitutional review that has existed since the 1976 con-
stitution (Const., art. 75 c.; and Const. 2019, Articles 108 e. and 122 h. and i.).
Making constitutional review a function of the ANPP means that in material 
terms no effective constitutional review exists: the ANPP is responsible for carry-
ing out constitutional review of laws, decree-laws, presidential decrees, decrees 
and other general provisions, and as such becomes both part of the legislative 
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process and its judge, at the same time approving laws and exercising oversight 
of them (Const. 2019, art. 108 e.). 
Bourgeois states have oversight bodies that supervise the fulfilment of the 
constitution, that interpret it and check that the laws parliament approves com-
ply with it. These oversight bodies are placed above the parliament. According 
to Zhidkov et al., the reactionary nature of such bodies is worsened by the fact 
that they do not depend on representative institutions (1988: 260). This is the 
coherent logic that shapes the entire 2019 constitution within the framework of 
socialist constitutionalism: conceiving of an institution that is able to correct the 
criteria defined by the ANPP – the people’s highest representative and the central 
pillar of the Cuban power structure – is impossible.
Against that background, and subject to the constraints inherent in the pre-
vailing constitutional model, one of the challenges Cuban authorities face is en-
suring that the constitution, the “supreme norm of the State” is applied directly 
by the different judicial operators and, especially, by the courts of justice in the 
specific case in question. It is not necessary in every case to wait for implementing 
legislation to be approved before directly applying the constitution – that is why 
it is defined as the “supreme norm of the State” and “[a]ll are obliged to comply 
with it” (Const. 2019, art. 7). This does not preclude the need for implementing 
legislation to be approved on the matters in question; it would be unacceptable 
for such laws never to be approved, or for them to be approved with such delay as 
to reduce the respect for and prestige of the constitution itself. 
The main task facing judicial operators is to place the constitution at the 
very heart of the theory of interpretation. This means applying criteria to assess 
the compliance of norms approved both prior to the constitution’s approval and 
afterwards. These laws should then be interpreted and applied in the light of the 
provisions of the new fundamental law, which will be progressively assimilated 
by citizens and become a “living constitution” for them and all the organs of the 
state. A living constitution is one that dialectically adapts to a highly changeable 
reality. The Cuban constitution declares a large number of good ideals that will 
nevertheless be difficult to implement without mechanisms aimed at their fulfil-
ment. 
If all judicial operators take a course of action that fails to adapt to the ar-
guments outlined and if the constitution fails to regulate the political, social and 
economic reality, we will face a scenario in which the public perception of the 
constitution becomes increasingly degraded and discredited and becomes a “se-
mantic” constitution, a mere façade without substantial content, or in Lassalle’s 
words, a mere “piece of paper”. 
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3 Socialist law and the rule of law
Socialist law is the theoretical basis for the creation of the new society in Cuba. 
According to the concept of socialist law, law and government play a positive and 
dynamic role in the creation of socialism. Lenin saw law as a political instrument 
(cited in Evenson, 1994: 20, note 21), and it may indeed be used to lay the foun-
dations of the continuous evolution towards socialism.
The definition of socialist law is an abstract expression that appears not only 
in the constitution but also in other laws and includes not only the legal norms 
that serve as instruments to regulate and transform society, but also the set of 
values and methods on which the evaluation and amendment of the law are 
based (Evenson, 1994: 16).
To continue strengthening socialist law ongoing state surveillance and party 
control of the activity of all state bodies and social organisations is needed to en-
sure their strict and rigorous compliance with the law (Alexandrov, 1963: 218).
For the first time within the hegemonic framework of socialist law, the 2019 
constitution recognises “rule of law” as a category in Cuba (Const. 2019, art. 1). 
It is a category that socialist constitutionalism has previously considered taboo. 
Marxists attributed it to bourgeois thought, historically belittled it, and as it was 
unknown, even vilified it. That the Cuban constitution includes it in its frontis-
piece is an attempt by socialist constitutionalism to assimilate this category,1 
altering the content established over centuries while at the same time instru-
mentalising it as it has with others, such as the law. Words mean what they mean, 
not what power wants them to mean.
It seems impossible to consider that the category “rule of law” can fully de-
velop its values, principles, institutions and norms within the material limits 
established by the reality of the Cuban political system.2 The “people’s power” 
structure and the hegemonic position of the PCC prevent further exploration of 
such unknown paths. Time will reveal the extent to which this until-recently re-
viled clause is developed. 
1  During the debate on the draft constitution in the ANPP, Homero Acosta, secretary of the Council 
of State, highlighted the inclusion of the term “Estado Socialista de Derecho” (socialist rule of 
law) as a transcendent and innovative concept taken from the bourgeois liberal thought of the 
19th century. Capitalism wants exclusive use of the term, he said, but we have re-evaluated it 
in order to incorporate it. In the European socialist experience, this concept was never defined, 
which was a failure with consequences – it was one of the factors that undermined those states 
at the time, he said (Radio Miami, 2018).
2  The meaning of the “rule of law” has developed over centuries. It relates to setting limits on 
power, separating powers, the supremacy of the law, and the declaration of rights and freedoms 
and their jurisdictional guarantees. 
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Interpreting Article 1 of the constitution while ignoring the meaning “rule 
of law” has held since the Enlightenment and the requirements deriving from 
it is no easy task. An enormous intellectual and creative effort is needed to give 
a different dimension to this historical category, coined so many years ago, and 
frame it within socialist constitutionalism. Difficult, if not impossible, unless we 
conclude along with Kelsen that every state by virtue of being so embodies the 
rule of law.
The category “law” in the 2019 constitution
Several years of excessive improvisation and spontaneity have left the Cuban leg-
islative process lacking systematisation and coherence (Guntin, 1988: 145–150). 
The problem has been compounded by the pace of change since 1989. The need 
to maintain stability in the midst of ongoing urgent reforms complicates the 
chance of achieving an adequate, balanced framework in accordance with social-
ist objectives (Evenson, 1994: 17–18).
The underlying issue in Cuba is the interaction and confusion of the state 
with the PCC. The “law” does not yet represent a precise limitation for the par-
ty-state. The “law” is a mere instrument for upholding the current political and 
economic order. Since 1959, the category “law” has been used synonymously 
with “general provisions”. The law is not yet a constitutional legal category.
The 2019 constitution does not seem to have changed that approach or what 
the “rule of law” requires. The glossary of the 2018 draft constitution clarifies 
what we should understand as “law”: 
Although the term literally refers to the normative provisions approved by 
the National Assembly of People’s Power, in the text it is also conceived as 
referring to any type of norm regardless of the body that issues it.3
The vagueness of this categorisation of constitutional law, which is so solidly es-
tablished in the configuration of the “rule of law”, has significant negative con-
sequences for two of its fundamental principles. First, it impacts legal certainty, 
begging, for example, the questions: Will a fundamental right, for example, be 
implemented through a “regulatory provision” that is not a law? Which body oth-
er than the ANPP can pass it? The second principle that is affected (and which 
is connected to the first) is normative hierarchy. Can a “regulatory provision” 
repeal a prior law? In the case of a conflict between a “regulatory provision” and 
a “law”, which takes precedence? Then, of course, there is the principle of pub-
3 The italics are mine. 
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lishing the norms in the Boletín Oficial, which allows advance notice to be given 
of their formal existence and their consequences before they enter into force. 
Not doing this generates distrust in the legal system, which in turn causes a lack 
of certainty in the law that makes it impossible for Cuban jurists to confidently 
advise Cuban citizens and foreign clients, for example.
The principle of hierarchy is fundamental to the structuring of the legal sys-
tem. The relationship of the constitution to the rest of the legal order is based 
on this criterion, although it might better be conceptualised as a relationship of 
supremacy, since the principle of hierarchy provides a narrower field of action 
than that of supremacy. In any case, the principle of hierarchy is an essential 
technique for redirecting the order towards unity and achieving the coherence 
needed to properly speak of a legal order. The absence of this principle from 
the constitution itself makes it difficult to coordinate a coherent unit that could 
qualify as a legal order, if we understand that an order is not merely a juxtaposi-
tion of norms, but a prius in relation to the elements that make it up. The order’s 
validity mirrors its effectiveness: a legal order is valid if it exists, that is to say, if 
it is genuinely effective. The order’s validity – its existence – can only be deter-
mined in relation to the society it is intended to regulate. An order is valid when 
it is effective: when most of its rules are observed by most of those subject to it 
(Balaguer, 2012: 85).
As well as those mentioned above, certain other situations show the difficul-
ty of evaluating the existence of a true legal order. For example, even after cer-
tain policies are given legislative expression and become law, in practice the PCC 
Guidelines and even its leaders’ speeches may modify or repeal prior laws and 
any other type of “regulatory provision”, directly breaking the structures meant 
to support the concept of the rule of law and particularly the principle of legal 
certainty.
This confusion in the operation of certain fundamental principles of the “rule 
of law” is due to the status of the revolutionary institutions and their particular 
conception of the law, which has not historically promoted particular adherence 
to or respect for the law, leading to outcomes that call into question the existence 
of a true and genuine legal system.
If introducing the categorisation of the “rule of law” (Const. 2019, art. 1) 
is intended to initiate a shift towards greater consideration and respect for the 
law, so that the “supremacy of the law” can develop to its full potential by re-
ducing discretion and in some cases arbitrariness in the exercise of power, its 
incorporation into the constitutional text will be very welcome and will mark an 
extremely important step forward. But governing by the law and respecting the 
values, principles and procedures set forth in the constitution itself as a way to 
reduce subjectivity in the exercise of power do not seem an easy fit with the “peo-
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ple’s power” form of government and the PCC’s hegemonic position in the state. 
Cuba’s transformation into a state that is governed by laws, let alone one under 
the rule of law, is no easy task.
4  The PCC and the restructuring of the central organs of the 
state
Of the reforms introduced by the 2019 constitution, those affecting two particu-
lar areas of the organisation of the state stand out: the restructuring of the state’s 
apparatus – the state as the central power; and the restructuring of the state 
community – the state as a local power. The analysis in this chapter will focus on 
the state apparatus, or state as central power, leaving the other for later study.
The institutionalisation of revolutionary power in Cuba, starting with the 
1976 constitution, took the organisational and operating principles of the Soviet 
system as a political model for consecrating the revolutionary process, guaran-
teeing the total centrality of the state in all economic, social and legal spheres.
The principle of unity of power (not identified with unity of functions) is the 
essential core of the Cuban revolutionary constitutional tradition and is mani-
fested in “people’s power”, which is the way power is organised in Cuba. The new 
2019 constitution leaves this untouched, and defines its two immovable and ir-
revocable pillars: the socialist system adopted since the revolution, and the PCC’s 
predominant role as the guiding force in society and the state. Hence, a socialist 
bureaucracy is established that is subject to the dictates of the PCC but not to any 
oversight.
The PCC’s leadership in this type of model means it participates decisively 
in the selection and distribution of the governing cadres. Democratic centralism 
permits close hierarchical dependence within the party. And not only within the 
party. In fact, a dense network of dependency relationships built on solid bonds 
is observed that is often extremely closed and centralised. Democratic centralism 
has progressively limited the parameters of public debate and the channels for 
public influence on national policies. The PCC monopolises the formulation of 
policies and uses the grassroots organisations to implement its decisions. 
The principle of socialist democracy began to lose its profoundly democratic 
freshness from the moment the limited channels of public influence began to 
reflect the political elite’s permanent lack of trust in the people to lead the social-
ist state and the simple refusal of those in power to cede control. Over time, the 
bureaucracy’s firm control tightened (Evenson, 1994: 26).
Socialist democracy informs the 2019 constitution when it comes to the rev-
ocation of elected officials’ mandates, which is linked to their accountability to 
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the voters (Const. 2019, arts 80 f. and 101), and the recognition of citizens’ right 
to participate in the formation, exercise and monitoring of the state’s power. 
It is within this political and ideological conceptual framework that the 
changes the constitution introduces to the structure of the state organs must be 
analysed. 
At the apex of “people’s power” – formally, although not materially – is the 
ANPP, which is configured as the supreme organ of state power by virtue of rep-
resenting the people in their entirety and expressing their sovereign will (Const. 
2019, art. 102). The absolute concentration of power around the ANPP is un-
questionable, which gives it the legitimacy to define the guidelines for the state’s 
operation. This pre-eminent position makes it the source of the legitimacy of the 
other constitutional bodies that emanate from it, with these bodies considered 
mere executors of its decisions, whose ultimate purpose is to promote the ad-
vance towards communist society (Const. 2019, art. 5); while, at the same time, 
that concentration of power is further reinforced by the attribution to the ANPP 
of exclusive constituent and legislative authority (Const. 2019, art. 103). 
This absolute centrality of the ANPP in the structure of the organs of the 
state is not reflected in the country’s political, social and economic reality. The 
ANPP lacks visibility and direct connection with citizens. This estrangement is 
partly explained by the fact that its parliamentary activity is limited to two peri-
ods of ordinary session each year (Const. 2019, art. 110 b.), when it sits for two or 
three days each time (notwithstanding the activity of the parliamentary commit-
tees). We therefore observe a certain lack of correspondence between its formal 
hegemony and the limited material development of its functions.
This glaring disparity is further visible in the fact that the vast majority of 
members of the assembly – the citizens’ legitimate representatives – do not at-
tend parliament outside the annual sessions. For the rest of the year they continue 
at their workplaces, which provide their pay, as their status as parliamentarians 
does not bring economic benefits (Const. 2019, art. 115). As Guanche (2018) 
points out, the limited permanent professional activity of its members leaves the 
ANPP with little choice but to compensate for its lack of control, information and 
powers by more often than not unanimously ratifying the government’s general 
provisions, which are passed via the Council of State.
This paradoxical situation clearly shows that it is the Council of State (an 
ANPP organ that represents it between sessions) and not the ANPP itself that is 
materially established as the supreme body and that adopts fundamental politi-
cal decisions on day-to-day business. 
The latest constitutional regulation on the Council of State reduces it to 
18 members, in addition to the president, vice president and secretary, who will 
hold the same roles in the ANPP (Const. 2019, art. 121). The previous Council of 
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State had 31 members, including a president, a first vice president, five vice pres-
idents and a secretary (Const. 2019, art. 75). The body’s current configuration 
is more dynamic and functional after a major generational change took place, 
as those who fought for the revolution from its very beginnings were removed, 
which reduced the average age (51) of its members significantly.
The members of the Council of Ministers and the highest authorities of the 
judicial, electoral and state control bodies are ineligible for the Council of State 
(Const. 2019, art. 121, para. 2).
That the same people lead the Council of State and the PCC’s Central Com-
mittee is the real embodiment of the principle of democratic centralism and the 
source of the confusion between party and state. In practice, this means that as 
the “leading political force of society and the State” (Const. 2019, art. 5), the 
guidelines defined by the PCC will define the direction of the state, even, if nec-
essary, above the constitution, as confirmed by José Luis Toledo, president of the 
Constitutional and Legal Affairs Commission of the ANPP.
While the Council of State materially plays the key role, the ANPP remains 
the formal centre of gravity of the entire Cuban political system, and as such 
elects the president and vice president of the republic; its own president, vice 
president and secretary; the rest of the members of the Council of State; it ap-
points the prime minister, the deputy prime ministers and other members of the 
Council of Ministers upon the recommendation of the president of the republic; 
elects the president of the People’s Supreme Court, the attorney general of the 
republic and the comptroller general of the republic; the president and the other 
members of the National Electoral Council; the vice presidents and magistrates 
of the People’s Supreme Court, as well as the lay judges of that body; and the dep-
uty prosecutors and deputy comptrollers general of the republic. All of the posi-
tions the ANPP appoints may be revoked or replaced by the ANPP itself (Const. 
2019, art. 109).
With the ANPP defined as both centre and backbone of Cuba’s power struc-
ture, the new constitution introduces some changes with respect to the 1976 
constitution that affect the principle of unity of power as the basis for the organ-
isation and operation of the state organs. Nevertheless, the essence remains un-
altered, as this principle is the fundamental support upholding “people’s power”.
A novelty of the 2019 constitution is the incorporation of the president of the 
republic as head of state, independently of the Council of State. In the 1976 con-
stitution, amended in 2002, power was concentrated in a single person, in that 
case, Fidel Castro, who assumed the position of president of the Council of State, 
head of state and head of government (Const. 1976, amended in 2002, art. 74). 
This break with the concentration of power in a single individual is enacted 
via the establishment of a president of the republic as head of state independent-
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ly of the Council of State, and the creation of the figure of the prime minister. 
As head of government of the republic (Const. 2019, art. 140 et seq.), the prime 
minister leads the highest executive and administrative body, and is appointed 
by the National Assembly upon the recommendation of the president of the re-
public for a five-year term. 
The principle of unity of power – the expression of the state’s unity of po-
litical action  –is not affected by the new institutions of the president of the re-
public and the prime minister, despite their different structures and functions. 
The ANPP, which is the guarantor of the unity of power, as we have seen, has the 
power to elect and revoke both positions. The PCC, meanwhile, retains its always 
superior position, materially defining the state’s fundamental policy lines. His-
torically, the head of state combined that position with that of first secretary of 
the PCC (as well as other posts) and thereby held the totality of power. However, 
this is not presently the case, as the president of the republic is not the first sec-
retary of the PCC. But this deconcentration of power, of separation between the 
two positions, is entirely temporary.
As Raúl Castro stated at the act of inauguration of the current head of state, 
the moment the president again simultaneously holds the position of PCC first 
secretary the position of the president of the republic will be strengthened and 
the PCC’s position as the state’s guiding force and fundamental pillar will be re-
affirmed (Castro, 2018).
Setting to one side the fact that the president of the republic is able to con-
solidate their political power by assuming the leadership of the PCC, the 2019 
constitution lays the foundations for a deconcentration of power between dif-
ferent authorities: the president of the republic, the head of government and the 
president of the Council of State, who will also be president of the ANPP. 
This deconcentration of power into three institutions is a significant change 
introduced by the 2019 constitution. The harmony and fluidity of relations be-
tween them is the result of the institutional and political structure that sustains 
them and gives them a foundation and meaning, specifically, “people’s power” 
and the PCC. This monolithic, closed structure, which provides it with support, 
may at some point break down due to a range of circumstances that cause disso-
nance in the exercise of power and translate into self-interested interpretations 
of the constitution by any of the three fundamental institutions of the state, giv-
ing rise to a constitutional conflict of competences, in addition to the underlying 
political conflict between institutions.
Despite the dominant positions of the president and PCC first secretary, for-
mally, the ANPP as the supreme body of the state can fully or partially revoke all 
general provisions, including presidential decrees (Const. 2019, art. 108 h.). The 
president of the republic does not have the right of veto over provisions approved 
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by the ANPP, which for Bertot Triana would have meant breaking with the princi-
ple of unity of power and moving closer to a presidential model with political and 
structural differentiation (Bertot, 2019: 31).
These circumstances are of particular sensitivity when considering the real 
dimensions of the new constitution: any analysis should be guided by the dialec-
tic between the formal and material constitutions.
The division of the concentrated power held by the figure of Fidel Castro, 
the separation of the positions of president of the republic and president of the 
Council of State, which is a permanent organ of the ANPP, and the establishment 
of the president of the assembly as the head of that council (Const. 2019, art. 
121) seem to lead us to two conclusions: on the one hand, that the Council of 
State could develop a more active role in the ANPP’s functioning; and, on the oth-
er – and deriving from that – that it may enjoy progressively greater “autonomy” 
and, therefore, growing institutional projection in accordance with the central 
position of the ANPP in the Cuban political system.
In any case, the ultimate driver of the decision-making process is not the unit 
comprised of the central organs of state power, but essentially the PCC’s lead-
ership. The most important decisions are made by the PCC’s Central Commit-
tee and only then are they adopted and executed by the competent state bodies. 
These are some of the structural elements that define the material constitution 
and interact dialectically with the formal constitution.
5 “Human rights” and socialist constitutionalism
None of Cuba’s revolutionary constitutions consider rights to be expressions of 
natural and inalienable requirements. Rather, they are seen as contingent prod-
ucts of specific historical moments, and acquire particular and precise efficacy 
only in socialist society, which concerns itself with providing citizens with the 
material means needed for their realisation. 
Socialist law strives above all to guarantee collective welfare on the basis 
of equality. It enshrines the material guarantee that the state makes with its re-
sources and makes very limited reference to legal guarantees; it even applies 
rights via material guarantees rather than with laws. The lack of an education 
law, for example, has not prevented the state from setting up free education at all 
levels (Prieto, 2019: 58).
But in a context of economic crisis, the insufficiencies of the material guar-
antees that have been and remain the main factor of legitimation of the socialist 
system at the national and international level are revealed. As the economic crisis 
deepens, it becomes increasingly difficult to preserve its socialist principles. The 
2019 constitution is a sign of this difficulty.
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Until the late 1980s and early 1990s the concept of “human rights” was con-
sidered alien to socialist constitutionalism. But from the 1990s onwards, the 
category of “human rights” began to be used, except interpreted in a way that 
aligned with the principles of socialist constitutionalism. As such, no distinction 
was made in the Cuban constitution between civil and political rights and eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights. Of course, this lack of distinctive criteria led to 
a lack of definition about whether a hierarchy existed between them. The latest 
constitution has not changed this, and the different types of rights are not distin-
guished from each other. Chapter II of Title V is generically called “Rights”, and 
contains civil rights such as “[the] home is an inviolable space” (Const. 2019, art. 
49), the right to privacy (Const. 2019, art. 48); political rights, such as political 
participation (Const. 2019, art. 80); and social and economic rights, such as the 
right to “adequate housing” (Const. 2019, art. 71), and the right to education 
(Const. 2019, art. 73).
Two important aspects of the configuration of rights in the 2019 constitution 
require our attention
On the one hand, as we have already pointed out, all rights have the same 
rank and consideration. However, Article 99, which establishes a “preferential, 
expedited, and reduced” means of protecting rights, determines that the law will 
establish which rights are protected by this guarantee. A simple reading of the 
constitutional text will not tell us what those rights are. As well as its essential 
content – what the right is – a fundamental issue with any right is what its pro-
cedural content is, in other words, which processes are envisaged for making the 
material content of the right effective. To guarantee legal certainty, the rights that 
are protected by this preferential resource should be expressly determined by the 
constitution, rather than leaving the final decision to the ANPP, the Council of 
State or any other body – if it ultimately decides to define them. 
What is more, when the rights included in the constitution require imple-
mentation or regulation via a subsequent law, this is not done in an imperative 
manner (the law “will regulate”, the law “will implement”), as a mandate to the 
legislator, but in a neutral way (the law “establishes”, “according to the law”, the 
law “defines”). This apparently banal difference in the use of a different verbs and 
tenses, is revealing because behind it lies the implicit recognition that the con-
stitution cannot impose its legal mandates on the ANPP due to the configuration 
of “people’s power”. The constitution does not appear to be above either power 
or the party.
All of this translates into a lack of commitment to addressing the imple-
mentation of rights in order to make them effective. Of course, the law that im-
plements or regulates a right should not establish its essential content – that is 
found in the constitution itself; what corresponds to the implementing legislation 
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is to respect that essential content in all cases. That is one of the basic guarantees 
of fundamental rights: the essential content of the constitution is “unavailable” 
to the legislator.
It is especially significant to note that the advance of the recognition and 
protection of human rights in Latin American constitutionalism has not been 
reflected in the Cuban constitution. Cuba’s constitutions – that of 1976 (partial-
ly reformed in 1978, 1992 and 2002) and the current one of 2019 – are in no 
way influenced by those of neighbouring countries like Venezuela, Ecuador and 
Bolivia. Curiously, Cuba has not managed to spread its constitutional model to 
any other country in America, and the models of its ideological peers have not 
influenced Cuba’s new constitution. Cuba retains its own unique character. Cuba 
remains an exception, in spite of the approval of the current constitution.
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The Reception of International Treaties in Cuba 
in the Light of the 2019 Constitution
1 Introduction
The international arena is increasingly shaped by states’ growing desires for 
greater integration, and Cuba is no exception. Bilateral and multilateral treaties 
– many of which address matters of pressing concern to citizens – have prolif-
erated. Hence, the interest of this research in the appropriate mechanisms for 
ensuring these international conventions are effective at domestic level.
States’ law-making activity takes place both at domestic and international 
levels. At the domestic level, the competent state bodies develop the country’s 
specific system of sources or national law and, at the international level, the state 
collaborates with other states in the formation of public international law. 
At any moment in time, any act, situation or conduct may, at the urging of 
states, become a subject that is governed by international law.1 At such a time, 
the two systems – state and international law – may converge or even coincide on 
these matters, making it necessary to consider what relationship exists between 
them in order to achieve the necessary inter-system coherence.
A brief review sketches the theoretical and doctrinal dimensions of the sub-
ject, which then it will be addressed from a legal-positivist point of view. In other 
words, we analyse how the Cuban system has responded to the relations between 
international law and national law.
Whichever theoretical underpinning is accepted (monist or dualist), today 
the doctrine is shifting towards a greater emphasis on data from the international 
context, and places the centre of gravity in the different national systems and the 
concrete solutions they offer. In short, this is because each state’s constitutional 
norms determine the use of international law in national law, as well as its scope 
at national level, regardless of its effects at international level. Hence, our work 
centres on analysing the provisions in the new Cuban constitution promulgated 
1  For example, the fundamental rights and freedoms of the human person were for a long time 
regulated only by states’ national law, but with the Charter of the United Nations of 1945, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and other international treaties they became a 
matter that also falls within the material scope of international law.
https://doi.org/10.3224/84742546.13
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in 2019 that refer to the reception of international treaties in order to seek to 
identify which procedures incorporate these norms into Cuban law and thereby 
identify their dualist or monist roots. 
International law takes no position on dualism or monism: it does not affirm 
the unity or separation of international and domestic law, nor does it refer to the 
validity of domestic norms when they conflict with their international counter-
parts. The only thing it clearly establishes is that in the international arena inter-
national norms prevail over national ones. Hence, the 1969 Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) describes a model in which, under the general 
rules and principles of international law, such as that of good faith or pacta sunt 
servanda, domestic law does not serve as an excuse for non-compliance with 
international obligations without incurring international responsibility, and it 
is therefore for states to ensure that their internal systems are compatible with 
those commitments.2
2  The relationship between the international and domestic 
systems
States use different techniques to establish the relationship between the inter-
national and state legal systems and achieve the necessary inter-systemic coher-
ence: reference, complement or dependence. In this sense Cuba is no exception.
Reference is a commonly used technique whereby one of the orders refers 
to concepts or categories from the other. Thus, the domestic may refer to the in-
ternational order or the international the domestic. This is the case, for example, 
with international norms that refer to “the competent authorities of the state”, as 
such authorities must be determined in accordance with the national law of that 
state. Or, by contrast, a national law may refer to “diplomatic representatives of 
foreign states”, as the Cuban Penal Code does in article 113. In order to deter-
mine who such representatives are, reference will need to be made to the rules 
of international law on the status and functions of diplomatic missions and their 
staff.
Relations where one system complements the other are also common. Es-
sentially, this is when international treaties demand domestic implementation 
measures, and merely establish the obligation on states parties to adopt the do-
mestic legislation needed for their implementation. 
2  Article 26 of the VCLT connects the two principles, when it says “Every treaty in force is binding 
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith”. Article 27 establishes that 
“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform 
a treaty”. 
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Such relationships are found in international treaties on criminal matters, 
such as the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, which only establishes the type of crime, and leaves states parties to 
criminalise and sanction such conduct in their domestic law. In Cuba, for exam-
ple, this crime is set out in article 116 of Law No. 62 of the Cuban Penal Code,3 
with no mention of the international norm of origin. 
Resolution 206/2015, the Procedure for Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties, 
provides for such relations when it requires authorities interested in concluding 
an international treaty to submit an opinion detailing, among other things, the 
implications for Cuban domestic law and any consequent need to amend, repeal 
or enact new laws.4
In such cases, the national legislation adopted to execute the international 
law is complementary to the international treaty in question. Reciprocally, each 
set of norms complements and explains the another.
Finally, the relationships between the two systems can also be addressed 
from the point of view of dependence. In this case, a domestic norm depends on 
an international one. This relationship of dependency occurs when an interna-
3  Article V of the Genocide Convention contains an obligation on states parties to criminalise and 
punish the crime of genocide: “The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with 
their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the 
present Convention, and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of geno-
cide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III...”; the act is defined thus in article II: “... 
genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing 
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Impos-
ing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the 
group to another group.”
In line with this, the Cuban Penal Code criminalises and establishes the crime by taking up the 
definition of genocide from the convention in article 116, as follows: a custodial sentence of ten 
to twenty years or death shall be the punishment for those acting with the intention of destroying 
all or part of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such: (a) subjecting this group to con-
ditions of existence that constitute a threat of extermination to the group or any of its members; 
(b) taking measures to prevent or impede births within that group; (c) carrying out the forced 
transfer of children from that group to another; (ch) seriously killing or harming the physical or 
mental integrity of the members of the group (Gaceta Oficial de la República de Cuba, Extraordi-
nary Edition, No. 9, December 29th 1987).
4  See: Articles 20.2. (e) and 26.2 (g) of Resolution No. 206/2015, „Procedimiento para los Tratados 
bilaterales y multilaterales“ (Gaceta Oficial de la República de Cuba, No. 40, Ordinary Edition, 29 
September 2015).
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tional norm allows states to regulate a particular situation, meaning that state 
legislation is justified by the existence of the international norm. 
This is the case with international rules such as the Law of the Sea, 
in particular the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), which allows states to establish a 12-nautical-mile “territorial sea” 
or a 200-nautical-mile “exclusive economic zone” through their domestic leg-
islation. Both the delimitation of these marine spaces and the rights enjoyed by 
states in them are determined by international law. If this were not the case, 
in other words, if the domestic norm did not comply with the international re-
quirements, that domestic norm, while valid in the domestic legal system would 
not be effective against other states at the international level. What is more, its 
application would constitute an internationally unlawful act that would generate 
international responsibility. 
In the Cuban legal system we find this kind of relationship, for example, in 
article 11 of the Constitution of the Republic of 2019, which defines that the na-
tional territory extends to the outer boundary of the territorial sea, and declares 
its powers both in the national territory and in relation to the natural resources 
in the waters, bed and subsoil of the exclusive economic zone, in accordance with 
international law. As a state party to UNCLOS, Cuba has also established the 
geographical boundaries and powers exercised in its maritime areas by means of 
several decree-laws.5
But, beyond this, from a structural perspective that contemplates the totality 
of the legal order, the relations between the two systems – international and do-
mestic – materialise in the attitude national law takes towards international law. 
In this regard, it should be recalled that the international community is a rad-
ically decentralised social group composed of sovereign, independent and equal 
states that coexist within a horizontal structure. No political power is superior to 
that of the states themselves and no international body exists with the power to 
create law. The states themselves are the creators of international norms, as well 
as their subjects. The logical corollary of a system structured on the basis of state 
5  Some of these norms were incorporated into Cuban law when they were customary in nature, 
that is, before they were codified by the Convention on the Law of the Sea. Decree-Law No. 1 
„Del Mar Territorial“, Gaceta Oficial de la República de Cuba, No. 6, Ordinary Edition, February 
26th 1977; Decree-Law No. 2 „De la Zona Económica Exclusiva“, Gaceta Oficial de la República de 
Cuba, No. 6, Ordinary Edition, February 26th 1977; Decree-Law No. 158 „De la Zona Contigua”, 
Gaceta Oficial de la República de Cuba, No. 14, Ordinary Edition, May 11th 1995; Decree-Law No. 
212 „Gestión de la Zona Costera“, Gaceta Oficial de la República de Cuba, No. 68, Ordinary Edi-
tion, August 14th 2000; Decree-Law No. 266 „Del Límite Exterior de la Zona Económica Exclusiva 
de la República de Cuba en el Golfo de México“, Gaceta Oficial de la República de Cuba, No. 17, 
Extraordinary Edition, of May 18th 2009. 
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sovereignty is that any binding quality of international law depends on states’ 
consent. Hence, for an international norm to emerge – whether conventional, 
customary or the binding act of an international organization – and for interna-
tional rights and obligations upon states to be established, the initial consent of 
each state and common consensus with other states is necessary.
For reasons of legal coherence, if the state projects its will in the interna-
tional sphere in order to formulate international norms, it should facilitate the 
technical mechanisms needed to integrate those norms into its domestic legal 
system. 
At this point, two different legal questions present themselves: on the one 
hand, it is necessary to identify the procedures by which international norms are 
incorporated into domestic legal systems; and, on the other, what position the 
norms, once incorporated, occupy in the state system’s structure of sources or, 
in other words, what strength the international norm has is in the domestic legal 
system in the event of a regulatory conflict. In what follows we will address the 
first of these questions.
3 The theoretical dimension of the problem
Studies of the relations between international and national law have traditionally 
revolved around two opposing concepts: dualism and monism.
The dualist conception emerged from the theoretical premises of late 19th 
and early 20th century legal positivism, specifically the works of Trieppel (1899 & 
1931) and Anzilotti (1956: 281). The conception is based on the presumption 
that a stark separation exists between international law and national law – that 
they are distinct, separate and autonomous legal orders. According to this school 
of thought, the two orders are distinguishable from each other by the subjects 
they address, the processes by which they formulate their norms and the bases 
on which they create them.6 
Based on these assumptions, and as a result of them, in order for an interna-
tional norm to be applied domestically it needs to be transposed into a domestic 
norm, and from that moment acquires the status of the national norm that trans-
poses it. It follows that the treaty’s binding force does not lie in the international 
norm, but in the law incorporating or transposing it. Hence, any clash between 
an international norm already transposed into domestic law and domestic law 
6  International law aims to regulate relations between sovereign states through rules created by 
them, of which they are the subjects, and the basis for which is their intention. National law reg-
ulates domestic relations, its subjects are individuals, it arises from the intention of a single state 
and its norms emerge from an “authoritarian” source, in so far as they are imposed norms.
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itself must be resolved by applying the traditional rules of law, namely, that a 
subsequent contrary norm repeals the previous one.
The monist conception is based on the opposite presupposition. Both Kelsen 
(1926: 227) – from a normative position based on his “pure” theory of law – 
and Scelle (1932) from a sociological perspective, deny that any difference exists 
between international and national law. In this school of thought, the domestic 
and the international are merely two different manifestations of the law; and al-
though one legal order is placed above the other, that is because the link between 
the two is largely the product of the relations of subordination between them. In 
terms of legal logic, equally admissible hypotheses can be made for the superior-
ity of national law and the superiority of international law.
For Kelsen, the unity of the law could be attributed to the concept of the 
“basic norm” of the system, from which the validity of all the rules within it de-
rive, with international law at the apex of the pyramid. Thus, in the event of any 
conflict arising, the domestic norm that clashes with an international norm must 
be regarded as null and void ab initio, since its validity is conditional upon the 
higher norm. Scelle reached the same conclusion through the idea of “delega-
tion” from international law to national law.
Since these initial formulations, a doctrinal evolution has shifted the issue 
towards more moderate positions that advocate for the coordination of systems 
and not their strict separation. It should be noted that these theories emerged 
in the early twentieth century in a highly specific, markedly statist context in 
which there was also a struggle between those advocating for state sovereignty 
and those who gave a privileged place to individuals and, in turn, to international 
law. Today, states are not the only actors involved in creating and implementing 
international law. This has led normative sources to multiply, along with their 
aims and the tools and means for achieving them. In this context, efforts have 
been made to adapt old doctrines to new challenges; some are even committed to 
a more radical renewal (Nijman & Nollkaemper, 2007; Novakovic, 2013; Acosta 
Alvarado, 2016; Acosta López, 2017; Rivas Ramirez, 2019).
One of the leading exponents of moderate dualism, Arangio Ruíz, insists 
that dualism is useful (despite its flaws, which he considers can be overcome) 
for explaining the relationship between international law and domestic law and 
for accommodating several of the recent mutations on the international scene 
into the domestic. In this regard, he suggests that the need to focus on national 
norms in order to decipher relations between the two systems is the result of a 
dualistic premise and that, despite what is often claimed, dualism never denied 
the interaction between the two systems; what it denies is the possibility that 
international law could diminish the validity of national norms. According to 
Arangio Ruíz, dualism is useful for understanding both the current scenario of 
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interdependence and why we continue to refer to national norms when seeking 
to determine the scope of the relationship (Arangio Ruíz, 2007: 15).
Moderate monism or neo-monism recognises that while international law 
has its own structures and tools, in order to be implemented in the state system 
it needs the national order and its mechanisms. These, in turn, must respect the 
particular characteristics of the system and, therefore, the international nature 
of the norms and ensure their coherence (Cannizzaro, 2011: 35; Somek, 2010).
In reality, both approaches are very similar and, at any rate, both agree on 
the importance of national law in ensuring the effectiveness of international 
norms in domestic systems. That is why, from a legal-positive perspective, we 
will focus on the response of the Cuban legal system to the issue of the reception 
of international treaties.
4  The reception of international treaties in the Cuban constitution 
of 2019
If the constitution is the basic norm upon which the state’s internal legal order 
is built, logically the same must be true of its international activity. We must 
therefore look at the constitutional mandates in order to understand how state 
bodies are able to act at the international level, as well as the recognition of the 
commitments in national law. 
Before addressing the reception of international treaties in the Cuban legal 
system, it is therefore worth mentioning the means by which the Cuban state’s 
foreign intentions are formed.
A) The formation of the Cuban state’s foreign intentions
In keeping with Cuban constitutional history article 108 (n) and (ñ) of the 2019 
constitution establishes that the National Assembly of People’s Power is the sup-
reme body of state power, which represents all the people, expresses their sove-
reign will and has the authority to approve the general guidelines on foreign and 
domestic policy, as well as to approve peace treaties.
According to article 137 (d) it is for the Council of Ministers, the highest 
executive and administrative body, which constitutes the government of the re-
public (see article 133 of the 2019 constitution), to approve international treaties 
and submit them for ratification by the Council of State. In line with this, article 
122 (ñ) establishes that it is for the Council of State, as a permanent body of the 
National Assembly, to ratify and denounce international treaties.
According to article 137 (d) of the mentioned constitution, “ratification” of 
a treaty by the Cuban Council of State is an act of national law that precedes the 
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international “ratification” of the agreement, the purpose of which is to authorise 
the executive to declare at international level that the state consents to be bound 
by the agreement.
As D’Estefano Pisani points out, ratification is a solemn, written act that 
must be distinguished as a domestic procedure (national ratification as approval 
of a treaty under the national law of the state concerned) or as an act of interna-
tional relations (formal act by which a state confirms such a decision) (D’Este-
fano Pisani, 1977: 27).
Internal ratification of the treaty is the means by which the willingness of the 
state to be compelled by international provisions is established in national law. 
The interconnection between the two acts – internal ratification and internation-
al ratification – is therefore necessary for the validity and consequent enforcea-
bility of international agreements in Cuban national law.
However, the precepts of the constitution itself, specifically articles 12 and 
16, present an initial obstacle to the Council of State’s authorisation for the Cu-
ban state to be bound by a treaty.
Under article 12, treaties, concessions and pacts agreed under conditions of 
inequality or which disregard or diminish the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of the Republic of Cuba are considered illegal and void. According to Richards 
Martínez, the constitutional text insists that international agreements must meet 
the demands of national sovereignty and, consequently, the political, economic 
and social foundations of the Cuban state, as a prerequisite for being incorporat-
ed into the domestic system (Richards Martínez, 2012: 141).
Article 16 (a), meanwhile, stipulates that “economic, diplomatic and polit-
ical relations with any other State may never be negotiated under the force of 
aggression, threat, or coercion” (Constitución de la República de Cuba, 2019: 8). 
In our view this provision is superfluous, because the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties of 1969 itself includes such circumstances among the grounds 
for invalidating an international treaty. Specifically, article 52 declares a treaty 
null and void “if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force 
in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the 
United Nations”. This constitutional formula makes no sense “per se” except, as 
Azcuy points out, on historical grounds – as an expression of the Cuban people’s 
rejection of the consequences of restrictions on their sovereignty and the imposi-
tion of arbitrary pacts by American imperialism (Azcuy, 2000: 67). 
Once these barriers are overcome, it is clear from the above-mentioned 
constitutional provision that all treaties the Cuban state intends to sign must 
go through the pre-procedure of national ratification by the Council of State. 
However, Decree-Law No. 191/1999 on International Treaties contradicts that 
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mandate,7 as it requires the intervention of the Council of State only for certain 
groups of treaties:
Article 14.- The following international treaties are subject to the constitu-
tional procedure for approval by the Council of Ministers and ratification by the 
Council of State: 
1. BILATERAL TREATIES: 
a)  on mutual friendship, investment, cooperation or collaboration and 
support between states, 
b)  on the delimitation and demarcation of the maritime borders of the Re-
public of Cuba with other states and those of air navigation rights, 
c)  on geological prospecting and drilling, 
d) on visa waivers, 
e) any other signed on behalf of the Republic of Cuba or its government. 
Excluded from the previously stipulated are external debt renegotiation 
agreements signed on behalf of the Republic of Cuba, which shall only re-
quire compliance with the administrative approval process regulated in 
article 22. 
2. MULTILATERAL TREATIES: 
(a) treaties signed on behalf of the Republic of Cuba or its government, 
(b)  treaties that have not been signed, but in which the Republic of Cuba or 
its government will participate, 
(c) the annexes and amendments to the above-mentioned treaties, 
Article 15.- The Council of Ministers shall approve and shall not subject to 
ratification by the Council of State: 
1. BILATERAL TREATIES 
(a)  treaties with potential financial implications not contemplated in the 
state budget, namely: 
–  treaties negotiated and signed by the state’s central administrative 
agencies in the fields of their competence, 
–  treaties negotiated and signed by the Central Bank of Cuba, within its 
area of competence. 
–  Protocols that execute, complement or derive from treaties already 
in force. 
2. MULTILATERAL TREATIES 
(a)  Recommendations by international bodies that require government 
approval, 
7 Gaceta Oficial de la República de Cuba, No. 12, Ordinary Edition, March 12th 1999.
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(b)  Annexes and amendments to international treaties not covered by ar-
ticle 14 (2) 
(c),  that contain financial implications that have not been contemplated in 
the state budget. 
Richards Martínez considers that as the wording of the constitution does not 
distinguish between agreements that merit approval or ratification and those 
that do not, all treaties approved by the Council of Ministers should be approved 
by the Council of State, granting the permanent representative body a degree of 
oversight over the executive (Richards Martínez , 2012: 141).
In our view, this is close to a maximalist position. In practice, given the enor-
mous development of conventional international law, most constitutions employ 
a material criterion, according to which only certain treaties require prior par-
liamentary ratification. That no requirement exists for the Council of State as a 
permanent body of the National Assembly of People’s Power to intervene in all 
treaties approved by the Council of Ministers is therefore not unusual. However, 
we consider it desirable that the distinction between treaties should be made 
clear in the text of the constitution itself, since this divergence adversely affects 
the internal coherence of Cuban law. In this sense, we believe that the constitu-
tional reform that culminated in the 2019 constitution was a wasted opportunity 
to align constitutional provisions with implementing regulations.
 Once the procedures established by Cuban domestic law have been 
complied with, Cuba can register its consent to be bound by the treaty at interna-
tional level. And from that moment on, as the 1969 Vienna Convention sets out, 
the treaty will enter into force “in such manner and upon such date as it may pro-
vide or as the negotiating States may agree” (see VCLT: Art. 24). From that point 
on, the treaty becomes binding upon the parties and has legal effect on them, and 
must be fulfilled in good faith in accordance with the expressed intention.
 Hence the importance of the mechanisms for the reception of treaties. 
In order to integrate international legislation into national law and ensure coher-
ence between the state’s external and internal action, domestic law should pro-
vide for such mechanisms. A constitutional mandate is required that establishes 
the procedure to be followed for their execution and implementation.
B) The international treaty reception process in the Cuban legal order
Reception – defined in the Cuban legal environment as a complex, sovereign act 
of domestic law by which international norms are incorporated into the domestic 
legal order of the state, which has expressed its consent to be bound by them 
(Moré Caballero et al., 2003: 37) – is particularly valuable for understanding 
which theory or stance predominates in the practice of the state.
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For an international norm to have domestic effect, national law may pre-
scribe that an internal procedure must be carried out: for example, the official 
publication of the treaty or its conversion into a provision of national law. This 
may be described as a special reception system that is the expression of a mod-
erate dualism in the first instance, and a pure dualism in the second. If, on the 
other hand, no procedure is required, meaning that upon its entry into force the 
international norm has direct effect at the domestic level, this is known as auto-
matic reception, and fits with the tenets of monism.
Generally speaking, the procedure to be followed is found in the state’s con-
stitution. The 2019 Cuban constitution does not expressly establish a single, 
general mechanism for incorporating international treaties into the Cuban legal 
order, either through an automatic reception system or a special reception sys-
tem, making it impossible to clearly determine its monistic or dualistic basis. 
Article 8 of the constitution merely provides that what “is prescribed in interna-
tional treaties that are in force for the Republic of Cuba constitute or form part 
of national legislative regulations, as applicable” (Constitución de la República 
de Cuba, 2019: 6) . 
The two verbs at the heart of the sentence “constitute or form part” seem to 
create a degree of ambiguity. “[C]onstitute” favours a system of automatic re-
ception of certain international treaties; while “form part” appears to allow for a 
special reception system, in other words, via the necessary adoption of a legal act 
of domestic law that incorporates the treaty into the Cuban legal system. 
Article 8 does not offer greater precision: that is to say, it does not in any way 
establish which international instruments are incorporated automatically and 
which require a formal act of reception. Its lack of clarity in this respect is total.
The distinction between “self-executing” and “nonself-executing” treaties 
may help shed some light. In order for a treaty’s clauses to be applied by a state’s 
domestic authorities, those clauses must be self-executing. This means that they 
directly generate specific rights and obligations for individuals, without the need 
for any legislative or regulatory implementation measures. These are clauses that 
contain direct mandates which can be implemented immediately by state author-
ities. By contrast, if the clauses lack such regulatory precision – if they are not 
complete and detailed enough to contain obligations of general application – the 
clause is non-self-executing, and will require domestic legislation to be adopted. 
Of course, a single treaty may contain both self-executing and non-self-execut-
ing provisions, with the former applied directly, and the latter only after further 
development.
Human rights treaty provisions provide one example of self-execution, and 
are particularly suitable for automatic reception, as the trend in Ibero-Ameri-
can constitutions shows (Manili, 2002; Ortíz Ahlf, 2002). It is worth noting in 
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this regard that the inclusion in the American Convention on Human Rights of 
a provision (article 2) requiring the adoption of legislative or other measures to 
enforce the rights and freedoms protected in the convention does not affect the 
immediate enforceability of the obligations set out in the convention (Medina 
Quiroga, 2003: 21–25).8 
In the field of human rights treaties, the absence from 2019 Cuban consti-
tutional text of a formula similar to article 10.2 of the Spanish Constitution of 
19789 – and which appeared as article 39 in the Preliminary Draft Constitution– 
prevents us from stating that such treaties can be applied automatically in Cuba 
without the need for a special reception procedure. Indeed, article 39 of the Pre-
liminary Draft Constitution established that “The rights and duties recognized 
in this Constitution are to be interpreted in accordance with the international 
human rights treaties ratified by Cuba” (Proyecto de Constitución, 2018: 14). 
As mentioned this formulation vanished from the final approved text. It 
would have had the potential not only to integrate or incorporate international 
8  Contrary to the thesis that article 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights indicates that 
its substantive provisions would not apply directly and that articles 1 to 32 would therefore be 
non-self-executing – in line with the first interpretations of that precept – the rich jurisprudence 
developed over more than 30 years by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) 
(which has direct effect in the system of sources of the domestic law of states parties to the 
convention that have accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the IACtHR) has been interpreted as 
meaning that article 2 does not affect the immediate enforceability of the obligations established 
in article 1 of the convention, which is a general provision whose content extends to all of its 
provisions. Cecilia Medina Quiroga, former president of the IACtHR, points out that when a state 
is party to a treaty it has an obligation to adapt its domestic legislation to the provisions of that 
international instrument and to comply with its provisions in their entirety. She therefore consid-
ers that article 2 was not really necessary, and should be regarded only as an application of the 
maxim abundans cautela non nocet (abundant caution does no harm). In this regard, Gros Espiell 
noted in Advisory Opinion 7/86 that “The obligation that results from Article 2 thus complements, 
but in no way substitutes or replaces, the general unconditional obligation imposed by Article 1” 
since “when Article 2 was proposed, it was explained that its only purpose was to emphasize and 
clarify that the requirement to comply with that obligation was immediate, direct and obligatory, 
and not to signify a change or ignore the special obligation that results from Article 1” [IACtHR. 
(1986): 13, para. 6]. The debate around this provision was explained at length by Medina Quiroga 
(1988) The Battle of Human Rights. Gross, Systematic Violations and the Inter-American System, 
Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1988, Chapter V, p. 93.
9  Article 10.2 of the Spanish Constitution contains the following formula “The principles relat-
ing to the fundamental rights and liberties recognised by the Constitution shall be interpret-
ed in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the international trea-
ties and agreements thereon ratified by Spain”, available at: https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.
php?id=BOE-A-1978-40001.
275Carmen Antón Guardiola
agreements ratified by Cuba on the rights of the person into Cuban domestic law, 
but also to help define their interpretation by the oversight bodies established 
by them (including potential future interpretations), thus providing a minimum 
standard of protection that Cuban domestic norms or international jurispru-
dence could strengthen (Mangas Martín, 1980: 150). 
 However, it should be noted that neither the 2019 constitution nor Cuban 
law contains any general prohibition on the direct applicability by Cuban internal 
bodies of any self-executing international norms to which Cuba has committed. 
To give but one example, article 20 of the Cuban Civil Code states that if an inter-
national agreement or treaty to which Cuba is a party establishes rules that differ 
from those expressed in the previously mentioned articles or are not covered by 
them, the rules of that agreement or treaty apply.10 
Similarly, article 4, paragraphs 1 and 5, and article 5 of the Penal Code, which 
relate to the jurisdiction of Cuban criminal law, contain exceptions favouring the 
application of the international treaties signed by the Cuban state.11
Such provisions undoubtedly establish the primacy of treaties over the law 
and confirm the applicability of international treaties in Cuba. What they do not 
tell us is whether that application is direct or not; that is, whether the treaty 
needed to be previously incorporated into the Cuban domestic legal system by an 
act of domestic law or not. The wording of these provisions – treaties to which 
Cuba is a party, or treaties signed by the Cuban state, without further condition-
ing factors – leads us to infer that these treaties are immediately applied in the 
state upon their international entry into force. However, in Cuban practice, the 
competent authorities do not recognise the need to apply the requirements of 
international treaties when they conflict with domestic norms. Moré Caballero 
writes that in administrative practice there is often no recognition of the need to 
resort to international regulations, with the result that they do not apply. This is a 
manifestation of an unconscious dualistic attitude (in some cases radical and un-
10  Law No. 59, Código Civil, Gaceta Oficial de la República de Cuba, Extraordinary, No. 9, of July 16th 
1987.
11  Cuban Penal Code. Article 4.1.: Cuban criminal law applies to any and all offences committed in 
the national territory or on board Cuban ships or aircrafts, wherever they may be located, with 
the exception of any dispensations established in treaties signed by the Republic […]
5. Issues arising from offences committed in Cuban territory by diplomats or foreign citizens 
excluded from the jurisdiction of the courts of the Republic by international treaties shall be 
resolved by diplomatic means. 
Article 5.2. Cuban criminal law is applicable to any and all Cubans committing an offence abroad 
who are delivered to Cuba to be judged by its courts, in compliance with the treaties signed by 
the Republic. 
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justified, because what prevails is ignorance) [...] similar circumstances surround 
Cuban judicial practice (Moré Caballero, 2007: 390).
All of this brings us back to the initial problem of treaty reception in the 
Cuban legal system. As the 2019 constitution is silent on the subject, we will 
attempt to find a legal foothold in the ordinary regulations on the boundary be-
tween international treaties and Cuban national law and investigate the possible 
existence of a reception mechanism, either through the adoption of an internal 
law that transposes it or through the publication of the treaty. 
In this sense it may be useful to consider the abovementioned Decree-Law 
No. 191/1999 on International Treaties, especially articles 26 and 27, which to 
some extent relate to publication.
Article 26 establishes that:
Information on the ratification of bilateral international treaties by the Re-
public of Cuba and its participation in multilateral international treaties 
and their entry into force should be published in the Gaceta Oficial de la 
República de Cuba.
Article 27 stipulates that:
The President of the Council of State and of the government may order 
the publication of the treaty text in its entirety or only of information on 
ratification, acceptance or approval.
However, we do not believe that the legislature’s intention to provide a treaty 
reception system can be inferred from reading these two provisions. On the one 
hand, this is because notifying that Cuba has ratified a treaty in the Gaceta Ofi-
cial de la República de Cuba cannot be understood as a sufficient mechanism 
for understanding that the treaty has been incorporated into domestic law and 
will have legal effects in it. To achieve this, the text of the treaty would need to 
be published in full. This would mean publishing the text itself, as well as any 
annexed documents or supplementary agreements in which states develop or ex-
plain treaty-based rules and, where appropriate, any reservations or declarations 
Cuba made at the time of expressing its consent to be bound by the treaty, and 
any acceptances of or objections to such reservations. 
What is more, the treaty’s publication is optional – the President of the 
Council of State and government may order the full publication of the text of 
the treaty. There is no obligation, as the president may decide only to publish the 
information that Cuba has ratified the treaty. 
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For its part, paragraph 1 of article 52 of Resolution No. 206/2015, the Proce-
dure for Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties, stipulates that once the date a treaty 
will enter into force has been decided the Directorate of International Law is 
obliged to immediately communicate it to the national authority responsible for 
its implementation and to send the announcement to the Secretariat of the Coun-
cil of State for publication in the Gaceta Oficial de la República de Cuba.
Again, it is not the full text of the treaty that is published, but the announce-
ment. The announcement’s publication is mandatory and aims to make it known 
that the Cuban state has been internationally bound by a treaty. Through the 
publication of the announcement, the society at large is informed that the state 
has approved or ratified a particular international agreement, but that is not suf-
ficient to introduce the agreement into domestic law. 
Neither the Cuban constitution of 2019 nor the implementing regulations 
allow us to infer a legislative intention to consider publication a mechanism for 
the formal reception of international treaties Cuba signs that would make these 
treaties part of Cuban law and give them legal effect in the domestic sphere. Un-
der no circumstances do these provisions determine the scope of international 
agreements in Cuban domestic law, nor do they declare that they may be imple-
mented by national authorities. Publication is merely a mechanism of disclosure, 
which simply announces or reports on the ratification of a treaty by the state 
without any legal consequences. 
It is therefore essential to refer to Cuban practice in order to determine the 
country’s treaty reception procedure. According to Moré Caballero, the regular 
procedure followed on the island is a dualistic system that consists of incorpo-
rating treaties into Cuban domestic law through the promulgation of internal 
provisions. Even human rights treaties – which as mentioned above are particu-
larly suitable for automatic reception – always benefit from an internal norm 
that reproduces the agreed protection regime (Moré Caballero, 2007: 382). Moré 
Caballero shows that the 39 conventions on human rights listed in a joint work by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba, the Ibero-American Institute of Human 
Rights and the National Union of Jurists of Cuba have been integrated through 
internal provisions that allow their subsequent application in the country.12
Thus, Cuban practice shows an inclination towards a system of special re-
ception of international treaties that is clearly dualistic and transforms the in-
ternational norm into an internal norm, which from that moment on acquires 
the status of the norm used for domestic transposition – law, decree-law, decree, 
12  Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba, Instituto Iberoamericano de Derechos Humanos y 
Unión Nacional de Juristas de Cuba (2001). Instrumentos internacionales sobre derechos hu-
manos ratificados por Cuba, 1ª ed.
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resolution. The treaty thus loses its direct legal force and becomes an indirect 
source (Matilla Correa, 2004: 145).
Final considerations
The 2019 Cuban constitution contains no single procedure for receiving interna-
tional treaties in the Cuban legal order. Neither are the implementing regulations 
clear in this regard. This being the case, we believe that the constitutional reform 
process provided an opportunity to bring internal coherence to the Cuban legal 
system in this area. This opportunity was missed.
 A close reading of article 8 of the constitution may lead us to conclude that 
it includes a double system of reception: automatic, for certain types of treaties – 
although without specifying which; and special for other, also unidentified, types 
of treaties. As a single, general mechanism for incorporating international trea-
ties into the Cuban legal system is not expressly established, it is not possible to 
clearly determine their monistic or dualistic lineage.
In this regard, we consider that it would be desirable for the process of in-
ternational treaty reception in Cuban law to be clearly determined. Specifically, 
what kinds of treaty constitute and what kinds of treaty form part of Cuban law. 
While the opportunity has been missed to do include this in the constitution, it 
should be done in ordinary law. This would undoubtedly bring coherence to Cu-
ban law in this area and legal certainty for the authorities and actors involved in 
the application of these rules.
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Yanina Welp
Deliberation in the Constitutional Reform 
Process: Cuba in Comparative Context
1 Introduction1
According to official data, for a period of 12 weeks between August 1st and No-
vember 15th 2018, more than 7 million Cubans inside and outside the island 
discussed a constitutional proposal, the draft of which had been prepared by a 
commission appointed by the National Assembly of the Popular Power (ANPP) 
(ANPP, 2019; Agencia Cubana de Noticias, 2018). This is the official informa-
tion, but alternative media and consultations with representatives of Cuban civil 
society confirm that the process effectively achieved mass participation, although 
they stress that the context was not one of free deliberation, but was tightly con-
trolled from above (Domínguez et al., 2020). On December 22nd, five weeks after 
the end of this participatory process, the ANPP approved the final text, which 
was then eventually ratified in a referendum on February 24th 2019. With 90% 
participation, 87% voted in favour of the new constitution (ANPP, 2019).
Considering that the Cuban electoral roll is close to eight million, such par-
ticipation is of a scale rarely seen in other parts of the world (in fact, no records 
exist of anything similar anywhere). This may reinforce the typical trend of con-
sidering Cuba an exceptional case. Regional comparisons seem to confirm this, 
as the constituent processes involving citizen participation that have been most 
studied and cited in recent decades, and which are part of the new “Latin Amer-
ican constitutionalism”, did not engage such numbers of participants. In Colom-
bia (1991), Venezuela (1999), Ecuador (2007) and Bolivia (2006–2009) not even 
include a quarter of the population participated, let alone half.2 In some cases, 
such as Ecuador in 2008, participation reached notable levels (see: Ortíz Lemos, 
2013), but far short of that observed in Cuba. For some scholars, this is a true 
sign of the validity of old-fashioned democratic centralism, with the people exer-
1  I would like to thank Bert Hoffmann and Laurence Whitehead for their comments on previous 
versions of this chapter.
2  See Welp (2018), Jiménez Martín (2006), Ortíz Lemos (2013), García-Guadilla & Hurtado (2000), 
Maingon et al. (2000), Tanaka & Vera (2010).
https://doi.org/10.3224/84742546.14
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cising constituent power. For others, it shows that the government has never lost 
control and provides a new example of political manipulation. 
This study aims to analyse the Cuban participatory constituent process by 
contrasting it with the experiences of other Latin American countries from 1976 
until the present. In doing so, two dimensions will be analysed. The first is the 
mechanism of participation: who is allowed to participate, in what, for how long 
and with which information. The second is the method of processing the content 
generated during the deliberations: Is there a method for classifying or selecting 
amendments and suggestions? If so, it is known in advance? Who is in charge of 
implementing it? Is it published, so that changes may be identified and traced? 
I assume that neglecting one of these two aspects – participation mechanism 
and content processing method – leads to erroneous or incomplete conclusions, 
underestimating mobilisation and/or overestimating its influence on the final 
text. For example, if the process of participation is open and plural but content 
is later on selected by a government-controlled commission, the results will not 
reflect “the will of the people”. If the process of amendment is transparent but 
only members close to the regime are allowed to participate, the result will also 
be biased. In the Cuban case: what was the process and how does it fit into the 
regional experiences of participatory constitution-making?
This paper proceeds as follows: the next section reviews the findings of pre-
vious research, showing the need to deepen the analysis of the mechanisms of 
deliberation and the procedures for including the content generated by participa-
tory processes. Then the methodology and case selection are presented, followed 
by the empirical analysis. Finally, conclusions are drawn.
2 The role of “the people” in the constitutional agreement
The imaginary of modern constitutionalism is theoretically based on the found-
ing role of the people expressed in a constitutional agreement (Negretto, 2018). 
This role for “the people” is claimed both in liberal democracies and the Soviet 
tradition of “democratic centralism” – the two strands that shaped the theoret-
ical development of constitutionalism during the 20th century. In liberal democ-
racies, direct participation was perceived as an expression of authoritarianism, 
while indirect politics (that is, through representation) were considered more 
legitimate (Zaremberg and Welp, 2020). 
By the mid-20th century, a dichotomy had emerged between authoritarian 
participation and democratic representation. In the 1970s it began to break 
down, and after the fall of the Berlin Wall citizen participation became more 
popular in the West. Since then, by diffusion or zeitgeist (spirit of the time), var-
ious mechanisms of citizen participation and control have spread throughout the 
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world, as it is considered that by complementing and enriching the relationship 
between participation and electoral representation they enact a form of demo-
cratic deepening. Thus, in recent decades, some blurring has occurred between 
these two traditions in terms of participatory processes, and participation for-
mats with procedural similarities have been observed.3
Citizens’ engagement in constitution-making has above all been promoted 
in contexts of conflict resolution, decolonisation and independence, with inter-
national organisations like the United Nations (UN), the United States Insti-
tute for Peace (USIP) and the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(International IDEA) encouraging citizen participation (see: Hart, 2003; Ghai, 
2006; Gluck and Ballou, 2014). More recently, citizens’ engagement in consti-
tution-making has also been promoted in democratic contexts where deep crisis 
might lead to a considerable loss of legitimacy, such as Iceland in 2011. Ginsburg 
et al. (2009) point out that constitutions gain weight when they are developed in 
extraordinary contexts of popular mobilisation, which include extra-parliamen-
tary processes of ratification and communication. Other studies have support-
ed similar conclusions (Eisenstadt et al., 2017; Contiades and Fotiadou, 2016). 
However, the results of these processes in terms of increasing legitimacy and giv-
ing stability to the new regimes are not crystal clear. For instance, Parlett found 
evidence of constitutional systems in post-communist countries in Europe and 
Asia that have been established and endured without backing from popular mo-
bilisations, while many of those approved in such conditions do not necessarily 
produce better constitutions in terms of limiting the concentration of power in 
the president (Parlett, 2012: 195–196). However, such a discussion is beyond 
the scope of this chapter; here, the focus is on the criteria to be fulfilled for a 
process to be considered fair, competitive and democratic. 
After analysing constituent processes in post-conflict scenarios, Saati (2015) 
concluded that not enough evidence exists to show the positive effects of citizen 
participation. According to Saati, minimal, insignificant experiences have been 
overvalued due to their promotion by international organisations even when 
minimum guarantees of citizens’ inclusion were not met. 
In Latin America, the “new constitutionalism” has emphasised the partici-
patory nature of the processes observed in the Andean region, especially in the 
analysis of Venezuela (1999), Ecuador (2007–2008), and Bolivia (2006–2009) 
(Viciano Pastor and Martínez Dalmau, 2011). However, participation has been 
overrated, with not enough attention paid to the intrinsic characteristics of these 
processes and in particular to their (lack of) autonomy from the ruling govern-
3  Laurence Whitehead (2017) developed a clearer overview of “the ‘fiction’ of representation and 
the ‘faction’ of direct democracy”. 
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ments, inclusiveness, and the transparency of the processing of their content. 
Other research has analysed the extent to which pluralism conditions the results 
of the constituent processes.4 This pluralism is a central element of our proposal, 
which relates to the subjects that participate and to the supervision and coordi-
nation of the process.
Most studies have focused on case analysis, and it is our view that not enough 
attention is paid to the conditions that a constitutional change process with delib-
erative participation should meet. In order to contribute to understanding these 
processes, as well as to the discussion of standards in previous work (Welp & 
Soto, 2019), I propose two groups of conditions that are determinants of the type 
of process generated. The first is the mechanism of deliberation (access to infor-
mation, time given for it, actors included and the openness of the agenda) and 
the method of processing the content generated: Does something like a method 
exist? Has it been disseminated beforehand? Is it traceable and does it allow the 
contents to be connected to the final discussion of the constitution – and, if so, 
how? These aspects are key to explaining whether or not an informed, open, plu-
ral deliberation occurs, but they are not enough. 
The second dimension is the method of processing content: Does a method 
exist? Has it been  previously defined? Does it allow results to be traced? And, is 
it controlled by the government? Even if participation is plural, it may not have a 
connection with the constituent process, unless a specific mechanism establishes 
one. The traceability condition does not presuppose automatic approval of citi-
zen proposals, but it does presuppose their consideration (essential criteria for a 
process not to be merely symbolic). The public information given before, during 
and after the process is also key. Government control over the procedure will be 
addressed as part of the second dimension of analysis. Even a broad, inclusive 
and participatory process may be controlled by the government at the final stage 
if content is filtered with methods that lack transparency and legitimacy. 
3 Methodology and case selection
The focus here is on collective deliberation and collective content produced for 
a new constitution. Thus, I will not address other types of consultation (partici-
patory budgeting or other citizens’ assemblies) or referenda (which are designed 
neither to produce content nor deliberation). The type of participation I am inter-
ested in may occur before (prior consultations) during (discussion of the draft), 
or both. Collective public participation is a necessary condition for inclusion in 
my sample. I selected experiences in which participation was regulated and/or 
4 See: Bejarano & Segura (2013), who focus particularly on Colombia.
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promoted by the government or public institutions, excluding those in which it 
occurred in parallel, as an act of civil society. The time-frame focuses on what 
Elster (1995) identified as the sixth wave of constitution-making, which started 
in 1970 (1970–2019). Eleven cases in ten countries were selected, as listed in 
Table 1.
Table 1: Eleven cases of citizen deliberation for constitution-making






Cuba 1976 Institutionalisation of the revolution Yes Yes
Nicaragua 1986 Institutionalisation of the revolution Yes No
Guatemala 1994–1996 Pacification No Yes
Brazil 1988 Transition to democracy Yes No
Colombia 1991 Pacification Yes Yes
Venezuela 1999 Transformation of the political system Yes Yes
Ecuador 2007 Transformation of the political system Yes Yes
Dominican Rep. 2007 Institutional reform Yes No
Bolivia 2006–2009 Transformation of the political system Yes Yes





Cuba 2018 Institutional reform Yes Yes
Source: Compiled by author.
* After a plebiscite on October 25th 2020 approved the replacement of the 1980 Constitution, the 
electoral process to select the constituent members is scheduled for April 2021. 
I am interested in this chapter in the institutional design of the mechanism of 
deliberation and the procedure for processing the content generated, rather than 
the final constitution.5 In addition to the design, practices are analysed (how they 
occurred and whether the outcomes were published) based on primary and se-
5  Accordingly, I will not discuss which changes are amendments and which lead to a new consti-
tution. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the doctrine is not uniform in defining the limits 
of one and the other. A new constitution may result: (a) in a strictly procedural sense, from the 
total revision of the constitution according to the procedure established by it; and/or (b) from the 
breaking of the constitutional rules, which makes room for other specific discussions.
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condary sources for each of the cases. The dimensions and indicators were defi-
ned as follows.6
Characteristics of the mechanism of deliberation:
 •  Information and civic training stage: Was the process accompanied by an ed-
ucational and/or dissemination of information stage? Coded as Planned or 
Improvised. If it was, an assessment of its adequacy is made (Sufficient/Insuf-
ficient), and whether it was based solely on the government’s vision (Biased).
 •  Time: Was there time enough to conduct a real discussion? Coded as Impro-
vised (not fixed) or Planned. If Planned, was it Sufficient or Insufficient? This 
is a controversial criterion. The evaluation was based on reports from civil 
society organisations and scholars.
 •  Actors convened: According to the call, was the process aimed at a few ac-
tors (Restricted) or was it Inclusive? An observation is then made of how it 
worked, according to reports. 
 • Agenda setting: Was the agenda Closed and predefined or Open?
Characteristics of the procedure for processing the content generated: 
 •  Method: Defined as the existence of criteria for preparing the systematisation 
of documents (Yes/No).
 • Observation of whether the method was previously disseminated (Yes/No)
 •  Traceability: Once the content is published (even without an explicit method 
for the aggregation of preferences), is it possible to track its incorporation or 
at least its discussion? (Yes/No). This is not possible when citizens do not have 
access to documentation. 
 •  Influence: Traceability identifies whether the content produced had influence 
or not. If no clear outcome (e.g. a written report) is produced, it is not possible 
to observe whether the constitutional discussion incorporated issues arising 
from the citizen deliberation. A number of methods exist that guarantee that 
the contents of the participatory process are discussed by the constituent body 
(e.g. citizens’ proposals backed by a certain number of signatures; or compul-
sory discussion of suggestions), alternatively discussion may be optional and 
discretionary. Does the mechanism require the contents generated to be dis-
cussed in the Congress  or constituent assembly? (Yes/No). It is Mandatory 
when it leads to discussion and Optional when the specific discussion is at the 
discretion of the constituents.
6  These dimensions are based on Welp and Soto (2019). 
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 •  Connection with the constituent process: Was there government control? 
There are many options here, including the “smokescreen” whereby, ultimate-
ly, a few actors of doubtful legitimacy decide what enters and what does not 
(e.g. the most recent Cuban process of 2018). Coded as Independent (not con-
trolled by the government) or Prejudiced (under government control). 
4 Analysis: Meaningful citizen participation or smokescreens?
In this section, a brief presentation is made of each of the 11 cases before their 
processes of deliberation are classified and compared and conclusions are drawn. 
As an additional goal, I will observe the extent to which the processes conduct-
ed in democratic contexts are – as should be expected – clearly democratic by 
comparison with those in hybrid or authoritarian regimes. I suggest that when 
the basic conditions are not met, even in a democratic setting the participatory 
process may be merely a “smokescreen”. 
Cuba (1974–1976): Many can talk but few in the party decide 
In 1974, the Cuban government and the Communist Party appointed a Drafting 
Commission with 20 members. The experience was inspired by the elaboration 
of the Soviet constitution in 1936 and the Czech constitution in 1960, where the 
Communist Party had notable participation and the project was subject to pop-
ular discussion (Guzmán, 2015). It must be mentioned that in 1940 Cuba had 
approved one of the most progressive constitutions of the time. However, backed 
by the United States, the dictator Fulgencio Batista suspended the constitution 
and the rule of law (Rojas et al., 2017), creating the conditions for the revolution. 
From 1959 until 1974 the revolution did not create its constitutional founda-
tions. In 1975 there was a public discussion in which 216,000 people proposed 
more than 12,000 modifications (Zaldíval Abad, 2016: 25–26). The draft was 
discussed by party members and followers, grassroots committees and governing 
bodies of the Union of Young Communists, the trade unions, the Committees 
for the Defense of the Revolution and, among others, the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces. The participatory process would have resulted in the modification of 60 
articles (Guanche, 2013) but the discussions were not made public and there is 
no information about the process of selecting and rewriting the draft. The First 
Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba approved the text, which was finally 
ratified by popular referendum. 
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Nicaragua (1986–1987): The institutionalisation of the Sandinista regime
In Nicaragua in July 1979, the Sandinista revolution put an end to the dicta-
torship of the Somoza family (1934–1979). After the electoral victory of Daniel 
Ortega in 1984, the constitutional process was launched. A special commission 
(unelected), composed of representatives of seven political parties, elaborated 
the constitutional proposal: 750,000 copies were published and between May 
and June 1986, councils were organised throughout the country. More than 70 
councils were activated, in which contributions were received from all social 
groups. About 100,000 citizens participated, of whom 2,500 made suggestions in 
the councils, while 1,800 delivered them in writing. The Constitutional Commis-
sion was responsible for receiving the results of the open constitutional councils 
and the opinions and suggestions made by citizens. After the systematisation, 
several changes were recommended that were subsequently submitted for dis-
cussion and approval by the plenary of the legislative body (Asamblea Nacional, 
1987).
Brazil (1988): “The Citizens’ Constitution”
The case of Brazil is well known because the constitutional replacement was con-
ducted within the transition to democracy in 1988. Different instruments were 
designed to channel citizens’ suggestions, proposals and criticisms, with clear 
prerequisites for their activation. For instance, 72,719 petitions by 122 civic as-
sociations were accepted and registered after gathering around 12 million signa-
tures. Of these, 83 (a low number in proportion) met the formal prerequisites to 
be presented at Congress,7 and became an antecedent of the popular initiative. 
There were also approximately 400 citizen meetings at the local level that gen-
erated around 2,400 suggestions. Finally, once the first draft of the constitution-
al text was presented, legally registered associations were entitled to make new 
suggestions if they had the support of 30,000 signatures (Rauschenbach, 2011). 
The final decisions were in the hands of the parliament, but the mechanism guar-
anteed that certain issues were raised and forced MPs to discuss them. The key 
point is not that the procedures allowed the decisions to be directed but that the 
rules for participation were clearly formulated and the discussion of proposals 
mandatory.
7  Brazil did not have a constitutional convention; the parliament was in charge of writing the con-
stitution. After delivering the constitution, the parliament retained that role and completed the 
mandate. 
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Colombia (1991): Popular support for a new social contract
In the late 1980s, violence and the discrediting of the political class dominat-
ed the Colombian public sphere. In 1988, President Virgilio Barco (1986–1990) 
tried unsuccessfully to promote a constitutional reform. In 1990, before the gen-
eral elections, three candidates for the presidency were assassinated: Luis Car-
los Galán of the Liberal Party, Bernardo Jaramillo of the Patriotic Union and 
Carlos Pizarro of the M-19 (linked to the guerrillas). A student-led movement 
known as “the seventh ballot” (la séptima papeleta) requested the convocation 
of a constituent assembly through an ad hoc referendum to be held on March 
11th, alongside the parliamentary elections. Despite being informal, 2.2 million 
ballots were counted, following a court order (Jiménez Martín, 2006). As a result, 
the new president César Gaviria (1990–1994) took on the mandate of changing 
the constitution and called a new referendum. The participatory process took 
place prior to the launch of the convention. A total of 1,580 working groups were 
formed that operated throughout the country between September 16th and No-
vember 15th 1990 (constituent elections would take place in December), leading 
to the presentation of more than 100,000 proposals. The proposals made by the 
working groups were recognised in a synthesis prepared by the same preparato-
ry commissions and later discussed by the convention (Jiménez Martín, 2006; 
Welp, 2018).
Guatemala (1994–1996): A frustrated participatory process 
In 1994 an agreement between the government and the Guatemalan National 
Revolutionary Unity (URNG) reopened the peace negotiations that aimed to put 
an end to the civil war. The United Nations and several countries acted as ob-
servers and mediators. A Civil Society Assembly (ASC) consisting of 84 delegates 
representing 47 organisations was launched and thematic commissions were 
created to formulate proposals on priority issues, which were then discussed in 
plenary sessions by delegates of all participating groups. The model allowed for 
plural and open participation. These documents were shared in other meetings 
with various political and social actors, including organisations representing 
women, businesspeople, indigenous people, peasants, the Church, human rights 
NGOs and displaced persons, which resulted in an agreement signed by the gov-
ernment and finally submitted (and rejected) in a referendum in which only 17% 
of citizens participated (Delgado & Brett, 2005; Álvarez, 2004).
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Venezuela (1999): Mobilisation as a strategy to overcome institutional 
obstacles
The victory of Hugo Chávez in the 1998 elections opened the door to the 
long-postponed constitutional replacement (Maingon et al., 2000). However, it 
was not easy to promote, since the constitution in force at the time did not allow 
the convocation of a constituent assembly (CA) and the president did not have 
the parliamentary majority to promote a constitutional amendment reform prior 
to replacement. The government opted for an advisory referendum to authorise 
the convening of a constituent assembly. The process was extremely controver-
sial (for details, see Massüger & Welp, 2013) but it was finally accepted. Despite 
often being cited for its participatory nature, there were no formal procedures 
to channel or process the information generated by the grassroots participants. 
The first three months of the constituent assembly were characterised by a par-
ticipatory debate, while the second discussion of the constitutional project took 
place over just a few days. The most participatory stage was that involving assem-
bly members during the election campaign, while the ruling party’s representa-
tives in the CA discouraged debates and prevailed through strength of numbers 
(García-Guadilla & Hurtado, 2000).
Bolivia (2006–2009): A participatory process without influence on the 
draft
The Movement to Socialism (MAS) led by Evo Morales triumphed in the 2005 
elections and initiated constitutional change. In Bolivia, unlike Colombia, Vene-
zuela and Ecuador, there was no controversy over the legality of calling a constit-
uent assembly, since it was regulated in the existing constitution (2004 reform, 
art. 232). However, there was a confrontation around the powers granted to the 
constituent body. The constituent assembly was criticised for a lack of debate and 
racism that materialised in disqualifications based on clothing and habits and in 
the refusal to allow members of the population identified as indigenous to enter 
restaurants and hotels near the convention. The territorial meetings, which saw 
the 255 assembly members travel across the country to listen and present pro-
posals, contributed to counteracting the absence of debate in the assembly. How-
ever, they had little impact on the preparation of the final text (Lazarte, 2008; de 
la Fuente Jeria, 2010). While social movements were fairly active, their influence 
was shaped by informal exchanges with representatives rather than being chan-
nelled through an open process of participation
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Ecuador (2007–2008): Massive participation, presidential control over 
the process
Like Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, in Ecuador Rafael Correa (standing for the PAIS 
Alliance, the new party he created for the election) had campaigned on the prom-
ise of convening a constituent assembly, and once he entered government in 2007 
he activated a referendum to unlock the process. This was necessary because the 
constitution did not permit its own reform by a constitutional assembly and the 
new president had no representation in parliament. Also similar to the case of 
Venezuela, Correa’s arrival in government occurred within a period of huge social 
and institutional crisis.8 The election of assembly members for the constitutional 
convention gave Correa and his allies a considerable victory (80 of the 130 seats). 
A Social Participation Unit was created and three people were given the man-
date to organise and systematise all the proposals and comments received. The 
number of participants and suggestions overwhelmed the process: some 170,000 
visits were registered. Workshops and discussion groups with experts were also 
organised (see: Ortíz Lemos, 2013; Centro Carter, 2008). The lack of resources 
and methods, on the one hand, and the tight control of President Correa on the 
other, meant there was limited pluralism within the assembly (for details, see: 
Welp, 2018).
Dominican Republic (2007): Experts and authorities consulting  
“the people”
In the Dominican Republic, the initiative emerged from an initiative promoted 
by President Lionel Fernández in October 2006 to form a commission to take 
charge of preparing the draft reform of the constitution prior to a participatory 
process. The process in question was entrusted to a commission of 13 jurists (de-
cree No. 323/2006), which prepared a document with 77 questions and designed 
a methodology of popular consultation accompanied by open councils. The im-
plementation was carried out by a team of facilitators who had to articulate a par-
ticipatory process at the municipal level and systematise the results generated. 
The conclusions were presented at a national meeting (February 2007), based 
on a report of recommendations (April 2007) that were weighted by an elected 
Review Assembly (2009) that finally approved the final constitutional text (DI-
8  Eight different presidents led the executive between 1996 and 2006, which were interrupted by 
three institutional breakdowns provoked by popular protests. These included a particularly harsh 
economic crisis in the early 2000s and inter-institutional clashes that led to the Supreme Court’s 
failure to function for almost a year in 2005.
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APE, 2007). This means that there was a methodology and clear rules, despite 
the process being oriented towards consultation rather than towards promoting 
deliberation.
Chile (2015): (Still) frustrated citizen’s dialogue
In Chile, the instance of participation arose as a commitment by President Mi-
chelle Bachelet (2014–2018). In this case, rather than the draft, the participation 
concerned three topics of constitutional discussion: values and principles; rights, 
duties and responsibilities; and state institutions. The consultation process in-
cluded two modalities: a digital form that was answered individually and in-per-
son collective deliberation. The collective debate stage, in turn, was implemented 
in three phases: local, provincial and regional. The first, called local self-convened 
meetings (ELA), registered the highest participation, with 106,412 participants; 
followed by the individual consultation with 90,804 responses. In the provincial 
and regional councils, 12,852 and 8,621 people participated, respectively. In to-
tal, more than 200,000 people participated. The process was accompanied by a 
Council of Observers and another of systematisers, who presented their respec-
tive reports in January 2017. In March 2018, as she left government, President 
Bachelet sent a new constitution project to Congress based on the results of the 
participatory process (although it attracted some criticism). This project was not 
discussed in the parliament (Soto & Welp, 2017). In 2021, the elaboration of a 
new constitution was again on the agenda, after being approved in a plebiscite on 
October 25th 2020, but it is unclear if the results will be connected with the draft-
ing and/or if a new participatory process will be conducted. The 2017 experience 
had the most advanced and transparent methodology applied in the region until 
now, and all the data generated is available. 
Cuba (2018–2019): Massive and controlled
In 2018 Cuba conducted a new process of deliberation. According to official data, 
more than 7 million Cubans (64% of the population) discussed a constitutional 
proposal prepared by a commission appointed by the National Assembly; the 
discussion was held over 12 weeks in neighbourhoods and towns. While this sug-
gests mass participation, in fact the opposition was prohibited and persecuted. 
From the 133,681 meetings, about 10,000 proposals were generated. The Na-
tional Processing Team analysed the interventions as they were received, without 
predefined criteria. The documentation generated was then passed to the Anal-
ysis Group, which was composed of eight members of the Editorial Committee 
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and 22 experts from various branches of law (handpicked). They drafted the text 
that was approved by the National Assembly and it was ratified in a referendum 
on February 24th 2019. Unlike the 1975 process, all of this documentation has 
been made available. For these reasons, the process had influence, although it 
was controlled. 
5 Discussion 
The 11 cases analysed share certain elements and differ on others. The mecha-
nisms of participation show that, with the exception of Cuba, the processes were 
open and plural. Only in Cuba was there political persecution and restrictions 
placed on what could be discussed, despite notable differences between 1976 and 
2018 (when the discussions were much larger and more open). However, despite 
the emphasis on the participatory nature of the new regimes in Venezuela, Ecua-
dor, and Bolivia, there was no real planning of a civic stage and/or of the citizen 
deliberation. Chile stands out as the best-organised process but, interestingly, it 
did not end in constitutional replacement and is therefore not a model for our 
second dimension, where we address the mechanisms for systematising the con-
tent generated and connecting it to the convention. 
Table 2: Characteristics of the mechanism of participation (11 cases)
Case Information/Civic 
education stage
Time for deliberation Participants Agenda 
Cuba 1976 Planned / Biased Planned / Sufficient Restricted Partial
Nicaragua 1986 Planned / Adequate Planned / Sufficient Inclusive Plural
Guatemala 1994–1996 Planned / Adequate Planned / Sufficient Inclusive Plural
Brazil 1988 No Planned / Sufficient Inclusive Plural
Colombia 1991 No Planned / Sufficient Inclusive Plural
Venezuela 1999 No Improvised Inclusive Plural
Ecuador 2007 No Planned / Insufficient Inclusive Plural
Dominican Rep. 2007 Planned/Adequate Planned / Sufficient Inclusive Plural
Bolivia 2006–2009 No Improvised Inclusive Plural
Chile 2017 Planned / Adequate Planned / Sufficient Inclusive Plural
Cuba 2018 Planned / Biased Planned / Sufficient Restricted Partial
Source: Compiled by author from primary and secondary sources for each case. 
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In contrast to the openness, planning and pluralism that characterised most of 
the countries in the first dimension, the procedure for systematising the con-
tents generated was only clearly fixed in three cases (Brazil, Dominican Republic 
and Chile), and only Brazil really worked in terms of connecting the citizens’ de-
mands to the constitution-making process. In Cuba in 1976 and 2018, the final 
decision was in the hand of the government.  The same applies to Venezuela, 
Ecuador, and Bolivia, but in these cases, there is no report summarising citizens’ 
proposals and, accordingly, no evidence to suggest a connection between citizens’ 
requests and final decisions. 
Table 3: Characteristics of the procedure for systematising the content generated  
(11 cases) 







Cuba 1976 No – No No Prejudiced
Nicaragua 1986 No – Yes Yes, optional Independent
Guatemala 1994–1996 No – Yes Yes, optional Independent




Colombia 1991 No – Yes Yes, optional Independent
Venezuela 1999 No – No No N/A
Ecuador 2007 No – N/A N/A N/A
Dominican Rep. 2007 No – Yes Yes, optional Independent
Bolivia 2006–2009 No – No No N/A
Chile 2017 Yes No Yes (No) N/A
Cuba 2018 No – Yes Yes Prejudiced
Source: Compiled by author from primary and secondary sources for each case. 
6 Conclusions
Citizen participation in the definition of public affairs is a founding myth, an 
articulating principle and a fashionable remedy for disenchantment with the po-
litical status quo. This is no less true of the process of constitutional reform. Cuba 
fits within this framework, but with specific characteristics. The first and most 
relevant for our purpose is that it is not a democratic system. The second is that 
more recent patterns of participation bring little that is new to the current discus-
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sion because they tend to reproduce patterns of functioning typical of authoritar-
ian regimes with state control. A third novelty is that while control from above 
was tight, more information is available than on previous occasions with which 
to monitor the mechanism activated to create the illusion of participation: the 
participation was real but lacked legitimate influence on the final constitution. 
This is the result of the use of new communication technologies, which enabled a 
greater systematisation and publication of results.
Some issues sparked much debate and others less, and there have been 
notable and late changes, such as the recognition of the legal supremacy of the 
constitution and the possibility of enshrining rights in law. As mentioned above, 
communism as a principle remains in the constitution, the direct election of the 
president has not been included, and neither have steps been taken to recognise 
political pluralism (the text preserves the “leadership” of the Communist Par-
ty). The constitution recognises various forms of ownership, including private, 
mixed and cooperative, with the state given the role of market regulator. One of 
the issues that has generated most controversy is same-sex marriage. The 1976 
constitution recognised marriage between a man and a woman. The first draft of 
the new constitution released by the commission has sought a neutral formula by 
speaking of “spouses”, which does not close the door to same-sex marriage but 
does not completely open it either. As with many other rights that remain unre-
solved, it is announced that the laws will give it shape: in this case, a Family Code 
that would be voted on in a future referendum. Many doubt that this referendum 
will take place because the party is not aligned around a position and does not 
tend to open doors to internal divisions, much less let the citizens decide without 
tutelage.9
My research confirms that deliberative processes implemented in non- 
democratic contexts tend not to meet the minimum requirements to be consid-
ered open and plural, but it also shows that deficiencies also exist in the pro-
cesses implemented in democratic contexts (Ecuador is a notable example). The 
conclusions suggest that it is essential to define standards for fair deliberative 
processes and invite readers to discuss the most appropriate mechanisms for this 
(two possible examples are sorted assemblies combined with referendums and/
or deliberation processes that allow initiatives to be generated when backed by 
signatures). At the level of policy design, these findings invite promoters of delib-
erative participation, in general, to take into account the minimum criteria that 
a process of these characteristics requires to prevent them from continuing to 
feed the spiral of disenchantment. The main theoretical implication invites us to 
9  Detailed information was provided by El Toque (2019), using the official documents registering 
the deliberative process.
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consider that a participatory initiative must comply with minimum parameters 
that make it possible to distinguish between a mere symbolic or instrumentalised 
exercise and a fair, competitive and democratic procedure. In relation to Cuba, it 
shows once again that mass participation does not mean democratic, fair, plural 
and autonomous citizen participation. 
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Stable Change in Cuba after the Constitutional 
Referendum
“Se vogliamo che tutto rimanga come, bisogna che tutto cambi.” 
Tomasi di Lampedusa
1 Introduction
On February 19th 2008, Granma published the letter in which Fidel Castro 
announced that he would “neither aspire to nor accept the positions of Presi-
dent of the State Council and Commander in Chief” (Castro, 2008). Ever since, 
speculation has been unceasing about the change of leadership and the rise of a 
new elite to political, military and economic power, with age alone meaning the 
new leaders would not be representatives of the so-called “historic generation” 
(Escobar, 2019). But in reality, the change began not in 2008 but on July 31st 
2006, when Fidel Castro stood down for health reasons and his brother Raúl, 
the first vice president, provisionally became president of the Council of State. 
Raúl Castro was also minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), and it 
is important to note that as well as controlling the military apparatus, the role 
is a central pillar of Cuba’s economic and political power structure. No further 
change occurred in Cuba’s senior leadership until April 19th 2018, when Miguel 
Díaz-Canel assumed the presidency of the Council of State and the Council of 
Ministers, meaning the two Castro brothers were no longer part of the execu-
tive. The generational replacement and symbolic handover from the elite that 
had ruled the country since the victory of the 1959 revolution was thus complete. 
The desire for renewal extended to a legal limitation introduced on the election 
of over-60s to certain roles.
In addition to these changes, institutional renewal occurred in the form of 
the new constitution (CC) approved on February 24th 2019. The new constitution 
nevertheless retains the main institutional features of the 1976 version: rough-
ly summarised, Cuba would remain a republic with a socialist economic model 
and single-party government by the Cuban Communist Party (PCC). But beyond 
the macro-institutional continuity, modifications were made to the government 
structure: layers of subnational power were created to increase the forums for 
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participation, and posts that combined several roles and thereby concentrated 
executive power were separated out. What consequences these changes have had 
for the island’s governance and, above all, if and how the reform will affect the 
nature of the political regime are questions that need to be asked.
Almost 15 years since the beginning of a cycle that was meant to involve 
processes to liberalise the political and economic system, little progress seems to 
have been made, as certain actors and analysts predicted (Hoffmann, 2019). To 
explain why, this chapter discusses the endogenous factors that helped maintain 
the internal cohesion of the core group that controls the island until just before 
the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. In the uncertain international scenario the pan-
demic has provoked, it seems possible that the group’s unity and correlation of 
forces will be altered, although any forecasts in this regard must necessarily be 
cautious, given the resilience Cuba has previously shown to external shocks like 
the US blockade and the fall of the eastern bloc. Thus far, it seems safe to say that 
major political and/or economic transformations have yet to transpire, despite 
changes in institutions, leaders and the ruling elite. Cuba seems different, in this 
sense, from cases in which transitioning from rulers who have held power for 
decades often brings crisis to the regime. For the time being, the country’s shift 
to what Hoffmann (2016) calls bureaucratic socialism has been notable for its 
continuity and stability. 
The thesis this chapter addresses is that this stability is due to the ruling co-
alition or power group remaining intact. To verify this assertion, the institutional 
change brought by the new constitution will be reviewed, particularly the chang-
es to the form of executive power and existing power structures and actors. The 
analysis will focus on the potential implications of this as a mechanism for sepa-
rating powers, and how it was prevented from occurring. Then, certain aspects of 
the Cuban political system that have served to hold the ruling coalition together 
will be examined. Analysing a number of formal and informal institutions that 
are well-consolidated in the Cuban political system helps us explain how, despite 
the mentioned changes, the preservation of the status quo has been guaranteed. 
This is evident in at least three areas: 1) the control exercised by the Revolution-
ary Armed Forces (FAR) during, before and after the turnover process; (2) the 
centrality of the PCC as a space of power and coordination; and, above all, 3) the 
formation of a political-technocratic elite  (“cuadros”, cadres in local jargon) that 
does not question the essence of the regime, and accepts and defends the revolu-
tion as the basis of its legitimacy. The final section will seek to explain the trans-
formations in Cuba’s centres of power, based on the composition of the Council 
of Ministers, the Council of State and the PCC. It will be shown that no substan-
tial changes have occurred in the structure of the ruling coalition, but that the 
group formed throughout the process has gradually been taking up positions in 
302 Stable Change in Cuba after the Constitutional Referendum
it, filling the government and bureaucratic apparatus and, as a result, controlling 
the island. Continuity of the political and economic model is therefore likely, with 
any changes being very gradual.
Finally, it should be noted that this chapter will address neither the actions 
nor the influence of the groups that oppose the regime and aim to force politi-
cal or economic change on the island. Unlike works that seek possible areas for 
reform, this analysis focusses on showing the ruling elite’s cohesion and mecha-
nisms for controlling dissent in its role as the ruling coalition in the processes of 
stability and political change.
2 Stability, change and the ruling coalition
The academic literature on political regime change grew substantially in the early 
1980s, seeking to explain how authoritarian regimes became third-wave democ-
racies (Linz & Stepan, 1996; O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1994). One of the key ques-
tions was why some authoritarian regimes became democracies while others did 
not. According to elite theory (Szmolka, 2016) the change can be explained by the 
modifications to the ruling coalition, that is, the group of actors who control the 
resources of power, as Linz (1964, 1978) showed when interpreting the Franco 
dictatorship in Spain. Since his seminal work on political regime change, Morlino 
(1985) has underlined the role actors play in the consolidation or weakness of 
political structures. He argues that a coalition of political actors becomes dom-
inant when it has the opportunity to impose its preferred solutions through the 
possession or conscious use of the majority of resources, which may be elective, 
non-elective and influential, or coercive. Broadly speaking, these coalitions are 
the politically active social groups that uphold the regime in its phase of estab-
lishment and in successive periods. More precisely, these elites are the direct or 
indirect expression of the regime’s social base and participate in governance by 
holding leadership positions in its key structures. In an authoritarian regime, 
agreement also exists (de facto and explicit) about the ways political conflicts are 
resolved. The ruling coalition will almost always benefit, while all other actors are 
excluded and marginalised through a combination of police repression and the 
adoption by the regime’s elites of the ideological apparatus for their own legiti-
mation (Morlino, 2004).
Applying this theory to the study of the transition to democracy, authors 
such as Maravall and Santamaría (1988) explain that the stability or instability 
of an authoritarian regime depends on the existence or otherwise of a cohesive 
coalition of actors to support it. A fracture in that coalition is thus a fundamental 
factor in provoking the crisis that gives way to the transition. This interpretation 
fits with Rustow’s (1970) three-phase regime change model, where the process 
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begins in a “preparatory phase” in which a struggle takes place between those in 
power and their opponents or diverse forces promoting change. Once the ruling 
coalition is divided, those seeking change take power.
While these models were designed to explain political change, they may also 
be used to explain a lack of change and the reason a regime persists. That is 
what is proposed here for the case of Cuba, where instead of cracks in the ruling 
coalition, we find a cohesion and strength that allows it to control the process. 
To define the specific characteristics and workings of the ruling coalition at least 
four elements must be considered: 1) the role of the leader who interacts with the 
different parts of the coalition, arbitrating between the various interests, privi-
leging or subordinating one in relation to another, either consciously or out of 
ideological choice; they also perform the fundamental task of connecting inter-
ests via a range of strategies, whether personal loyalty relationships, promises, 
forms of coercion, or others; (2) the control of the coercive, influence or status 
resources actors use to pursue their own objectives; (3) the development of the 
ideology that justifies the regime; 4) the control of the political structures created 
and institutionalised by the regime (Morlino, 2004). 
To be sure, this proposed explanation focusses on the role of elites as a varia-
ble that is independent of the processes of change. But the role of structures and 
institutions and the economic, social or political environment is not underesti-
mated, and neither are the specificities of the regime that emerged from the Cu-
ban Revolution, with its permanent resilience and adaptation within the island 
via, for example, processes that include the participation of grassroots organisa-
tions in decision-making. The choice of approach is due to the desire to under-
stand how the groups that control power operate, and how they have managed 
to preserve stability despite the period of change in the leadership, increased US 
pressure and the economic crisis.
3 New constitution, new form of government 
Of the changes introduced by the constitution approved in 2019 (Chofre, 2019; 
Noguera Fernández, 2019), this chapter is interested in those relating to the divi-
sion of the leadership of the executive branch. When the figure of prime minister 
was abolished in 1976, executive power was concentrated in the president of the 
Council of Ministers, a position that Fidel Castro effectively held until 2006. The 
figure of the prime minister as distinct from the presidency of the republic was 
then restored. The president is the head of state, is elected by an absolute major-
ity of members of the National Assembly of People’s Power (ANPP) and serves at 
most two five-year terms, if re-elected. Meanwhile, upon the recommendation of 
the president of the republic, the prime minister is appointed by the ANPP as pres-
304 Stable Change in Cuba after the Constitutional Referendum
ident of the Council of Ministers, and serves as a kind of head of government. The 
restitution of the figure of the prime minister may be understood as a way to cre-
ate a shared power structure that decentralises executive decisions, even though 
the president of the republic possesses a number of supervisory mechanisms. In 
this spirit of further separating roles, the president, vice president and secretary 
hold the same positions in the Council of State. This contrasts with the pre-reform 
era when the key political figure was the president of the Councils of State and 
Ministers, as the posts were held by Fidel Castro (1976–2008) and Raúl Castro 
(2008–2018), as well as being linked to the position of first secretary of the ruling 
(and only) party, the PCC. 
The Council of State (arts. 120–124 of the CC) is an institution that is par-
ticular to the Cuban system of government; a kind of standing committee that 
operates in the periods when the ANPP is not normally sitting. Chaired by the 
president and vice president of the National Assembly and formed of members 
elected by the ANPP, the council has legislative and supervisory capacities, the 
most striking being that of suspending presidential decrees, agreements and oth-
er provisions that conflict with the constitution and the law. It informs the ANPP 
of any suspension at the first session after it is agreed (art. 122. h. of the CC). 
Reading the reforms in terms of the division of power, it should be noted that 
members of the Council of Ministers cannot join the Council of State or occupy 
the highest positions in the state’s judicial, electoral and supervisory bodies. 
In liberal democracies the form of government is the institutional structure 
by which power is separated in order to create control mechanisms that prevent 
its accumulation. Since the time of classical liberal theory on the separation of 
powers such as Locke and Montesquieu, there has been an understanding that 
its purpose is to share power between more political actors. The form of gov-
ernment, in a minimal instrumental definition, is the way it is organised into a 
political system and, in particular, the way its leader is chosen (Sartori, 1997). In 
presidential systems, the principle of the separation of powers becomes effective 
by unlinking the origin and survival of the executive and legislative. In a parlia-
mentary system, on the other hand, it is the legislative branch, elected through 
direct, plural votes that appoints and, if necessary, dismisses the head of govern-
ment (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1994; Sartori, 1997; Shugart & Carey, 1992).
Cuba’s government structure closely resembles that of a parliamentary sys-
tem, because, according to articles 104 and 105 of the constitution, the ANPP 
(legislative power) is formed of “representatives elected through a free, equal, 
direct, and secret vote of the electors” in a proportional system for a five-year 
term. This assembly is responsible for electing the president and vice president 
of the republic and, upon the president’s recommendation, appointing the prime 
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minister and assigning the members of the Council of Ministers to government 
portfolios (art. 109 of the CC).
Cuba’s executive, however, is similar to that of a semi-presidential system, as 
the president of the republic, as well as being head of state, takes on and shares 
certain powers with the prime minister – the de facto head of government. More-
over, the appointment and dismissal of the prime minister by the legislative as-
sembly are subject to the recommendation of the head of state. This manner of 
vote of confidence by the ANPP also applies to the Council of Ministers, which is 
appointed by the legislature but upon the recommendation of the head of state, 
not the prime minister (arts. 128, 140, 141, 142 and 143 of the CC).
It is therefore a structure in which executive power is divided. A priori, this 
could produce incentives to redistribute duties among the leadership and, at the 
same time, mutual oversight between the different bodies, as is appropriate in 
liberal democratic government. But it should be noted that, while certain insti-
tutional safeguards exist, such as the ANPP’s powers over the president and the 
president’s power the Council of Ministers, the PCC remains a structure of cohe-
sion of the ruling coalition, as its members are the only ones who can nominate 
candidates.
To understand the singularity of Cuba’s system of government, it must be 
recalled that article 5 of the CC retains the PCC as the central pillar of the political 
and representative systems. Therefore, even though the rules provide for free, 
equal, direct and secret elections, they are not plural because of the suprema-
cy of a single party and because the National Candidature Commissions consult 
with representatives from all over the country about who should appear on the 
corresponding draft nominations to be submitted to parliament. In accordance 
with article 76 of the Electoral Law, the Candidature Commissions are formed of 
representatives appointed by the leaderships of national, provincial or munici-
pal authorities (depending on the type of candidacy) of political and grassroots 
organisations – the Cuban Workers’ Federation (CTC), the Committee for the 
Defense of the Revolution (CDR), the Federation of Cuban Women (FMC), the 
National Association of Small Farmers (ANAP), the Federation of University Stu-
dents (FEU) and the Federation of Secondary School Students (FEEM) – and are 
chaired by a representative of the CTC. This is clearly a fairly effective mechanism 
for managing the admission and allegiance to organisations, because the candi-
date’s continuity and political life depends directly on the leadership’s approval.
So while the electoral model allows Cubans to vote for their representatives 
at the neighbourhood, municipal and provincial level, no mechanisms exist for 
directly electing the senior leadership, who are voted for in substantial majorities 
by the rest of the ANPP. As such, the members of the ruling coalition select the 
country’s most senior officials, while preventing people entering into the highest 
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spheres of power who are not fully committed to the system’s continuity. Howev-
er, in a hypothetical scenario of pluralistic elections with a multiparty system, the 
CC’s institutional design could easily result in a liberal democracy that resembles 
parliamentarianism.
4 The ruling coalition and continuity mechanisms
This section will analyse several formal and informal institutions that have 
served to bring continuity to the Cuban political and economic model, creating 
incentives and conditions that unite the political actors in the ruling coalition. 
The description is intended neither to be exhaustive nor to comprehensively ad-
dress processes that deserve their own research. It will merely indicate which 
elements influence the formation and cohesion of the coalition that governs Cuba 
and sustains the current government structure.
4.1 Leadership continuity since 1959
The long leadership of Fidel Castro was one element that helped uphold Cuba’s 
power structure. More recently, Raúl Castro – unquestioned among the “revo-
lutionaries” – has been instrumental in guiding and mediating the handover of 
command to the new leadership, as well as supervising its enactment. The two 
brothers’ leadership has been characterised by the concentration of power in 
a single person at the head of the highest executive and legislative bodies: the 
Council of State, Council of Ministers, and the PCC – the gateway to political 
power in Cuba. This structural framework made it very difficult for any other 
actor to gain power by controlling part of the state or party without the support 
of Fidel Castro or challenging his hegemony.
Castro’s charisma has been amply studied (Hoffmann, 2009), but he also 
showed himself to be able to perform the tasks Morlino (2004) attributes to the 
leaders of ruling coalitions – arbitrators or distributors of incentives and resourc-
es and, above all, creators of strong bonds of symbolic ideology-based affinity. It 
should be added that, unlike other examples of strong personality-based lead-
ership, he shrewdly forged institutional management structures that possessed 
degrees of autonomy but ultimately responded unquestioningly to his authority. 
Fidel Castro’s young age when he reached power partly explains the lack of 
changes. The symbolic legitimacy of achieving that power through armed means 
also prevented divisions from emerging within the ruling group borne of desires 
to seize control of it. Additionally, unlike processes where succession occurs due 
to the leader’s death, Castro had the opportunity to lead and shepherd the pro-
cess of change. This is an important aspect to consider, as succession in social-
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ist regimes has elsewhere fractured ruling coalitions, producing struggles and 
clashes within communist parties when the time comes to choose who will take 
on the state’s highest powers. As the last survivor of the Soviet bloc, Fidel Castro 
was able to take note and learn from other experiences and anticipate certain 
problems.1
4.2 The cohesion of the Communist Party of Cuba
Closely associated with the above is the PCC’s role as a centre of power and meet-
ing place for the various leadership groups, as well as of representatives of the 
framework of political (state and administration), social (grassroots organisa-
tions) and military control. It thus serves as a field for coordinating interests 
and, where necessary, ironing out differences. The PCC is structured around the 
Central Committee and Politburo: while various groups may participate, all are 
subordinate to the first secretary, a position held only by the Castro brothers. It is 
worth recalling that communist parties adopt a Leninist model; in other words, 
a centralised system of managing and concentrating power resources (Gaido & 
Jozami, 2017). The entry and departure of people from the committee or the 
Politburo have also served as means of exerting discipline (this will be discussed 
later) and control.
The current PCC is defined by the constitution as “unique, Martiano, Fidel-
ista, and Marxist-Leninist” and the “superior  driving force of the society and 
the State” (Constitute Project, 2019: 4). The party was formed in 1962 out of 
three groups that were represented in the Integrated Revolutionary Organiza-
tions thanks to Castro’s leadership and the purging of its members for the “errors 
of sectarianism” – the accusation made of those who showed resistance to the 
impending process of power concentration. Since that time, the PCC has faced no 
public episodes of internal division that have threatened Castro’s leadership or 
party unity. The ruling coalition has therefore remained united and, lacking spac-
es for dissent, no alternative powers have developed. Multipartyism was defined 
as a counter-revolutionary dogma at the Fourth PCC Congress in 1991. 
The PCC produces ideological and programmatic discourses to bring cohe-
sion and legitimacy to the ruling coalition. To achieve this, it uses mechanisms 
like the resolutions it adopts at its congresses, which cover a wide range of politi-
1  A classic historical example is Lenin’s long succession in the USSR due to his illness. As guiding 
the process proved impossible, and his chosen successor, Trotsky, failed to take control of the 
party ahead of Stalin, Lev Kamenev and Grigory Zinoviev, when Lenin finally died in 1924, Stalin 
already controlled the Communist Party and was ratified by congress as secretary-general, from 
where he led a purge of the political apparatus.
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cal, social and economic issues and become guidelines for the public administra-
tion and social organisations (Leogrande, 1980).
José Luis Toledo, chairman of the ANPP’s Constitutional Affairs Commis-
sion clearly defined the PCC’s power and centrality in the current Cuban process. 
The party is a force that is above the state, he said, and is its leader and superior; 
thus the constitution cannot set the party’s guidelines. Toledo’s statements show 
an understanding of the party as an entity to which all the people do not belong, 
and which does represent them, but which ranks as the highest power in society, 
since the constitution places it above the system’s elected institutions (BBC News 
Mundo, 2019). 
Studies have established that in communist countries, party membership is 
a mechanism for accessing resources, power, status and job opportunities (Ro-
manò & Echevarría León, 2015). But this is not an option that is available to all 
Cubans, as there are only two ways to secure PCC membership: being chosen as 
a “vanguard worker” or distinguishing oneself in the Union of Young Commu-
nists (UJC). Candidates are assessed based on their private life, family history, 
activism in institutional associations and participation in their neighbourhood, 
conduct at work, education and political background. Joining one of Cuba’s cen-
tral power structures is a process that can take up to two years and many filters 
must be passed that ensure access is granted only to people who are loyal to the 
operational principles of the political system.
4.3 The Revolutionary Armed Forces
As well as its epic resistance of US-sponsored operations and participation in 
military campaigns abroad, the FAR has gained symbolic value and legitimacy 
as the successor to the Rebel Army that overthrew the Batista dictatorship, and 
for having achieved high levels of citizen security compared to other countries in 
the region. Along with the PCC, the FAR is the structure that has supported the 
Cuban regime over time and from where the transition process to the post-Castro 
period is being directed. Both organisations have overcome the conflicts they ini-
tially faced (Leogrande, 1978) and defined their spaces of power and hierarchies. 
The FAR is one of the last remaining strongholds of power directly controlled 
by one of the Castro brothers, with Raúl retaining the rank of commander. From 
there he has supervised the transition process and the armed forces’ significant 
economic and political resources, distributing power and penalising individuals 
or groups in order to consolidate the ruling coalition (Diamint & Tedesco, 2017; 
Tedesco, 2018). Throughout history, the FAR has played the important role of 
giving protection and power to the revolutionary commanders – the old guard – 
and cohesion and confluence to the interests of various groups. At the same time 
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it has served to prevent other commanders from criticising the leadership and 
destabilising the regime, as this would mean losing privileges.
At operational level the FAR is an effective mechanism of sanction and con-
trol thanks to the powerful intelligence team it controls from the Ministry of the 
Interior. This ensures that political leaders remain loyal to the ruling coalition 
and the leadership, a factor that will be explained in more detail later. As well as 
controlling the system of cohesion and repression – the police and army form a 
single whole – the FAR has been Cuba’s most important economic actor since it 
began acquiring companies during the “Special Period” for the purposes of fi-
nancing itself and posing less of a burden on the state. Over time, this became 
a mechanism for accumulating the island’s greatest wealth, which in turn trans-
lated into political power and the ability to distribute resources and incentives 
among members of the ruling coalition (Klepak, 2005).
4.4 Control of economic resources
Cuba’s socialist economic system in which the state controls most of the econom-
ic resources has granted the ruling coalition effective tools for distributing in-
centives and sanctions among its members. The permanent economic difficulties 
deriving from its international isolation that seriously worsened after the fall of 
the socialist bloc have only reinforced this situation. US blockade measures have 
made Cuba’s international trade inefficient, with goods and products supplied at 
higher prices than other countries, which also hinders the modernisation of its 
production facilities. That its exports are restricted to potential buyers who do 
not fear US sanctions aggravates the situation. All of this makes it more difficult 
for Cuba to secure financing in the international market to make productive in-
vestments.
In these circumstances, the coalition that leads the state and controls its ma-
terial resources is well aware of the country’s particular circumstances due to 
its involvement in public management. Specifically, it knows that it is extremely 
difficult to access resources without state involvement. Hence, it is highly unlike-
ly that any politically autonomous group could emerge or attempt to break that 
power structure and match political capacity with economic power. 
Meanwhile, self-employed people in the fledgling private economy lack close 
links to the circles of power. Indeed, as Romanò and Echevarría León (2015) 
point out, self-employment is not an easy fit with PCC membership. Although 
the theory of modernisation suggests that greater access to economic resources 
tends to increase demands for access to political power resources, thus far Cu-
ba’s self-employed have maintained a very low level of public exposure, as their 
activity is not clearly regulated and exists in a legal grey area. It is worth bearing 
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in mind in this regard that any action that makes the ruling coalition or the au-
thorities feel threatened, such as increased control mechanisms or regulation, 
may have negative effects.
Through its conglomerate of companies, the FAR controls Cuba’s most im-
portant productive and business resources (Bacaria & Serrano, 2020). Mean-
while, the military’s strategic vision means the proper functioning of the Cuban 
economy is perceived as a matter of national security, which, as well as all its 
practical implications, strengthens the  role of the institution, as mentioned 
above. The FAR’s business experience began during the “Special Period in Time 
of Peace”, when it began to run a number of companies with the aim of financing 
itself. Soldiers became managers who “discipline the economy” and generals be-
came directors (Tedesco, 2018). At the same time, civilian cadres incorporated 
to manage companies are promoted to other areas of power, the most significant 
being Manuel Marrero, current president of the Council of Ministers. Marrero 
began his career managing military-owned hotels and, according to available in-
formation, gained his previous position as minister of tourism and current post 
as prime minister thanks to military support.
Another relevant example is the Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A. 
(GAESA), which is attached to the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
(Minfar) and whose current executive chairman is Brigadier General Luis Alber-
to Rodríguez López-Calleja, a member of the Central Committee of the Commu-
nist Party of Cuba and head of the 5th department of the FAR.  It should be added 
that he was married to one of Raúl Castro’s daughters and is father to one of his 
grandchildren, who bears his grandfather’s name and has the peculiar task of 
being head of his personal security.
GAESA is wreathed in a kind of legend and is alleged to control between 50% 
and 80% of business revenue in Cuba (Aznarez, 2019) – over 60% of the nation-
al economy and 80% of the tourism sector (Valle, 2015). Various Cuba experts 
cast doubt on that figure (Bermúdez, 2017), but everyone agrees that GAESA’s 
power increased as Raúl Castro assumed the state’s highest offices. Around the 
same time the military conglomerate absorbed the companies and financial ar-
rangements of Cimex – a state group of government-controlled companies – and 
tripled its size to become the island’s largest business oligopoly. Cimex was made 
up of 73 subsidiary companies and 21 partner companies, with 61 based outside 
the island.
The first part of its expansion strategy was the acquisition of Habaguanex, 
a financing mechanism for Havana’s Office of the Historian, whose income con-
tributed to restoring some of the capital’s historic centre. Habaguanex included 
around 100 “dollar stores”, 21 hotels and hostels, and an extensive network of 
cafes and restaurants. Finally, GAESA took control of the Banco Financiero In-
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ternacional (BFI), which specialised in international foreign exchange manage-
ment, and Financiera Cimex (Fincimex), which has a monopoly on the sending of 
remittances to Cuba and controls the operations of Visa and Mastercard.2 
As mentioned, the state and the ruling coalition effectively control Cuba’s 
economic assets through the FAR. Unlike in other socialist countries, where oli-
garchies challenged the power of the state and the party by appropriating and 
running state resources, in this case the aim seems to have been for the most effi-
cient of the state branches – which is at the same time the guarantor of the revo-
lution – to maintain control. It also has a powerful tool for distributing incentives 
and sanctions. A single example suffices: thanks to its business structure, GAESA 
controls the island’s best-quality and most sought-after jobs, which is fundamen-
tal given the major limitations of the labour market. 
4.5 Disciplinary mechanisms
Organisations like the Union of Young Communists (UJC) and the Committee 
for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR) figure among Cuba’s mechanisms of 
exerting discipline. Both have representatives on the Candidature Commissions 
and issue reports on people’s political commitment and conduct, which, in such 
a state-regulated setting, may mean denying access to a number of resources. 
Without embarking on an assessment of Cuba’s levels of coercion and repres-
sion – undoubtedly not those of a liberal democratic regime – it is worth noth-
ing that, unlike similar regimes where hierarchies have been very tolerant of the 
excesses of the people around them, the Castro regime was aware that such an 
attitude only politically weakens the government. A great merit of its disciplinary 
systems is that they apply to everyone, even, unhesitatingly, to their own rela-
tives, which sends a clear message to the members of the ruling coalition that 
they will be excluded for the slightest slip or loss of trust in them. 
These measures have ranged from the shootings of the early years of the rev-
olution to the creation of a highly efficient counterintelligence system and pris-
on or exile. But, once the regime was established and consolidated, perhaps the 
2  The sectors GAESA controls are summarised in the following non-exhaustive list: 1) hotel fa-
cilities, with approximately 29,000 rooms and agreements with around 14 international chains; 
2) the national network of retail stores via TRD Caribe; 3) shipping companies Melfi Marine Corp 
and Servinaves Panama S.A.; 4) its own airline, Aerogaviota; 5) car sale and rental through Hava-
nautos and Havanatur; 6) construction, through the Unión de Construcciones Militares and real 
estate with Almest; 7) banking and financial services; 8) imports and exports through Tecnotex 
and Tecnoimport; 9) port, customs and transport services through Almacenes Universales S.A.; 
and 10) control of the Mariel Special Development Zone (Zdimsa).
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most extreme example of the unbending nature of the sanctions imposed by the 
regime was the shooting of General Ochoa, who began in the guerrillas fighting 
Batista and had a brilliant military career, being named “Hero of the Republic of 
Cuba”. But none of this, nor his close friendship with Raúl Castro, were enough 
to spare him the death penalty for drug trafficking offences. To a lesser degree 
(and stopping short of imprisonment or exile), other senior government officials 
have been punished with demotion within the employment structure when the 
regime has considered they may become a threat. Roberto Robaina is one such 
case. The former foreign minister was very close to Fidel Castro and a rising fig-
ure in Cuban politics, but was dismissed for receiving money from the governor 
of the State of Quintana Roo for works in the ministry. Then there was the case 
involving Prime Minister Carlos Lage, Foreign Minister Felipe Pérez Roque, and 
Fernando Remírez de Estenoz, foreign affairs chief of the Communist Party of 
Cuba, who were dismissed when images and audio recordings leaked of a private 
meeting with a representative of the Basque regional government in which crit-
icisms were made of the Castro brothers, among other things. The events went 
on to take on the dimensions of an espionage and counterespionage plot. Such 
sanctions, known in Cuba as “truene” (thunder), involve the loss of all privilege 
and operate as a permanent threat that promotes cohesion. As Foucault (2012) 
suggests, their public and highly visible nature gives shaming and making exam-
ples of them an educational function. 
Dissidents’ testimonies suggest that one of the missions of Alejandro Castro 
Espín, son of Raúl and head of the Defense and National Security Commission 
until 2018, was to lead an intelligence unit that monitored relatives and close 
associates of political leaders. But whether this special unit exists or not, the fact 
that disciplinary sanctions are imposed on close relatives of the leaders of the 
revolution sends a clear message to the people that the implementation of pu-
nitive measures is strict and general. One clear example is the dismissal of Fidel 
Castro’s son of the same name from the Secretariat for Nuclear Affairs for “ineffi-
ciency in the performance of his duties”, which was announced via a statement in 
Granma (EFE, 2018); another is the case of the son of Commander Juan Almei-
da, who grew up in Raúl Castro’s home, and resorted to a hunger strike in order 
to be allowed to leave Cuba after falling out with the regime. 
4.6 Forming cadres and technocracy 
Unlike other Latin American countries, Cuba has managed to professionalise its 
public administration by providing careers opportunities within it, making this a 
clear incentive for doing these jobs. Cuba’s foreign service is perhaps the best ex-
ample of the very powerful technocracy established. Formed of career diplomats 
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specially trained since university, its efficiency may be the reason an island of 
just over 11 million inhabitants has such international impact. The consultancy 
work its intelligence services perform in other countries could also be cited, with 
Venezuela the most recent case.
It should be added that Cuban technocracy nurtures the ruling elites, as will 
be seen in the next section. Those who reach the summit of power via the public 
sector join the ruling coalition after a career in which they will have gone through 
several selection processes and demonstrated their loyalty to the Cuban political 
project. A look at the Higher School of State and Government Cadres helps us 
understand the Cuban leadership’s conception of the mechanisms of promotion 
and meritocracy. It is a training centre in public administration and political in-
doctrination to which students cannot apply, but must be recommended by their 
workplaces or social and political organisations. An examination of the careers of 
Cuba’s youngest leaders shows that all attended this school. 
The National Defense College works in a similar way. This higher education 
centre is aimed not only at the military cadres, but also civilians in senior man-
agement positions, and trains them in basic political, economic, social and mil-
itary knowledge in order for them to work on national defence. One hypothesis 
is that by inviting civilians to join these formations the FAR forms relations with 
those who will fill senior management positions. Marta Sabina Wilson, current 
president of the Central Bank, seems to fit this pattern, as she took those courses 
despite her career path being ostensibly somewhat removed from the defence 
sector. 
5 Changes and continuity in the Cuban political elite
Confirming the hypothesis of this chapter, it may be said that the change of gov-
ernment in Cuba did not greatly affect the interests of the ruling coalition. This is 
due to the cohesion and control mechanisms in the systems of promotion within 
and access to the government. It must be said that the “historic generation” suc-
cessfully formed a leadership group whose lives have been shaped by the power 
of the revolution, and who have made its interests and political project their own.
Miguel Díaz-Canel’s election as president of the republic in April 2018 to re-
place General Raúl Castro is an example of this machinery in operation, as Castro 
leads the final phase as a kind of guardian of the essence from the position of first 
secretary of the PCC until its next congress in 2021. Everything that took place 
prior to the publication of this chapter shows that the generational transition is 
occurring with little upheaval and fitting neatly into the command structures. 
Díaz-Canel is a 60-year-old (in 2020) who has been successful in senior positions 
at the national level in the Union of Young Communists since the late 1980s, 
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who then held leadership roles in the PCC in the provinces of Villa Clara and 
Holguín, was minister of higher education and, since 2013, first vice president 
of the Councils of State and Ministers. He has also been a member of the PCC’s 
Politburo since 1997.
The vice president, Salvador Valdés Mesa, is another leader with a long track 
record. An agronomist by profession, he stands out for his technical training (like 
the president), as well as for the symbolic capital of his African descent. His ac-
complishments are mainly union-based, as secretary general of the CTC from 
2006 to 2013, but he also previously occupied the position of minister of labour 
and social security from 1995 to 1999 and the leadership of the party in the prov-
ince of Camagüey from 1999 to 2006. Since 2008 he has been a member of the 
PCC’s Politburo.
But perhaps the most surprising appointment and that which best explains 
how the mechanisms of power work in Cuba today – in the sense, as mentioned, 
that they are conditioned by the FAR and its economic interests – is the election 
of Manuel Marrero as president of the Council of Ministers, even though he does 
not have a long history as a PCC leader or of participation in political and social 
organisations. An architect by profession, placed in charge of tourism by Fidel 
Castro in 2004, he was the most veteran minister at the time of the transition. 
Granma characterises him as a politician who emerged from the grassroots of 
the country’s tourism industry, one of its main sources of foreign exchange. He 
started out in the sector in the province of Holguín before taking various posi-
tions managing hotels in the eastern provinces and in Varadero. His election was 
relatively surprising because he was not among the favourites for the post, who 
were Roberto Morales (minister of health) and Inés María Chapman (member of 
parliament and of the Council of Ministers). But the most intriguing thing about 
Manuel Marrero’s professional background is that in 2000 he became president 
of the Grupo de Turismo Gaviota, one of GAESA’s leading tourism companies – a 
clear sign of the military’s trust in him.
Beyond the prominent figures, the new ministers are an army of technocrats 
with clear experience in their fields, who have risen through the administration. 
Cuba has developed a kind of meritocracy which, combined with the control 
mechanisms of the ruling coalition mentioned above, has managed to nurture 
new leaders to promote to the leadership group who are very well trained in their 
technical fields and have political experience, so that no major risks are taken. 
Table 1 clearly shows that all ministers about whom we have information have 
held high-level positions in the state structure. Particularly relevant is that over 
half were second-in-command of their ministries before they became ministers, 
which sends a clear message of reward for work well done and loyalty to the 
organisation of which they form part. In what follows it will be shown that the 
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Council of Ministers is the centre of power that has undergone most renewal. 
The data once again show the role of the PCC and the FAR as core mechanisms 
of power and control, as they tend to provide the ministers with less technocratic 
profiles.
Table 1: Professional background of Cuban ministers 2020
Ministry Name Previous position
Science, Technology 
and the Environment Elba Rosa Pérez Montoya
Official of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of Cuba
Culture Alpidio Alonso Grau
Official of the Ideological Department of 
the Central Committee of the  
Communist Party of Cuba
President of the Council 
of Ministers Manuel Marrero Minister of Tourism
Domestic Trade Betsy Díaz Velázquez No data
Agriculture Gustavo Rodríguez Rollero No data
Central Bank of Cuba Marta Sabina Wilson President of the Foreign Bank of Cuba
Food Industry Manuel Santiago Sobrino
President of the Assembly of People’s 
Power of Granma Province
Education Ena Elsa Velázquez Cobiella
Rector of Frank País García Pedagogical 
University
Foreign Trade and 
Foreign Investment Rodrigo Malmierca Díaz Cuban Representative at the UN3
Secretary
José Amado Ricardo 
Guerra
Personal Secretary of Raúl Castro/ 
General in the FAR4
Deputy Prime Minister Salvador Valdes Mesa Vice President of the Council of State
Audit and Control
Gladys María Bejerano 
Portela Deputy Minister of Audit and Control
Finances and Pricing Meisi Bolaños Vice Minister of Finances and Pricing
Employment and Social 
Security Marta Elena Feitó
First Deputy Minister of Labour and 
Social Security
Public Health José Ángel Portal Miranda
Deputy Minister of Medical and Social 
Assistance of the Ministry of Public 
Health
3 UN = United Nations
4 FAR = Revolutionary Armed Forces
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Ministry Name Previous position
Energy and Mines Liván Nicolás Arronte Deputy Minister of Energy and Mines
Construction René Mesa Villafaña
Deputy Minister of Construction/Official 
of the Central Committee of the  
Communist Party of Cuba
Tourism Juan Carlos García Deputy Minister of Tourism
Transport Eduardo Rodríguez Dávila Deputy Minister of Transport
Economics and Plan-
ning Alejandro Gil Fernández
First Deputy Minister of Economy and 
Planning
Higher Education José Ramón Saborido Loidi
First Deputy Minister of Higher  
Education
Industry Eloy Álvarez Martínez First Deputy Minister of Industry
Armed Forces Leopoldo Cintra Frías First Deputy Minister of the FAR
Foreign Affairs Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Interior
Julio Cesar Gandarilla 
Bermejo First Deputy Minister of Interior
Communications
Jorge Luis Perdomo 
Di-Lella
First Deputy Minister of  
Communications
Institute of Sport
Osvaldo Caridad Vento 
Montiller Vice President of the Institute of Sport
Justice
Oscar Manuel Silveira 
Martínez
Vice President of the People‘s Supreme 
Court
Source: Websites of the various ministries, informative bodies and ANPP.
A second aspect to consider is that the Cuban model of controlling power is via 
the combination of new and old cadres. In this sense, the PCC and social organi-
sations provide stability: the PCC, by controlling the mechanisms for accessing 
state positions; and social organisations by mobilising the population. What is 
more, although – as has  been shown – the military controls the material re-
sources, interconnections appear to exist between the two (beyond the possib-
le role of Raúl Castro), with many members of the PCC Politburo either being 
members of or having passed through the FAR. Another contributing factor to 
the renewal is that those who have recently joined lack military experience and 
have more technical training. Table 2 shows that nearly two-thirds of the deci-
sion-making core have been in these areas of power for 20 years or more. Hence, 
it may be said that changes in government are not always reflected in changes in 
the other power structures, which gives short- and medium-term stability to the 
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regime. It will be interesting to observe the performance of the Politburo once 
older members such as Ramiro Valdés and Raúl Castro, who have also held po-
sitions in the interior and defence ministries (mechanisms of social and political 
control of the revolutionary project), leave their positions. 
Table 2: Composition of the Politburo of the PCC 2020














First Secretary of 




Second Secretary of 
the CC – PCC 90 Medicine PCC, CDR, CTC 1975
Esteban Lazo 
Hernández
President of the 
ANPP11/Council of 
State 76 Economics PCC, CDR, CTC 1985
Leopoldo 
Cintra Frías





ence PCC, CDR FAR 1991
Miguel Díaz-
Canel 
President of the 
Republic 60 Electronics PCC, CDR, CTC FAR 1997
Salvador 
Valdes Mesa
Vice President of 
the Republic 75 Agronomist PCC, CDR, CTC 1997
Álvaro López 
Miera
Chief of General 




Vice Minister of 
the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces 81 Military
PCC, CDR, 
ACRC FAR 1997
5 PCC = Communist Party of Cuba
6 CDR = Committees for the Defense of the Revolution
7 ACRC = Association of Combatants of the Cuban Revolution
8 MININT = Ministry of the Interior
9 CC = Central committee
10 CTC = Workers‘ Central Union of Cuba
11 ANPP = National Assembly of People‘s Power
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Member of the 
Secretariat of the 
Central Committee 
of the Party 58 Forestry





Head of the Perma-
nent Commission 
for Implementation 
and Development 59 Economics PCC, CDR, CTC 2011
Bruno  
Rodríguez 
Minister of Foreign 




of the Center for 
Genetic Engineering 
and Biotechnology 53 Biology 






of the Council of 
Ministers 53
Public 
Health PCC, CDR 2016
Source: Websites of the PCC, official informative bodies and ANPP.
The third pillar of the Cuban political elite to be observed is the Council of State 
which, as noted, functions as a delegated committee of the ANPP. Although it is 
the body whose members have least direct power, it is nevertheless an important 
space for representation and connection with provincial elites or with those from 
social and political organisations and the productive apparatus. It also serves as 
an important arena for training emerging politicians, even more so given the in-
compatibility between being a member of the Council of State and the Council of 
Ministers. Table 3 shows that the Council of State has the youngest members of 
the bodies examined. But that does not mean that they lack strong political back-
grounds; indeed, half of them are part of the PCC’s highest management bodies. 
It is also worth highlighting the growing trend towards including more women 
and people with technocratic profile in the administrative bodies studied. 
12 FMC = Federation of Cuban Women
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Table 3. Members of the Council of State
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13 UJC = Young Communist League
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Source: ANPP website and official information bodies.
6 Conclusions
The data provided throughout the chapter corroborate the hypothesis that Cuba’s 
ruling coalition has not fractured during the process of leadership change thanks 
to a number of cohesion, control and selection mechanisms that have enabled 
renewal of the original group. The result is it has been possible to transition from 
a system based on strong charismatic leadership to a system of bureaucratic so-
cialism. 
Changes in the structure of the executive branch and the people who make up 
it have also brought no further transformations because, as has been explained, 
the PCC and the FAR control the social, political and economic resources. This 
leaves the government with little room for manoeuvre and decision-making, not 
only because it lacks the assets, but because it must reach agreement with other 
centres of power. In this area, the change to the system is notable. Previously, 
Fidel Castro or his brother Raúl could function as transversal actors in the de-
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cision-making process, but the current president must rely on the bureaucratic 
mechanisms of legitimacy.
In short, the success of the Cuban regime seems to lie in its unyielding con-
trol and sanctions procedure, which has prevented the entry into the ruling coa-
lition of representatives of groups that might generate division or criticism from 
within. To this end, it has articulated a system of incorporation of new leaders 
based on meritocracy and political loyalty that has allowed everything to change 
so that everything stays the same.
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